CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

AFFAIRS IN CHINA.

1859—60.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1861.

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Correspondence respecting Affairs in China: 1859—60.

No. 1.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 29, 1859.

FROM the terms of your despatch of the 10th August,* I infer that, at the time when you wrote it, you thought it not improbable that the Chinese Government might shortly address to you some communication with the view of inviting you to proceed to Peking for the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

If any such proposal has been made to you, and if it be still unanswered when you receive this despatch, you will state, in reply, that you are not authorized to entertain it until the Chinese Government shall have made a formal apology for the act of the troops who fired on Her Britannic Majesty's ships of war from the Takoo forts in June last.

You will add, that Her Majesty's Government require that, when you go to Peking for the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty, you shall proceed up the Peiho river to Tien-tsin in a British vessel, and that provision be made by the Chinese authorities for the conveyance of yourself and your suite with due honour from Tien-tsin to Peking.

Should the assurances given to you by the Chinese Government on these heads be satisfactory, you will make arrangements for proceeding to Peking at the earliest period at which it may be safe and convenient for you to undertake the voyage. It will be proper that a naval force should accompany you to the mouth of the Peiho, and directions to this effect will be forwarded to Admiral Hope.

Should you experience any unbecoming treatment, either at Peking, or on your journey to or from the capital, you will return to the Gulf, and place the matter in the hands of the Naval Commander-in-chief, who will, however, be instructed to adopt no hostile measures, except those hereinafter directed, until he shall have received sufficient reinforcements.

You will take an early opportunity of apprizing the Ministers of the Emperor of China that, in consequence of the attempt made to obstruct your passage to Peking in June last, when you were proceeding thither to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, Her Majesty's Government consider that the understanding entered into between the Earl of Elgin and the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana, with respect to the residence of the British Minister in China, is at an end, and that it rests henceforward exclusively with Her Majesty, by the terms of Article II of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, to decide whether or not she shall instruct her Minister to take up his abode permanently at Peking.

If, however, no pacific overtures shall have been addressed to you by the Chinese Government before the time when this despatch reaches you, you will, immediately on its receipt, communicate to the Prime Minister of the Emperor the demands of Her Majesty's Government, as stated above, and inform him that, unless, within a period of thirty days from the date of your communication, you receive from him a reply conveying to you the Emperor's unqualified assent to these demands, the British naval and military authorities will proceed to adopt

* See "Correspondence with Mr. Bruce, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China," presented to Parliament, January 24, 1860, No. 15.

such measures as they may deem advisable for the purpose of compelling the Emperor of China to observe the engagements contracted for him by his Plenipotentiaries at Tien-tsin, and approved by his Imperial Edict of July 1858.

With a view to this contingency, instructions will be forwarded to Admiral Hope by this mail, directing him, when he shall have received from you the necessary communication authorizing him to act, to take steps to arrest the grain-junks destined for Peking, either at the ports of departure, at the entrance of the Gulf of Pecheli, or at the mouth of the Peiho, and of any other channels leading from the Gulf towards the capital which may be used for transport. It is hoped that the whole, or the greater part, of the supplies sent to Peking by the sea-route during the months of February, March, and April, may by this means be cut off. A considerable effect would probably be produced on the Court of Peking if, in connection with these operations, one of the Miatow Islands were to be occupied by a British force as a basis of operation, and a receptacle for stores.

On grounds of humanity, Her Majesty's Government would be desirous, if possible, to avoid the necessity of having to undertake military operations on a great scale against the capital of the Chinese Empire. They will learn, therefore, with satisfaction, that the measures which I have indicated, and others of a similar character which may be adopted on the spot, have had the desired effect, and induced the Chinese Emperor to accede to the moderate terms which by this despatch you are instructed to offer for his acceptance.

It is necessary, however, to be prepared for a different result, and it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to make such arrangements as will enable a considerable military force to be dispatched from the South with the change of the monsoon, if it should be then requisite to undertake operations on land.

I have only to add that it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government that you should consider yourself to be bound by your instructions to insist on a personal interview with the Emperor. It is essential that you should correspond on terms of equality with the chief officers of the Empire, and that you should refuse to submit to any degrading ceremonial, either on the occasion of an audience of the Emperor, or on any other; but you will be guided by your own discretion, and in some degree by the practice of the Representatives of other Great Western Powers, in determining whether or not you will press the demand that the Emperor of China shall receive you, in the only manner in which you could consent to be received, namely, with the forms which on such occasions are customary in the West.

Her Majesty's Government are in communication with the Government of the Emperor of the French in reference to the subject of this despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 2.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 10, 1859.

SINCE my preceding despatch of the 29th ultimo was written, I have received and laid before the Queen your despatch of the 3rd September.*

It appears by this despatch and its inclosures, that the Emperor of China now fully sanctions the resistance made by the forts at Takoo to the passage of Her Majesty's ships up the River Peiho.

He states that Takoo was fortified by his command, and that the Envoys of the different nations were told by Kweiliang and Hwashana at Shanghae, that Taku was so fortified, and that they must go round by Peh-tang.

Now, although the denial of a passage to the capital by the usual and most convenient route would have been evidence of an unfriendly disposition, yet it was a matter upon which you might have remonstrated and negotiated, without having recourse to force to clear the passage.

* See "Correspondence with Mr. Bruce, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China," presented to Parliament, January 24, 1860, No. 18.

You say, however, with regard to these alleged warnings:—"These assertions are directly contrary to the truth, though I think it not improbable the Commissioners may have represented the matter in this light to the Emperor. Neither in the letters that passed between the Commissioners and the Envoys, nor during the interviews Mr. Ward had with them, was a word said of defences at Takoo, nor was any allusion made to Peh-tang."

Thus it appears that neither you nor M. Bourboulon received any warning; nay, when the Admiral arrived at the mouth of the Peiho, so far from having an intimation, from authority, that the passage of the Envoys up the Peiho was to be resisted, he was assured that the fortifications were made by the militia of the country as a defence against pirates, and that a passage should be opened to allow of vessels proceeding by the river.

The soldiers at the forts had no doubt ascertained the correct range of the palisades and stakes where the French and British vessels were certain to be stopped, and thus they had all the benefit of a prepared ambuscade.

Whether the Emperor was cognizant of this act, or whether it was directed by his officers, it is an outrage for which the Chinese Government must be accounted responsible.

Unless, therefore, the most ample apology should be promptly made, and the other demands specified in my previous despatch shall be complied with, you are instructed to state that a large pecuniary indemnity will be demanded by Her Majesty's Government from that of China.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 3.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received November 11.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November* 11, 1859.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you herewith, for the information of Lord John Russell, a copy of a letter, dated the 10th instant, addressed to Rear-Admiral Hope by desire of their Lordships, together with a copy of its inclosure, relative to the proposed bases for combined operations of the British and French naval forces on the coast of China.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Hope.

(Extract.) *Admiralty, November* 10, 1859.

THE British and French Governments have agreed that Chusan, and some point or points in the Gulf of Pecheli, shall be the bases for combined operations on the coasts of China,.

The French have fixed on Hong Kong as the general rendezvous for their ships, and Her Majesty's Government have made the following arrangements with that of France:—

After the first portion of the French ships have arrived at Hong Kong, and a sufficient force is assembled there, the combined force is to proceed, if the season will permit, to Chusan, to take possession of that island, without waiting for the arrival of all the French ships.

When the joint expedition is established at Chusan, and the forces have been organized, they should proceed to the Gulf of Pecheli, to take possession of such point or points as you and the senior French naval officer may determine to occupy during the operations, which should be directed, as soon as possible, against the forts at the mouth of the Peiho.

The command in chief, in what concerns the naval forces, is to be exercised in concert between the two Admirals, or senior naval officers, as in 1858, when the understanding was complete between Sir M. Seymour and M. Rigault de Genouilly.

It is probable that the *personnel* of the French expedition will be assembled at Hong Kong towards the beginning of April at the latest, so that operations at Chusan can take place at the commencement of the south-west monsoon.

If one of the expeditions of the two Governments should precede the other in the China Seas, that one should await the other for a period of at least fifteen days at some place to be designated beforehand; and if you should quit Hong Kong before any French Admiral who may be appointed should arrive there, it would be desirable that the French Admiral should find at Hong Kong a letter from you to inform him at what anchorage you will wait for him.

No. 4.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 31, 1859.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to state to Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that, if sufficient forces belonging to either or both nations are ready to proceed from the rendezvous which may have been agreed upon, to the attack of the forts on the Peiho in the middle of April, those forces ought not to wait beyond the 25th of that month for expected reinforcements, of whatever nation those reinforcements may be.

I have to add, that Her Majesty's Government in speaking of the 25th of April, mean that date to apply to Chusan. But it will, probably, be convenient that the first rendezvous should be at Hong Kong.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 5.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 3, 1860.

THE time has arrived when it is necessary to give you further instructions, to provide for the case of an absolute refusal of the Chinese Government to make any apology for the attack on Her Majesty's vessels and forces at the mouth of the Peiho, or to allow you and the Plenipotentiary of France to proceed up the Peiho to Tien-tsin, on your way to Pekin to ratify the Treaty.

The instructions given to the commanders of Her Majesty's forces, by sea and land, will put you in possession of the nature of the operations in contemplation. But there are certain proceedings to be taken on your part, which cannot on any account be neglected.

You will, in the first place, by a public notification, inform the Chinese of the causes of the hostilities to be undertaken.

You will state in this notification nearly as follows:—

"The Emperor of China made in June 1858 a Treaty of Peace with my Sovereign, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The Emperor ordered, by special command, that this Treaty should be signed by his Ministers. It was provided and agreed to by the Emperor, that the Treaty should be ratified at Pekin within a year. But when, in pursuance of the orders of the Queen my Sovereign, I attempted to go by the ordinary route of the Peiho to Tien-tsin, with a view to travel with my retinue from the mouth of the Peiho to Pekin, in the most friendly manner, I found the river blocked with stakes and rafts, and when the Queen's ships endeavoured to remove these obstacles, they were fired upon, and many of the Queen's subjects were killed and wounded by the cannon of the Emperor of China.

"No notice had been given to me that the way to Pekin by this the ordinary passage was to be prohibited, although a year had gone by since the signature of the Treaty.

"The Queen has ordered me to ask for an apology for this injury, and to demand the ratification of the Treaty. The Queen has asked that the Emperor should fulfil his solemn promise.

"This has been refused. It has been refused, also, to the Queen's august ally, the Emperor of the French.

"We go to seek redress for these wrongs, and to require that the word of the Emperor should be observed, and that an indemnity should be paid for the loss of men, and the heavy expense of obtaining redress.

"We wish to continue the friendly relations of commerce, and peaceable communications with the people of China. We wish to carry on the war only against armed men, and the advisers of the Emperor of China who urge him to war.

"Rely upon our disposition to respect your property and your families. Peace may thus continue between our nations, and the Emperor be forced to do justice."

In order to be able to confer with the Generals on shore, and to be ready to receive any propositions for peace, you will land with the Head-quarters of Sir Hope Grant, and continue either with them, or within easy reach of them, while he is on shore.

You are to understand that the French General is entrusted with the discretionary power of either halting his troops, or pursuing his march, when overtures for peace shall be received.

In the event, however, of any such overtures being received, you will, in the first instance, concert with M. Bourboulon, your French colleague, as to the manner in which they shall be treated, with the view of eventually coming, in conjunction with him, to a common understanding with Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant and the French Commander, as to the propriety and mode of taking advantage of the opening so afforded by the Chinese Government for negotiation.

In dealing with any such overture, you will consider the probable sincerity of the proposal, rather than the exact form in which it may be couched.

We cannot submit to place ourselves in any position which, in the eyes of Europeans, would be degrading. We cannot allow our Plenipotentiary to occupy any seat inferior to that assumed by those of the Emperor of China; still less can we allow our Sovereign to be less than the equal of the Emperor of China. But there is always a danger that, by too nice and minute an attention to Chinese distinctions and pedantic pretensions, we may seem to attach too much importance to foolish and absurd ceremonies.

You will, therefore, always keep in view both substance and form; but where one is to yield, let it be form rather than substance.

I have only further to recommend the most cordial co-operation between French and English, naval, military, and civil officers. It is only by complete union that success can be attained.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL

No. 6.

Lord J. Russell to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, January* 5, 1860.

I HAVE already furnished your Lordships, for communication to Rear-Admiral Hope, with copies of the instructions which, with the concurrence of the French Government, were given to Her Majesty's Minister in China, on the 29th of October and 10th of November last, for the guidance of his conduct in the existing state of our relations with the Government of that country; and I have also transmitted to you, for the same purpose, a copy of a draft of instructions,* prepared by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the War Department, for the Lieutenant-General commanding Her Majesty's forces to be employed in China, which had been communicated to the French Government for their concurrence; and which, as your Lordships will have seen by Earl Cowley's telegram, of which a copy was communicated to you on the 27th of December, his Excellency considers to have been agreed to by the French Government.

These papers, together with your Lordships' instructions of the 10th of

* Inclosure in No. 9.

November last, will have placed the Admiral fully in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government on the several points of which they treat.

Admiral Hope will have seen, by the instructions to Mr. Bruce of the 29th of October, that, in the event of the required satisfaction not having been afforded by the Chinese Government to the communication which Mr. Bruce was directed, on the receipt of those instructions, to address to it, the British naval forces were to take steps to arrest the grain-junks, destined for Pekin, either at the ports of departure, or at the entrance of the Gulf of Pecheli, or at the mouth of the Peiho, or of any other channel leading from the gulf towards the capital, which may be used for transport; and that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it was probable that a considerable effect would be produced on the Court of Pekin, if, in connection with those operations, one of the Miatow Islands were to be occupied by a British force, as a basis of operation and a receptacle for stores.

Admiral Hope will also have learnt, by the letter of your Lordships' Secretary of the 10th of November last, that the British and French Governments had agreed that the Island of Chusan, or some point, or points, in the Gulf of Pecheli, should be the bases for combined operations on the Coasts of China; that the French Government had fixed on Hong Kong as the general rendezvous for their ships; that after the first portion of the French ships should have arrived at Hong Kong, and a sufficient force be assembled there, the combined force, without waiting for the arrival of all the French ships, was to proceed, if the season should permit, to Chusan, and take possession of that island; that when the joint expedition should have been established at Chusan, and the forces should have been organized, they should proceed to the Gulf of Pecheli, to take possession of such point, or points, as the commanding officers of the allied naval forces might determine to occupy during the operations; such operations being directed, as soon as possible, against the forts at the mouth of the Peiho.

Admiral Hope will have learnt, in the last place, by the draft of instructions which, subject to the concurrence of the French Government, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for War had prepared for the General commanding Her Majesty's troops, the nature of the operations to be undertaken on shore; and Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that, in regard to all the matters alluded to in the papers which I have enumerated, Admiral Hope will act with zeal and ability, and will make preparations for co-operating, at the earliest moment, in the services to be performed by the naval and military forces of the two Powers.

Admiral Hope will have seen in the Memorandum annexed to the draft of instruction to Sir Hope Grant, in what way the relative responsibilities of the officers commanding Her Majesty's land and sea forces in China are defined. It appears, however, that the regulations of the French service require that the supreme command over the naval as well as over the military forces of France should be vested in the Military Commander, who is the superior officer. But Her Majesty's Government do not anticipate that this difference between the practices of the two countries will, in any degree, impair the cordial good understanding and concert which both Governments anxiously desire to see prevail between their Naval and Military Commanders. Nevertheless, to guard against any possible misunderstanding, Admiral Hope should be informed that, as far as his relations towards the British Military Commander are concerned, the Memorandum annexed to the draft of instructions to the Military Commander will continue to form the rule of their respective conduct towards each other.

Until the military forces of the allies are actually landed at the place from which they are to commence operations, the expedition will be mainly dependent on the resources of the naval forces; but the relative position of the naval and military branches of the service will be inverted when the armies are prepared to move onward from the coast, and it will then be the more especial duty of the British Admiral to support, by every means at his disposal, the advance of the allied troops.

But the action of the naval forces being limited to operations strictly of a naval character, that action must necessarily be at all times under the immediate control of the Admirals; and it is in regard to that point that I am now to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands that instructions to the following effect should be addressed to Rear-Admiral Hope:—

Her Majesty, acting, in this respect as in others, in cordial concert with her illustrious ally the Emperor of the French, is desirous that the operations to be undertaken against China should be confined to the strict necessities of the case, and that with this view pressure should be made to bear, not so much on the population of China, as on its Government, which is the offending party. The Chinese Government, however, has not yet, except in the case of Canton (now occupied by the allies), extended the sphere of hostilities to the cities and districts habitually frequented by foreigners.

It appears to Her Majesty that it would be a harsh and unwise measure to subject the ports of China south of the Yang-tze-kiang to the hardships consequent upon a blockade. The Chinese authorities at those ports have shown no disposition to disturb the existing arrangements for commercial intercourse; neither have the Chinese inhabitants of those towns shown any sympathy with the policy of the Court of Pekin, nor have they evinced any disposition to molest, on political grounds, foreigners established in those ports.

It, is, therefore, the desire of Her Majesty that, as regards those ports, and generally as regards the sea-board south of the Yang-tze-keang, no measure of coercion should be applied by Her Majesty's naval forces, so long as the temper and conduct of the Chinese authorities and people in those parts of China shall remain as friendly as they at present are. This principle, however, should not be carried so far as to preclude the officer in command of Her Majesty's naval or military forces from occupying any position, either on or off the coast of China, such, for instance, as the Island of Chusan, which may be required as a basis of naval or military operations.

Her Majesty is further pleased to desire, that the coasting trade between the several ports of China within the above-mentioned limits should not be interfered with. Any interference with that coasting trade would inflict much distress on the population of those provinces, who depend for the means of existence, in a great degree, on supplies brought by sea.

But Her Majesty considers, that no such immunity either from blockade or from capture should be extended to the Chinese ports and trade, either on the Yang-tze-kiang, or to the north of that river. Any restrictions which can be placed on the ports and trade of China, in this northern part of the Empire, will have an immediate and direct bearing on the Imperial Government.

On these grounds, it is Her Majesty's pleasure that, if the Chinese Government shall not accede to the terms which Mr. Bruce has been instructed to propose, her naval forces, acting in concert and co-operation, as far as circumstances may admit, with the naval forces of her ally the Emperor of the French, should, at the earliest possible period, establish and enforce a *strict* blockade of the mouth of the Yang-tze-kiang, and of the entrances of the canal by which communication can be carried on between that river and Pekin, and of all such ports and places on the sea-board of China, extending from the Yang-tze-kiang to the northward, and embracing the Gulfs of Pecheli and Lean-tung, through which communication can be had with the interior for the conveyance of merchandize and provisions, as, in the exercise of the discretion which in this respect Her Majesty is pleased to confide to the Commander of her naval forces, it may appear to him desirable to subject to that restraint.

Her Majesty further desires that the Commander of her naval forces should be instructed that all Chinese junks or other vessels found attempting to break, or act in violation of, a blockade effectively established, should be subject to capture, and be proceeded against in the usual manner to condemnation, according to such instructions as Her Majesty may eventually be pleased to signify in that behalf to her Court of Admiralty.

But although Her Majesty's Government, as at present advised, think it right to limit the operations of the British fleet in regard to blockade and capture in the manner which I have stated, they nevertheless, are willing to leave full discretion to the British Admiral to carry out such operations beyond those limits, if circumstances should appear to render it advisable to do so.

Your Lordships will point out to Admiral Hope that he must be careful to maintain in an effective manner any blockades which, in pursuance of these instructions, he may see reason to establish. He will forthwith, after establishing a blockade, notify the same at Canton and Shanghae, and generally on the coast, and he will as soon as possible report to your Lordships the names of the places and ports blockaded.

Finally, I am to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's special commands that Admiral Hope should be enjoined to conduct his communications with the Naval and Military Commanders, and with the Diplomatic Representatives of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, in a spirit of the utmost cordiality and confidence. Her Majesty can entertain no doubt that those distinguished French officers, acting in obedience to the commands which they will receive from His Imperial Majesty, will be prepared to display the same spirit in their intercourse with the diplomatic, and naval, and military authorities of Her Majesty; and it is obvious that the success of the operations to be undertaken in China must in a great degree depend on the harmony and good feeling which may prevail between the various authorities to whom the conduct of those operations is confided by their Sovereigns.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 7.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Grey.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 7, 1860.

COUNT JAUCOURT has communicated to me a despatch from Count Walewski dated the 3rd instant, with reference to the proposal which, by my despatch of the 31st ultimo, I instructed Earl Cowley to make to the French Government with regard to the commencement of operations in China.

In that despatch I stated that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that if sufficient forces belonging to either or both nations are ready to proceed from the rendezvous which may be agreed upon to the attack of the forts on the Peiho in the middle of April, those forces ought not to wait at Chusan beyond the 25th of that month for expected reinforcements, of whatever nation those reinforcements may be.

Count Walewski says that the Imperial Government is disposed to agree that, if at the time specified the forces collected at Chusan should be deemed sufficient for an attack on the forts of the Peiho, the Commander of such forces should not be bound to wait for any further reinforcements which might be on their way; although the Imperial Government did not attach any importance to the operations being commenced on any one particular day, and were of opinion, on the contrary, that as the commanding officers will alone be able to determine whether it is expedient to commence operations a few days sooner or later, it is indispensable to leave with them a certain amount of discretion in that respect.

Count Walewski goes on to say that it is to be clearly understood that there can in no case be a question of the separate arrival at the Peiho of one or other of the flags of the two Powers. Operations may, doubtless, be commenced without waiting until an equal amount of force on both sides is ready to act: but, whatever may be their relative proportion, at all events, in the first instance, the operations at the Peiho should be undertaken conjointly by both. The Commander of the French naval forces had already been enjoined to undertake no operation without the concurrence of the English forces; and Count Walewski presumes that such will also be the spirit of the instructions addressed to Admiral Hope.

I have to instruct you to state to M. Baroche, to whom you will also give a copy of this despatch, that in naming the 25th of April as the day on which the combined operations should commence, I had in view the necessity of not delaying those operations beyond the period at which a force sufficient to undertake them might be expected to be collected at Chusan. It is of importance, with reference to the season and the state of the wind on the coast, that the expedition should move at the earliest possible moment; but Her Majesty's Government are perfectly willing to leave the exact day of its departure to the discretion of the commanding officers on the spot.

Her Majesty's Government also concur with the Imperial Government in the propriety of the operations against the forts of the Peiho being, at all events in the first instance, undertaken by a combined English and French force; and that no enterprise should be undertaken by the commander of the naval forces of

one of the allied Powers without the concurrence of the commander of those of the other.

Her Majesty's Government will address a further instruction to the British Admiral in conformity with the views expressed in this despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 8.

Lord J. Russell to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, January 7, 1860.*

THE despatches to Her Majesty's Ambassador and Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, of which I inclose copies,* will apprize your Lordship of certain communications which have passed between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French in regard to the period at which, if occasion should arise for doing so, the military operations of the allied forces in China should commence.

Your Lordship will see by these despatches that Her Majesty's Government had proposed that if sufficient forces belonging to either or both nations are ready to proceed from the rendezvous which may be agreed upon, to the attack of the forts on the Peiho in the middle of April, those forces should not wait at Chusan beyond the 25th of that month for expected reinforcements, of whatever nation those reinforcements might be; and that the French Government, though concurring generally in that view, do not attach importance to the operations being commenced on any particular day, but are of opinion that it should be left to the discretion of the commanding officers to determine whether it would be expedient to commence such operations a few days sooner or later.

Your Lordships will further observe that the French Government consider that it should be clearly understood that there can in no case be a question of the separate arrival at the Peiho of one or other of the flags of the two Powers; and that although it may not be necessary to wait until an equal amount of the forces of both nations is ready to act, yet that, whatever may be the relative proportion of those forces, the operations at the Peiho should, at all events in the first instance, be undertaken conjointly by both.

Your Lordships will also perceive that the commander of the French naval forces has been enjoined to undertake no operation without the concurrence of the English forces; and that the French Government conclude that corresponding instructions have been sent to the British Admiral.

Your Lordships will further perceive that Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to state to the French Government that Her Majesty's Government are perfectly willing to leave the exact day of the departure of the joint expedition from Chusan to the discretion of the naval commanders on the spot; that Her Majesty's Government concur in the propriety of the operations against the forts at the Peiho being, at all events in the first instance, undertaken by a combined English and French force; and that no enterprise should be undertaken by the commander of the naval forces of one of the allied Powers without the concurrence of the commander of those of the other.

I am accordingly to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's pleasure that instructions to the above effect should be sent to the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's naval forces in China.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 9.

Mr. Sidney Herbert to Lord J. Russell.—(Received January 10.)

My Lord, *War Office, January 10, 1860.*

ADVERTING to the correspondence which has passed in reference to the instructions to be addressed to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant for his

guidance as Commanding officer of Her Majesty's military forces in China, I have now the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information a copy of those instructions, in the form in which they have been finally approved and despatched.

I have, &c.
(Signed) SIDNEY HERBERT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Mr. Sidney Herbert to Lieutenant-General Sir H. Grant.

(Extract.) *War Office, January* 9, 1860.

THE Queen having been pleased to nominate you to the command of the military force destined to take part in the expedition to China, Her Majesty's Government feel confident that Her Majesty's service will derive the greatest advantage from the appointment of an officer whose experience both in China and in India peculiarly fit him for this important command.

The object of Her Majesty's Government being to obtain the formal disavowal of, or apology for, the outrage committed at the mouth of the Peiho, and further to secure the ratification in good faith of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, Her Majesty has determined to reinforce the squadron now in the Chinese waters, under the command of Admiral Hope, and to dispatch from England two batteries of Field Artillery (viâ Egypt), and a battalion of the Military Train (by long sea), a battalion of Infantry, viz, 1st Battalion of the 2nd Foot, from the Cape of Good Hope, and a force from India consisting probably of at least five battalions of Queen's British Infantry, two squadrons of British Cavalry, three batteries of Field Artillery, and a company of Royal Engineers, with some Native Irregular Cavalry and Infantry; the whole force, exclusive of the troops now in China, amounting to about 10,000 men.

To act in conjunction with these forces, the Emperor of the French is about to dispatch 5,800 Infantry, four batteries of Field Artillery, and some "Compagnies de Débarquement," in all about 8,000 men under the command of General Montauban.

You will immediately upon your arrival in China, after conferring with Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary, Mr. Bruce, place yourself in communication with the French Commander, should he be arrived, and consult with him upon all occasions respecting the measures to be adopted by the allied forces for the conduct of the war, in the event of hostilities being determined upon, and Her Majesty's Government entertain no doubt that under your command perfect harmony will prevail in the concert and execution of the operations that may have to be jointly undertaken by Her Majesty's forces and those of the Emperor of the French.

The relative responsibilities of the officers commanding Her Majesty's sea and land forces in China are defined in the inclosed Memorandum, a copy of which will be transmitted by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to the officer commanding Her Majesty's naval forces, and it will be your duty to act in conformity with the instructions therein contained.

Authority for the commencement of hostilities will be conveyed to you by Her Majesty's Minister in China; and if at any time in the course of subsequent operations on shore Her Majesty's Minister should communicate to you that such overtures have been made to him by the Chinese Government as, in his opinion, hold out the prospect of a satisfactory arrangement without further hostilities, and should intimate to you at the same time his opinion that it would be desirable to suspend the operations on which you are engaged, it will be your duty to comply with his Excellency's wish, unless by so doing you may compromise your position or risk the loss of any military advantage which may be immediately within your reach. In such case you will fully and unreservedly state to Her Majesty's Minister your reasons for not at once complying with the tenour of his communication.

A strict adherence to these injunctions is the more necessary as Her Majesty is unwilling to abandon the hope that the Emperor of China and his Ministers will be sensible of the character of the outrage which was committed at the mouth of the Peiho, and of the policy of ratifying the Treaty of Tien-tsin and abiding by its conditions with frankness and good faith.

Should, however, the hopes of Her Majesty be disappointed in this respect, and should the resumption of hostilities be unavoidable, Her Majesty's Government are anxious, as far as possible, to confine such hostilities to the part of the Chinese Empire in which the outrage of which we justly complain was committed.

Up to the latest period at which Her Majesty's Government have received information from China, the inhabitants of the ports which are the great seats of commerce with Europeans have not only remained perfectly tranquil, but have manifested no animosity against Her Majesty's subjects resident there, nor any desire to interrupt the friendly and peaceful relations existing between themselves and the Europeans with whom they trade.

Her Majesty's Government are anxious for every reason both of humanity and policy that these relations and this good understanding should be carefully preserved, and that whatever measures it may, unhappily, be necessary to adopt with a view to enforce upon the Emperor of China a policy of sincerity and good faith, should be directed against the Central Government, upon which alone should rest the responsibility of the proceedings at the Peiho, and not on an unoffending people who have abstained from all demonstrations of hostility against us ,and shown no sympathy with the acts of the Central Government.

I need scarcely observe to you, that in a climate such as that in which you are about to operate, especial care in the matters regarding sanitary arrangements and the discipline of the troops will be indispensably requisite.

The instructions which I have given to the medical and commissariat officers attached to the expedition are herewith sent to you, and you will give your best attention to their being carried out under your orders.

In all movements of the troops you must give due warning to the sanitary officer, and order your Assistant Quartermaster-General to consult him as to the sanitary features of any ground which it may be deemed right to occupy for an encampment.

In respect to the measures to be taken to insure the health and well-being of the troops as regards clothing, rations, &c., you will have full power to order any alteration in the rations of the troops which, after consultation with the Paymaster and sanitary officers, you may consider it desirable to adopt.

You will report to me direct all proceedings in which you may be engaged, and you will keep me informed from time to time of every particular of your operations.

Inclosure 2 in No 9.

Memorandum showing the relative Responsibilities of the Officers Commanding Her Majesty's Sea and Land Forces in China.

IT must be observed that in carrying on the operations indicated by the Government in the China Seas, so much will depend upon the season, the period of the monsoon, the state of the navigation, and the weather, that it will be absolutely necessary that the supreme direction in respect to the point of attack under the instructions of the Government, and the period of making it, should be left to the Admirals, or officers commanding the allied naval forces; they, of course, communicating freely with, and consulting the Generals or other officers commanding the land forces, and attending to their opinion in the selection of a place for landing the troops, in case any should at any time be landed.

In case of difference of opinion, each of these officers is to give to the other his opinion in writing, signed by himself.

In case of continued difference of opinion, that of the Admiral is to decide the question, and to be the rule of conduct, considering that it is impossible for the troops to act alone, or unless in conjunction with, and supported by the fleet.

When the troops are landed, the officer commanding them is to be the sole director of their operations, he taking care to apprize the Admiral and keep him informed exactly of what they are, and where they will lead him; and both Admiral and General will understand that the fleet and army must not be separated as military bodies.

The army must depend upon a secure communication, and even union, with the fleet, for its supplies of provisions, ammunition, and military stores.

No. 10.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, February* 8, 1860.

IT has been decided between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French that the amount of indemnity-money to be demanded of the Chinese Government shall be in each case a sum of 60,000,000 francs, these sums comprising not only what the Chinese Government had undertaken to pay by the Treaties of Tien-tsin, but the further indemnities which the two Governments have thought it right to demand from China towards the expense of the joint expedition now on its way to the China seas.

No. 11.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1860

I HAVE, in the first place, to repeat to you the assurance which I gave you in my despatch of the 26th of September last,* that the confidence of Her Majesty's Government in you is undiminished.

Her Majesty's Government, however, not having hitherto received from you any intimation that the Chinese Government are prepared to apologize for the outrage at the mouth of the Peiho, and to ratify the Treaty at Peking, have seriously considered the present state of affairs.

The presence of a large British and French force, both naval and military, in the Gulf of Pecheli, will make the Chinese Government understand that the Queen of the United Kingdom and the Emperor of the French are quite in earnest.

But some punctilio or tradition may make the Chinese Government hesitate to make concessions to the Ministers whose attempt to ascend the Peiho they successfully repelled.

They might be more willing to yield if persons of high authority were specially sent from this country to renew the broken ties of amity.

With this view the Earl of Elgin, on the part of Her Majesty, and Baron Gros, on the part of the Emperor of the French, have been fixed upon for a special mission to China.

Her Majesty, as well as the Emperor of the French, is animated by a sincere desire to confirm and renew peace without further effusion of blood.

In the meantime you will continue to exercise all the powers conferred upon you by Her Majesty, and, in concert with the Representative of France and the Commanders-in-chief of the allied forces, endeavour to obtain the fulfilment of the conditions which have been laid down as the bases of future pacific relations.

Should these attempts fail, whether in your hands or in those of the Earl of Elgin, Her Majesty's Government will have the consolation of reflecting that they have neglected no means by which the further effusion of blood might be prevented.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 12.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 28.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, January* 6, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches of October 29th and November 10th, conveying the instructions of Her Majesty's Government as to the course I am to adopt.

* See "Correspondence with Mr. Bruce, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China," presented to Parliament, January 24, 1860, No. 12.

As M. de Bourboulon has not received his instructions, and he informs me that until they arrive he does not consider himself at liberty to depart from the system of reserve hitherto pursued, I have not yet addressed the Imperial Government. A separate communication would be less likely to be successful than simultaneous notes presented by M. de Bourboulon and myself, and the Chinese might be thereby encouraged to suppose that the views of the two Governments do not coincide as to the course to be pursued. I have addressed the inclosed letter to Admiral Hope, as there is ample time to receive an answer from him, and for the subsequent communications with the Chinese Government, before operations indicated in the despatches can be undertaken with advantage. Great efforts were made during the autumn and up to the time when frost set in, to send rice to Peking, and I am inclined to think that there is not much to be had in this country until the spring crop is gathered.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.

Extract.) *Shanghae, January* 6, 1860.

IN order that you may be fully informed of the views of Her Majesty's Government, I have the honour to forward copies of two despatches received by the last mail in which the course of policy to be pursued is indicated. You will see that I am directed to communicate immediately the demands of the British Government to that of China, and to insist on an answer being returned to me within thirty days. Should that answer not contain an ample apology for the outrage of June last, and an unqualified acceptance of the demands of Her Majesty's Government, I am to inform the Chinese Government that Her Majesty's naval and military authorities will proceed to adopt such measures as they may deem advisable to compel the Emperor to observe his engagements. These measures I am told will consist in stopping the grain junks, in seizing one of the Miatou Islands, as a basis of operation, &c.; and it is hoped that their combined effect will be such as to induce the Emperor to give way without the necessity of a land campaign.

It is clear, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government are anxious that no means should be left untried to terminate this affair without bloodshed; and if we were dealing with a Government which had adopted the maxims of civilized nations in regard to persons engaged in pacific pursuits, I should at once, in compliance with the above instructions, address the Imperial Government. But we know by experience that the Chinese do not confine the rights of a belligerent within the limits established by European usage, and that if they are not prepared to accede to our demands, and we are unable to follow up instantaneously our threats, we incur the risk of exposing foreign persons and property at the open ports to great annoyance and danger, and of giving to the hostilities that general and more serious character which former instructions have directed us, if possible, to avoid.

I am not yet in receipt of any information which would entitle me to assume that the Chinese Government will yield the points I am instructed to put forward.

Since the Decree alluded to in the despatch of November 10th, another has appeared, bestowing posthumous honours on those who fell at Takoo, and stating that the rebellious English have received a lesson which will deter them from again provoking the martial dignity of the Celestial Empire.

Sieh has, however, been named as Treasurer of this province, with, I understand, a special Decree, authorizing him to act with Ho in the management of barbarian affairs.

His appointment may be an indication of a wish to arrange differences pacifically, or he may be simply chosen as a man of ability and experience capable of supplying Ho's defects. Should the former prove to be the case, the appointment will be due to the report of preparations in England and France, and he will not improbably be charged to discover what terms will be considered satisfactory by us. The advantage of this order of proceeding would be that I could then convey those terms without pledging you to act, should the force at your disposal be insufficient to protect our interest, and at the same time carry out the aggressive measures proposed by Her Majesty's Government.

I inclose a Memorandum drawn up by Mr. Wade on the grain supply of Peking. All accounts concur in representing the rivers in the north as frozen till the beginning of March. I do not think, therefore, that until that time a blockade, even if it could be undertaken, would produce any important results, and the risk of its leading to retaliatory measures at the ports is a contingency not to be overlooked.

It is to be remembered that the Decree of the Emperor obtained here on our return from the north, and which was apparently genuine, directed the authorities not to molest the English unless they commenced hostilities; and this has been followed by strengthening the defences of Shanghae, and by an increase to the garrison of Foo-chow.

These are defensive measures in themselves, but they will facilitate offensive movements if we commence hostilities in a partial and languid manner. It would be most desirable to obtain, before taking any formal step, some knowledge as to the intentions of the Imperial Government, now that the reports furnished by their agents on the coast can leave no doubt on their minds that reparation will be demanded for the outrage of last June.

I am anxious, however, to be informed of your views, and at what period you consider the force at your disposal will enable you to carry out the policy indicated in the inclosed despatches. At all events it will not be necessary to act before March.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

Memorandum on the Grain Supply of Peking.

THE inclosed papers, which are a reprint of matter contributed by me on the subject to the "North China Herald," contain nearly all I have been able to collect from Chinese statistical works or the "Peking Gazette," respecting the amount of grain required in Peking, and the channels and periods of its remittance.

Most of the details were submitted to Lord Elgin in the winter of 1857–58.

The state of the Grand Canal, almost useless since the inundations of 1851, and the disquiet from the rebellion of the south and west of China, have forced the Government to look almost exclusively to the seaboard south of the Yang-tze-kiang for its grain supply, and to remit the grain collected almost entirely by sea. Its financial difficulties have compelled it apparently to retrench the rice expenditure of the North no little.

This province, Kiang-su, should contribute by law nearly 1,500,000 piculs, say 90,000 tons a-year. The demand made on it this year was but for 400,000 piculs, and the Provincial Treasurer declared himself unable to promise more than 250,000 piculs. Even this quantity he has failed to make up. The land taxes are almost everywhere in arrear, and subscriptions, to be repaid in rank, as the local Proclamations show, have yielded far less than the authorities had conceived themselves entitled to expect. An embargo was laid on vessels in the autumn to carry the supply to Tien-tsin, but many of these have cleared out without any rice; and the frost having already set in, it is now too late for junks to reach Tien-tsin by the time insisted on by all the public notices that allude to the question, to wit, before the frost sets in. Two local Proclamations now before me, of the last week in October and second week in November respectively, lay great stress on this condition. The first is directed against the tardiness of the junks already loaded, but still lingering at Shanghae; the second against land-tax defaulters, who must be well aware of the pressing call for the money due by them, in order that the Government may repay the advances which it has been obliged to make in order to dispatch the grain before the usual report is made up.

All evidence within my reach, written or oral, is agreed that at least during the months of December, January, and February, the rivers in the north are frozen so hard as to be impassable; and it should be borne in mind that the frost must impede not only the transport of grain from the southward, but equally that of all similar cargoes from Neu-chwang and other places to which the capital and its vicinity are beholden for supplies of wheat, pulse, &c. It is

upon these that the population of Peking and the neighbourhood subsists. Rice is consumed only by the Court, the official establishments, and the garrisons. Even the Court, therefore, I presume, would contrive on an emergency to support itself without any rice whatever. Be this as it may, of rice which is sown and cut between August and October, it cannot possibly receive any more this winter.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE, *Chinese Secretary.*

Shanghae, January 6, 1860.

Inclosure 3 in No. 12.

Extract from the "North China Herald" of July 31, 1858.

GRAIN SUPPLY OF PEKING.—IT is now several months since rumours reached us of the terror produced in the districts adjoining the lower part of the Yellow River, by its disappearance from its ancient bed.* It seems beyond doubt established that, from a point which must be about as high up as Kai-fung-fu, this violent stream has forced a new, or, according to Chinese historians, has resumed an old, channel in a north-easterly direction, and now makes its way in the Gulf of Pecheli by superadding its waters to those of the Ta-tsing and other rivers of Shan-tung. Much of the intermediate country is described by a recent traveller as more lake than land; and the great artery of Northern China, the Grand Canal, clogged in some places, and expanded out of all symmetry in others, lies useless for any of the greater purposes of trade or supply, for which it was originally intended. From the statement of the crew of a Yang-chau junk, which had forced her way up to Tien-tsin early in 1857, the bed of the Yellow River had been filled with water from the canal reservoir by Hwai-ngan-fu to the depth of three feet to enable vessels to cross. The junk in question drew but two feet. She found in many places up the canal but four inches water, and the greatest depth at any point did not exceed four feet. We have since learned that the bed of the Yellow River, if temporarily filled, as stated, at the point in question, is now, at all events, perfectly dry.

It is difficult to say from what depths of exigency the industry of China may not recover itself; but it is almost beyond a doubt that, for the present, the operation of one of her greatest works is in abeyance, and the North of her Empire is consequently beholden for its commerce, and to a large extent for its subsistence, to the coast trade, which it has been the policy of the Government, as regards the most important article of Chinese life, to restrict in favour of its inland traffic. The wants of Northern China naturally attract our attention at a moment the ports of that region have been opened to a certain extent to our commerce; and the following particulars of what we are wont to describe as the Grain Tribute of China, and of the past and present methods of its transmission, may not be uninteresting to our readers.

The Code of the Board of Revenue of 1831, the latest edition we believe in print, showed that, exclusive of 13,340 tons for which a constant commutation tax, amounting to 246,570 taels, was levied at various rates in five of the contributing provinces, the whole Grain Tribute, annually forwarded in kind, used to be collected in the following proportions:—

	Tons.
Rice	210,000
White rice for the Court's use	44,000
Wheat	4,000
Pulse	17,000

The wheat and pulse were grown in Chih-li itself, in Shan-tung, and in Ho-nan; the black pulse in Manchuria. The wheat is stated to be the only sort destined for human consumption, but this is by no means certain.

The subjoined Table, drawn up from the same authority, declares the proportions in which, under ordinary circumstances, the producing districts would contribute. The wretched state of the canal communications and the rebellion, which, besides interrupting both the collection and transmission of the

* See "North China Herald," No. 336, January 3, 1857; No. 359, June 13, 1857; No. 407, May 15, 1858; No. 411, June 12, 1858.

grain-supply, has for many years absorbed the funds otherwise applicable to the repairs of the canal and river, are causes which materially affect the original conditions of this branch of revenue. We will speak of it first as it was.

The official expenditure of grain in 1811 was some 113,000 tons, without reckoning the Court's own demand; and according to the Revenue Statistics of 1831, already quoted, there should always have been in store at Peking 354,000 tons of rice, and at Tung-chau, twelve miles off, 82,000 tons. None of this should be allowed to be unsold or unexpended longer than three years.

The shipment of the grain was effected at forty-four major and nineteen minor stations in the eight Provinces of Chih-li, Shan-tung, Kiang-su, Ngan-hwui, Kiang-si, Cheh-kiang, Hu-nan, Hu-peh.

These, with all details of the establishment charged with its carriage and escort, are under a Superintendent, with the title of Governor-General, whose head-quarters are at Hwai-ngan-fu. He has under him a force on a *quasi*-military footing, the total strength of which is about 64,000 men. The grain-junks used to leave the points of collection in fleets departing at different periods, so as to avoid confusion, each vessel bearing 300 piculs on Government account. The escort, known as "ki-ting," carried a certain amount on private account, and were indeed rewarded for bringing in from 100 to 200 piculs in excess of the Government cargo. Each junk was allowed a sum for her expenses ranging in amount from 160 to 200 taels.

The collection of the Grain Tribute was supposed to commence on the 1st of the 10th moon, say in November, and all grain, no matter where collected, to be weighed and shipped for the canal two months later. The junks from the districts north of the Yang-tze, in the neighbourhood of the canal, by law should cross the Yellow River at Hwai-ngan-fu in the 12th moon, January or February; those from other parts of Kiang-su and Ngan-hwui, a month later; and those from Kiang-si, Cheh-kiang, Hu-peh, and Hu-nan, a month later than the last. After they are across, the law still allows them three months to ascend the canal to Tien-tsin, there to trans-ship their cargoes for Tung-chau, whence the chief part of them would be carried in carts to Peking.

The line of canal communication between the Yang-tze and the Yellow River has but two approaches officially recognized as available for the transmission of the Grain Tribute, one the Kwa-chau mouth of the canal opposite Chin-kiang-fu, the other at I-ching, a few miles higher up the stream. Punctuality has not been more remarkable in this than in any other branch of Chinese revenue, but the grand derangement of all calculations respecting the transmission of grain has ever been the capricious disposition of the Yellow River. The 20th term of the Chinese year, known as the "frost's descent," has always been watched with anxiety; and freedom from inundation during this period entitled the Spirit of the stream to a special sacrifice in token of the Emperor's gratitude. A glance at the map will show that from the point of its intersection by the Yellow River, the canal takes a north-westerly direction, running for a considerable distance nearly parallel to the course of its turbulent neighbour. As it quits the border of Kiang-su, it becomes principally beholden for its supply to various sheets of water, part lake, part reservoir, which, unless we misunderstand the "Peking Gazettes," are of a construction precariously primitive. Vast earthworks are thrown up, and into the space they inclose water is worked from the adjacent streams to the very great peril, as the Gazette admits, of the mud *enceinte*, which would be utterly destroyed were the body within it all water. To mitigate this danger, and at the same time to preserve the water-level necessary to the supply of the canal, the vast tanks are three-fourths filled with mud.

In 1851, a more than usually violent outbreak of the Yellow River swept away all the works of earth and masonry in the section of river-works known as the Fung-peh, in the north corner of Kiang-su. In August 1852, the upward-bound grain fleet was obliged to land its cargo in Shan-tung, some eighty miles below Tsi-ning, to a point in which department all the grain had to be carried by land for re-shipment to Peking. The Emperor was shortly moved by various Memorialists to consider some new means of supplying the capital with grain; the canal, it was urged, having become impracticable by mismanagement.

Early in 1853, a censor recommends the transport of grain by sea. He puts the total consumption of the capital at 4,000,000 piculs of superior and 2,500,000 piculs of inferior descriptions of grain; say 430,000 tons. The

provinces heretofore relied upon were all disturbed by rebels; but in Fuh-kien and Cheh-kiang, which were quiet, a sale of rank might be opened, and grain bought by the Local Government with the proceeds. The Formosa market was also spoken of. By the end of the year, 333 junks of grain from the South had reached the Gulf of Pecheli.

In the spring of 1854 the capital was in sore distress. The rebels were on the borders of Tien-tsin, and Cheh-kiang was the only one of the supplying provinces not in disorder; even there floods had done damage. The Emperor was accordingly prayed to give a general invitation to merchants to import grain from all parts. The river communication between Peking and Tien-tsin had also been injured by inundation. Still, by the close of the year, the grain receipts at Tung-chau amounted to 1,424,946 piculs, nearly 100,000 tons. This is described as grain of 1853. It is classed under eight different denominations, and its carriage up from Tien-tsin, it is observable, employed 3,892 river junks from the 7th of June to the 3rd of August.

A Decree of January 1855 shows that the rendezvous of the junks bringing grain from Kiang-su and and Cheh-kiang was the port of Liu-ho, a small customs' station on the Yang-tze, at no great distance from Shanghae. The Emperor is in great want of rice, and lays an embargo, right and left, on flat-bottomed vessels along the whole coast from the Gulf of Liau-tung down to Ning-po. Cheh-kiang furnished no less than 60,000 tons this year; but this appears to be nearly all that Peking received.

In May 1856 the Governor of Cheh-kiang, in a somewhat self-complacent memorial, reports the shipment of about 60,000 tons in 721 junks, divided into six fleets. It is now four years, he says, since the sea-transport was commenced on the recommendation of his predecessor, and the subsidy is increasing annually. By the 5th July 1,200 junks had discharged 100,000 tons at Tien-tsin and returned south. Some 6,000 tons were still due. The insurrection being now, to all appearance, about to limit itself to the southern provinces, the canal was surveyed in the hope of again making it navigable for the grain fleet. The report is long, and, from the use of certain technicalities, somewhat difficult of translation. The fact, however, is established that, owing to a series of inundations from 1851 to 1855, the artificial channels had sustained almost irreparable damage. The Wei-shan-ho, a principal reservoir, which should have in it fourteen feet of water, had but from two to eight feet; in many places mud-banks stood out like islands, and along its whole western verge was a dry tract of varying width. A proposition to introduce more water and more deposit was rejected, as calculated to jeopardise the frail enclosure of the Hu. The year closes with disastrous notices. In Peking rice was from nine to ten dollars a picul; the crop short in Kiang-su and Cheh-kiang, which were also suffering from locusts. There were locusts in Chih-li as well.

In 1857 the authorities of the Two Kwang are called on to find rice for the Court. Some of the Kiang-su quota is detained for war supplies. That the abandonment of the canal transport is in contemplation may be inferred from a proposal, made by the Board of Revenue, to dispose of the junks formerly employed upon the canal, many of which we know to be rotting in Hang-chau and elsewhere.

The Board also remarks, by the way, that an equivalent to their former tax in grain is now levied in coin on Hu-peh, Hu-nan, Kiang-si, and Ngan-hwui; another indication of the Court's acceptance of the sea-transport as something more than a temporary measure. The authorities of Manchuria reported the shipment, in June, of some 3,000 tons of grain, which they describe as rice. It was probably wheat.

Supposing the censor's estimate, tendered in 1853, to be approximately correct, it follows that in the last six years the supply of the best grain has only twice equalled a third, and did not, last year, amount to a tenth of the Peking demand. The supply of this year remains to be ascertained, but when the Mission were at Tien-tsin, a month ago, rice was selling at from five to six dollars a picul, and the resources of the province were threatened by locusts, which continued to arrive by myriads. These were sold dried as food, at forty cash a catty. They did not seem in such request, nevertheless, as to cause future speculators in "grain-stuffs" any serious apprehension.

TABLE showing the Proceeds of the Grain Tax of China, as returned in 1831.

	Chih-li.	Shan-tung.	Honan.	An-hwui.	Kiang-su.	Che-kiang.	Kiang-si.	Hu-peh.	Hunan.	Totals.
	Piculs.	Piculs.	Piculs.	Piculs.	Piculs.	Piculs.	Piculs.	Piculs.	Piculs.	Piculs.
Rice for Peking	57,000	83,295	8,969	288,239	1,038,111	621,466	351,394	94,622	95,529	
„ surplus	..	19,159	2,047	63,400	228,382	136,708	77,286	20,812	21,010	
„ for Tung-chau	..	42,914	9,192	102,075	94,852	29,353	151,614			
„ surplus	..	7,310	1,564	14,280	13,270	4,981	25,772			
„ for the Court	..	..	..	..	69,025	29,975				
„ surplus	..	..	..	..	20,700	13,482				
Total Rice	57,000	152,678	21,772	467,994	1,464,340	835,965	606,066	115,434	116,539	3,837,788
Wheat for Peking	..	9,915	24,652							
„ surplus	..	2,280	6,660							
„ for Tung-chau	..	9,391	12,766							
„ surplus	..	1,581	2,159							
Total Wheat	..	23,167	46,237	..	..	..	..	..	..	69,404
Pulse for Peking	..	82,114	67,189							
„ surplus	..	18,880	15,430							
„ for Tung-chau	..	31,082	27,857							
„ surplus	..	5,270	4,726							
Total Pulse	..	137,346	115,202	..	..	..	..	..	..	252,548
Total Grain	57,000	313,191	183,211	467,994	1,464,340	835,965	606,066	115,434	116,539	4,159,740
Commutation—										
In silver taels	..	12,000	12,000	4,332	74,543		..	22,764	3,647	
At different rates	..	40,000	40,000	17,829						
	..	..	..	21,635						
	..	52,000	52,000	43,796	74,543	..	..	22,764	3,647	

Inclosure 4 in No. 12.

Extract from the "North China Herald" of August 14, 1858.

GRAIN SUPPLY OF PEKING.—The "Peking Gazette" of the 30th June contains a memorial from Wants'ai, Manchu President of the Board of Works, Tau Ting-siang, Governor-General of Chih-li, and Tsung-lun, Director-General of Granaries. The last two are known to us as unsuccessful pacificators of the barbarian. The paper is curious as throwing some light upon the channels of supply remaining open to the capital when the canal was unnavigable, and the river we call the Peiho in a state of blockade. We should not be the worse, however, for a little more light, as any one who peruses the paper, map in hand, will not fail to observe.

"Your Majesty's servants Wants'ai, Tau Ting-siang, and Tsung-lun, on their knees, present a memorial.

"Their respectful memorial praying for authority to place in store certain rice received by them and passed, but which they had not been able to re-ship for transmission, they present, imploring the Imperial glance thereon.

"On the 13th of the 4th moon (25th May), the ships of the barbarians having ascended the river to Shang-yuen, your servants gave orders to the grain junks, whether their cargoes were completed or not, to withdraw one and all to within the Ta-tsing river, and lie there for the present. The subsequent occupation of the anchorage at the confluence of the three streams (viz., at the junction of the Peiho and the Grand Canal) by the barbarian vessels made it impossible for the junks above described to proceed northward, and it is now reported that, from Ts'un-sin up, the river has been staked at regular intervals. The obstruction of its passage thus making the transport of the rice a difficult matter, your servants have deliberated together and are of opinion that it will be better to take measures for the storage of the grain than to leave it anchored along the river shore, where it may turn mouldy or be stolen. When the barbarian business shall be in some degree settled, it can be shipped again and brought up. There is a place, it appears, some 200 *li* west of the Ta-tsing river, on the Pih-kau river to wit, at which the grant of grain remitted annually to Yih-chau is laid down in portions as it arrives, to be forwarded. The Grain Superintendent of the division reports 132 of the junks above described as having entered the Ta-tsing with cargoes, estimated at 25,857 piculs, and he proposes to send on to Yih-chau the whole quantity of rice intended for the sacrifices at the Imperial mausolea in that district, to make good the small deficiency due to that quota (out of the grain now in the Ta-tsing) and then to carry the balance, some 20,102 piculs, up to the Pih-kau river, and house it for the time being in the magazines there; and when, in short, the barbarian business shall have been brought to a pacific termination, to re-ship it on the Pih-kau river for Tung-chau.* The lower part of the Ta-tsing being, however, so shoal as to render the transport of the grain impossible, unless small vessels be taken up for its reception, orders have been given to the authorities of the districts adjacent to hire vessels of 100 piculs burden, more or less, to be in readiness for this service. Your servant Tan Ting-siang has at the same time directed the local authorities in this instance to co-operate with the functionaries of the Grain Department, and, in concert with them and the officers specially deputed, to be zealous in their superintendence and guidance of the brokers, weighmen, and other employés. As soon as all the grain shall have been discharged, (the officers deputed) are to bring back with them a certificate, stamped with the official seal, showing the amount received into the granaries in question. By this provisional arrangement the grain which it has been impossible to transmit by the inner waters† will be preserved from destruction or damage.

"The particulars of this temporary measure of storage your servants, as in duty bound, submit to your Majesty in a memorial prepared by them conjointly."

Now, the junks turned out of the river after the forts of Taku were taken on the 20th May, were very generally believed to have run for the mouth of the Ta-tsing, which falls into the sea about eighty miles south of the Peiho, and none of the maps, native or foreign, give any river between these. Still, unless

* That is, for Peking.

† Or, specially, the Inner River, viz., from Tien-tsin to Tung-chau.

there be some other Ta-tsing river than that in Shan-tung, or some other Pih-kau river than that in Yih-chau, it is inconceivable that any station 200 *li*, say 70 miles, from the mouth of the Ta-tsing, should be, as alleged, the ordinary point of deposit for grain bound to Yih-chau. It is further to be observed that the canal is not mentioned at all as the channel to be used, and the maps show no water whatever between the Ta-tsing and the canal. These two streams have themselves "relations" in normal times; but, supposing the canal practicable, boats ascending the Ta-tsing to enter it would travel some 200 miles south-west, and then up the canal and its neighbours, some 300 miles more, northing and westing. There may be an error in the text, or the text, which is always possible, may have been misapprehended; or, which is as nearly as likely, the large tract bounded by the canal on its western, and the Ta-tsing on its south-eastern face, may be intersected by waters, natural or artificial, beneath the notice of the geographer, but calculated to bring the canal and river into closer communication. It is noteworthy that this great river, the Ta-tsing, described as very navigable by large junks up at Tsi-nan, is here shown to be too shoal at the mouth for vessels of very moderate burden. It shares the common lot of China streams. Earlier in this Dynasty an attempt was made to insulate the mountain promontory of Shan-tung, and by linking streams and boring through elevations, a water-way was, with much trouble and expense, contrived from the mouth of the Takoo river on the south, to a point in Lai-chau-foo on the north coast of the province. It was to have shortened the passage of grain-junks, but, although it became a fact, it was found of little practical advantage; the last attempt to turn it to account was made in the middle of last century. The Government maps of 1812–18 have retained it, nevertheless, in equal prominence with the larger rivers of the Empire.

Inclosure 5 in No. 12.

Extract from the "North China Herald" of September 24, 1859.

Supply of the Capital.—The memorial to which we alluded in our last issue as reporting upon the condition of the Grand Canal, proves to be no more, though of great length, than the usual formal report made to the Emperor by Directors-General of Canal and River Works on their assumption of office. It confirms the account, so often repeated and contradicted, of the Yellow River's perversion from its old bed, from its mouth to a considerable distance up stream, and of the consequent derangement of the Canal, the reorganization of which, in the present dearth of funds, is not to be looked for. In our issue of July 31, 1858, we gave a notice of the grain supply, as formerly transmitted by the Grain Canal from eight provinces of the Empire to Peking, and we are indebted to the contributor of the details there placed at our disposal, for a *résumé* of the State papers that have appeared on the subject since 1852, together with some interesting memoranda bearing more or less upon the question of supplying the metropolis.

1852.—At the beginning of May, an Imperial Decree degrades the Director-General of Water Communications, and the Governor-General of Kiang-nan, for being unable to complete the repairs of the canal at Fung-peh (a sectional post of river works, on the north bank of the Yellow River, in the north corner of the Kiang-su Province). They had tried twice and failed; the flood sweeping away the works of earth and masonry intended to stay it.

At the beginning of August, the same Governor-General shows that the state of the waters in Shan-tung (just north of the point above alluded to), is such as totally to hinder the advance of the up-going grain fleet. The Emperor directs that the grain should be landed at Tai-chwang (in the district of Yih, in Yuen-chau-fu), and reshipped on the canal at Tsi-ning. (The portage would be some 80 miles.)

Three months later, a Censor urges the necessity of directing the Provincial Governments responsible for the transmission of grain, to devise some means of supplying the capital otherwise than by the canal; that channel being, for the present, so out of repair as to have prevented the arrival of the grain-junks now due (autumn 1852), and promising even a worse state of things next year.

The Governor of Cheh-kiang recommends the Emperor, in a Memorial

published the 14th of October, to try the transport of grain by sea; the cana having been rendered impracticable by mismanagement.

1853.—About the 4th of April appears a memorial by a Censor, urging the Emperor to sanction the transport of grain by sea. He puts the total consumption of the capital at 4,000,000 piculs (say 250,000 tons) of superior, and 2,500,000 piculs (say 150,000 tons) of inferior descriptions of grain. The provinces which by law contributed to the supply heretofore brought by canal to Peking, are all in such trouble (from rebellion) that the grain due can no longer be brought to Tung-chau (the store-house of Peking). But Fuh-kien and Cheh-kiang, having no war on their hands, should be called on to subscribe liberally (*i.e.*, to purchase rank), and the grain bought by the authorities with the proceeds of the subscription should be sent round by sea.

Towards the end of May, a Vice-President of the Board of Revenue recommends the purchase of grain in Formosa, where it is abundant, and its transmission thence by sea.

About the begining of July, a Censor shows that, though rice has been brought this year from Kiang-su and Cheh-kiang by sea, the rebellion has prevented the arrival of any from Hu-peh, Hu-nan, Ngan-hwui, and Kiang-si. The authorities of these, he urges, should do their best to collect the value of the grain not sent, in money, and remit the amount to the Board of Revenue in order that grain may be purchased at Tien-tsin.

A Decree of the 19th September acknowledges the Memorial of Sun Sui-chin and Kingki, reporting the arrival at Tien-tsin of 805,400 piculs of grain from Kiang-su. The quota of that province is still short 18,400 piculs, which it is proposed should be made good by remittances from the Grain Commissioner (or Commissary of Kiang-su) at the rate of 1 tael 4 mace per picul. (We assume, because the season was now too far advanced to expect the arrival of the grain itself.)

On the 25th September, the "Gazette" publishes a Memorial from the Governor of Shan-tung, showing that between the 6th and 26th June, there had passed northward twenty-four grain-junks from Fuh-kien, and seven from Cheh-kiang, making, during the past season, a total of 333 junks which had been convoyed past the Tung-chau promontory by the Shan-tung marine.

1854.—In the middle of March, the Emperor punishes the Governor-General and other authorities of Kiang-su for not having sent in the account of the past year's supply.

On the 12th March, a Censor moves the Emperor to cause a notification to be issued to grain-merchants, inviting them to import rice to Tien-tsin, as Cheh-kiang is the only one of the supplying provinces not disturbed (by rebels). Even there the department of Tai-chau has suffered from inundation.

On the 13th April, the special Commissioners (selected annually to receive and pass the grain at Tien-tsin) report that, last autumn, the embankments north of Tien-tsin and in its immediate vicinity had fallen in, and pray that these may be immediately repaired, as the supply of grain coming by sea is near at hand. (The works in question are those on the water by which grain is passed up from Tien-tsin to Tung-chau.)

On the 24th May, an additional Commissioner is sent to Tien-tsin.

On the same day, a Decree desires the Commissioners to lose no time in providing bags for the grain which has reached Tien-tsin, boats in which it may be transferred thence to Tung-chau, by the Li-ho (or Inner River), and carts to carry it thence to Peking.

On the 11th December, a special Commissioner and another officer report to the Emperor that the grain receipts of the current year (1854), from the provinces of Kiang-su and Cheh-kiang, amount in all to 1,424,946 piculs (say under 100,000 tons). This employed 3,892 river junks from the 7th June to 3rd August, during which time the whole was carried from Tien-tsin to Tung-chau. It is particularised as grain of the third year of this reign (1853), and the whole quantity is classed under eight different heads or descriptions.

1855.—A Decree of the 20th January, after noticing the Memorial of Shau-Tsan, praying the Emperor to hurry the officers connected with the transport service, proceeds:—"The grain supply of the coming season to be brought by sea from Kiang-su and Cheh-kiang being all to be shipped at the port of Liu-ho,*

* The Liu-ho, or Lew-ho, according to the Chinese maps, is the next small stream north of the Wu-sung river, that falls into the Yang-tze-kiang. The Wu-sung river passes close to Shanghae, forming, in fact, the north boundary of the foreign settlement which is north of that city. Its mouth,

thence to proceed north, it is expedient that abundant means of transport be provided with all speed, to the prevention of delay. To this end, we command the chief authorities in Manchuria Proper, Chih-li, and Shan-tung, at once to direct all flat-bottomed (trading) junks and fishing vessels, from Shanghae and Ningpo, and every kind of 'tung-wei' vessel (? Tien-tsin boats) now lying in the ports of their respective jurisdictions to hasten to Liu-ho, there to be in readiness to take in the fresh supply, and to proceed with it northwards." The grain-factors are to be punished if they try to run up prices, &c.

The "Gazette" of the 22nd May has a Memorial from the Governor of Cheh-kiang. He adverts to a Memorial presented by the Board of Revenue, and approved by the Emperor in the 12th moon (January–February), requiring that the Cheh-kiang grain collection should be weighed, and in order, at the port of shipment, before the end of the Chinese year (17th February, 1855), so that it might sail in the coming spring, and arrive with the Kiang-su collection at Tien-tsin in the third moon (April–May). The Cheh-kiang collection much exceeds that of the years 1854 and 1855, amounting to no less than 735,800 piculs, but there is a deficiency of tonnage. He therefore moves the Emperor to write express to the authorities of Chih-li and Shan-tung, to lay an embargo on boats of Tien-tsin and other places, and "in the spring, when the ice breaks up, to hurry down to Liu-ho, there to take in their cargoes."

1856.—In the "Gazette" of the 27th May appears the Governor of Cheh-kiang's account of the dispatch of grain from his province. He had shipped 900,000 piculs, which left for Tien-tsin in 721 junks divided into 6 fleets, sailing one after the other at different times between the 4th March and the 1st May. It is now four years, he adds, since the experiment of transporting grain by sea to Tien-tsin was made, at the suggestion of his predecessor. The subsidy is increasing annually, and he has in hand, besides the quantity forwarded, 129,600 piculs of grain, subscribed by the gentry and officials of the province, which he is carrying to the account of the regular remittance.

The "Gazette" of the 20th June gives a Memorial (probably) from a special Commissioner. He had already reported, he says, the arrival of grain-junks at Tien-tsin, on different dates between the 23rd April and 8th May. The Military Commandant* at Takoo now reports to him the arrival of other junks, making, up to the 8th June, 1,053 sail in all, carrying 1,220,000 piculs of grain. All the Cheh-kiang junks are in (Tien-tsin?) They number some 758. Only 96 (296?) are in from Kiang-su; these are four-fifths of the whole number expected.

On the 7th July appears another Memorial from the same officer, who states that the total receipts, up to date, amount to 1,490,000 piculs of grain. This reached Tien-tsin between the third moon (April) and the 4th of the sixth moon (5th July). Upwards of 1,200 junks have returned south after discharging their cargo. There are still due 100,000 piculs, which he will report as the junks arrive.

A Decree of the 21st September acknowledges the receipt of a report, inclosing a survey, upon the possibility of replenishing the canal at the point where it suffered in 1851, so as to make it again navigable for the grain fleet. The employment of one or two technical terms of which it is difficult to insure the exact equivalent render its translation no easy matter. In substance, it shows that the principal reservoir for the supply of the section of the canal in question is the lake, or sheet of water, called the Wei-shan Hu. The sluices leading thence into the canal used formerly to be kept open three days and three nights, when the grain fleets entered the waters known as those of the districts Pei-chau and Suh-tsien. Up to 1814, the surface of the lake used to be kept up to twelve Chinese feet, viz., three feet of deposit and nine feet of water; but in 1816 this was increased to fourteen feet. In 1851 and 1853, the Yellow River, "throughout the whole length of its side," broke in upon the lake. This inundation was followed, in 1855, by one which carried away the north bank of the river in Ho-nan, and the Yellow River "ceased to flow" (that is, of

twelve miles below Shanghae, is in the adjoining district of Páu-shan, the north side of which is washed by the Liu-ho. The grain-junks were to assemble at the mouth of this stream, some way up which there is a military station and branch custom-house, subordinate to the Superintendent residing at Shanghae.

* There is at Takoo a brigadier or colonel; also a civilian sub-prefect. How two officers of this rank came to have left their post entirely to the care of "the people," when the British squadron arrived last June, is not explained.

course, in its old direction). The officers of the proper department now report that the depth of water in the Wei-shan Hu varies at this moment from two to eight feet, but that mud-banks stand out in many places, and that along the whole western verge there is a dry tract of unequal widths. The water in the centre of the lake is, however, still eight feet deep, and the Sub-Prefect of the section, on whose Report the Memorial is chiefly based, proposes (so far as one can understand him) to introduce (how, it is not so easy to explain) a sufficient quantity of muddy water to renew the stream of the canal. He talks of adding two feet seven inches Chinese of deposit; but to this the Memorialists object, urging that if the surface of the Wei-shan Hu be so much raised, not only may the adjacent lands and waters be inundated by the *débordements* of the lake, but the earthworks, which, it appears, inclose the lake itself, being too light to withstand such increase of pressure, will be carried away altogether.

A "Gazette" of the 29th September gives a Censor's Memorial on the prospects of the grain-market next year. At the time he writes, rice is selling at rather more than ten strings of current cash a picul. But there is a dearth in Kiang-su and Cheh-kiang, besides a visitation of locusts, which will not fail to cause a great diminution in the supply of the coming year (1857). There are also locusts in Chih-li; but grain-merchants are buying up all they can find in the vicinity of Peking, and there is an abundant supply for the current year's rations and allowances in hand.

1857.—On the 16th February, the "Gazette" gizes a Memorial urging the Emperor to desire the authorities of the Two Kwang to look into the question of supply, as there was a famine in Cheh-kiang last year. There is precedent for the purchase of rice in the Kwang, and for its transmission to Cheh-kiang, thence to be transmitted to Tien-tsin. (He probably alludes to a large commission for rice undertaken by Howqua in 1851 or 1852. It would have been sent from Kwang-tung in foreign bottoms, or the purchase of it negotiated by him with foreign merchants at Shanghae.)

On the 24th March, a Decree authorizes the detention of 250,000 piculs of grain in Kiang-su, for war supplies; the drought and locusts of the previous year having spoiled the harvest and caused prices to rise in that province.

In a "Gazette" of the 15th May, the Board of Revenue, observing that the transport of grain by sea now devolves on the two provinces of Kiang-su and Cheh-kiang, and that an equivalent in coin is levied on Hu-peh, Hu-nan, Kiang-si, and Ngan-hwui, move the Emperor to desire the authorities of the provinces which no longer take part in the transport service, to report, within two months, whether it will not be practicable to dispose of the older vessels belonging to the transport service; also, whether their treasuries have or not the money in hand which should be periodically expended on the repair and reinforcement of the grain fleets.

In the "Gazette" of the 20th May is another Memorial of the Board of Revenue, noting that the Governor of Cheh-kiang reports that the first of the year's grain fleets had put to sea (or had been authorized to put to sea) on the 20th February, and that, as the Kiang-su grain-fleets were to arrive with those of Cheh-kiang at Tien-tsin in the third moon (26th March–23rd April), it was their duty, in accordance with the precedent of the last three years, to pray His Majesty to appoint special Commissioners to pass the cargoes at Tien-tsin. The Emperor appointed Twan-hwa, a Prince of the highest degree, and Tsung-lun (the officer sent in 1854 to meet Sir John Bowring and Mr. McLane, and in 1858 to meet Lord Elgin at the mouth of the Peiho.)

In the "Gazette" of the 10th June, the same two Commissioners state that grain-junks had been arriving from the fourth moon (April–May) up to the 9th of the fifth moon (31st May); from Kiang-su 100 junks, carrying 115,000 piculs; and from Cheh-kiang 160 junks, carrying 220,000 piculs. The south wind prevails, but six junks are still missing; besides these, seven junks had been robbed by pirates, some of 10 piculs, some of as much as 50 piculs.

On the 16th June, the Tartar General governing Manchuria Proper reports, that he has purchased and sent down to Kin-chau and Siau Ma-ti K'au, for shipment, 42,400 piculs of grain—he calls it rice. He begs that the authorities of Chih-li may be desired to take up country boats (*i.e.*, boats not belonging to Government) for the transport of this supply.

On the 22nd June, Twan-hwa and Tsung-lun report their mission accomplished. Including the white (or Court) rice, there have arrived from Kiang-su

and Cheh-kiang, 383,300 piculs. The smallness of the supply is due to the drought and flight of the locusts from which those provinces suffered last year. Some had also been taken by pirates at sea, but no great quantity.

As to the practicability of the inland water communications by which Peking is supplied from the south,—the Grain Canal consists, in fact, of three, if not four, different sets of works and rivers. The northern portion, called the Yu-ho, or Imperial river, connects Tien-tsin with Liu-tsing-chau; the central portion; more particularly called the Chah-ho, or river of locks, connects Lin-tsing and Kwa-chau on the Yang-tze-kiang; and a third portion connects Chin-kiang, on the Yang-tze, with Hang-chau-fu, the capital of Cheh-kiang. Amongst the Chinese a difference of opinion will be found to prevail as to the distinctness of the sections, and the chronology of their respective construction.

Exclusive of those south of the Yang-tze-kiang, the works for the regulation of these and other waters are divided into north, east, and south jurisdictions. The inundation of 1852, noticed above, was in the south jurisdiction, in the north corner of Kiang-su; the chief authority in which province, having a definite share in the responsibility of the river service, was punished as has been shown.

The military river-service of the southern jurisdiction numbers about 10,000 men, formed into twenty cantonments, subdivided into fifty-seven detachments. The Civil service is divided into twenty-one petty circuits, each under a Sub-Prefect. The station charged with the section of the canal damaged in 1852, and which includes three of these detachments, belongs to the district of Fung, which, according to Chinese maps, is bounded along its whole east front by the Wei-shan lake, which, with other waters in the neighbourhood, is skirted, if not traversed, by the Grain Canal. It was just below these lakes in Yih-hien, a border district of Shan-tung, that the floods stopped the grain fleet at the period before referred to, and compelled its contents to make a détour by land to Tsi-ning-chau, some eighty miles north.

The cause of the inundation is doubtless to be found in the divergence of the Yellow River from its ancient bed. For a stream without its rival in the impetuosity of its current, its direction is shown by history to have been oftener changed by the ingenuity of man than any river of like pretension, and the reactions of its violence have been proportionably numerous.

On the 3rd January, 1857, Dr. Macgowan, of Ningpo, started some queries regarding the Yellow River, in the "North China Herald." He had heard that, so far back as 1852, the Yellow River was fordable at Hwai-ngan-fu. A Chinese in his employ, of highly respectable antecedents, had found it all but dry up at Sü-chau, in September 1853, and had been told that higher up at Kai-fung, the capital of Ho-nan, the water was too low to allow of the approach of boats to the city. In May last, the Director-General of River Works reported the Yellow River dry in nine of the twenty-two petty circuits of his jurisdiction. This is beyond doubt. It is stated in a financial paper, in which he informs the Emperor that he is not drawing for the repairs of these embankments, as there is no water of the Yellow River in them. The Emperor remarked in the same month, according to Dr. Macgowan, that "the Yellow River no longer flows as usual." Dr. Macgowan adds, that travellers report that the Yellow River now makes its way through Tsau-chau-fu, across Shan-tung, into the Gulf of Chih-li; he presumes by its ancient channel. This would be in some sort parallel with the canal, and in the direction of Lin-tsing-chau. Against this hypothesis Dr. Macgowan's Chinese authority states that, in February 1853, there was less water than usual from Tien-tsin to the point where the canal is fed from the east by the Yun-ho (Wan-ho?). The current there turned in his favour (Lord Amherst's Embassy note the same), and the water in the canal became less and less till it reached the Yellow River, where it (the canal) was dry.

Dr. Macgowan finds other accounts contradict the rumour that the river has turned north-west, and his queries generally tend to connect the phenomenon of the disappearance of its lower waters with the numerous earthquakes of which we have had recent notice in North China, Manchuria, and Japan. That the river is dry at the point where the canal fleet used to cross it, we have the most indisputable evidence. In May 1857, the English missionary long resident at Shanghae went up the canal above Hwai-ngan-fu to Tsing-kiang-pu, the residence of the Director-General of River Works, some four miles distant from

the Yellow River; thence he ascended the bank of the *ci-devant* stream, which rises some thirty feet above the surrounding country, and looked down on its dry bed, now a red sandy plain of about a mile in width, slightly depressed in the centre, with a deeper rut near the southern bank, in which there is a plentiful supply of perfectly clear water. The same gentleman subsequently heard, by letter, of the river's escape into the Gulf of Pecheli (across Shan-tung), and learned, by inquiry, that the bank on the Shan-tung side (the east bank of its new course) had given way between 400 and 500 miles above Tsing-kiang-pu. This, if we are to understand that the river is following the direction of the canal, as above surmised, would put the rupture in question near Liu-tsin, from which point, be it remembered, the Yu-ho flows north, through a channel more indebted to nature than art.

Chinese history shows that in the first century and a-half after the great Mongolian undertaking which connected the rivers of Chih-li with the Yang-tze, and which has given the Yuen dynasty more glory than properly belongs to it, the Grand Canal was not esteemed so perfect but that simplifications of the route by sea suggested themselves more than once. Some time about 1340-60, it was proposed to pierce the Shan-tung promontory by a new river, to be called the Kiau-lai; it being, in fact, a cut connecting the Kiau, a stream running south into the sea through Kiau-chau, and the Lai, running north out of Lai-chau-fu. The works continued five years, and were then stopped by the Emperor. Under the following dynasty, the Ming, in 1461, it was proposed to complete them, giving the new stream a mouth in the district of Yeh, so as to save 1,000 *li* of coast transit to the Peiho. The proposal was rejected. So was another in 1531, on account of the rock to be cut through. In 1538, notwithstanding, the Provincial Government undertook to blow up the rocks, and in a year or so did open a canal with nine locks, in which there were but ten miles of difficulty. But in 1552, there was water only half-way through, and in 1570 much mud was complained of, indeed, the cut was becoming impassable towards the north; sand was choking both its extremities; it was shoal in spring and summer, and dangerous from floods in autumn and winter. Another alteration of the channel was suggested in 1574, but the expense was too great. Lastly, in 1643, the year before the Ming were driven out by the Manchus, it was suggested that supplies (rations in grain or money) should be sent by this route; but this was also rejected.

It may be assumed as tolerably certain, that, whatever has become of the Yellow River, there is now little immediate prospect either of the canal's accessibility by way of that river, or its navigation between that river and Tsi-ning, the terminus of the portage of 1852. Of its condition north of Tsi-ning, no specific mention is made in the Gazettes under review, nor does the chronicle of the rebel movements throw much light on the subject. The Tai-ping insurgents descended it a short way in their movement on Tien-tsin, in October 1853, but do not seem to have used it when they retreated in 1854. The rebel reinforcement which reached Liu-tsing in May 1854, had crossed the Yellow River in March, in the Fung district, and do not appear, going or returning, to have approached the canal nearer than that point. The movements of the Nieh Fi, a Ho-nan banditti, who rose as the insurgents passed, overspread the conterminous districts of Ho-nan, Chih-li, Shan-tung, Kiang-su, and Ngan-hwui, in which last province they are still formidable; but this first raid only included the ground of the original inundation, and the rebel vagaries altogether increase our mystification as to the possible whereabouts of the Yellow River.

Supposing the canal to be practicable between Tsi-ning and Tien-tsin, we can find no stream by which junks could approach that section of it from the sea-board south of the Ta-tsing. This river, some 200 miles from its mouth, joins the canal, and is also connected with the Wan-ho, one of the canal's most important affluents from the east. The "Gazette" of the 30th June, 1858, shows that when the foreign Missions entered the Tien-tsin river last year, 132 junks, carrying about 26,000 piculs, ran for the Ta-ts'ing river; that most of this was taken to a place on the Pih-kau river, described as some 200 *li* west of the Ta-ts'ing, and reshipped on the Pih-kau for Tung-chau; an arrangement which, with our notion of the geographical relations of the places named, is simply incomprehensible.

Other causes place the food market of the capital singularly at the mercy of any enemy who takes the field against the Emperor early in the year.

Various Chinese, natives of Peking, and for many years resident there, affirm that the waters at and about Peking are frozen from the 10th to the 2nd moon, say from November to February. One states it to be his strong impression that the rivers of Shan-tung and Ho-nan are nearly in the same predicament. Another who, earlier in life, made several journeys from Peking to Hu-peh and back, says that, in the winter of 1839, he crossed the Yellow River a little east of Kai-fung-fu, the capital of Ho-nan, and that it was frozen over. This city is some 300 miles south of Peking.

Père Amiot, in his critique on M. Pauw's Researches, observes, "que le canal est fermé par la glace depuis le mois de Novembre jusqu'à celui de Mars." ("Mémoires concernant les Chinois," ii, 541.)

The same missionary, Amiot, supporting Martini's theory that the extraordinary consistence of its ice is due to the nitrous properties of the soil, air, and weather of Chih-li, again observes: "C'est que les rivières des environs de Péking dont on la tire (la glace), commencent à gêler vers le milieu du mois de Novembre, et ne dégêlent que sur le fin de Mars. Quelque temps qu'il fasse dans l'intervalle de ces deux extrêmes, on peut sans danger marcher hardiment sur les eaux." ("Mémoires," &c., ii, 541.)

Again: "(Les terres) gêlent en hiver jusqu'à trois ou quatre pieds de profondeur, et une fois prises, elles ne dégêlent que vers la fin de Mars; ce qui suffit, ce me semble, pour expliquer pourquoi la gelée tue aux environs de Péking des plantes que M. Linnæus a elevées dans la Suède." ("Mémoires," &c., vi, 345.)

A lump of ice, weighing 50 livres French, bought in the street of Peking for experiment, by Père Amiot, on the 29th July, 1777, took fifteen hours to melt completely, though exposed to the air and sun.

Another writer, in the same collection, in a paper on Chinese green-houses, says of the cold, "Quoiqu'il soit plus doux depuis quelques années, il donne un froid qui fait descendre le termomètre à 13 et 14 degrés au-dessous de congélation, et le fixe des mois entiers entre sept et dix." (Vol. iii, 424, published 1778.)

As to the possibility of entering the Gulf of Pecheli during the contrary monsoon, it has been thought that such a voyage is made practicable to junks by a southerly slant in the 10th moon, say December. A good authority on such points can state no more than this—that going to California, in the winter monsoon, he has often found the wind north-west instead of north-east. His course lay between Lewchew and Japan, that is, hardly so far north by two degrees as Shanghae, at which port the prevailing wind in the latter winter months certainly is north-westerly.

A Chinese long resident at Shanghae says that he knows that during the winter junks do contrive to reach Manchuria from Shanghae; but whether their port is on the south coast of that province, or on the east shore of the Gulf of Pecheli, he cannot say. With a north-west wind junks might fetch Fung-hwang from Shanghae.

The second Emperor of this dynasty (K'ang Hi), a very learned and inquiring man, observes, in a paper translated in the "Mémoires," that when the wind is north-west in Chih-li, it blows south in the adjoining Province of Shan-tung; also that the only wind that blows steadily at Peking is the south-west.

No. 13.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 28, 1860.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 6th ultimo, and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve your having delayed, for the reasons therein stated, to act upon the instructions contained in my despatches of the 29th of October and 10th of November last with regard to the satisfaction to be required of the Chinese Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 14.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 17.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, January 21, 1860.*

THE inability of Admiral Hope to act aggressively for some time confirms me in the opinion, that before presenting an ultimatum, it is expedient, if possible, to ascertain the disposition of Sieh on his arrival from Peking, which is daily expected.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Rear-Admiral Hope to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, "*Chesapeake*," *Hong Kong, January 14, 1860.*

CONCURRING entirely in the views expressed in your letter of the 6th instant, I regret that the early departure of the packet compels me for the present to delay stating the grounds of my concurrence.

Under the most favourable circumstances, I have no expectation of a force being collected here sufficient to act before the middle of April, and the uncertainty which must necessarily attend the concentration of a force collected from points so distant, and so various, renders it highly inexpedient that you should adopt any course which would involve the necessity of commencing active operations at any fixed period.

I shall not fail to acquaint you immediately that I am able to speak with more certainty on this point.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HOPE.

No. 15.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 26.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, February 6, 1860.*

SIEH does not appear to have arrived from Peking, nor has any overture been made to myself or M. de Bourboulon.

It is said that several of the grain granaries at Tien-tsin have been destroyed by fire, and that the Government is chartering junks to take up supplies. I am told that little rice is to be had in this province, and that there is great reluctance on the part of the junk-owners to undertake the transport of what can be obtained from the neighbouring provinces.

M. de Bourboulon and myself have, however, agreed to request the Admirals to place a vessel of each nation at our disposal, in order to carry the letters specifying the ultimatum to the mouth of the Peiho. By adopting this mode of proceeding we shall gain information of what is passing in the north, keep the local authorities longer in suspense, and the junk-owners will be alarmed, and prevented, I hope, from starting in any considerable number, until the arrangements for protecting the forts are completed, and a sufficient force assembled for an effectual blockade of the Pecheli.

There is reason to believe, from Captain Bythesea's investigations last autumn, that there are several points on its coast, besides Takoo, where the grain can be disembarked and transported to the capital, though not without additional expense and trouble.

The stoppage of these junks, according to the best information, would be financially a blow to the Chinese Government, for it is issued as rations to the troops and the households of the dignitaries of the Empire. But it does not form the food of the bulk of the population, and there is said to be always a large surplus in store.

I do not think, therefore, that this operation taken singly will be sufficient to overcome the formidable opposition we must expect to our demands; and if we were to stop the junks at the place of embarkation before our preparations

for defence are completed, the valuable interests at the settlements might be seriously compromised.

I feel myself in a position of much difficulty with reference to the ultimatum I am directed to present. The French ultimatum demands an indemnity for the expenses of the expedition rendered necessary by the conduct of the Chinese Government. In my instructions that demand is made contingent on the ultimatum of Her Majesty's Government being rejected; an act of grace founded, I apprehend, on the impression conveyed by my first despatches, that the Chinese Government would be glad of a reasonable and fair accommodation.

I do not think that impression was a correct one; on the contrary, I am now more convinced than ever that from the period of our departure from Tien-tsin in 1858, the war party assumed the ascendant, and deliberately determined to set aside the engagements entered into by the Emperor. For though the main objection stated is to the residence of a Minister, I cannot doubt that if an arrangement be made which leaves the credit and power of the war-party intact, they will strain every nerve to render nugatory the stipulations destined to facilitate intercourse with this country. We know by the example of Foo-chow, which remained hermetically sealed to trade for ten years after the Treaty of Nanking, that a port may be nominally open, and may be practically shut; and violent counsellors will without difficulty throw such obstacles in the way of granting passports, and of the operation of the clauses respecting transit-duties, as will either reduce these privileges to nothing, or will lead to fresh differences in a short time. I feel bound to record my conviction that nothing short of the complete defeat of this hostile party, and a lesson which will teach the Chinese that perfidy and bad faith lead necessarily to signal punishment, will enable us to place our relations for the future on a secure basis. I do not think that this lesson will be given, if the Chinese are allowed to plan an ambuscade and slaughter our men, and then to escape from the consequences of their acts by consenting to receive us in a proper manner when they see a force collected which they are afraid to resist. This result will encourage the advocates of that system of dogged obstruction which has characterized all their intercourse with us, which has rendered all amicable efforts to adjust difficulties unavailing, and has led even in cases of private wrong either to an acquiescence in injustice, or to its redress by local acts of violence.

The spirit of your Lordship's despatch of the 10th November leads me to hope that this view will not be contrary to the policy of Her Majesty's Government. If the Emperor had disavowed the act committed by his subordinates at once, and had made such advances towards an accommodation as would have justified me in assuming that he would consent to reasonable terms, and in forwarding the ultimatum on its arrival, I should have done so with pleasure.

But as a display, if not an actual exercise of force, will certainly be required to make the Chinese give way, and I cannot proceed as I should do, did a disposition to effect an amicable settlement exist,—as I must be prepared to meet retaliatory measures, and to follow the demands up with an early blow, I hope your Lordship will think me borne out in making my ultimatum agree with that of the French, and that the advantages of an identity of proceeding on the part of the Allies will excuse the step.

I need not dwell on the grave inconveniences to which an opposite course may lead. If there is one art of diplomacy understood by the Chinese, it is that of separating interests which ought to be identical, and from it we are suffering at present.

Two years ago the Representatives of England and France avoided it by endorsing each other's demands, but on a question of pecuniary indemnity, asked by a foreign Power, I could not adopt such a measure. I must, therefore, either make a similar demand, justified fully, I submit, by the moral features of the case, or desert our Allies in a legitimate demand, and expose China and the interests connected with it to the risk of a contest with France single-handed.

I am quite aware of the responsibility I incur, and trust that my reasons will prove satisfactory to your Lordship.

No. 16.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, April* 17, 1860

IT was to be hoped that the Emperor of China, when fully informed of the misconduct of his officers in firing upon British ships, without notice, would have been ready both to apologize, and to declare his readiness to abide by the Treaty of Tien-tsin, to which his Imperial sanction had been already given.

But hitherto we have only received obscure intimations that the Treaty will be fulfilled by the Emperor of China; while the Chinese Government lay upon the British Plenipotentiary and the British Admiral the blame of that conflict which was occasioned by their own culpable concealment of their intention to resist by force the passage of the Peiho to Tien-tsin.

In these circumstances Her Majesty, resolved to employ every means calculated to establish peace between Her Majesty and the Emperor of the French on the one hand, and the Emperor of China on the other, has determined to call upon your Lordship again to give your valuable services to promote this important object, and has signified her intention of appointing your Lordship to proceed to China as her Ambassador Extraordinary to deal with these matters.

Her Majesty and her august ally are of opinion that persons of weight and authority, like your Lordship and Baron Gros, whom the Emperor of the French will appoint to act as your colleague, may prevail upon the Emperor of China to make concessions, which misplaced pride and misguiding counsels might otherwise induce him to reject, and thus to avert the necessity of further hostilities. It is obvious that many events may occur, and many difficulties may arise, in the course of the transactions which you and your colleague will have to conduct, which it is impossible to foresee. But some indications of the general views of Her Majesty's Government may be useful to you in the performance of the duties you are about to undertake. In giving you these general views, I wish you to understand that your Lordship is not required to pursue any line of conduct which circumstances of place and time may show to be inexpedient or inopportune.

The first point on which I shall touch regards the occupation of territory.

If the requisite apology for the outrage at Takoo be made, and if the Treaty of Tien-tsin be ratified, the necessity for a continued occupation of any portion of the Chinese territory, as a material guarantee for the payment of the required indemnity, may perhaps be obviated by some arrangement which will secure its gradual liquidation. This might be done by appropriating a portion of the Chinese Customs duties to the gradual payment of the indemnity.

This observation applies likewise to the occupation of Canton, which might in such case cease.

If such an arrangement should prove to be impossible, you will concert measures with the French Ambassador for the joint occupation of Chusan, or some other portion of the Chinese territory, in addition to the city of Canton, by the British and French forces till the indemnity is paid.

There are some other points on which suggestions rather than directions may be given to you with advantage.

It will be necessary that the British and French Ambassadors should reach Peking, and that they should be received there with honour. Their continued residence at the capital must be a matter left to your joint discretion.

There are many obvious inconveniences to which a British Minister residing at Peking might be exposed during that part of the year when the severity of winter would cut him off from all communication with any British force or authorities in any other parts of China.

With respect to decisions which turn more upon naval and military considerations, such as the march upon Tien-tsin, the further advance of the allied forces beyond that town, and the occupation of Tien-tsin during the winter, should peace not have been made before the autumn, your discretion will be guided by the opinions of the Allied Military and Naval Commanders.

In carrying on operations in the north of China, there is a danger to which Her Majesty's Government are very sensible. It may happen that, after taking the forts at the mouth of the Peiho, after the capture of Tien-tsin, and even in contemplation of the capture of Peking itself, the Emperor of China may refuse

the terms of peace demanded. He may retire from his capital, and await in retirement in Tartary the further measures of the allies. Such a course might entail great embarrassment on the allies, and expose to danger the authority of the Emperor of China.

As it might not be expedient that the allied forces should remain at Peking or even at Tien-tsin during the winter, it would, probably, be necessary for them to return about the month of October to the Gulf of Pecheli, and then, by blockade and the capture of islands and other similar measures, endeavour to distress the Chinese Government.

But while this course would be tedious and expensive for the allies, it might place the Emperor of China in a position of obvious peril.

Abandoning his capital upon the advance of European troops, condemned to admit the superiority of Powers whom the Court of China, in its fatuity, has hitherto treated with contempt, the Emperor would suffer greatly in reputation.

The rebels would take heart; the great officers of the Empire might find it difficult to maintain the central authority; the Governors of Provinces might hardly be able to quell insurrection. In short, the whole Empire might run the risk of dissolution.

Her Majesty would see with great concern such a state of things. It might even portend a great catastrophe; and the bonds of allegiance, once loosened, might never again be firmly united.

In these circumstances your Lordship and your enlightened colleague, Baron Gros, will be required to exercise those personal qualities of firmness and discretion which have induced Her Majesty and her ally to place their confidence in you and the French Plenipotentiary.

There are, however, three conditions a consent to which by the Chinese Government seems indispensable. These are:—

First. An apology for the attack on the allied forces at the Peiho.

Secondly. The ratification and execution of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

Thirdly. The payment of an indemnity to the allies for the expenses of naval and military preparations.

If these terms are obtained, we may hope for permanent peace and future amicable relations with China.

No. 17.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 17, 1860.

IN transmitting you Her Majesty's instructions for your conduct in China, there is one point upon which you might wish to have a communication of the views of Her Majesty's Government, to be used according to your discretion and judgment at the time and on the spot.

It is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that, in respect to the question of authority as regards the diplomatic and naval and military servants of the two Crowns, the Plenipotentiaries should be the sole judges of all matters pertaining to negotiations—when they should commence, when break off, what terms should be accepted, what refused. But this large discretion should be subject to the condition, that if the Military Chiefs assign military reasons for declining to stay military operations at any given moment, those reasons should prevail.

I shall send a copy of this despatch to Paris, and trust that Baron Gros will be armed with similar powers.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 18.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 27.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, March* 6, 1860.

I AM informed by Admiral Hope that he will be able in the course of this month to take sufficient measures for the protection of Shanghae and for the

occupation of Chusan, should hostilities become unavoidable, and should it be decided to occupy that island as a base of operations. The necessity of despatching to Singapore the four paddle-wheel steamers, stationed in these seas, to assist in towing the transports up to Hong-Kong has reduced very much for the present the naval force available for operations, and we must trust for the security of Foo-chow and of the minor ports to the effect produced on their population by the arrival of troops in the South, which will take place, I trust, soon after the expiry of the thirty days fixed in the ultimatum for its unconditional acceptance. For the protection of the ports we are at present dependent exclusively on the British navy. Of the French squadron but one vessel had reached Hong-Kong at the date of my last letters, and the Americans have only one vessel or steam-corvette on the station. She is in the South.

M. de Bourboulon and myself have, however, decided on not delaying further the transmission of our demands formally to Peking, trusting that the Chinese Government will ere this have received such information as to the force under way as will convince them of its imposing character, and may therefore incline them to a *bonâ fide* acceptance of the terms offered, and thus insure to us such a reception as will be accounted satisfactory. To that end I think the immediate approach, if not the actual arrival, of an imposing force absolutely indispensable; for the absence of any communication subsequent to the arrival of Sieh, coupled with reports of hostile preparations being in progress in the river, all point to the conclusion that the influence of the violent party is still predominant in the Emperor's councils, and until faith in their power of resistance is shaken I fear that the voice of the commercial interests of the sea-board of Central China will not be listened to at Peking.

I have the honour to inclose copy of the ultimatum which I have endeavoured to frame in accordance with the spirit of your Lordship's instructions. That of M. de Bourboulon does not vary essentially, except in asserting the principle of the payment of the expenses of the expedition sent out by France.

I considered seriously whether I should be justified in inserting a similar demand on the part of Her Majesty's Government. But this involved a serious departure from your Lordship's instructions, while on the other hand, if the peace party recovers the ascendant, the payment of an indemnity will not offer a serious difficulty in the way of peace. But it is evident that this will depend on its not being excessive in amount; and a satisfactory arrangement of this question is rendered more probable by our abstaining from making a like demand in the first instance.

I have addressed the ultimatum to the Senior Secretary of State and the members of the Council. I have not inserted the name of Kweiliang, as I have sought to leave a loop-hole to the Emperor of China by showing that his Decree was based on the misrepresentation of what passed between his Commissioners and the Envoys at Shanghae.

M. de Bourboulon and myself have agreed that it is advisable to send these documents through Ho, the established channel of communication with the Imperial Government. It is not unlikely that the Chinese at the forts of Ta-koo might refuse to accept the letters, or at least that no person would present himself of sufficient rank to allow us to fix on the Government the responsibility of their receipt. Should they decline taking charge of them, an inconvenient delay would be the result.

I ought to observe, that both in the published Decrees of this Government, and in the language held by the authorities, there is evidence of a hope on the part of the Chinese that the present question may be considered as one affecting the English only. For this reason it has appeared to me most desirable that the demands of the French should be made at the same time with ours, in order that the Chinese may understand that the cause is common to both nations, and I think on the whole that in the interests of peace the advantages of this joint proceeding outweigh the inconvenience resulting from the difference on one point of the terms we offer.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Mr. Bruce to the Senior Secretary of State, Pang Wan-chang.

Shanghae, March , 1860.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to address a communication to his Excellency Pang Wan-chang, &c., and their Excellencies the Members of the Great Council of His Majesty the Emperor of China.

The Undersigned has the honour to state that, as in duty bound, he has laid before Her Britannic Majesty's Government a full narrative of all the circumstances attending his journey to the mouth of the Tien-tsin river last summer for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, as required by the provisions of that Treaty, on or before the 26th June, 1859.

Besides the whole of his correspondence with the Imperial Commissioners and other officers of the Imperial Government, the Undersigned has transmitted to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty a copy of the Imperial Decree dated the 9th August, and handed by the Emperor's desire to the United States' Minister, Mr. Ward, on the eve of his departure from Peking.

The Decree begins as follows:—"Last year the ships of the English sailed into the port of Tien-tsin and opened a fire on our troops. We accordingly instructed Sang-ko-lin-sin, Prince of the Khor-chin tribe, to adopt the most stringent measures for the defence of Takoo, and (the Envoys of) the different nations coming up to exchange Treaties on this occasion were told by Kweiliang and Hwashana, at Shanghae, that Takoo was thus strictly guarded, and that they must go round by the port of Peh-tang. The Englishman Bruce, notwithstanding, when he came to Tien-tsin in the 5th moon, did not abide by his original understanding with Kweiliang and his colleague, but actually forced his way into the port of Takoo, destroying our defensive apparatus."

The Undersigned did not fail at once to apprise the Government of Her Britannic Majesty that the Emperor had been singularly misled. Had it, indeed, been signified to him by the Commissioners at Shanghae that His Majesty had decided on closing to foreign Envoys the natural and most convenient highway to his capital, such evidence of an unfriendly disposition on the part of the Imperial Government would certainly have been regarded by the Undersigned as fit matter of remonstrance and negotiation.

No intimation of the kind, however, was conveyed to the Undersigned in the letters of the Imperial Commissioners. The port of Peh-tang was never named by them, nor did the Undersigned enter into any engagement with them other than that contained in his letter of the 16th May, in which he acquainted his Excellency Kweiliang of the nature and object of his mission, and of his intention to proceed by ship to Tien-tsin, from which city he requested his Excellency to give the necessary orders for his conveyance to Peking.

He begs to inclose copy of this letter, as also of that received from the Imperial Commissioner of the 12th June. These will prove that the Undersigned was allowed to quit Shanghae in total ignorance of the Emperor's objection to his employment of the usual river route.

A like silence on the subject of the Imperial prohibition was observed towards Admiral Hope, Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval forces in these seas, when in furtherance of the objects made known to his Excellency Kweiliang in the letter above cited, he appeared on the 17th June at the mouth of the river to announce the approach of the Undersigned and his colleague, the Minister of France. The Admiral was assured that the passage had been closed by the so-called militia whom he found in charge of the booms obstructing it, without the orders of their Government, none of whose officers, the militia repeatedly affirmed, were near the spot; also that it was closed not against foreigners, but against a native enemy. These false representations were supported by false appearances, the batteries of the forts were masked, no banners were displayed, no soldier discovered himself. Still further to prevent verification of the statements of the militia, no communication was allowed with the shore. After promising to remove the obstacles at the river mouth, the militia repudiated the promise. They conducted themselves with rudeness and violence to the officers who were sent to speak with them, in one instance proceeding so far as to threaten the life of a gentleman dispatched with a message from the Admiral.

Such was the state of things when the Undersigned arrived outside the bar on the 20th June. Finding that the officials persisted in keeping aloof, while the militia continued to assert that the obstruction of the river-way was their own unauthorized act, he called on the Admiral to take such steps as would enable him to reach the capital by the time appointed. This, after due notice given to the militia, and after receiving from them an assurance on the previous evening that they should certainly have nothing further to communicate, the Admiral was proceeding to effect, on the 25th June, the eighth day from his arrival, when the forts, which had been for these eight days to all appearance deserted, suddenly opened fire upon his squadron. Apparently to cover this treacherous conduct the officers in charge of the forts have imposed another fiction on His Imperial Majesty, who has been led to believe that the British squadron assumed the offensive by bombarding the forts. This is utterly without foundation: no shot was fired until the batteries had opened, the ships having no other object in advancing, but to remove the obstacles placed across the river without authority.

The facts of the case are simply those stated by the Undersigned, and Her Britannic Majesty's Government, after mature deliberation, have decided that, whether the Emperor of China was cognizant of this act of hostility or whether it was directed by his officers, it is an outrage for which the Chinese Government must be held responsible. Her Britannic Majesty's Government require, therefore, an immediate and unconditional acceptance of the following terms:—

1. That an ample and satisfactory apology be made for the act of the troops who fired on the ships of Her Britannic Majesty from the forts of Takoo in June last, and that all guns and material, as well as the ships abandoned od that occasion, be restored.

2. That the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin be exchanged, without delay, at Peking; that, when the Minister of Her Britannic Majesty proceeds to Peking for that purpose, he be permitted to proceed up the river, by Takoo, to the city of Tien-tsin in a British vessel; and that provision be made by the Chinese authorities for the conveyance of himself and of his suite, with due honour, from that city to Peking.

3. That full effect be given to the provisions of the said Treaties, including a satisfactory arrangement to be made for the prompt payment of the indemnity of 4,000,000 taels, as stipulated in the Treaty, for losses and military expenses entailed on the British Government by the misconduct of the Canton authorities.

The Undersigned is further directed to state that, in consequence of the attempt made to obstruct the passage of the Undersigned to Peking, the understanding entered into between the Earl of Elgin and the Imperial Commissioners in October 1858, with respect to the residence of the British Minister in China, is at an end, and that it rests henceforward exclusively with Her Majesty, in accordance with the terms of Article II of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, to decide whether or not she shall instruct her Minister to take up his abode permanently at Peking.*

The Undersigned has only to add, that unless he receives, within a period of thirty days from the date of this communication, a reply conveying the unqualified assent of His Majesty the Emperor of China to these demands, [a large pecuniary indemnity will be demanded from the Government of China, and†] the British naval and military authorities will proceed to adopt such measures as they may deem advisable for the purpose of compelling the Emperor of China to observe the engagements contracted for him by his Plenipotentiaries at Tien-tsin, and approved by his Imperial Edict of July 1858.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

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* This is inserted according to the version finally sent:—"The Undersigned has further to observe, that the outrage at the Peiho has compelled Her Majesty's Government to increase her forces in China at a considerable cost, and the contribution that may be required from the Chinese Government towards defraying this expense will be greater or less according to the promptitude with which the demands above made are satisfied in full by the Imperial Government."

† These words omitted in the version finally sent.

No. 19.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 27.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, March* 7, 1860.

SINCE closing my despatch of the 6th instant, I have decided upon adding to the ultimatum a clause, of which I beg to inclose a copy. It will precede the concluding paragraph.

I have been influenced in this decision by the consideration that the French were asking positively for an indemnity while we were demanding none.

Mature deliberation on all such intelligence as I have been able to collect assures me at the same time that it is not the money question which will drive the Chinese Government to war. The Treasury is empty; but the mercantile community continues solvent, and I apprehend no difficulties on the score of indemnity.

I consider it also as advantageous, as regards the Chinese Government, that the proposals of the two Powers should be, as much as possible, in harmony.

The modification which I have introduced involves, of course, the omission of the words: "A large pecuniary indemnity will be demanded from the Government of China," in the last paragraph of the ultimatum inclosed in my despatch of yesterday.

The mail having been already sent on board, it was not in my power to withdraw that letter.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Paragraph to be inserted in the Ultimatum.

THE Undersigned has further to observe that the outrage at the Peiho has compelled Her Majesty's Government to increase her forces in China at a considerable cost, and the contribution that may be required from the Chinese Government towards defraying this expense will be greater or less according to the promptitude with which the demands above made are satisfied in full by the Imperial Government.

No. 20.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 27.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, March* 8, 1860.

HER Majesty's ship "Sampson" leaves to-day for Hong Kong, and as she is likely to catch the mail for Europe, I inclose copy of the ultimatum I am about to send to the Chinese Government.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Mr. Bruce to the Senior Secretary of State, Pang Wan-chang.

Shanghae, March 8, 1860.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to address a communication to his Excellency Pang Wan-chang, a Senior Secretary of State, and their Excellencies the Members of the Great Council of His Majesty the Emperor of China.

The Undersigned has the honour to state, that, as in duty bound, he has laid before Her Britannic Majesty's Government a full narrative of all the circumstances attending his journey to the mouth of the Tien-tsin river last summer, for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, as required by the provisions of that Treaty, on or before the 26th June, 1859.

Besides the whole of his correspondence with the Imperial Commissioners and other officers of the Imperial Government, the Undersigned has transmitted

to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty a copy of the Imperial Decree, dated the 9th August, and handed by the Emperor's desire to the United States' Minister, Mr. Ward, on the eve of his departure from Peking.

The Decree begins as follows :—

"Last year the ships of the English sailed into the port of Tien-tsin, and opened a fire on our troops. We accordingly instructed Sang-ko-lin-sin, Prince of the Khorchin tribe, to adopt the most stringent measures for the defence of Takoo, and (the Envoys of) the different nations coming up to exchange Treaties on this occasion, were told by Kweiliang and Hwashana, at Shanghae, that Takoo was thus strictly guarded, and that they must go round by the port of Peh-tang. The Englishman Bruce, notwithstanding, when he came to Tien-tsin, in the 5th moon, did not abide by his original understanding with Kweiliang and his colleague, but actually forced his way into the port of Takoo, destroying our defensive apparatus."

The Undersigned did not fail at once to apprize the Government of Her Britannic Majesty that the Emperor had been singularly misled. Had it, indeed, been signified to him by the Commissioners at Shanghae that His Majesty had decided on closing to foreign Envoys the natural and most convenient highway to his capital, such evidence of an unfriendly disposition on the part of the Imperial Government would certainly have been regarded by the Undersigned as fit matter of remonstrance and negotiation.

No intimation of the kind, however, was conveyed to the Undersigned in the letters of the Imperial Commissioners. The port of Peh-tang was never named by them, nor did the Undersigned enter into any engagement with them, other than that contained in his letter of the 16th May, in which he acquainted his Excellency Kweiliang of the nature and object of his mission, and of his intention to proceed by ship to Tien-tsin, from which city he requested his Excellency to give the necessary orders for his conveyance to Peking.

He begs to inclose copy of this letter, as also of that received from the Imperial Commissioner of the 12th June. These will prove that the Undersigned was allowed to quit Shanghae in total ignorance of the Emperor's objection to his employment of the usual river-route.

A like silence on the subject of the Imperial prohibition was observed towards Admiral Hope, Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval forces in these seas, when in furtherance of the objects made known to his Excellency Kweiliang in the letter above cited, he appeared on the 17th June at the mouth of the river to announce the approach of the Undersigned and his colleague, the Minister of France. The Admiral was assured that the passage had been closed by the so-called militia whom he found in charge of the booms obstructing it, without the orders of their Government, none of whose officers, the militia repeatedly affirmed, were near the spot; also that it was closed, not against foreigners, but against a native enemy. These false representations were supported by false appearances: the batteries of the forts were masked; no banners were displayed; no soldier discovered himself. Still further to prevent verification of the statements of the militia, no communication was allowed with the shore. After promising to remove the obstacles at the river-mouth, the militia repudiated the promise. They conducted themselves with rudeness and violence to the officers who were sent to speak with them, in one instance proceeding so far as to threaten the life of a gentleman dispatched with a message from the Admiral.

Such was the state of things when the Undersigned arrived outside the bar, on the 20th June. Finding that the officials persisted in keeping aloof, while the militia continued to assert that the obstruction of the river-way was their own unauthorized act, he called on the Admiral to take such steps as would enable him to reach the capital by the time appointed. This, after due notice given to the militia, and after receiving from them an assurance, on the previous evening, that they should certainly have nothing further to communicate, the Admiral was proceeding to effect, on the 25th June, the eighth day from his arrival, when the forts, which had been for these eight days to all appearances deserted, suddenly opened fire upon his squadron. Apparently to cover this treacherous conduct, the officers in charge of the forts have imposed another fiction on His Imperial Majesty, who has been led to believe that the British squadron assumed the offensive by bombarding the forts. This is utterly without foundation: no shot was fired until the batteries had opened; the ships having

no other object in advancing but to remove the obstacles placed across the river without authority.

The facts of the case are simply those stated by the Undersigned, and Her Britannic Majesty's Government, after mature deliberation, have decided that whether the Emperor of China was cognizant of this act of hostility, or whether it was directed by his officers, it is an outrage for which the Chinese Government must be held responsible. Her Britannic Majesty's Government require, therefore, an immediate and unconditional acceptance of the following terms :—

1. That an ample and satisfactory apology be made for the act of the troops who fired on the ships of Her Britannic Majesty from the forts of Takoo in June last, and that all guns and material, as well as the ships abandoned on that occasion, be restored.

2. That the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin be exchanged without delay at Peking; that when the Minister of Her Britannic Majesty proceeds to Peking for that purpose, he be permitted to proceed up the river by Takoo to the city of Tien-tsin in a British vessel; and that provision be made by the Chinese authorities for the conveyance of himself and of his suite with due honour from that city to Peking.

3. That full effect be given to the provisions of the said Treaties, including a satisfactory arrangement to be made for the prompt payment of the indemnity of 4,000,000 taels, as stipulated in the Treaty, for losses and military expenses entailed on the British Government by the misconduct of the Canton authorities.

The Undersigned is further directed to state that, in consequence of the attempt made to obstruct the passage of the Undersigned to Peking, the understanding entered into between the Earl of Elgin and the Imperial Commissioners in October 1858, with respect to the residence of the British Minister in China, is at an end, and that it rests henceforward exclusively with Her Britannic Majesty, in accordance with the terms of Article II of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, to decide whether or not she shall instruct her Minister to take up his abode permanently at Peking.

The Undersigned has further to observe, that the outrage at the Peiho has compelled Her Majesty's Government to increase her forces in China at a considerable cost, and the contribution that may be required from the Chinese Government towards defraying this expense, will be greater or less according to the promptitude with which the demands above made are satisfied in full by the Imperial Government.

The Undersigned has only to add, that unless he receives within a period of thirty days from the date of this communication, a reply conveying the unqualified assent of His Majesty the Emperor of China to these demands, the British naval and military authorities will proceed to adopt such measures as they may deem advisable, for the purpose of compelling the Emperor of China to observe the engagements contracted for him by his Plenipotentiaries at Tien-tsin, and approved by his Imperial Edict of July 1858.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 21.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 28.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, April 6, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that I have received a note from his Excellency Ho, the Imperial Commissioner, dated the 28th *ultimo*, informing me that *His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to confer upon* Sieh, Commissioner of Finance for the Nanking Division of the Province of Kiang-su, the honorary title of Provincial Governor, and to associate him with Ho in the administration of the trade of the five ports.

Sieh arrived at this place on the 2nd instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 22.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received May* 28.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, April* 7, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to submit a few observations on the manner in which our relations with the Imperial authorities are at present carried on.

The Imperial Commissioner, Ho, is Governor-General of the Two Kiang Provinces (of which Nanking is the capital), as well as Superintendent of Commercial Affairs. He resides at Chang-chow-foo, about 130 miles from Shanghae.

The distance makes it impossible to establish and keep up the constant personal intercourse with him which is so essential to a speedy and amicable solution of important questions, while his duties as Governor-General afford an excuse for not meeting a foreign Minister whenever the subject of discussion is one he wishes to avoid. Thus Mr. Ward was unable to obtain an interview for the purpose of conferring on the best mode of suppressing the abuses connected with emigration. It is also remarkable that when Ho consented to meet him and fix a time for opening the ports of Swatow and Tai-wan, he followed the precedent established at Canton for the reception of a foreign Minister, and instead of receiving Mr. Ward at his official residence, he selected an out-of-the-way place by the river-side for the interview. The visit itself was of short duration, Ho being called away the same afternoon, as he alleged, to attend to important provincial affairs.

In applying for redress of local grievances, and for the due administration of justice in cases where Her Majesty's subjects have to complain of Chinese, I regret to say that I find no improvement in the state of things so frequently described by my predecessors. Ho's replies are, indeed, couched in courteous language, and abound in promises that redress shall be afforded. But either the Governors-General of other jurisdictions disregard his authority, or he merely puts me off with fair words; for in no case yet has performance followed his promises.

Shin-pao-ching, the author of the calumnious charge at Ningpo of kidnapping against foreigners, is still at large and unpunished. I cannot discover that any penalty has been inflicted on the persons implicated in the murderous assaults on Mr. Lay and others, in the month of July last, at Shanghae; and my request that justice might be done without delay in several cases at Foo-chow of debts, &c., due by Chinese, has been followed by no result. Indeed, it may be said that the clause in the Nanking Treaty providing for the recovery of debts from Chinese has been from the commencement a dead letter.

The difficulty of obtaining redress in cases of individual wrong is no doubt owing, in some degree, to the system of Chinese administration. A high provincial authority in China possesses an almost unlimited discretion and responsibility. He may be guilty of corruption, oppression, and injustice, without the risk of being called to account, so long as he is sufficiently sagacious and sufficiently feared to keep the mass of the population quiet. Should he push his excesses so far as to induce the people to combine against him, he either yields to popular clamour, or an insurrection takes place; troops are called in to quell it, and the Supreme Government finally interferes by an arrangement which generally embraces the punishment of the rioters on the one hand, and the removal and degradation of the officer on the other. His successor takes care not to give the same cause of complaint; and the grievance being thus redressed, everything goes on quietly as before.

The Chinese Government has sought to conduct its intercourse with foreigners in the same way. It repudiates all access to the capital; and though it has appointed a Commissioner to deal with commercial questions under the Treaties, I entertain little doubt that his functions are limited to the discussion and settlement of general questions, and that upon the provincial authorities of each district is devolved the duty of doing justice where foreigners are concerned, and of abstaining from a course of conduct which may endanger public tranquillity.

The Chinese Government has also, in a certain measure, recognized, or acquiesced in, the use of force by the leaders of foreign communities to obtain redress of local wrongs—a right analogous to that of insurrection enjoyed by the

Chinese themselves; and it has invariably closed its eyes to the violent measures sometimes resorted to by foreign Agents and Consuls in reparation of local grievances, such as stoppage of duties, destruction of forts, &c. To such an extent has this been carried, that on the assault and capture of Canton, the language used by Chinese officials at the other ports was, that these events were due to Yeh's mismanagement, and that the Chinese Government was in no way responsible for the conduct that led to this result.

I do not think that, in cases as between man and man, where it is necessary to invoke the aid of Chinese tribunals, a pure administration of justice is to be looked for, nor do I think it would be reasonable to push matters to extremes because of delays and evasions, from which Chinese suitors, I apprehend, suffer at least as much as foreigners. Perhaps a remedy might be found in the institution of a Court composed of officers of both countries for the disposal of such cases. But, independently of the difficulty arising from the employment of torture in Chinese procedure, a Chinese officer will not consent to sit in a public tribunal on terms of equality with foreign authorities. He will receive them on equal terms in his residence, but he will not accord to them that position in the eyes of the people. Nothing short of an order of the Emperor could establish such an innovation on their established customs. In the mean time, those who enter into transactions with Chinese, and give them credit to a large extent, will do well to reflect that they do it at their own risk, and with little hope of judicial support.

The facility and certainty of obtaining redress, however, becomes of greater importance to our security in this country, when violence is used against the persons of Her Majesty's subjects; for if the Chinese are allowed to take the law into their own hands, and commit outrages with impunity, the position of foreigners will soon become untenable, and serious collisions unavoidable. Injuries of this class have been frequently redressed by violent measures adopted at the spot where they occurred. Thus Mr. Alcock exacted retribution for an assault on two missionaries by detaining the Imperial grain-junks; and the American Consul attempted to obtain satisfaction for the murder of an American citizen at Foo-chow by stopping the duties payable by the American trade. The same course was pursued by Sir John Davis in his descent on Canton in 1847; and it is remarkable that in these cases no complaint or remonstrance, as far as I am aware, was made by the Imperial Government.

It is obvious, however, that this principle of local responsibility is attended with serious inconvenience. In the first place, it can only be applied on the seaboard, and at points to which ships of war have access. Its assertion brings with it great danger to the large trading interests located at the ports, and may lead to eventual war, where, as at Canton, the obstinacy and ignorance of a Chinese functionary may induce him to hold out against partial measures. It moreover suits admirably the obstructive policy of the Imperial Government, as it allows of repulsion and evasion being pushed to their utmost limits, the Central Government always reserving to itself the right to disavow the acts of its agents whenever it may become expedient to do so. Furthermore, if the interior of China is to be opened, it will afford little protection to those who wish to avail themselves of the privilege, for the Provincial Governments have no sympathy with or authority over each other. To put pressure, for instance, on the seaboard Province of Che-kiang would have no effect on the authorities of the Province of Hu-peh.

I inclose an extract from the "Abeille du Nord," which describes accurately and advocates this course of policy in China. It recommends that foreign nations should ignore the Peking Government altogether; that all arrangements should be made with the provincial authorities, and punishment locally inflicted for every crime or offence committed against a European; and that foreigners should confine themselves to the seaports. In other words, that China be treated as a congeries of separate States. Whatever be the objects of those who deal in such speculations, it is undoubtedly true that the principle of local responsibility, rigidly enforced, would speedily produce a state of relations not unlike what is described in the inclosed extract.

Suggestions of this kind are founded on a misapprehension of the position and influence of the Chinese Government. There are no semi-independent Pashas, nor a feudal nobility, like that of Japan, in China. Except in the districts occupied by the rebels, the will of the Emperor is supreme; and were

he to change his exclusive and anti-foreign policy for a more liberal system, were he to cease to regard increased intercourse with foreigners as an evil, and were he to recommend them to the protection and hospitality of the authorities and population of the provinces, they would enjoy in China the same security as the natives of the country itself. Unfortunately, the disposition of the Court became more and more hostile, as the impression of the events of 1841-42 wore off, and the change from soothing and management to evasion and dispute, and finally to defiance and resistance, can be easily traced in the conduct of the three successive Imperial Commissioners, Keying, Seu, and Yeh, and is entirely due to the altered attitude of the Government.

So far as the peculiar circumstances of China are concerned, I see, therefore, no other necessity for the employment of irregular methods of obtaining redress, than that which arises from the difficulty of obtaining access to Peking, and from the reluctance of the Imperial Government to admit any immediate responsibility for the manner in which foreign interests are treated.

Inclosure in No. 22.

Extract from an Article on China contained in the "Abeille du Nord."

THE "Abeille du Nord" of St. Petersburgh publishes an article on China, in which it endeavours to prove that the English Government has been unjust towards the Celestial Empire on more than one occasion. The following is the conclusion of the Article:—

"What can European nations want in China but security and liberty of commerce in the sea-ports? It is there that the power of European nations can be sensibly felt without being exposed to considerable losses in men and money. Would it not better, instead of treating directly with an impotent Government, to make arrangements with the local authorities? Let the Peking Gazette occupy itself with chimerical attacks on Europeans; your honour will not suffer. The principal object is to convince the Mandarins in the provinces on the sea-coast that an exemplary chastisement awaits them every time a Chinaman shall commit a crime, or even an offence, against a European. The population in the interior laugh at the idea of an invasion of their provinces. In our opinion it would not be bad policy to accept the Emperor of China's apology for the lamentable incident of the Peiho. In this manner a campaign in the interior of the Celestial Empire might be avoided. At all events, after having obtained satisfaction in one way or another, it will become necessary to revise the Treaty of Tien-tsin, and substitute clauses favourable to commerce, in place of those which are insulting to the Chinese, and cannot be executed. Any other arrangement will lead to permanent collisions most injurious to trade."

No. 23.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 28.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, April 7*, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose extract of information that, some time since, the Imperial Government directed no more grain to be sent North on account of the troubles, and that the rice collected for Government account should be sold here, and the proceeds remitted in money.

I have never entertained the opinion that a stoppage of grain-junks would be of much effect if the hostile party at Peking were still in power, while any partial measures of such a description were calculated to lead to retaliatory measures of annoyance at the open ports, which the Chinese would be encouraged to adopt in consequence of the inadequacy of the force to afford protection to the residents, and the non-arrival of the armaments, the appearance of which may induce the local authorities to hesitate.

It is to be recollected that on this occasion we are directly at issue with the Government of Peking, and it would be an error to assume, because peace was not interrupted while we were engaged in hostilities at Canton, which the

Imperial Government treated as a local disturbance, that the same system will be pursued in the present contest. Whatever may be the disposition of the people at those points, the authorities dare not refuse to make a show of acting, if the Emperor calls upon them to do so.

Her Majesty's Government has, very wisely, decided on confining hostilities to the North, and on inflicting as little injury as possible on the industrious and commercial people of the South. Now the junks employed in the transport of rice are private property, and are largely engaged in carrying foreign goods—opium, &c.—as part of their cargo to the North. They belong to the large commercial guilds, and are well-disposed towards us on account of the assistance they have derived from the operations of Her Majesty's ships against pirates. Their seizure would inflict a heavy loss on the proprietors, would produce a bad feeling amongst them, and seriously cripple their trading operations. It does not appear to me that they deserve to be treated as hostile because, when called on by their Government for funds, they feel compelled to furnish them as subjects of the Emperor of China, any more than the silk and tea-growers, or the brokers who exchange these commodities with our merchants.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 23.

Newspaper Extract.

GRAIN SUPPLY.—A DECREE was received some time since, says a correspondent, directing the Governor-General to dispose of all cargoes of grain intended for Peking which had not yet put to sea, "as there was (or, would be) trouble on the road," and to remit the money to Peking instead. He goes on to state that the Taoutae has been acting on this order, has dispatched all the junks that were loaded, but has sent back whatever rice had not been transshipped from the river-boats to the districts which had supplied it. This has kept down the price of grain, which must otherwise have risen after so long a rain.

No. 24.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received May 28.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, April 9, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of the reply to the ultimatum presented on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. I received it yesterday after the departure of the mail, and despatch it per "Peiho," which leaves for Hong-Kong to day, and will reach it I hope before the mail leaves that place for England.

1. It refuses any apology or expression of regret for the treacherous conduct at the mouth of the Peiho last year.

2. It refuses permission to ascend the Tien-tsin river, and directs me to proceed, not to Peking, but to Peh-tang, there to await the exchange of the ratifications, stating that if I attempt to go by way of Takoo, the officer in charge of the forts will be called on to act.

3. It refuses to restore the guns or ships abandoned at the mouth of the river, or to consider the payment of an indemnity.

4. It refers me authoritatively to the regulations laid down for the reception of the American Mission last year, appearing to hint at the same time that these may be in some degree modified in discussion with Ho.

Its most important instruction to Ho, however, is that before I proceed to the North, he is to consider what parts of the Treaty are to be brought into operation and what parts will require compromise or modification.

As to the justification put forward of the proceedings of the Chinese Government last year, I must remark, that it appears that the determination to resist by force any attempt of the foreign Missions to approach Peking by the Peiho had been communicated some months previously to the Russian Govern-

ment. In the letters addressed to me and my colleagues by the Commissioners at Shanghae not a word was said of any such intention, and the same silence on this point was observed to Mr. Ward in their personal intercourse with them. The last letter to me merely intimated a wish that the vessels should anchor outside the bar at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river (the Peiho). Admiral Hope did, in the first instance, anchor his squadron at Sha-liu-tien, thirty miles off, and appeared outside the bar with a steamer and two gun-boats, despatching his gig, with an officer and interpreter, over the bar to communicate to the authorities in charge the approach of the allied Ministers, and to request that they might be allowed to proceed up the river. He was assured no officer was on the spot, but the contractor informed him that the obstacles would be removed within three days. When, on account of the exposed nature of the anchorage, he moved the smaller gun-boats over the bar, he notified that the squadron would remain there during my absence at the capital, and requested that the men might be allowed to land for supplies of water and provisions.

I have no doubt that the instructions to the Commissioners were to delay us at Shanghae, and that Pehtang was an after-thought. Their letter in the passage above referred to especially mentions my "arrival at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river," and we now know that the stream which debouches at Peh-tang has no connection whatever with the Tien-tsin river or Peiho. Moreover, Hang the Governor-General's proposal was that I should wait in the bay until the garrison was withdrawn from Pehtang, no preparations having evidently been made for my reception or journey, although his letter was dated only three days before the expiration of the term fixed for the exchange of the ratifications. I know from indisputable authority that Hang himself, the General Commanding, and the Intendant of Tien-tsin were present at Takoo at the time when the people were instructed to deny that there was any officer whatever on the spot, and while they were threatening with violence the persons we sent on shore to enter into communication with the authorities, and to endeavour to obtain information as to the intentions of the Chinese Government. Their conduct was unjustifiable, even according to Chinese customs, for from time immemorial it has been laid down as the duty of frontier authorities to advise all comers of any prohibitions that may exist.

As regard the proposal to exchange the Treaty at Peh-tang after further discussion of its provisions, it proceeds not from caprice, but from policy, and is one of the strongest proofs to my mind of the determination of the Imperial Government to confide the management of foreign affairs, as hitherto, exclusively to a provincial authority.

Time does not admit of my offering any further observations.

I ought to call your Lordship's attention to the fact that the reply is not addressed to me directly, but to the Imperial Commissioner for transmission, a form not consistent with the provisions of the Treaty of Nanking.

Inclosure 1 in No. 24.

Commissioner Ho to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

HO, &c., makes a communication.

Upon receipt of the British Minister's communication addressed to the Great Council and Senior Chief Secretary of State on the 22nd of the 2nd moon (14th March), the Commissioner, as in duty bound, inclosed it at once. On the 14th instant of the 4th moon (4th April) he received a letter from the Council, copy of which it is his duty to communicate to the British Minister.

He avails himself, &c.

A necessary communication addressed to the Hon. F. W. A. Bruce, C.B.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 3rd moon, 15th day (5th April, 1860).

Inclosure 2 in No. 24.

The Great Council of State to Commissioner Ho.

(Translation.)

THE Great Council writes a reply (to the Commissioner Ho, which he is) to transmit.

The Council received yesterday (or, a short time since), a despatch from the Commissioner, and with it a communication he had forwarded from the British Minister Bruce, the contents of which have occasioned the Council the greatest astonishment.

He states (1), for instance, that Peh-tang was never alluded to by the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and his colleagues. It appears that last year the Imperial Commissioners, Kweiliang and his colleagues, waited for the British Minister at Shanghae, for the express purpose of considering with him in person all the conditions proper to an exchange of Treaties. On ascertaining that the Minister Bruce had arrived at Wu-sung, they wrote to him several times to engage him to meet them, their object being, in fact, to acquaint him that Takoo was fortified (or, that arrangements had been made for keeping people out of Takoo), and that he must go by way of Peh-tang. He, however, repelled them, refusing them an interview. The Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and his colleagues, moreover, informed him that vessels of war must, on no account (2), cross the bar; but the British Minister Bruce paid no attention to these words, and when, on arriving off the Tien-tsin coast (or, the port, or the ports, of Tien-tsing), Hang, Governor-General of Chih-li, dispatched an officer with a communication to the effect that he was to proceed by way of Peh-tang, and sent him a present of provisions, he would receive nothing; but suddenly brought his vessels into Takoo, and (commenced) destroying the defensive apparatus there placed. How can he allege that he never received the slightest intimation that he was to go by Peh-tang? And as he was coming to exchange Treaties, why did he bring with him ships of war? It was plainly his intent to pick a quarrel. How, then, can he (when the blame is all his own) charge China with shortcoming towards him?

The defences prepared at Takoo are not either (as he implies) prepared to keep out the British (3). Suppose that some other nation's ships of war were to go the length of presenting themselves under British colours, could it be left to them to commit any breach of propriety they pleased? Well, then, the defences of Takoo cannot possibly be removed, even when the Treaties shall have been exchanged.

(Then the demand for) indemnity under different heads, and for the restitution of guns, arms, and vessels is yet more against decorum (4). The war expenses of China have been enormous. The cost of defending the coast from Kwang-tung and Fuh-kien up to Tien-tsin, from first to last, has not been short of several millions of money. Were she to demand repayment of England, England would find that her expenses do not amount to the half of those of China.

As to restoring ships and guns, the year before last England destroyed the forts at Takoo, and obtained possession of a number of guns belonging to China; ought she not, then, on her part, to be considering how to make these good? But, besides this, half the British ships and guns (demanded) were sunk in the sea; they are not in the possession of China at all. The question may be dropped, therefore, by both parties alike.

Then there is (the announcement that) the compromise by which, the Treaties once exchanged, (the Minister) was to have resided somewhere else, is at an end. The compromise by which, once the Treaties were exchanged, (the Minister) was either to select some other place of residence, or to visit (the capital) whenever there might be business of importance to transact, was definitely settled by the British Minister Elgin in negotiation with the Imperial Commissioner Kweiliang and his colleagues. The revocation of this compromise now (announced) is even more unreasonable (than all the other propositions).

Last year when, after the Americans had exchanged their Treaty, there was an alteration in the rate of tonnage dues, and the ports of Tai-wan and Chang-chau (Swatow) were opened to trade, the British Minister earnestly prayed for a like arrangement (in his favour). The English had not exchanged their Treaty,

but His Majesty the Emperor, liberal to foreign nations and full of tender consideration for the interests of commerce, graciously sanctioned an extension of the boon to the English, for which they should be equally grateful (5). But if the compromise duly negotiated is to be annulled, there will be no impropriety on the part of China, if she cancel the arrangement by which she has conceded to the English (the same advantage of) the improvements in tonnage-dues and trade that accrues to the Americans under their Treaty.

To come to the (British Minister's) request to be treated with courtesy when he comes north to exchange Treaties. If he be sincere in his desire for peace, let the Commissioner, when he shall have thought over all the details of the Treaty, those which it will be proper to give effect to, and those respecting which compromise (or arrangement) is to be made, negotiate (with the British Minister), and when both parties shall be perfectly agreed, if he will come north without vessels of war and with a moderate retinue, and will wait at Peh-tang to exchange the Treaties, China will not take him to task for what is gone by. He must be directed to acquaint himself with the rules (observed, or laid down) at the exchange of the American Treaties, and the course to be pursued will be further discussed with him (by the Commissioner).

But if he be resolved to bring up a number of vessels of war, and if he persist in proceeding by way of Takoo, this will show that his true purpose is not the exchange of Treaties, and it must be left to the high officer in charge of the coast (or port) defences to take such steps as shall be thereby rendered necessary (*lit.*, as shall accord with reason).

The despatch written on this occasion (by the British Minister) is in much of its language too insubordinate and extravagant (for the Council) to discuss its propositions more than superficially (*lit.*, to go deep into argument). For the future he must not be so wanting in decorum.

The above remarks will have to be communicated by the Commissioner to the British Minister, whom it will behove not to adhere obstinately to his own opinion, as by so doing he will give cause to much trouble hereafter.

A necessary communication.

Notes.

The archives of Yeh's yamun prove that all the business of the Empire is ordered by letters in this form, addressed by the Council to the Provincial Governments; but they invariably begin with an acknowledgment of the receipt, on a particular date, of the Emperor's commands—of what we term an Imperial Decree. I assume that the Council wish it to be inferred that Mr. Bruce's propositions have not been submitted to the Throne.

(1.) The form in which this passage is adverted to, as well as all quoted below, has special reference to the closing remark of the letter. The whole thing is unreasonable; for instance this, for instance that, &c.

(2.) The Commissioners' letter of the 12th June runs: "There is no need for him (Mr. Bruce) to feel any anxiety. They (the Commissioners) would wish that on his arrival at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river (or Peiho) he would anchor his vessels of war outside the bar." The Tien-tsin river could not possibly signify the stream which falls into the sea at Peh-tang; this is named in the maps the Peh-tang Ho, and has no connection, save an artificial cut, not navigable, with Tien-tsin Ho.

(3.) Mr. Bruce's despatch cited the words of the Emperor's Decree issued on the occasion of Mr. Ward's visit; in which His Majesty states that his fortification of Takoo was because of the irruption of the English the year before.

(4.) Against decorum ("li") should probably be against reason ("li"). One character has been written by the copyist for another.

(5.) Equally with the Americans. It will be remembered that the operation of their Treaty concession was not sanctioned until after further negotiation, and then as a grace.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE, *Chinese Secretary*

No. 25.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received June* 5.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, April* 17, 1860.

I HAD the honour to transmit to your Lordship by last mail, the document emanating from the Great Council at Peking, and communicated to me by the Imperial Commissioner Ho, as the reply to the ultimatum. It is drawn up in the form usually adopted by the Chinese in rejecting proposals, viz., that of an argument against the propriety of acceding to them, rather than of a distinct refusal of the demands themselves. M. de Bourboulon also communicated to me a translation of the reply he had received, the tenor and spirit of which are the same.

I suffered a few days to elapse before taking any further decided step, for although the documents themselves imply the rejection of all the demands made, and are couched in a tone which leaves little hope at present of arriving at any satisfactory result by merely pacific negotiation, I wished to give an opportunity to the Assistant Commissioner, who was at Shanghae, of offering any explanations which might justify me in putting upon these replies a construction more favourable to peace than they at first sight bear.

I regret to say that I do not think there exists, among the Emperor's present advisers, any sincere desire for an accommodation on such terms as I could alone accept.

It is certainly remarkable that the reply of the Great Council does not allude to the pleasure of the Emperor as having been taken on the important questions on which they pronounce their decision, and omits the formula to that effect, with which, I am told, such documents are invariably prefaced when issued as Imperial Decrees. I should certainly be inclined to infer, from this omission, that Sang-ko-lin-sin has taken on himself the entire management of the question, the Emperor relying on his ability to cope with the barbarian, but reserving to himself full liberty of action in the event of defeat.

Being satisfied, therefore, that any attempt to enter into negotiation on the basis of so unsatisfactory a document as the Council's reply would lead to no good result, while it would embarrass the progress of the expedition, to the appearance of which in the North I look as the sole means of bringing the Chinese Government to reason, I resolved, after consultation with M. de Bourboulon, to send in an answer declaring the reply of the Council unsatisfactory, and referring the Imperial Government to the concluding clause of the ultimatum, advising it of the immediate action of the naval and military authorities. This step could be no longer deferred, as the Commanders-in-chief will be prepared to occupy Chusan by the 20th of this month, and the troops must be disembarked to enable the vessels to return to Hong Kong, and be made available for future transport.

I also addressed the inclosed letter to Sir Hope Grant and Admiral Hope, empowering them to act; but pointing out at the same time that it was possible that the gradual approach of the force and the magnitude of the preparations might induce the Chinese Government to come forward in a more reasonable spirit, in which case I should not decline to consider their overtures. But, while reserving to myself the power of acting according to circumstances, I think it desirable to state that, looking at the unsatisfactory tenour of the Chinese reply, and to the advanced state of the season, I think the only course consistent with sound policy is to require a complete surrender to our demands before we consent to arrest the progress of the expedition, to insist on the immediate exchange of the Treaties at Peking, and to refuse to enter into negotiations on matters of detail connected with carrying out the Treaty until that ceremony is over; the object of such negotiations on the part of the Chinese being to curtail the practical value of the privileges conceded, and involving on their part the pretension that adjustment of these points is essential before the Treaty be finally accepted. The sooner, indeed, negotiations are transferred from Shanghae to the North, the more likelihood there will be of arriving at an understanding; for it is clear that the tone of those officials who are sent here to "soothe" the barbarian will be no safe criterion of the demeanour and intentions of those at Peking, whose mission it is to "control" him, and negotiations requiring reference to Peking would be so managed by

the Chinese as to entail the loss of the season for hostile operations, should they at last become inevitable.

I do not think that the Government at Peking, to judge by the tone of its reply, is as yet sufficiently alive to its situation to make such a surrender. At the same time the provincial authorities are impressed with the formidable nature of the preparations in progress, and it is hoped that this impression, which will grow stronger and stronger as they see the troops actually arrive, will at last find its way to Peking. The deliberation and calm progress of our proceedings, and the abstaining from partial operations on the coast, will tend to disabuse the Government of the idea that it is intended to rely mainly on a naval force; and will shake the confidence they repose on the defences they have thrown up to keep us out of the Tien-tsin river—a confidence which, after the occurrence of last year, they are excusable in entertaining against a merely naval attack. It appears to me that it would be neither humane nor politic to throw away the chance of effecting a peaceful settlement which may arise from the effect produced at Peking itself by the visible concentration in these waters of so large a force; and I confess, looking to our future relations in the North, as well as in the South, I think a settlement brought about by this means would be much more satisfactory if unattended by any vexation or injury to the great native trading interests of China.

On this subject I beg to observe that no line of separation can be drawn between the trading interests of the North and of the South of China. The capital employed in the trade of Neu-chwang, Chefoo, and other points in Shan-tung and in the Gulf of Pecheli belongs entirely to the native merchants of Shanghae and Ningpo, who exchange opium, manufactures, &c., bought in the South, for the produce of the North, through the trading colonies or settlements they have formed at the northern ports. The number of junks engaged in this trade is roughly estimated at 3,000, and the capital invested at 7,000,000*l.* and upwards, all of which is held in shares by the merchants of Shanghae and Ningpo. The destruction of these vessels, or the stoppage of their trade, will throw their crews, estimated at 100,000 men, out of employment, and render them fit instruments for pillage and disorder. It will inflict a serious blow on commerce for years to come, and on the interests of a class of men who are the best friends we have in this country, and have given their whole weight in support of those who sought to make pacific counsels prevail at Peking.

The irritation such a measure will produce will be directed towards us as the authors of losses and misery to them, for which they had given no cause. Their clamour will have little or no effect on the faction who now sway the counsels of Government, and even if it led to some more open manifestation of discontent, the result would be to add to the mass of anarchy and disorganization from which the Empire is suffering in the south and centre to our detriment as well as its own.

Your Lordship will see by my despatch of the 7th instant that the contingency of a blockade has been considered by the Chinese Government, and provided against in a great measure both by the sale of a large part of the rice due from the South, and by great efforts during last autumn. It would be unreasonable, therefore, to calculate that any blockade at present would, taken singly, modify the decision of the Chinese Government, or render the advance of the troops to the North unnecesssary, if they are resolved to try the chances of an attack on the forts, while it is indisputable that any measure of the kind would alarm the population of the coast, and make it much more difficult to obtain supplies for the subsistence of the troops. At present all our operations are conducted as in time of peace; horses are being collected at the different ports, and contractors present themselves for the supply of meat, &c., for our troops at Chusan and other places. The news of supplies being promptly and liberally paid for, and of our presence being a gain to the inhabitants, will precede our advance to the North, where we are little known, and will tend to allay the distrust and alarm of the population; and if their petty trade is not interfered with, and is allowed to go on unmolested as long as they bring us what we want, I am in hopes that the great resources of Shan-tung will be available for the supply of our wants.

I beg to refer your Lordship to a Memorandum I took the liberty of submitting at a Conference held at my residence on the 14th, to consider the measures to be adopted at once. In the views therein expressed, my French

colleague and the Commanders-in-chief unanimously concurred. I regret that Admiral Hope was not present, as his opinion on a question of this nature would have been decisive.

The immediate occupation of Chusan, as essential to future operations, was also resolved on, as likely to exercise a good influence in the present position of affairs, and tending to convince the Chinese that we are in earnest and in force.

In concluding this despatch, I ought to mention to your Lordship that it has not been without great anxiety and much reflection that I have ventured to depart from the course prescribed in my instructions. To the best of my ability, I have endeavoured to reconcile the safety of our vast interests on the coast and forbearance to the trading Chinese, who are friendly and well-disposed, with the success of the expedition in obtaining reparation for the past and some guarantee for the faithful observance, in future, of engagements by the Chinese Government. As time advanced, I became, reluctantly, more and more convinced that this could not be effected by any measures short of the appearance of the force already ordered, and on its way; that the force is amply sufficient for the purpose, and that the objects could be attained by a skilful exercise of it where the offence was committed without inflicting the calamities of war upon the helpless and unresisting population; that, if achieved in this way, success would disabuse the Peking Government of its false ideas of our power and of our intentions, and would prove to the people our humanity and civilization: whereas a pressure applied indiscriminately along the northern coast would rather strengthen the impression that we are a piratical and cruel horde, and thereby fail in one of the most essential objects affecting our future status in, and intercourse with, this country.

I am well aware that any such justification or palliation as my conduct admits of is to be only found in the circumstances of the case when my instructions reached me, and in the development of subsequent events.

Whatever be the consequences to myself, I could not venture to hesitate between what appeared to me the public interest on the one hand, and my personal responsibility on the other.

Inclosure 1 in No. 25.

Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Ho.

Shanghae, April 13, 1860.

THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, &c., begs to acknowledge receipt of a despatch dated the 5th instant, from his Excellency Ho, Imperial Commissioner for the superintendence of Trade, inclosing copy of one addressed to his Excellency by the members of the Great Council.

The Undersigned had the honour, on the 8th ultimo, to address a communication to their Excellencies the above high officers, and the Chief Secretary, Pang Wan-chang, a proceeding in perfect accordance with the provisions of Article XI of the Nanking Treaty, by which it is agreed that Her Britannic Majesty's high officer in China shall correspond with the Chinese high officers, both at the capital and in the provinces.

As in the case of the late Chief Secretary, Yu-ching, when addressed by the Earl of Elgin in 1858, their Excellencies have thought proper to ignore this treaty right, and have left the communication of the Undersigned on a most important question unacknowledged.

The language of the letter, however, which the Council has instructed the Commissioner to communicate to the Undersigned is sufficient, in his opinion, to determine the course he is to pursue.

The Undersigned was directed by Her Britannic Majesty's Government to demand the unqualified acceptance of certain conditions. Not only has the acceptance of these not been signified to the Undersigned, but a letter has been written, the tone of which, the Undersigned regrets to observe, is throughout such as to leave little hope of a pacific solution of existing difficulties.

It remains, therefore, for the Undersigned to refer the Government of His Imperial Majesty to the concluding paragraph of his letter of the 8th ultimo to

the Secretary of State and Great Council; in accordance with the tenour of which the naval and military authorities will now be called on to adopt such measures as may seem to them advisable, for the purpose of compelling the Emperor of China to observe the engagements entered into by him, and to grant reparation for the acts of His Majesty's Government in June last, when the Undersigned was on his way to Peking to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty.

The Undersigned will be obliged to the Commissioner to bring this letter to the notice of the Imperial Government.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 25.

Mr. Bruce to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant (and Vice-Admiral Hope).

Sir, *Shanghae, April* 16, 1860.

YOU are aware that the Imperial Commissioner Ho has communicated to me a document emanating from the Great Council of State at Peking, and purporting to be a reply to the ultimatum sent in by me.

Not one of the demands made is accepted, and the language in which the document is couched, convinces me that the course most likely to conduce to a speedy and satisfactory termination of existing differences, is to treat the reply as altogether unsatisfactory, and to call upon Her Majesty's military and naval authorities to prosecute with vigour and despatch the military preparations for an advance on the North. It is possible, that when the Peking Government becomes more alive to their magnitude than it is at present, more moderate counsels may prevail; but I am led to conclude from the most reliable sources of information, that such will not be the case, unless the hostile party, now dominant, feel that they are unable to resist on land the force brought against them, and I fear, after the unsuccessful attempt at the Peiho last year, that they will not be convinced of that fact by anything short of actual defeat.

I will keep you informed of any fresh overtures of the Imperial Government which may seem deserving of consideration, as I know that you, as well as myself, would willingly see the question terminated with as little effusion of blood and as little disturbance of peaceful relations with the industrious classes of China as possible. The latter consideration is of the highest importance with reference to our future position in this country.

M. de Bourboulon has taken a similar view of the reply received by him from the Chinese Government to the French ultimatum, and has informed me that he will to-day call upon the French naval and military authorities to act.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 25.

Memorandum.

ON the military and naval measures to be adopted, I am not qualified to offer an opinion; but I think it advisable to submit, on paper, certain considerations affecting them, which arise out of the anomalous character they are to bear.

The Governments have expressed their desire that the industrious population of China should be made to suffer as little as possible, and that measures of coercion should be confined to those parts of the coast where it will act most directly on the Court without injuring or interfering with the ports, so long as the local authorities and population remain quiet and inoffensive. For this reason, the instructions of Her Majesty's Government contemplate that the south of China should be considered as it were neutral; that its coasting and maritime trade should not be harassed or interfered with; but that no similar immunity should be extended to the coast and trade north of the Yang-tze-kiang.

On this subject, I must observe that considerable misapprehension prevails,

There is an enormous trade, as your Excellencies will see by the inclosed letter, between Shanghae and the ports in the Sea of Pecheli. The junks employed in this trade and their cargoes, belong, in shares, to the native merchants of Shanghae and Ningpo. A part only are freighted on Government account for the transport of rice to Tien-tsin; the others carry native and foreign produce to Neu-chwang, Che-foo, &c., and bring back peas, beans, and oil-cake, as return cargoes for this place. They are now expected from the North in large numbers, and the stoppage of this trade will inflict heavy losses on the native trading community, whose influence has been exercised as far as it could on behalf of a pacific arrangement. These junks also have large crews on board; and if they return here and are kept in idleness by a stoppage of their trade, will be a formidable element at the command of the authorities, should they wish to molest us by local disturbances.

I am anxious to state in this place, that no safe inference can be drawn from the quiet attitude of Chinese authorities since the events of June last as to the conduct they will observe when hostilities are begun.

The Chinese Government does not ordinarily take the offensive, and no doubt, were we to recede from our demands, it would gladly see a pacific arrangement, which would leave them victors in their last contest with the barbarian. The effects of such a policy would not be long in declaring themselves after the withdrawal of the forces. Neither does Canton offer a fair analogy. The Chinese Government disclaimed all responsibility for the acts of Yeh, and was quite ready to approve or disapprove of his conduct, according to results.

On the present occasion we are directly at issue with the Imperial Government; and if it is determined to run the risks of war sooner than yield to our demands, it is not to be assumed that it will omit any means of annoying us at those points where alone we are vulnerable. For years it has seen with apathy its most important towns and fairest provinces in possession of rebels, and it will not be deterred by any threats of subsequent vengeance we may make against its provincial cities from exciting the inhabitants against us, provided we, by injuring the interests of the population, and by thereby rendering it hostile, put it in the power of the authorities to do so. In short, I think that our prospects of maintaining tranquillity at this important port depend mainly on our abstaining from giving cause for irritation to the people, and on our impressing them at the same time with the conviction that if they, in spite of our forbearance, show hostility to us, we will visit them with severe chastisement.

Moreover, according to the instructions, it is contemplated to occupy some parts of the promontory of Shan-tung. The subsistence of the troops becomes, therefore, a primary consideration, and the goodwill of the inhabitants of that district and of the opposite coast will render that task more easy of accomplishment.

In this point of view, it would seem that to interfere with the coasting or other trade in that neighbourhood, will operate prejudicially on the prospects of the expedition.

I have only further to add, that I do not think the authorities at Shanghae are in a position to do us much injury, unless they succeed in exciting the people against us, and the occupation of Chusan by a considerable force will tend to secure us at this and the other ports, while the destruction of the junks employed in the Northern trade will impoverish the native mercantile community, and make the recovery of indemnity for war expenses hereafter more difficult.

As respects the rice-junks, I have it on good authority that one-half of the rice ordered was countermanded, the authorities being directed to sell it, and transmit the proceeds in money to Peking. It is further stated that the remainder will have reached ere this; but even admitting that a part of them might be intercepted, together with supplies of wheat and beans from Neu-chwang; were the Peiho and Peh-tang blockaded, and the blockade extended as far on both sides as the force employed is capable of guarding, I am too ignorant of the facilities for interior transport to judge whether this measure would prevent supplies reaching Peking, or how far it would distress the population.

The order of the Chinese Government I have alluded to shows that the contingency of a blockade has not escaped them, and it is reasonable to suppose that they have to some extent provided against it.

As respects a blockade of the Peiho at a time when we are not sufficiently advanced in our preparations to strike a blow, I think its expediency depends on the answers to the following questions:—

1. Can it be undertaken, as an isolated measure of coercion, without entailing the risk of retaliatory measures of annoyance, stoppage of supplies, &c., at the ports?

2. Is it likely, taken singly, to produce a decisive effect, that is, to bring the Emperor to terms?

3. Will it cripple materially the powers of resistance of the Chinese Government in the event of land operations, such as the capture of the forts, being necessary before the prestige of the War-Party is destroyed, and the Chinese Government convinced of the necessity of treating on the bases proposed?

1. On the first point no one can speak positively. A high Chinese functionary has hinted at retaliatory measures at the ports; and, as a general rule, experience has shown that partial and incomplete operations are to be avoided with the Chinese. I am inclined to think, moreover, that were such measures to be adopted by the Chinese, and were we obliged to retaliate, the effects of such retaliation in the present disorganized state of the South and Centre of China might be attended with the most serious consequences to the very existence of the Imperial authority.

2. I do not anticipate it would bring the Government to reason; on the contrary, it would lead them to doubt that our military preparations were more than a pretence, and would encourage them to try the effect of local diversions, increasing the probability of hostilities becoming general.

3. I think the resources they would derive from the absence of an immediate blockade would make no difference in the resistance they will offer, should it become necessary to undertake operations by land.

The occupation of Chusan appears to me open to none of the objections I have specified above; but, on the contrary, likely to exercise a good influence in the actual position of affairs.

I submit this Memorandum, with all deference, as containing the result of the best consideration I have been able to give to this complicated subject.

Shanghae, April 14, 1860.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 25.

The Chairman of the Shanghae Chamber of Commerce to Mr. Bruce.

British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghae.
April 13, 1860.

Sir,

AT the monthly meeting of this Chamber, held yesterday, amongst other questions incidental to the present political posture of affairs between the allied Governments of Great Britain and France and that of China, the probability of the establishment of a rigid blockade of the Gulf of Pecheli, and the consequent total stoppage of the native junk trade, became the theme of discussion, and I venture with due deference to lay before you the opinion of the Chamber upon this point.

From such information as is accessible to the Chamber, it appears that there are engaged in the junk trade on the coast of China, north of the port of Ningpo, more than 3,000 vessels, representing an invested capital, upon a moderate estimate, of 7,500,000*l.* sterling, and affording employment to about 100,000 of the population of the Northern Provinces of this Empire. These junks are entirely the property of private individuals, and the only direct interest which the Government of this country has in their operations consists in the annual receipt of the tribute rice at the port of Tien-tsin by their means. In transporting this rice it is estimated that about one-third of the number of junks above quoted are annually occupied.

The trade in which the remaining two-thirds are engaged, and that portion also of the fleet which has deposited its cargo of grain at Tien-tsin, so far as regards its return freight, lies almost entirely between the ports of Neu-chwang and of the Provinces of Shan-tung, and those of Shanghae and Ningpo, at

which latter towns the greater part of the capital permanently invested in the junks is represented.

Upon the present occasion it would appear probable that the larger portion, if not all, of the rice-junks, will have reached their destination by this time; and, in the opinion of this Chamber, a general blockade of the entire Gulf of Pecheli would exercise but a very slight influence, if any, upon the Court of Peking, while its effect upon the whole of the native trade would be most disastrous.

Further than this, it would appear highly probable that the losses entailed, and want of occupation enforced upon the large population engaged in the junk trade, would tend very considerably to increase the general disorganization at present existing in this part of China, and to raise up a feeling of bitter animosity against foreigners, which does not now prevail, the result of which might manifest itself in serious disturbances at the ports now open to foreign trade.

If, therefore, in the hostilities against the Court of Peking which they may be now compelled to initiate, it be the desire of the Allied Governments to confine operations as much as possible to the immediate vicinity of the Court, and to encourage and preserve general tranquillity at the other ports, this Chamber would most earnestly deprecate any further interference with the native trade than may be considered essentially necessary, and would desire most respectfully to submit this its opinion to your favourable consideration, and to that of those other high authorities with whom rests the final decision which must be arrived at upon the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. C. ANTROBUS, *Chairman.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 25.

Procès-Verbal.

A LA Conférence tenue, le 14 Avril, 1860, chez Mr. Bruce, à l'effet de prendre en considération générale les mesures d'hostilités auxquelles on aurait recours pour le cas où les Plénipotentiaires décideraient que les affaires seraient remises entre les mains des Commandants-en-chef des forces de terre et de mer;

Mr. Bruce a lu un Mémorandum rédigé par lui-même, en date du 14 Avril, 1860, qui traitait la question de l'établissement d'un blocus dans le Golfe de Pécheli, ou dans une partie de ce golfe, avant que les préparatifs militaires fussent assez avancés pour permettre aux troupes de faire un mouvement correspondant en avant, et calculait les effets qu'à Shanghae surtout une pareille mesure aurait probablement sur les intérêts commerciaux et la sécurité des étrangers.

Après avoir considéré le contenu de ce Memorandum et mûrement délibéré—

Les Soussignés ont résolu à l'unanimité qu'un blocus immédiat, comme opération isolée, serait probablement plus préjudiciable aux intérêts de l'expédition que nuisible au Gouvernement Chinois, et qu'en conséquence il n'était pas désirable de l'établir

AT a Conference held at the residence of Mr. Bruce at Shanghae, on April 14, 1860, for the purpose of considering generally the hostile measures to be taken, should the Plenipotentiaries decide on placing the affairs in the hands of the military and naval Commanders-in-chief;

A Memorandum was read, drawn up by Mr. Bruce, dated April 14, 1860, on the question of instituting a blockade of the Gulf of Pecheli, or any part of it, before the military preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable a corresponding move to be made forward by the troops; and on the probable effects of such a step on the trading interests, and on the security of foreigners particularly, at Shanghae.

On consideration of the statements therein set forth, and after deliberation it was—

Resolved unanimously, that an immediate blockade, as an isolated operation, would be likely to prove more prejudicial to the interests of the expedition than hurtful to the Chinese Government, and that it was not therefore desirable to institute it, until the

jusqu'à ce que les préparatifs de l'expédition fussent plus avancés.

Il a été également résolu que les forces alliées occuperaient l'Île de Chusan aussitôt qu'elles seraient prêtes à mettre cette opération à exécution, et que les Plénipotentiaires en feraient la demande aux Commandants-en-chef, attendu qu'il était essentiel pour les opérations ultérieures que cette mesure ne fut pas différée.

(Signé) A. BOURBOULON,
C.-AL. PAGE.
J. HOPE GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

preparations for the expedition were farther advanced.

It was also resolved that the Island of Chusan should be occupied by the allied forces as soon as they were prepared to carry the operation into effect, and as soon as the Plenipotentiaries should request the Commanders-in-chief to act; it being essential to further operations that this step should not be delayed.

(Signed) CH. DE MONTAUBAN.
FREDERICK W. A.
BRUCE.

No. 26.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 5.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, April* 17, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship a revised translation, by Mr. Wade, of the answer of the Council to my letter of the 8th ultimo, acquainting them of the demands of Her Majesty's Government.

The principal change is in the passsage which, as I observed to your Lordship in my despatch of the 9th instant, I regarded as the most important in the Council's reply. But the alteration is one of words only: the requisition of the Council remains to all intents and purposes the same; its plain condition being, that before I proceed even to Peh-tang to exchange ratifications, the Treaty is to be reconsidered by Ho, who is to negotiate with me at Shanghae whatever adjustments or compromises it may be proper to adopt.

Inclosure 1 in No. 26.

Mr. Wade to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Chinese Secretary's Office, Shanghae, April* 16, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a revised translation of the paper forwarded by the Imperial Commissioner Ho Kwei-tsing, as the reply of the Great Council to your ultimatum of the 8th March.

A reconsideration of the text, which I have further been allowed to compare with that of the Council's reply to the demands of the French Government, has induced me to modify the form of my original translation in the important passage in which the Council requires that you shall enter into deliberations with Ho, at Shanghae, with a view to adjustment or compromise of Treaty provisions before you proceed to Peh-tang to exchange ratifications.

As the words stand in the Chinese, they seemed, to the best native scholar I have ever met, to imply the distinction I drew in my earlier translation between "the details of the Treaty which it will be proper to give effect to, and those respecting which compromise (or arrangement) is to be made."

My native authority still bases his opinion, not only upon the spirit of the whole correspondence, which he has perused, but specially upon the use of certain collective particles not employed in the reply to the French Minister. As he admits, however, that the passage might mean no more than the words so nearly similar in the latter document, I have preferred, in my revised translation, to read "all details whatsoever of Treaty arrangements in which management (adjustment, compromise) may with propriety be effected."

The combination I have rendered "compromise, arrangement, management," is that which, when translating Lord Elgin's letters to the Imperial Commissioners into Chinese, I described the concession which it was understood Her Majesty the Queen should be solicited to make in regard to the establishment of her Minister in permanence at Peking. It is that by which the Council now describe

the concession to us of American privileges; these being, argue the Council, privileges to which we had no right, as our ratifications were not exchanged.

What I understand the Council to mean in the passage to which I have drawn attention is, simply, that the Treaty provisions offensive to the pride or unauthorised by the traditions of China must be understood to be modified in practice before the ratifications can be exchanged. The clauses aimed at, says a Chinese, are of course those affecting residence in Peking, diplomatic intercourse, circulation in the interior, and navigation of the Yang-tze-kiang.

The necessity for what is neither more or less than a revision, whatever its proposed extent, of the Treaty being beyond doubt insisted on, whichever way the passage be translated, I should not have troubled you, Sir, with so lengthy a commentary upon the subject, but for the sake of exactitude. The very importance of the, to our ideas, new position now assumed by the Chinese Government, renders it essential that the case, strong as it is, should not be overstated against it. The words I have withdrawn, in the distinction they expressed, did give a positiveness and peremptoriness to the declaration of the Chinese Government which, however much they may conceal, I do not on reflection feel sure, that the words avow; and I could not, with satisfaction to myself, have refrained from directing attention to the fact.

I have added some fresh notes to my new translation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE, *Chinese Secretary.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 26.

The Great Council of State to Commissioner Ho.

(Translation.)

THE Great Council writes a reply to the Commissioner Ho, which he is to transmit.

The Council received yesterday (or, a short time since), a despatch from the Commissioner, and with it a communication he had forwarded from the British Minister Bruce, the contents of which have occasioned the greatest astonishment.

He states (1), for instance, that Peh-tang was never alluded to by the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and his colleagues. It appears that last year the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and his colleagues waited for the British Minister at Shanghae, for the express purpose of considering with him, in person, all the conditions proper to an exchange of Treaties. On ascertaining that the Minister Bruce has arrived at Wu-sung, they wrote to him several times to engage him to meet them, their object being, in fact, to acquaint him that Takoo was fortified (or that arrangements had been made for keeping people out of Takoo), and that he must go by way of Peh-tang. He, however, repelled them, refusing them an interview.

The Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and his colleagues moreover informed him that vessels of war must on no account cross the bar (2); but the British Minister Bruce paid no attention to these words, and when, on arriving off the Tien-tsin coast (or, port or ports (3) of Tien-tsin), Hang, Governor-General of Chih-li, dispatched an officer with a communication to the effect that he was to proceed by way of Peh-tang, and sent him a present of provisions, he would receive nothing, but suddenly brought his vessels into Takoo, and commenced destroying the defensive apparatus there placed. How can he allege that he never received the slightest intimation that he was to go by Peh-tang? And, as he was coming to exchange Treaties, why did he bring with him ships of war? It was plainly his intent to pick a quarrel. How then can he (when the blame is all his own) charge China with shortcoming towards him?

The defences prepared at Takoo were not either (as he implies), prepared to keep out the British (4). What if some other nation's ships of war were to go the length of presenting themselves under British colours, how could it be left to them to act in violation of decorum? Well, then, the defences of Takoo cannot possibly be removed even when the Treaty shall have been exchanged (5).

Then the demand for indemnity under different heads, and for the restitution

of guns, arms, and vessels of war, is yet more against propriety (6). The war expenses of China have been enormous. The coast of defending her coast from Kwang-tung and Fuh-kien up to Tien-tsin has not been, from first to last, short of several millions of money. Were she to demand repayment of England, England would find that her expenses did not amount to the half of those of China.

As to restoring ships and guns, the year before last England destroyed the forts of Takoo, and obtained possession of a number of guns belonging to China: ought she not then, on her part, to be considering how to make these good? But, besides this, half the British ships and guns demanded were sunk in the sea; they are not in the possession of China at all. The question may be dropped, therefore, by both parties alike.

Then, there is the announcement that the compromise by which, the Treaties once exchanged, the Minister was to have resided somewhere else than at Peking is at an end. The compromise by which, once the Treaties were exchanged, the Minister was either to select some other place of residence, or to visit the capital whenever there might be business of importance to transact, was definitively settled by the British Minister Elgin in negotiation with the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and his colleagues. The revocation now announced is even more unreasonable than all the other propositions.

Last year, after the Americans had exchanged their Treaty, there was an alteration in the rate of tonnage dues, and the ports of Tai-wan and Cháu-chau (Swatow) were opened to trade. The British Minister earnestly prayed for a like arrangement in his favour. The English had not exchanged their Treaty, but His Majesty the Emperor, liberal to foreign nations and full of tender considerations for the interests of commerce, graciously sanctioned an extension of the boon to the English, for which they should be equally grateful (7). But if the compromise, duly negotiated, is to be annulled, there will be no impropriety on the part of China, if she cancel the arrangement by which she has conceded to the English the same privileges, in respect of tonnage dues and trade, that accrue to the Americans under their Treaty.

To come to the British Minister's request to be properly (or courteously) received when he comes North (8) to exchange Treaties, if his intention be indeed peace (or friendly), he will (or let him) leave it to the Commissioner to think over all details whatsoever of Treaty arrangements in which management (adjustment, compromise) may with propriety be effected; and negotiations being set on foot at Shanghae, when both parties are perfectly agreed, let him come North without a fleet, and with a small retinue, and wait at Peh-tang for the exchange of the Treaties (9); in which case China will certainly not take him to task for what is past. He should be desired to examine the rules observed when the copies of the American Treaty were exchanged, and to have a further consultation with the Commissioner as to the arrangements to be made (10).

But if he be determined to bring up a number of vessels of war, and if he persist in proceeding by way of Takoo, this will show that his real purpose is not the exchange of Treaties, and it must be left to the high officer in charge of the coast (or port) defences, to take such steps as shall be essential (*lit.* as shall accord with right).

The despatch written on this occasion is, in much of its language, too insubordinate and extravagant for the Council to discuss its propositions more than superficially (*lit.*, to go deep into argument). For the future the British Minister must not be so wanting in decorum.

The above remarks will have to be communicated by the Commissioner to the British Minister, whom it will behove not to adhere obstinately to his own opinion, as, so doing, he will give cause to much trouble hereafter.

A necessary communication.

Notes.

The archives of Yeh's yamun prove that all the business of the Empire is ordered by letters in this form, addressed by the Council to the Provincial Governments; but they invariably begin with an acknowledgment of the receipt, on a particular date, of the Emperor's commands—of what we term an

Imperial Decree. I assume that the Council wish it to be inferred that Mr. Bruce's propositions have not been submitted to the Throne.

(1.) The form in which this passage is adverted to, as well as all quoted below, has special reference to the closing remark of the letter. The whole thing is unreasonable; for instance this, for instance that, &c., &c.

(2.) The Commissioner's letter of the 12th June runs: "There is no need for him (Mr. Bruce) to feel any anxiety. They (the Commissioners) would wish that on his arrival at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river (or Peiho) he should anchor his vessels of war outside the bar." The Tien-tsin river could not possibly signify the stream which falls into the sea at Peh-tang. This is named in the maps "Peh-tang ho," and has no connection, save by an artificial cut, not navigable, with the Tien-tsin ho.

(3.) Literally the sea mouth or mouths. (See Note 2.)

(4.) Mr. Bruce's despatch cited the words of the Emperor's Decree issued on the occasion of Mr. Ward's visit, in which His Majesty states that his fortification of Takoo was because of the irruption of the English the year before.

(5.) This, from the words used, may refer to the garrison of the forts, but more probably has reference to the booms, &c.; more literally, (the apparatus for) keeping people out will not be removed or broken up.

(6.) "Against decorum" ("li"), should probably be "against reason" ("li"). The one character has been written by the copyist for the other.

(7.) "Equally with the Americans." It will be remembered that the operation of their Treaty concession was not sanctioned until after further negotiation, and then as of grace.

(8.) "Come North." The expression is the same as in the French document. There is no word about admission into Peking in either paper.

(9.) This, in so many words: Wait at Peh-tang. But see Note 10.

(10.) "Further consultation." This may cover of course exchange of ratifications in Peking, but with the foregoing requisition that this take place at Peh-tang; it may also, and most probably does, mean that if, like the Americans, when in Peking, we refuse to *kotow* to the Emperor, there will be no use in our proceeding further than Peh-tang.

(Signed) T. F. WADE.

No. 27.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 8, 1860.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 17th of April, I have to state to you that the reasons given by you, founded upon the representations of the merchants, and adopted by the military authorities in favour of not resorting to a blockade in the Gulf of Pecheli, appear to Her Majesty's Government satisfactory. The more the pressure is put upon the Government of China, and the less it is made to bear on those engaged in trade (provided the object is attained), the better.

Her Majesty's Government conclude that cannon, muskets, and munitions of war will be stopped on their way to the Chinese ports in the North.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 28.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 26, 1860.

I INCLOSE, for your information, a copy of a Circular which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ministers abroad, instructing them to communicate to the Governments to which they are respectively accredited, the Order in Council of the 7th of March last, declaring Her Majesty's intentions in respect to the

limitations under which the operations of Her Majesty's forces in the China Seas will be carried on.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 28.

Circular to Her Majesty's Ministers abroad.

My Lord,
Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 16, 1860.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith the draft of a note which you will present to the Government to which you are accredited, with reference to the operations about to be undertaken by Her Majesty and the Emperor of the French against China.

Your French colleague will receive instructions to make a similar communication, and it is desirable that you should arrange with him so as to make them as nearly as possible at the same time.

The Order passed by Her Majesty in Council on the 7th of March last, declaring Her Majesty's intentions in respect to the limitations under which the operations of Her Majesty's forces in the China Seas will be carried on, was forthwith transmitted to Her Majesty's officers in China; and I do not doubt that the Government will see, from the provisions of this order, that the utmost care has been taken by Her Majesty to prevent the operations which may be undertaken by her forces in China from entailing any unnecessary inconvenience or annoyance on the commerce of Neutral Powers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 28.

Draft of Note to be presented by Her Majesty's Ministers abroad to the Courts to which they are accredited.

THE Undersigned, &c., has been directed by his Government to make to the Government of the following communication.

The hopes which Her Majesty and her august Ally the Emperor of the French have entertained that the Emperor of China would be induced to make the moderate reparation required by them for the outrages committed in the month of June 1859, on their respective Plenipotentiaries, when proceeding to Peking, in order there to exchange, according to the provisions thereof, the ratifications of the Treaties concluded between the two Powers and China, at Tien-tsin, on the 26th of June, 1858, have unfortunately been dispelled by the peremptory refusal of the Emperor of China to accede to their demands.

The naval and military forces of the two Powers will accordingly proceed to undertake the operations which, in anticipation of such a result, have been prescribed to them by their respective Governments; but Her Majesty's Government are desirous of taking the earliest opportunity of apprizing all neutral Powers that those operations will be carried on under such limitations as will cause them to be attended with as little inconvenience as possible to the commerce of neutrals in the China Seas.

With the view of defining those limitations, Her Majesty was pleased, on the 7th of March last, to pass the Order in Council of which the Undersigned has the honour to inclose a copy, for the information of the Government.

Inclosure 3 in No. 28.

Order in Council.

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 7th day of March, 1860.

Present:

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS in the event of hostilities commencing between Her Majesty and her august Ally the Emperor of the French on the one hand, and the Emperor of China on the other hand, it is the intention and desire of Her Majesty, and of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, to act during such hostilities in strict conformity with the Declaration respecting MaritimeLaw signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, assembled in Congress at Paris, and dated April 16, 1856; and whereas Her Majesty is willing to extend the benefits of the said Declaration of Paris to all Powers which may be neutral in the said hostilities:

Now Her Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to Order, and it is hereby Ordered, that so far as regards the ships of any neutral Power, the flag of any such Power shall cover the enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war; so that no goods of enemies found on board any ship belonging to the subjects of such neutral Power, or to those inhabiting within the dominions of any such Power, and duly entitled to use the flag of such Power, shall be subject to capture or condemnation by reason only of such goods being enemies' goods; all other liabilities to capture and condemnation, respectively, of enemies' goods and neutral ships being reserved and remaining in all respects as before the Declaration of the said Congress at Paris, of the 16th April, 1856.

And it is hereby further ordered, that neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, shall not be liable to capture under the enemy's flag, by reason only of said goods being under the enemy's flag; all other liabilities to capture and condemnation of neutral goods being reserved, and remaining in all respects as before the Declaration of the said Congress at Paris of the 16th April, 1856: Provided always, and it is hereby Ordered, that nothing herein contained shall be applicable to, or shall be construed, deemed, or taken so as to operate or apply to or in favour of any person, ship, or goods whatsoever, which may be captured for breaking or attempting to break, or which may be lawfully adjudged to have broken or attempted to break, any blockade maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy; but that all such persons, ships, and goods, may be duly taken cognizance of, proceeded upon, adjudicated, dealt with, and treated, in all respects and to all purposes, according to the course of Admiralty and the Law of Nations, as if this Order had never been made, anything hereinbefore to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding.

And it is further Ordered, that, notwithstanding the existence of hostilities between Her Majesty and her august Ally on the one hand, and the Emperor of China on the other hand, and during the continuance thereof, all and every the subjects of Her Majesty and of her august Ally the Emperor of the French, shall and may, during such hostilities, freely trade at and with all ports and places wheresoever situate in the dominions of China, and also with all persons whomsoever, as well subjects of the Emperor of China as others residing or trading within any part of the dominions of the said Emperor.

And it is further Ordered and declared that if any Chinese ship or vessel shall be captured or taken by any of Her Majesty's vessels or forces, having on board any merchandize or goods being the *bonâ fide* property of any subject or subjects of Her Majesty or of her august Ally the Emperor of the French, such merchandize or goods shall not be subject or liable to be condemned as prize, but shall, on due proof of such property, as aforesaid, be restored to the owner or owners thereof: Provided always, and it is hereby Ordered, that this Order shall not apply, or be construed, deemed, or taken to operate to, or apply to or in favour of contraband of war, or to trading in supply of or dealing with any articles or things which it may be declared by Her Majesty and her august

Ally shall be deemed and taken as contraband of war, or to any trading or attempt to trade with places subject to effective blockade by the ships or fleets of Her Majesty and her august Ally, or either of them; and it is further Ordered, that Her Majesty's officers and subjects, and especially Her Majesty's Courts and officers exercising any prize jurisdiction, do take notice hereof, and govern themselves accordingly.

(Signed) WM. L. BATHURST.

No. 29.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received June* 26.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, April* 19, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 27th February, acquainting me with the approaching arrival of the Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros, on a special mission to arrange the existing differences with China.

I beg leave to express to your Lordship my grateful acknowledgment for the terms in which this announcement is made to me, and for the generous support afforded to me by your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government.

I am not without hopes that this measure may conduce materially to a pacific solution. The arrival of these high functionaries, with the concentration of a large and irresistible force, will give to the demands they will be prepared to insist on an imposing and authoritative character, while it will enable the Chinese Government, by resorting to its usual subterfuges, to give way with less loss of prestige.

No one will rejoice in this termination more heartily than myself, and it is a source of great satisfaction to me that the abstaining from any partial and inconclusive hostilities against the trade and inoffensive inhabitants of China, will allow of such a settlement being effected without leaving any irritation or bad feeling in the minds of the Chinese population. I shall do all in my power to preserve this favourable position of affairs intact until the arrival of Lord Elgin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 30.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received June* 26.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, April* 28, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of the Convention for the occupation of Chusan, concluded between the Allied Commanders-in-chief and the Chinese authorities in charge of the island. The occupation of the island seems to have given satisfaction to the inhabitants, who remember the profit they derived from it on the former occasion, and are busily occupied in furnishing supplies of every description. It was known that the measure was in contemplation some time before it actually took place, and I have it on good authority that shops, &c., were hired at advanced prices by Chinese speculators from Ningpo and other places, to be ready to take advantage of the golden harvest they expected to reap. Should hostile operations in the North become necessary, the establishment of a plentiful market for supplies at Chusan will prove of great importance.

Nothing can show more strongly how obsolete and ill-adapted to the actual condition of China is the isolated and anti-foreign policy of Peking, than the complete indifference with which the population of the seaboard look upon the quarrel the Chinese Government has been sufficiently ill-advised to provoke.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 30.

Convention agreed upon between the Commanders of the English and French Naval and Military Forces assembled before Chusan.

THE Commanders of the allied forces of England and France, now assembled before Chusan, having this day, through the intervention of their officers, summoned by mutual agreement the civil and military authorities of the town of Ting-hae and the Island of Chusan to give up to the hands of the said General Officers, the arms, military posts, and the government of the said island and town; and the Chinese authorities having consented to it, seeing that any attempt at resistance to so powerful a naval and military force would only cause an useless effusion of blood, and a lamentable destruction of property; it has been agreed:—

1. That the delivery of the said arms and government should take place under a neutral flag, in order to conciliate the respective positions of the English and French Commanders; that for want of a neutral flag at this moment at Chusan, the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam-ship the "Granada" should be considered as such.

2. That every Chinese military body should cease to exist from henceforth, and that the men composing the said corps shall be free to go wherever they please.

3. That four magistrates, two for England, and the other two for France, shall be nominated in order to control all the acts of the constituted authorities of the island.

4. That the civil mandarins shall be maintained in the exercise of their functions, whether municipal, judicial, administrative, or pertaining to revenue, under the surveillance and control of the four English and French magistrates, themselves placed under the superior authority of the allied Commanders.

5. That all military posts shall be occupied by the combined English and French troops.

6. That order shall be maintained in the town and the island by the allied troops, supported by a police selected from their ranks.

7. That the arms and munitions delivered up by the Chinese authorities shall be taken care of by the allies, to be restored in the same state in which they shall be when the island is given back to the Chinese Government.

Done in triplicate at Ting-hae, this 21st day of April, 1860.

(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT, *Lieutenant-General, Commanding Military Forces in China.*
LEWIS T. JONES, *Rear-Admiral Commanding the British Naval Forces at Chusan.*
T. PAGE, *Le Contre-Amiral Commandant les Forces Françaises Navales et Militaires.*

No. 31.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received June* 26.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, April* 28, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translation of Ho's acknowledgment of the reply I forwarded to the letter of the Great Council.

In communicating my answer to Peking, Ho will doubtless inform the Government of the approaching arrival of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, in possession of the final resolution of the Governments of England and France, and invested with full authority to deal definitively with the whole question. This announcement, coupled with the occupation of Chusan, and with the arrival and gradual advance of the troops, can hardly fail to elicit fresh instructions to him from Peking. If the Emperor be sufficiently alarmed to incline him to concession rather than war, he may take advantage of the arrival of the Special Mission to issue instructions in a more conciliatory spirit, and to invest Ho with sufficient authority to make the requisite concessions, an authority which I am convinced at present he does not possess.

Under existing circumstances. therefore, I do not think it expedient to take

any notice of the wish to discuss (conveyed in such vague terms in Ho's letter), as, independently of my desire to fetter as little as possible the action of the Ministers, I am certain that the more advanced are our preparations, and the more reliance we show on our ability to exact redress by force, the more chance there is of effecting an arrangement without resorting to hostilities. My own position, moreover, would, at present, render my efforts unavailing.

The first effect produced on the minds of the Chinese by the arrival of the Special Mission will be the hope that the demands made will be modified. If disappointed in this hope, Lord Elgin, coming direct from England, will be better able to obtain them by peaceful negotiation than I should be, at a moment when the direction of affairs is to be taken out of my hands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 31.

Commissioner Ho to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

HO, Imperial Commissioner for the Superintendence of Trade, &c., makes a communication in reply.

The Commissioner received, on the 26th instant, the British Minister's despatch of the 23rd of the 3rd moon (13th April). It acquaints the Commissioner that the Minister, having perused the copy of the Council's reply forwarded to him by the Commissioner, and finding therein no assurance of an acceptance, *in toto* (of the demands made), was now, in accordance with the tenour of the concluding paragraph of his despatch of the 16th day of the 2nd moon (8th March), addressing an application to the British naval and military authorities to take such steps as should be best calculated to compel observance of the Treaty; and it requests that representation be made to this effect to the Throne.

With friendly relations of so long a growth as those arising out of the commercial intercourse that has brought Englishmen all this distance to China, it appears to the Commissioner that, in order to the common advantage of both nations, it would be (or, would have been) a course in every way legitimate to consider, in discussion, the right means of adjusting any difference of opinion there might be between them. He does not see the necessity for farther hostilities.*

It will be the duty of the Commissioner, of course, to inform His Majesty, on behalf of the British Minister, of the sense of the letter under acknowledgment.

He avails himself of the opportunity to wish the British Minister enjoyment of the blessings of the season.

A necessary reply, addressed to the Honourable F. Bruce, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 3rd moon, 27th day (19th April, 1860).

(Received 21st April, 1860.)

No. 32.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 27, 1860.*

YOUR despatches to the 28th of April have been received and laid before the Queen.

Her Majesty's Government approve of the course you propose to pursue until the arrival of the Special Embassy.

Her Majesty's Government also approve of the occupation of Chusan, as reported in your despatch of the 28th of April.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* Or, for going to war again. I understand him to allude to Takoo as the last war, or act of war.

No. 33.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received August* 5.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, May* 30, 1860.

I INCLOSE a letter from Mr. Consul Meadows, describing an interview with the Taoutae, in which the latter solicited our assistance in protecting Shanghae against any rebel attack. The same request was addressed to the Consul of France.

I decided, in concert with M. Bourboulon, that it was expedient, both on grounds of policy and humanity, to prevent, if possible, the scenes of bloodshed and pillage being enacted here, which took place at Hang-chow-foo, when that city was lately assaulted by the insurgents; and it appeared to me that without taking any part in this civil contest, or expressing any opinion on the rights of the parties, we might protect Shanghae from attack, and assist the authorities in preserving tranquillity within its walls, on the ground of its being a port open to trade, and of the intimate connection existing between the interests of the town and of the foreign settlement, the former of which cannot be attacked without great danger to the latter. We accordingly issued separate proclamations to that effect in identical terms. I have the honour to inclose copy of this document. I have declined all suggestions to extend the protection further than to the city itself.

I do not think that the rebels, even should they take Chang-chow and Soo-chow, will advance on Shanghae when they hear of our determination to protect it. It is not their policy to involve themselves in difficulties with foreign Powers.

Sieh has returned to Shanghae, I believe for the sake of protection.

It would not appear that these successes of the rebels have, as yet, produced any change of policy at Peking. In estimating the impression likely to be made on the Emperor's advisers by these late reverses, foreigners do not sufficiently bear in mind that the Government against which this insurrection is directed, rules over a country the area and population of which are nearly twice as large as those of Europe; that for ten years it has seen its provinces over-run, its most flourishing cities sacked and ruined, and its troops constantly defeated.

In spite of these successes, and of the national pretensions put forward by the promoters of this movement, it appears to have found favour with no influential class in China. The authority of the leaders is only recognized in the places militarily occupied by them; and all accounts represent that, as soon as the inhabitants of a town or district are left to themselves, the Imperial Government resumes its power.

No doubt a movement on the capital would enlist the serious attention of the Emperor, as it would render it expedient for him to arrange his dispute with the allies, so as to be able to set at liberty the force he has collected in Pecheli for his protection against the domestic foe. Otherwise provincial disasters are likely to make themselves felt at the capital, chiefly by their financial consequences.

It is unfortunate for the Imperial cause that the mismanagement of their officers should have lost the Imperialist army at the very moment when the re-capture of Nanking seemed almost within their grasp. Though the insurgents had attempted to create a diversion by moving on Hang-chow-foo and other important points, the Imperialists had been able to relieve the menaced points without loosening their hold on Nanking. The cause of their defeat is said to have been a want of concert between Ho-chun, the War Commissioner, and Chang Kwoh-liang, their chief General. The troops that escaped are said to have thrown away their arms in their flight, and to have irritated the population of Soo-chow by plundering.

It is reported that these excesses are likely to produce an insurrection in the city, of which the insurgents would take advantage to get possession of it, and thus acquire an important position on the Imperial canal.

I inclose two reports, drawn up by Mr. Wade, on the movements of the rebels.

Inclosure 1 in No. 33.

Consul Meadows to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Shanghae, May 25, 1860.*

REFERRING to my conversation with you of the afternoon of the 23rd instant, when I reported that Wu the Intendant of Circuit had, accompanied by the Magistrate of Shanghae, just visited me and requested the aid of the British to defend Shanghae against the rebels from Nanking, I have the honour to state that a note from the Intendant has just reached me begging me to inform him whether I had reported his application to you, and what your intentions are.

As a reason for his urgency, the Intendant communicates some further intelligence, unfavourable to the Imperialists, which he received last night.

His information on the 23rd was in substance as follows:—

During the past winter, the Imperialists had been vigorously pressing the siege of Nanking, and had made more progress in the occupation of its advanced defences than at any previous period since the Tai-pings took it in the spring of 1853. It seemed the policy of the Tai-ping leaders not to raise or impede the siege by causing their armies in the neighbouring provinces to operate directly against the besieging Imperialist army, but rather, by successes obtained in various directions at a distance, to compel the Imperialist commanders to detach such large portions of the besieging army to check these successes, as would leave too small a force behind for the effectual conduct of the siege. The sudden and partially successful attempt of the Tai-pings on Hang-chow was a part of this strategy. Finding, however, that it had not the effect anticipated, that the Imperialists paid comparatively little attention to what was passing in other quarters and continued to direct their main efforts to the recapture of Nanking, and that this latter city was in consequence being hard pressed, the Tai-pings assembled an army of relief, which, supported by a sally of the garrison from all the gates, drove off the besieging army on the 3rd of May, a snowy and very cold day at Nanking. The Imperialists lost all their stores of ammunition and provisions. Their chief Generals, Ho-chun and Chang Kwo-liang, fled to Tan-yang, the first district city om this side of Chin-keang on the Grand Canal. There they were rejoined gradually by most of their men, few of whom, however, brought their arms with them. In the meantime, the Tai-pings followed up their success, and, after taking several district cities in the intermediate country, drove the armless Imperialists out of Tan-yang between 3 and 4 P.M. on the 19th instant. The Imperialist Commander-in-chief, Ho-tsun, had retired to the departmental city, Chang-chow, also on the Grand Canal and a boat-day's journey nearer to Soo-chow. The second in command, the ex-rebel Chang Kwo-liang, had not since been heard of, but it was supposed he had retired northward along the Grand Canal to Chin-keang. The Intendant added that since the 19th, Chang Yu-leang (the Imperialist General who has the credit of having re-occupied the portion of Hang-chow taken by the rebels some time ago) had met the Tai-pings about six miles beyond Chang-chow, and inflicted a severe check upon them.

The Intendant's intelligence of to-day is that the rebels have attacked Chang-chow, which he fears must be already lost; that the Governor-General (and Imperial Commissioner for Foreign Affairs) Ho had taken up a position at the Seu custom-house, about eight or ten miles beyond Soo-chow; and that the dispersed troops and distressed people were flocking into Soo-chow, which city was in a state of the greatest alarm and the gates of which it was proposed to close immediately.

This is the nearest and, for the Imperialist cause, the most dangerous approach that the Tai-pings have made on Soo-chow during the seven years that they have been warring with the forces of the Manchu dynasty in the central provinces of the Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) T. T. MEADOWS.

P.S. 2 P.M.—While the above was being copied, an American has arrived at the settlement, in a small despatch-boat, with the news that when he left Soo-chow yesterday at 1 P.M. the Tai-pings were entering that place. He has passed hundreds of boats laden with fugitives on their way to Shanghae.

T. T. M.

Inclosure 2 in No. 33.

Proclamation.

THE Undersigned issues this special proclamation to tranquillize the minds of the people.

Shanghae is a port open to foreign trade, and the native dealers residing therein have large transactions with the foreigners who resort to the place to carry on their business. Were it to become the scene of attack and of civil war, commerce would receive a severe blow, and the interests of those, whether foreign or native, who wish to pursue their peaceful avocations in quiet, would suffer great loss.

The Undersigned will therefore call upon the Commanders of Her Majesty's naval and military authorities to take proper measures to prevent the inhabitants of Shanghae from being exposed to massacre and pillage, and to lend their assistance to put down any insurrectionary movements among the ill-disposed, and to protect the city against any attack.

Shanghae, May 26, 1860.

Inclosure 3 in No. 33.

Memorandum.

THE printed paper inclosed is a Memorandum of Rebel movements during the last six weeks, communicated by me to the local paper.

Our information as to the minor details is not to be much relied upon. The greater facts are indisputable. These are, that nearly at the same time that a rebel force, advancing from the Westward, assaulted Hang-chow, another large body appeared in the country south-west of that city, descending the valley of the principal stream that falls into Hang-chow Bay, and that within a few days of the above movements the Nanking garrison attacked with unwonted fierceness and success the Imperialist army lying between Nanking and Chang-chow, the head-quarters of Ho, the Governor-General.

The sacrifice of the suburbs of Hang-chow, which were fired by the authorities, while directly discouraging and distressing large numbers of the well-affected, materially assisted the investing rebel force, which appears to have been rather of a predatory than a political character in its operations. The same course was adopted last week at Soo-chow, with a worse result as regards the inhabitants; as the houses destroyed were of a much more respectable character than those in the suburbs of Hang-chow. It is greatly doubted whether the rebels were nearer Soo-chow than the western bank of the lake on the opposite side of which that city stands; but much alarm had been created by the arrival of numerous fugitives from the force driven in by the Nanking sortie. These had been joined by numerous deserters from the reserves covering Chang-chow, and the whole had spread themselves over the country, not so much, it is asserted, from fear of their pursuers, who were not after all very numerous, but in quest of plunder, as they had been some time without pay.

There is less talk of danger to-day, but it is impossible that trade should not have felt the effect of these events, particularly of the burning of so great a centre of wealth as the suburbs of Soo-chow. The great peril now to be apprehended is of course from brigandage, to which it is but natural to expect the forces of the Government, in their present state of disorganization, will betake themselves.

Shanghae, May 30, 1860.

(Signed) T. WADE, *Chinese Secretary.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 33.

Memorandum on Rebel Movements.

REBELS.—The accounts of rebel proceedings, it will have been noticed, have been growing more and more unfavourable to the Imperial cause in this and the adjoining province, for many weeks past. Locally, since the taking of Nanking

in 1853, there has been no such state of alarm along the east bank of the Grand Canal. The territory thus afflicted may be loosely defined as stretching from the Great River to the Tsien-tang, in Cheh-kiang; bounded east by the canal from Hang-chau to Chin-kiang, and west by the waters which run north through Tai-ping-fu, and south out of Hwui-chau-fu.

At the end of 1858, Lord Elgin's Mission found the Tai-ping insurgents in possession of every place of importance along the Yang-tze-kiang from Nanking, the capital of Ngan-hwui (according to Dr. Williams's map and orthography), down to Nanking, the capital of Kiang-su. On the river itself they had nothing. Imperialist fleets watched them rather than acted against them here and there; and at the two extremities of this river base, large armies, supported by numerous junk squadrons, appeared to remain in observation, with occasional interludes of very moderate activity. The whole of Ngan-hwui north of the Yang-tze, and south of the Hwai river, was known to be seriously disturbed at the period above adverted to, as well as since, by the Tai-pings, while north of the Hwai, and along the south bank of the Yellow River, and occasionally across it, Government was from month to month *aux prises* with rebels or brigands, described sometimes as Tai-ping, sometimes as Nien-fei, the omnipresent banditti of Ho-nan, sometimes as a fusion of both. These continued to trouble the north frontier of the three provinces above-mentioned, as well as the south of Shan-tung, and even the tip of Chih-li. Till some six weeks ago large bodies hung about the country surrounding the intersection of the Grand Canal, no longer passable at the point in question, and the Yellow River, which at the same point is dry. They destroyed Tsing-kiang-pu, a large open town of great resort, a short way south of the Yellow River, and for some days, indeed during the whole of last April, communication by the great north road hence to Peking was almost entirely stopped.

Meanwhile, to the south of the Yang-tze, there was also a considerable amount of rebel business doing; only a small part, indeed, it is averred, by the Tai-pings pure and simple, but with enough of their leaven to identify those concerned with their movement, and to aggravate the disorder already so seriously affecting the existence of the still reigning dynasty. We have no details of their proceedings higher up the stream than Wu-hu and Tai-ping fu, one of their most important centres; but from this country they were moving inland some weeks since, for we heard, in a misty way, of their re-occupation of Ning-kwoh, a prefectural city which they seem always to have been able, during their seven years' occupation of the river bank, to revisit when they chose. The Imperialists do not appear to have had any force opposing them on that side, further west than Kwang-teh. The precipitate retreat of the latter from this city in March was held to augur ill for the safety of a region very precious to our silk trade, and it was not so astonishing as unsatisfactory to hear shortly after that Hu-chau and Hang-chau were both of them in danger from rebels and banditti, who had crossed the borders of Cheh-kiang east of Kwang-teh, and were burning and slaying in Chang-hing and Ngan-kih. For reasons which do not appear (possibly, as the Imperialists maintained, owing to the precautions taken by Government), the enemy let Hu-chau alone, to the momentary comfort of Su-chau (Soo-chow), which would of course have been seriously compromised by the capture of Hu-chau; but he fell, apparently by forced marches, on Hang-chau, mined the walls, and aided by sympathisers among the Chinese garrison or the militia, entered it on the 19th March. The Tartar garrison, however, could not afford not to fight, and after holding their inner city for six days, were succoured by a considerable detachment from Kiang-su, which, co-operating with them, recovered the city, after a fashion, upon the 24th. The captors appear to have retired but a short distance, and after an awful destruction of life and property. Another rebel force, as it has since appeared, had also crossed from Tsih-ki in Hwui-chau-fu, into Cheh-kiang, but whether this co-operated in the above movement on Hang-chau is uncertain. Some accounts connect it only with the following operation further south.

Some two or three weeks after the re-establishment of the Government in Hang-chau, came news of another invasion of Cheh-kiang, along its Kiang-si border. A force stated to be under the command of Shih Ta-kai, a redoubted rebel leader, was descending the Tsien-tang river; it had taken Ku-chau, was threatening, if it had not taken, Yen-chau, and had ravaged certain districts west of these prefectural cities.

It is remarkable that nearly at the same time accounts should have been received of renewed activity on the part of the Nanking garrison. In December 1858, Imperialist junks, if not troops, lay within easy range of the city, on its east face, while westward, though at a more respectful distance, their many-bannered host was described as spreading as far as eye could reach over the hills. There was really apparent ground for the declaration so often repeated by the authorities, that the investment of Nanking on three sides was complete, and it will be remembered that the communicative rebel who acted as guide to those members of Lord Elgin's Mission who entered the city, admitted to them the great extremity to which it was reduced. This was a year and a half ago, and there had been since constructed, if not before, a series of works or ditches from the Tsin-hwai river, which enters the Yang-tze just above Nanking, to the Yang-tze itself below the city. The rebels do not, however, seem ever to have abandoned Pu-k'au, which is on the north bank of the Great River, directly opposite Nanking, and in rear of Pu-kau their communications with their brethren of Ngan-hwui were so unrestricted as to make it frequently matter of doubt whether Yang-chau belonged to them or Government. Some three weeks ago, if not earlier, the garrison, no doubt reinforced by its friends north of the river, made an effectual sortie, undid the doing of several months' blockade, and inflicted fearful punishment on the people of Kü-yung and Lih-shwui, two district towns on the sources of the Tsin-hwai, for their share in the work of circumvallation.

The Imperialist army more especially besieging Nanking, was under the command of Ho-chun, a Manchu, high in favour at Court, who was also High Commissioner of War for the whole of the Two Kiang, and the ex-rebel Chang Kwoh-liang, generally admitted to be a man of courage and conduct. The two commanders, as will occasionally happen elsewhere, are said to have borne each other no goodwill; the antecedents of Chang Kwoh-liang exposed him to great contempt and insolence on the part of his colleague. This may explain the total failure of a combined attack projected against the rebels at and about Kü-yang. Which General it was that did not support the other is not quite clear. Such gossip as we have access to, generally lays the blame on Ho-chun, who undoubtedly had to fall back some forty miles upon Chin-kiang, after losing guns, stores, and all that made his force an army. Another story is that the real fault lies with the Governor-General Ho Kwei-tsing, who refused to allow Chang-kwoh-liang to move forward on Kü-yung, lest he should uncover Chang-chau, Ho's own head-quarters. The advance of the rebels consequent on Ho-chun's defeat, obliged Chang Kwoh-liang to act. He drove the rebels well back on the 1st May, with the loss of a famous leader named Sz-Ngan Kau (the Four-eyed Dog, probably a Cantonese). People who escaped from Nanking on the 5th saw his corpse carried into the city. This took place at Mo-ling-kwan, south of Nanking, but Chang must have ventured too far from his supports, as the next day brought the news that they had been beaten, and himself severely wounded, while the enemy, at what dates respectively we do not know, overran the districts of Lih-shwui, Kin-tan, Tan-yang, and I-hing; his appearance in great force at this last, lying as it does on the west side of the Tai-hu, being regarded naturally as a bad omen to the safety of Su-chau, which is situated on the east side of that lake. They were believed to be but a few miles from Chang-chau when the Governor-General Ho precipitately retired on Su-chau. A note received this morning states that on Ho's arrival at Su-chau, he was requested, in a petition, not to come into the city, but that he replied to the address that he was only come for money, and having raised 2,000,000 taels by subscription, returned promptly to Chang-chau, where he has drawn together a large force.

It was stated yesterday that Chang Yuh-liang (who is not, it appears, the brother of Chang Kwoh-liang) had gained a victory; also that Tan-yang had not fallen, although the whole country between it and Nanking was full of rebels. These, says the note writer, and it is confirmed by others, are by no means all of them Tai-ping. The Tai-ping impress the people *ad libitum* as they overrun the country, arm them, and drive them on in front, so as to receive the shock of the battle. They also send their own followers, divested of their long hair, to personate runaway soldiers, or people in distress. These act as spies and betray positions. The Su-chau neighbourhood is now, of course, very full of homeless people, and the authorities direct that they shall camp outside the walls and be daily rationed. Orders have also been given for the destruction of

the entire suburb of Su-chau, three days being allowed for the inhabitants to remove their property. Houses not destroyed within these three days were to be fired; which may account for a conflagration reported to have been seen in the vicinity of the city.

Such is the sum of the reports that reach us, and even if we exclude the disturbances in the north of Kiang-su from our estimate, it is difficult not to believe that these almost simultaneous movements are the result of more or less combination; combination not impossibly prompted, if there be anything like a policy among the rebels, by the approach of a large foreign force destined to try conclusions with the Emperor; or, it may be, simply by the necessity of preserving Nanking, which had begun to be pressed in earnest, and the evacuation of which would do more to discredit the Tai-ping cause than a long series of ordinary Imperialist victories in the field.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE, *Chinese Secretary.*

May 26, 1860.

No. 34.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 12.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, June* 10, 1860.

I INFORMED your Lordship, in a previous despatch, dated the 30th of May, of the serious reverse sustained by the Imperial forces besieging Nanking, and of the pressing request addressed to the Consuls of England and France, for assistance in protecting Shanghae against attack, in case the rebels should capture Soo-chow, and advance in this direction.

The proposal evidently accorded with the wishes of the peaceable inhabitants and of the foreign residents generally, and it appeared to me that it might be taken without departing from the neutral position hitherto taken by Her Majesty's Government in this civil contest. I consented, therefore, to issue a proclamation, so worded as to base the protection afforded to the town of Shanghae on the community of interest existing between it and the foreign settlement, which extends close to the city wall.

The Taoutae, however, of this place was anxious to extend the protection to Soo-chow, and his wishes in this respect were shared by the Roman Catholic missionaries, who were uneasy as to the fate of the Christians (some 13,000), should that place fall into the hands of the insurgents, whose iconoclastic tendencies are well known. They therefore urged General de Montauban to advance a column to save the city from being captured, and he so far entertained the subject as to authorize Colonel Foley to inform me that he would move immediately a force of 1,500 men with that view, provided I consented to a detachment of 400 Marines taking a share in the expedition, in which the Senior Officer, Captain Jones, declined to embark without my sanction.

To this proposal I did not consider myself at liberty to accede, for various reasons. In the first place, the British Commanders-in-chief had detached the Marines stationed at Shanghae for the protection of our interests at this port, and not with a view to operations in this part of China. Furthermore, great uncertainty existed as to the occurrences that had actually taken place, and as to the force and designs of the rebels; the Taoutae, either under an overpowering sense of fear, or from some other motive, transmitting as authentic information reports which next day proved to be in many cases totally unfounded, and in all exaggerated. Furthermore, Soo-chow contains an immense population, and is situated from 80 to 100 miles from Shanghae; the force of the insurgents was unknown; and the disposition with which the inhabitants might view the approach of a foreign force, unascertained; and it certainly appeared to me very hazardous to rely on a force of 2,000 men as sufficient, in the event of hostilities, to maintain themselves and to insure their communications at such a distance from the coast, while to retire, however strategically justifiable, would produce a bad effect on the Chinese, whether Imperialists or rebels, and to reinforce the column would seriously cripple the force in the prosecution of the objects the Allied Governments contemplated in sending out the joint expedition. On the other hand, it is evidently for the interest of the Chinese authorities to induce us to embark in a course of action which will embroil us with the insurgents, and may perhaps render abortive the expedition to the North during this season; and it does

not appear to me, I confess, that the present moment is well chosen to declare ourselves partisans of the Imperial cause, nor, indeed, would it be politic, I think, to intervene beyond the legitimate protection of foreign interests, without a previous settlement of our differences with the Court, and a distinct understanding with the Government as to the extent and nature of the assistance that is to be rendered.

M. de Bourboulon concurred with me in thinking that the proposal was open to serious objection, and it was consequently abandoned.

The Taoutae has since made several attempts, by alarming reports of the near approach of the insurgents, and by availing himself of the influence of mercantile interests and of religious corporations, to induce us to extend our posts to the neighbourhood of the Soo-chow lake, but without success, and the radius protected does not extend beyond four miles from the town.

The greatest danger to be apprehended here, arises from the influx of fugitive Imperialist soldiers, who seem to have fired and plundered the wealthy and populous suburb of Soo-chow, and to have revenged themselves for their defeat by pillaging the defenceless villages on their line of retreat. A considerable number of Cantonese braves, forming part of the Imperial army, have arrived here with their plunder, and the Taoutae, emboldened by the support he has received from us, has seized and executed a portion of them. It is clear that they would be quite ready to join the dangerous classes to be found in all Chinese towns, in an object so tempting as the plunder of the foreign settlement, and however desirable it may be to extend protection to the neighbouring villages, I do not think it safe so to weaken our force by outlying detachments as to expose our interests to risk. It is not, moreover, as yet the approach of a concentrated and organized force we have to fear; these fugitives slip into the town in bands of from ten to twenty men, with concealed weapons, prepared to rise on a preconcerted signal, when their numbers are such as to inspire them with hopes of success. Their objects and tactics are those of robbers only, and require to be guarded against by the presence on the spot of a considerable force.

I also ventured to suggest that two of the gates of the town should be confided exclusively to our care, to secure our entrance into it in the event of insurrection. The favourite mode of proceeding among these marauders is to seize the gates, and then proceed to pillage. The Chinese force at the command of the Taoutae is not to be relied on, and after our promises of protection, we should play a very ridiculous part if there were a rising in the town and the walls had to be breached or assaulted before we could lend the inhabitants any efficient protection. The suggestion has been approved of, and carried into effect.

Without discussing whether intervention, under the peculiar circumstances of the civil contest in China, be justifiable or not, or whether it would be expedient, with a view to opening the Yang-tze river to trade, to recapture towns such as Chin-kiang and Nanking, which command it, I am inclined to doubt the policy of attempting to restore by force of arms the power of the Imperial Government in cities and provinces occupied or rather overrun by the insurgents. Unless the force to be detached arrives before the capture of the menaced city, the evil, commercially speaking, is done. The beaten troops, the victorious insurgents, and the vagabonds of the city itself, all join in plundering the wealthy and respectable inhabitants.

The number of cities permanently held by the rebels as military positions seems small, their object being rather that of laying hands on the resources to be obtained in them, than of weakening their forces by attempting to hold permanently a number of isolated positions, in the midst of a population little disposed to join them.

It is hardly doubtful that these districts will be abandoned to, and recovered by, the Imperialists, as soon as they are able to collect their forces, unless, indeed, the population, distrustful of the power of the Government to protect them, should seek to come to terms with the rebel leaders, as the only means of escaping from the evils of an apparently interminable civil war, in which case the movement would assume the national character to which it has hitherto vainly aspired, and cease to be looked upon as an insurrection conducted by men of Kwang-tung and Kwang-si, with whom the population of Central China has no sympathy.

There is, indeed, another alternative open to the people, namely, that of placing themselves under the protection of a foreign Power, in whose justice and force they have confidence, to preserve them from pillage and massacre. From the language held by some of the more influential native merchants, I think it not unlikely that, sooner or later, some such proposal will be made to foreign Powers, at the suggestion of commercial or religious influences, should anarchy increase, and should the decision of such questions be left practically to the people and the authorities of the Provinces, in consequence of our being debarred from treating directly at Peking, on matters involving Imperial interest, and considerations of general policy of such vast magnitude.

I am further inclined to believe that foreign support thus given would render the re-establishment of the Imperial authority very difficult hereafter.

The local authorities in asking for it, seek merely to escape from the immediate difficulty which besets them, and to be able to report to the Emperor that the district committed to their charge has been saved from the rebels, giving such a colour to the foreign assistance afforded, as will enable them to represent it in the light of an act of vassalage. Under shadow of this protection they would be quite willing to collect revenue, and administer the province, relying on some lucky expedient to enable them to dispense with it after the cause of danger is past, and at all events satisfied with having obtained a temporary respite from degradation and severe punishment. In the meantime, however, the task of supplying the place of the foreign force would become every day more difficult. The Imperial authority would be entirely discredited in the eyes of the people. The Chinese officials, pressed for money, and relying on foreign support, would become more than ever cruel, corrupt, and oppressive; and the Chinese, deprived of popular insurrection, their rude but efficacious remedy against local oppressors, would with justice throw on the foreigner the odium of excesses which his presence alone would render possible. The consequence would be, popular hostility, reprisals, and that train of events which would render it necessary to appropriate permanently the province occupied, or to retire from it, leaving behind a bitter ill-will among the people. No course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation, as to lend our material support to a Government the corruption of whose authorities is only checked by its weakness.

I am in possession of no information from which I can infer that an intervention such as is now proposed is desired by or would be acceptable to the Imperial Government. Indeed, from the language held to me by Ho in his interview yesterday, I gather that even the services rendered to the Chinese in suppressing piracy have never been reported to the Court, nor do I think that any services or aid of this kind will be represented in their true light at Peking until we obtain an undisputed footing there. I hold this to be an indispensable condition if intervention is not to end in a partition of the Chinese Empire, and in discussing the subject with Ho yesterday I endeavoured to convey this impression to him, and to urge on him that the true policy of the Chinese Government was to put an end to its differences with foreign Powers, and apply their resources to the restoration of internal tranquillity.

According to the most reliable information, the rebels have not appeared at Soo-chow, or in the neighbourhood, in any force. The death of the Imperialist General and ex-rebel Chief, Chang Kwoh-liang, seems to have disorganized the braves, who formed a large part of the Imperialist army; and the excesses they and the other fugitives committed, induced the population of Soo-chow and Chang-chow to take up arms against them. The insurrection seems to have had for its object the expulsion of the marauders rather than the overthrow of the Imperial authority, and to have been headed by the civil officers. The result, however, is that these cities remain comparatively defenceless, and will fall into the hands of the rebels whenever they choose to advance and occupy them. Of the Imperial army, only 13,000 men it is said are collected, of whom only a part can be relied upon, the braves having shown a disposition to desert and join the rebels or commence plundering on their own account; and I cannot discover that any considerable body of troops can be collected in the province of Che-kiang to defend Hang-chow and the other important cities on the line of the Canal.

No. 35.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 12.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, June 12, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Imperial Commissioner Ho arrived here on the 7th instant, and inquired whether M. de Bourboulon and myself would receive him. Considering the position in which Ho, as Governor-General of this province, is placed by late events, and the protection we have extended to an important city within his jurisdiction, we agreed that the rejection of the ultimatum afforded no sufficient reason for declining his visit, while it was possible that some information might be gained as to the disposition of the Imperial Government, which might prove useful to the Ambassadors. Accordingly Ho, Sieh, and Woo the Taoutae, called on me on the 9th instant: the interview lasted two hours; and I inclose a report of the points of interest alluded to, drawn up by Mr. Wade, who acted as interpreter.

The Imperial Decree alluded to has not been communicated to me, but it was mentioned to Count Kleczkowski at an interview he had subsequently with the Commissioner on behalf of M. de Bourboulon. Ho exhibited it to him after taking the precaution of turning down all but the two first columns of writing. It bore no date apparently, but was issued, according to Ho's account, on the 13th of May.

Count Kleczkowski, however, read enough to satisfy himself that it was couched in vague terms, merely empowering Ho to concede what might be conceded, and refuse what ought to be refused; and he accordingly returned it, with the remark that a power of such a nature was quite unequal to what the occasion demanded. The fact of the Commissioners not having sent a copy according to promise, confirms me in the belief that they are themselves quite aware of its insufficiency.

The last report I have received is to the effect that before writing to Peking the Commissioners will await the arrival of the Ambassadors, perhaps with the hope of finding them more disposed to listen to them. At all events by this decision they will gain a few days, and the full news of the Imperial losses will have reached Peking.

It is impossible not to feel compassion for the position of these Chinese officials, who are sacrificed if they venture to tell unpalatable truths to their Government, and are equally held responsible for the calamities that may be caused by the wilful ignorance of the Government at Peking.

Inclosure in No. 35.

Memorandum of a Conference between Mr. Bruce and Commissioner Ho.

HO was accompanied by Sieh Hwan, one of the two Treasurers of Kiang-su, lately brevetted a Provincial Governor, and associated with the Imperial Commissioner in the management of foreign business; also by Woo Hü, Intendant of the Circuit in which Shanghae is situated.

Mr. Bruce was attended by Lieutenant-Colonel Neale, Secretary of Legation, and Mr. Wade, Chinese Secretary.

Ho professed a certain degree of deafness; the conversation was, therefore, principally carried on with or through Sieh.

After a few common-place remarks, Ho volunteered an acknowledgment of the efforts made by the allies to preserve this place from disorder.

Mr. Bruce, alluding to a report that the movements of the allies had in some instances alarmed the population, impressed upon him the necessity of explaining by proclamation or otherwise, the real purpose of these movements, namely, the well-being of the people. This all three mandarins assured him had been done throughout the neighbourhood.

In reply to Mr. Bruce's request that he would proceed to explain specifically the object of his visit, Ho stated that this was twofold: first, in virtue of a Special Commission, to attempt an accommodation of our differences with the Imperial Government; secondly, to move us to apply our force to the pacification

of this province, in the welfare of which we had a commercial interest, and the population of which had been so long on friendly terms with us.

The first question Ho disposed of in a single sentence, but on the second he enlarged much.

Mr. Bruce rejoined that the second, and, indeed, all local questions, were merged in the first. We had been subjected to treatment for which our Government demanded apology and reparation. Our terms had been set forth in his letter addressed to the Great Council, which had rejected every proposition. The good understanding to which Ho had appealed did not, consequently, exist as we understood the term, between the two Governments. It could only exist when, as we required, the Treaties had been exchanged in Peking, and our Minister's full title to go or stay, to move where and visit whom he would, had been practically recognized. A good understanding once established on these conditions, we should then see whether we could, with justice, aid in restoring tranquillity to the country or not; but, until these conditions were satisfied, we could have nothing to do with local questions.

This was the sum of what fell from Mr. Bruce during a good deal of dialogue, in which, on the other side, it was maintained that the collision at Takoo was the result of a misunderstanding for which we were, in two respects, to blame: first, we would not wait for the arrival of Kweiliang and his colleagues, though we had been informed here that their presence was necessary; secondly, our Mission, coming ostensibly to exchange ratifications, came supported by a large force. Hence, suspicion without the means of explanation, the result of which was the collision which took place at Takoo. The repudiations of the Council were made light of. The business in question was not the Council's business. It was half hinted that the Council's reply was not made under authority of the Emperor.

Mr. Bruce would not admit that there had been no means of explanation at Takoo. We were before it several days, during which the officials kept aloof. Immense preparations had been made against us, as if we were an enemy. The Emperor's Decree had approved the conduct of his agents. All this had been reported home, and Her Majesty's Government had required that which had been demanded, and which he, Mr. Bruce, had no power to modify or abate; it was not, therefore, in his power to discuss the matter of the ultimatum as if it were fit matter for negotiation, and the only communication from Ho to which he could attend, would be one to the effect that the Emperor conceded all that had been asked.

Sieh urged that no public question could be settled without deliberation; and, still insisting that there had been a misunderstanding—not here, but at Peking, Ho interposed, and said that there was one "tao-li" ("theory of right and wrong") for the North, and another for the South.

Mr. Bruce took occasion to say, that he felt that the proceedings at Takoo were evidence of the difference between Northern and Southern policy; and he presently inquired to what, while we were regarded with so much jealousy in the North, the friendly feeling towards us in this province, on which they laid so much stress, was attributable.

All three mandarins affirmed, with great warmth, that this was undoubtedly attributable to the people's long acquaintance with us.

Mr. Bruce then asked whether it was not fair to infer that a better acquaintance with us at Peking might not produce a similarly desirable result in the capital.

This did not draw forth any direct answer. Sieh urged, very vehemently, that if the negotiation of peace were entrusted by Mr. Bruce to Ho and himself, everything could be arranged by their representations to the Throne.

Ho observed, that in China particular business was given to particular men to transact, and as the Emperor had before deputed Kweiliang to negotiate the Treaty, &c., so had he now deputed him, Ho, to treat of the question before us.

In reply to his earlier assurances that Ho was fully qualified, Sieh had been pressed to say positively whether the Emperor's Decree, alleged to confer extraordinary powers, had been received by Ho or himself. Both said by the latter. They had not a copy with them, but would send one to-morrow. The original, however, they both said, was not in Ho's possession, but in Sieh's. Neither of them could remember the exact date of its arrival. Both insisted positively on the fact of its arrival, and in rejoinder to a question regarding the

authenticity or completeness of such a document, Ho stated very emphatically that a Decree was a paper he would not venture to change a word of.

Finding the discussion repeating itself without prospect of any definite result, Mr. Bruce closed it by observing that the only Chinese official with whom discussion would be possible would be one empowered to concede—one whose concession would be equally valid with the Emperor's; if none such were forthcoming, he must push on northwards until he met with one.

The conversation from beginning to end may be described as a series of attempts, on the part of the mandarins, to induce Mr. Bruce to enter into an engagement to assist the Provincial Government against the rebels; the principal argument in favour of this course being that in pleading our cause to the Emperor, Ho's hands would be materially strengthened were he enabled to appeal to our protection of the people of Kiang-su as a proof of the inoffensiveness which we professed.

One of Sieh's arguments in favour of our intervention is worth noting, viz., that during the many years our intercourse had endured nothing had been known of us at Peking, except as people as incessantly engaged in quarrels with China, and we had now the opportunity of disabusing the Court of this impression, by appearing as the allies of its subjects in distress.

In Mr. Bruce's rejoinder, on the other hand, he insisted on the impossibility of discussing the details of the ultimatum as matter of negotiation. If the Emperor sincerely desired peace, he would have no great difficulty in conceding the little that had been demanded. He expressed his doubts, notwithstanding the assurances of Ho and Sieh, that any provincial would be authorized even to discuss propositions that had been so positively negatived by so high a Court as the Council. Adverting to our unsatisfactory experience of the value of provincial representations, he dwelt more than once on the necessity of perfect freedom of access to the Central Government. He pointed out the inconsistency of those who professed to represent the Chinese Government in requesting the aid down here of the very foreigners whom, in the North, the Central Government is expending its resources in efforts to exclude as suspicious intruders. Lastly, he cautioned them against excessive readiness to introduce foreign troops into a wealthy and helpless district, the cities of which, once occupied, they might one day find it difficult to resume. Why, if you want assistance, asked Mr. Bruce, do you not at once come to terms, and, then, bring down Sang-ko-lin-sin and his troops, who will be no longer wanted in the North, in steamers? Sieh begged he would not joke or trifle. Mr. Bruce said he was perfectly in earnest. That what he regarded as trifling was the attempt now made to discuss at a moment that the Government ought to have made up its mind to concede.

This closed the conversation. Some questions were put to the mandarins before they withdrew as to the real condition of the country from Soo-chow to the Great River. From their answers it would appear that there are no authorities, civil or military, at any one of the cities along the canal traversing the above region. Their details generally corroborated the account already placed before us by common report.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE, *Chinese Secretary.*

British Legation, Shanghae, June 9, 1860.

No. 36.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1860.

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration your despatches of the 30th May and 10th June last, in which you report that you had, in concert with your French colleague M. de Bourboulon, acceded to the solicitation of the Chinese authorities for British and French co-operation in the defence of the city of Shanghae, in the event of an attack by the rebel force.

On the ground of the exceptional circumstances of the case, and of the safety of the foreign settlement and of foreign commercial interests being so intimately involved in the security of the town, Her Majesty's Government approve of your having acceded to the request of the Chinese authorities on the

distinct understanding that the promised co-operation is confined to the city itself.

Her Majesty's Government also entirely approve of the view which you take, as set forth in your despatch of the 10th of June, as to the impolicy of foreign intervention in the present state of affairs in China between the contending parties; and of your having declined to accede to General Montauban's proposal for a joint action of British and French forces for the protection of Soo-chow.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 37.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received August* 26.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, June* 29, 1860.

IN my despatch of the 12th instant, giving an account of my interview with the Imperial Commissioner Ho, I stated that it was in discussion among the Chinese to send an accurate report to the Emperor, both of the late disasters in this province, and of the necessity of immediate compliance with the demands of the allies; that Ho urged this course, because he was already compromised by provincial events; but that Sieh, not being so compromised, opposed it.

Mr. Wade has obtained a copy of a Memorial, purporting to be addressed by Ho, and Wang the Governor of the Province of Che-kiang, exposing very fully the reverses sustained by the Imperialists, and the necessity of an unconditional compliance with our demands. He entertains no doubt, from its style, of this document being prepared by an official; and the statement of my having visited Ho, whereas he visited me, is one of the class of misrepresentations which would naturally find its way into a Memorial addressed by a Chinese official to the Emperor. On the other hand, Mr. Wade has pointed out certain anachronisms and abrupt transitions in the argument, from which it is reasonable to infer that the copy obtained, or rather thrown in our way, supposing such a document to have been sent to Peking, has been altered so as to render it more satisfactory to us.

I the rather incline to this opinion, because subsequently to the receipt of this letter, and to Ho's degradation and disgrace, he has attempted to obtain from me a letter declining absolutely to negotiate here, which would have served as an excuse to him for anticipating the expected order of arrest, and proceeding by steam to the North. But as I am convinced that a letter refusing to negotiate here would be construed into a readiness to discuss in the North, and would only serve to mislead the Cabinet of Peking, while at the same time I do not wish to take on myself, in view of the approaching arrival of the Ambassadors, to declare formally all negotiation or discussion at an end, I came to the conclusion, in concert with M. de Bourboulon, that it was better policy to take no step of the kind suggested.

It is idle to expect any return for a personal service rendered to a Chinese official; and since I have seen General Ignatieff, I have reason to believe that Ho's representations to Peking have been as insincere and partial as those of his predecessors have been, and as those of his successors will continue to be, as long as a provincial authority is the channel through which our intentions and character are made known to the Government at Peking.

I inclose a Memorandum of Mr. Wade's on Ho's actual position.

Inclosure 1 in No. 37.

Memorial.

(Translation.)

HO KWEI-TSING, Governor-General of the Two Kiang, and Wang Yu-ling, Governor of Cheh-kiang, upon their knees, submit a Memorial to your Majesty, praying that, in view of the danger to which, in consequence of the annihilation of the army, the North and South have in the twinkling of an eye become exposed, peace may be made without loss of time, and thus by one move two wars brought to an end. Such is the representation which they have the

honour confidentially to set before you in a joint despatch, prepared with all deference, and imploring your Celestial Majesty to be graciously pleased to accord, with all speed, what they propose, in order to the rescue of the interests imperilled. They look upward, awaiting the glance of your Sacred Majesty thereon.

In a Memorial which, as the records show, your servant Ho Kwei-tsing had the honour to forward by the Government courier, under date the 16th of the fourth moon (5th June), your Majesty has already been apprized of the loss of Soo-chow, and the state of utter disorganization thereon ensuing; also, that your servant had proceeded to Shanghae, to negotiate and take action in obedience to the instructions of your Majesty.

The dissolution of the main body encamped before Nanking on this occasion, your servants are humbly of opinion, was entirely due to the fact that Ho-chun put faith in persons undeserving it. Hence dissatisfaction amongst the troops, not of a single day's growth; while Chang Kwoh-liang, annoyed at his inability to carry out his own measures (or, at not having his own way), threw himself into the fight at Tan-yang, and died (1). On this, simultaneously the whole army became so demoralized, that wherever the enemy came—and he very presently moved on Tan-yang and Wu-sih, as well as on Chang-chow and Wu-sih—it broke up. In every instance it behaved equally ill. At Soo-chow, spies had already introduced themselves into the city; and besides this, runaway soldiers and braves (inside) conspired with the rebels without the walls: so that in less than half a day (after the alarm was given) news came suddenly of the loss of the place. Most deplorable, indeed! Ho-chun, who was at the Hu-shu Kwan (an important Customs barrier a short distance north of Soo-chow), seeing with his own eyes that every one was disheartened, and that the situation was desperate, put an end to himself before the crisis (which he anticipated); while, on the other hand, Chang Yuh-liang, finding that Soo-chow was lost, moved with all haste into Cheh-kiang. Thus the army, its first and second in command having, one after the other, both lost themselves, was left without a chief, and troops and braves, many myriads in number, were in one morning scattered as the stars, their ammunition and supplies all going to supply the enemy. Such was the degree of dilapidation and overthrow (*état de délabrement*) attained in less than a month. Never in all antiquity has there been a state of confusion so remarkable.

As to the rebels, it was reported by the scouts that, on the 13th (2nd June), after the fall of Soo-chow, column after column kept arriving, extending themselves almost into Cheh-kiang. Outside the walls of Hang-chow (the capital of that province), there are at this moment some 20,000 or 30,000 fugitives from the Soo-chow force, privily mingling with whom there are very possibly spies of the enemy.

Your servant Wang Yu-ling has enjoined the civil and military authorities of the city to make search strictly and secretly, and to plant guard-stations at different points. But the multitude is so large, that, with more than half their officers dead or fled, the work of identification is attended with the greatest embarrassment (*lit.*, finger-pricking). In the city there is not money enough to pay the troops, and the force is small. The rebels in Yen-chau (2) are merely watching their opportunity to move. With depression within, and (an enemy) closing on it without, the condition of Hang-chow is, indeed, one of the utmost danger.

(Its chance of relief from other quarters is small.) Your servants have again and again (when sore pressed) written to the high authorities of adjoining provinces, and to the high officers commanding the armies in the field, urging them to send on reinforcements. But, alas! the troops marched up from Fuh-kien, Hu-kwang, Kiang-si, and the northern or southern division of Ngan-hwui, if not too much interested in their own preservation to attend to that of others, are so long on the road that they fail to meet the emergency (for which they are summoned). The Ngan-hwui corps, for instance, under the command of Kiang Chang-kwei, which has enjoyed a reputation for energy, did reach Ping-wang, on the common confines of Kiang-su and Cheh-kiang; but presently finding the fugitives of the force that was broken up sweeping in as a tide, it forthwith countermarched on Hu-chau. Other provinces, in that they are more distant, are not to be counted on; and if reinforcements were to come up in time, there are not the means of keeping them supplied.

It was for this cause that when Soo-chow was in extremity, your servant Sü Yu-jin, Governor of Kiang-su, being at his wits' end, wrote a despatch to be sent express to Sieh Hwan, recently translated to the Commissionership of Finance in this province, and to Wu-Hü, Intendant of the Su-sung-tai Circuit, directing them to apply for the loan of some English and French troops to come to the rescue of the provincial capital, and at the request of Han Tsung, Pang Wan-hwoh, Wang Tsau, Pwan I-fung, and others, being the gentry of the whole prefecture, preferred in a joint petition, he specially deputed Wu-Yün, Acting Prefect of Soo-chow, to carry down the despatch and hurry on the business. Wu-Yün however had but just reached Shanghae, when the news came that Soo-chow had fallen.

Your servant Ho Kwei-tsing was lying off Liu-ho, when he received a despatch sent to him express by Wu-Hü in a preventive service steamer, requesting him to hasten to Shanghae to deliberate (with the foreign Ministers), and make the necessary arrangements. Accordingly, on the evening of the 17th (6th June) he arrived at Shanghae, and on the 20th (9th June), received the British Minister Bruce. With him he conferred, and endeavoured to dissuade him from proceeding northward. This Minister said that no negotiations were possible at Shanghae; also that the peace propositions (the Treaty and Ultimatum), were all in all (or, were the foremost consideration); that before any other step, he must exchange the Treaties at Peking; that, as regards the fifty-six Articles of the Treaty concluded at Tien-tsin, and the four stipulations contained in the letter addressed to the Council last spring, there were but two words that need be spoken, "concession" or "rejection." If "concession," then peace would be restored; if "rejection," then there would be fighting immediately. (Your servant) subsequently saw the French Secretary of Legation, Kleczkowski, who held much the same language.

He now learns that the vessels of war of these two nations have already proceeded in consecutive divisions to the Shan-tung waters, and will take action immediately. It is already too late, therefore, to remonstrate against their moving.

Now, (to consider the question from another point of view,) when, a short time ago, the Soo-chow and Cheh-kiang merchants in business at Shanghae bethought them of begging these Ministers to move troops, their immediate requirement being of course the relief of Soo-chow, but their desire being also to recommend an adjustment of pending differences, these Ministers were evidently well-disposed, and even ready to give their aid; but what answer (or, report) could they have made to their Governments, if the large force put in motion for the express purpose of inflicting injury on us had been applied, before (its end was accomplished), to the suppression of rebellion on our behalf? Such a course would indeed have been, judging others by ourselves, one scarcely to be insisted on.

[It humbly appears to your servants that whereas there had been peace and trade between China and the English and French for nearly twenty years, there was no cause of quarrel between them until Yeh Ming-chin became Governor-General of the Two Kwang, when by his indifferent management there came to be constant disputes with these two nations, the result of which was the Canton affair of the 7th year of this reign (1857).

The peace negotiated the year before last at Tien-tsin received the sanction of your Majesty by Decree, and last year (3) your Majesty further sent Kweiliang and his colleagues to negotiate a Tariff. There remained but the exchange of Treaties, (and, this effected,) all (ill feeling) would have been put away on both sides. Kweiliang and his colleagues, however, were unable to return north by land with the same rapidity as the steam-vessels of the English and French Ministers moved. These speedily reached Tien-tsin. Sang-ko-lin-sin thinking only of defence, and not versed in the history of the negotiation of peace, his defensive apparatus was destroyed, and the two parties commenced firing on one another. Thus were hostile feelings re-awakened. In a word, while the commerce of China with the foreigner is a source of advantage to both parties, these quarrels, now of some years' continuance, are, on the contrary, a source of disadvantage to both. Not only will war, once commenced, be productive of trouble in every direction, but it is to be apprehended that there will be no end to war and the misery belonging to it; (and independently of the injury sustained by China within,) yet greater is the violence done to the principle that we should cherish the men from afar.]

(But the foreigner has no deep feeling of hostility). For instance, the act of the English and French Ministers in detaching troops to patrol round Shanghae, as a place frequented by the mercantile communities of all nations, now that rebellion is closing upon it, is doubtless intended for the protection of the foreign merchants; but the inclusion of the city and suburbs within the same protection makes it plain that these Ministers draw no invidious distinctions (between native and foreigner). But if, as is to be apprehended, this spot of coast come to be hemmed in by rebellion, how is it to hold out for any length of time? Trade has already been long interrupted; goods do not circulate, to the great damage of the native and foreign merchants. Still less is Customs revenue forthcoming. Local banditti are eager to try conclusions (with the Government). Canton braves are flocking hither, nor do funds suffice to send them all home. The only cause that keeps them from revolting at once, is the report that there is a prospect of an early negotiation of peace, and the employment of a foreign force to put down the rebels; and if even this cannot be brought about, they will not wait for the rebels, but will possess themselves of the city without more ado.

At such a moment, when the danger of the North and South of the Empire is pitted against its safety, if, still watching and waiting in silence, your servants were not to speak that they do know, their crime, in that it would affect the welfare of the State, would be yet more grave than it is; neither could ten thousand deaths adequately atone for their transgression. The only resource (they have to suggest) now, is the negotiation of peace without loss of time, so that the British and French may utterly put away their hostile feeling; they would then reasonably (or, they might then naturally,) lend us their troops, and with their co-operation the Empire might be in some degree relieved from the danger of war in the North and South.

The Treaties concluded at Tien-tsin, submitted to your Majesty by Kweiliang and his colleagues, you were graciously pleased to sanction. The four propositions advanced last spring by the Ministers are, it is true, in excess of the Treaty, but they have been brought forward because of the collision at Takoo; and if what is asked be not now conceded, the business in hand cannot really be brought to an issue (*lit.*, the game cannot, indeed, be played out).

Your servants, early and late laying their plans (or, deliberating) in secret, (submit that if what they propose be) done, there is some hope of restoring things; if it be not, the state of the North and South will be such as they cannot bear to imagine; and, inasmuch as when things come to such a pass, the single lives of your servants laid down in the service of the State would avail it nothing, they cannot refrain from setting the truth detailedly before your Majesty, whom, looking upward, they implore of your celestial bounty to yield to circumstances beyond the usual limit (of concession), and by authorizing in full the operation of the Treaties concluded with the English and French at Peking, and the satisfaction of the four requests preferred by them, to afford some hope of an immediate termination of war both in the North and in the South.

As to the admission of these Ministers into Peking and the exchange of ratifications, orders can be given to Sieh Hwan, in accordance with (or, on receipt of) your Majesty's pleasure, to hasten northward by sea, and arrange everything relating to these questions in a satisfactory manner, to the preservation of the great interests at stake.

Trembling beyond measure while they wait Your Majesty's commands, your servants forward their joint memorial, reverently prepared, by the fastest post (4), and, prostrate, implore thereon the sacred glance of your Majesty, and your instructions thereanent.

A respectful memorial, (stated to have been) despatched upon the 24th of the 4th moon of the 10th year (13th June, 1860).

Notes.

The two paragraphs at the foot of p. 96, in brackets, I believe to be an interpolation.

(1.) Chang Kwoh-liang is stated to have put an end to himself.

(2.) Yen-chau is a department intersected by the River Tsien-tang, falling into Hang-chow Bay.

(3.) This anachronism, no less than the general interference with the

argument of the whole passage, inclines me to regard it as an interpolation of the person who procured me this paper.

(4.) At the rate of 600 *li*, pressed to the utmost; the fastest speed of which the courier is capable.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE, *Chinese Secretary.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 37.

Memorandum.

THERE appears to be no doubt that Ho Kwei-tsing has been degraded for the late disaster before Nanking. I have been unable to obtain the Decree, but it is said to command that Ho be sent a prisoner to Peking, there to be tried.

Sieh, appointed some time since his coadjutor in the Commissionership of Mercantile, that is, Foreign Affairs, is stated to have taken over the "kwan-fang," or seal of Commissioner, yesterday.

Ho's successor, as Governor-General of the Two Kiang, is Tsang Kwoh-fau, as Minister, who has much distinguished himself as Commissioner of War against the rebels in Kiang-si, the comparative tranquillity of which province is entirely attributed to his exertions. He is believed to be still at Kwan-teh, to the south-west of the Tai-hu or Great Lake, where it is supposed he is concerting operations with Chang Yuh-liang, that General being in force between Hang-chow and Kia-hing. The accounts from those places, and, indeed, from others along the Grand Canal, favour the opinion that the Provincial Government will presently be enabled to reassert its authority throughout this important region. The Imperialist reverses appear to have been no little exaggerated, many towns and cities having been abandoned, or stated to be abandoned, before the appearance of any enemy. The actual presence of the long-haired, or Nanking rebels, at places this side of Soo-chow is not well authenticated.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE, *Chinese Secretary.*

Chinese Secretary's Office, Shanghae, June 27, 1860.

No. 38.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received August* 26.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, June* 30, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that his Excellency the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Her Majesty's Ambassador in China, arrived at this place, on the 29th instant, in the steam-ship "Feroze," of Her Majesty's Indian Navy, and that his Excellency Baron Gros reached Shanghae on the previous day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 39.

Colonel Foley to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received August* 26.)

(Extract,) *Shanghae, June* 30, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Sir Hope Grant and Vice-Admiral Hope arrived here on Saturday the 16th instant, on which day they called upon General de Montauban and agreed, together with Vice-Admiral Charner, who had come over from Woo-sung, that a Conference should be held at 12 o'clock on the following Monday.

On Monday, the 18th instant, the two Generals and the two Admirals met at the house of the French General, when the following decisions were arrived at.

1. That General de Montauban, with the French, should be disembarked in the neighbourhood of Chakoa, and Sir Hope Grant, with the English force,

on the left bank of the Peh-tang, subject to any change consequent on a further reconnaissance to be made by the naval and military authorities.

2. That the landing at the above-mentioned spots should take place on the 15th of July, or as soon after as possible.

3. That ten days before the actual day fixed upon for the landing a place of rendezvous be named, in order to ensure the simultaneous appearance of the allied forces near the mouth of the Peiho.

4. That measures be taken to disarm and expel from the river certain suspicious-looking junks which have arrived in the Shanghae waters, and which were causing much alarm amongst the inhabitants of the native town.

The landing-place chosen by General de Montauban appears to be the most practicable of any to the southward, within reasonable distance of the Peiho forts. There is a small creek at that point which can be entered by the boats at half tide, a bar at the entrance preventing their doing so at low water. It is about twenty-five miles from the forts, consequently the troops will have to carry four or five days' provisions with them, in the event of bad weather preventing communication with the ships.

With regard to the second paragraph, I can hold out to your Lordship no prospect of the landing taking place on the 15th of July. The French cannot possibly be ready for active operations by that day. A great many of their artillery and transport ponies are still here, and will not be embarked for the North before the 2nd or 3rd proximo.

On arrival at Che-foo they will have to be trained to draw artillery, &c., a difficulty which, I trust, may be soon overcome, as they show aptitude for draught work.

Taking all things into consideration, I am of opinion that the 25th of July will be much nearer the time for commencing operations than the 15th.

Very satisfactory accounts have been received of the French disembarkation at Che-foo. The country people, who were at first frightened, have since become re-assured, and bring poultry, vegetables, &c., to the camp for sale. The water is pronounced to be good, and sufficiently abundant.

Sir Hope Grant and Vice-Admiral Hope left Shanghae about a week ago to join the English force at Ta-lien-hwan.

The Taoutae of Shanghae having reported to General de Montauban that the rebels were in force about twenty-five miles off, a party composed of 300 French and 300 English soldiers, with four guns, was sent to occupy a position about seven or eight miles from Shanghae. The party returned this morning, having remained out some days, without seeing or hearing anything of the rebels.

I regret to say that two French chartered ships have been wrecked and their cargoes lost; one, the "Reine des Clippers," having on board the winter clothing for the army and the medical stores; the other, the "Alexander Raleigh," principally laden with coal.

General de Montauban and Staff leave Shanghae for Che-foo on the 2nd proximo.

No. 40.

Colonel Foley to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 13.)

French Head-Quarters, Che-foo, Gulf of Pecheli,
July 11, 1860.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that General de Montauban and Staff arrived here on Thursday morning, the 4th instant. He found the French camp well established, the health of the troops excellent, and a plentiful supply of all sorts of provisions coming into the market every morning, with the exception of bullocks and sheep, which do not appear to abound in this neighbourhood.

Within this last three or four days mules of a very superior description have been offered for sale, of which upwards of sixty have been bought, and there is every prospect of considerably increasing the number before our departure.

General de Montauban, on arriving here, found a letter from Sir Hope Grant, proposing, in order to secure a sufficient supply of water for the English troops, that a small combined force of English and French should immediately

proceed to Peh-tang, establish itself there, and await the arrival of the rest of the troops.

The French General did not accede to this, on the ground that it might, in self-defence, lead to an attack of the Peiho forts; and as Sir Hope Grant had, since writing the above-mentioned letter, disembarked his force at Ta-lien-hwan, and found a sufficiency of water there, not only to supply the troops, &c, but also the ships, the object of the proposed movement ceased to exist.

Sir Hope Grant arrived here yesterday, when it was agreed, at a Conference with General de Montauban and Admiral Charner, that the French General should write to Sir H. Grant on the 20th instant, and state the exact day on which he will start from Che-foo.

2ndly. The rendezvous for anchorage, previous to proceeding to the different points for disembarkation, was fixed.

3rdly. Admiral Charner is to send a gun-boat, or small vessel, having on board the Chief of the Staff, &c., to reconnoitre the sea-shore between Chakoo and eight miles from the Peiho river, but not to go further north; the British Commanders to make a reconnaissance to the north of the Peiho, should they be so inclined.

4thly. A Conference to be held immediately on the arrival of the Allied Commanders-in-chief, at the anchorage mentioned in No. 2.

I have much satisfaction in informing your Lordship that the French Commanders-in-chief are doing their utmost to enable them to leave Che-foo at the earliest possible date, and I am in great hopes, should no unforeseen occurrence arise, that the French force will be embarked and ready to start by the evening of the 25th of July.

Baron Gros arrived here this morning.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ST. GEORGE FOLEY, *Colonel*,
Commissioner at French Head-Quarters.

No. 41.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 13.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, July* 16, 1860.

THE insurgents are still at Soo-chow, and, although there are reports of their intention to make a move in this direction, there is reason to doubt whether they will make the attempt. They are badly armed and short of ammunition, and the possession of a seaport enabling them to communicate with foreigners would be very important to them as a means of supplying these wants. I fear, chiefly, the indiscreet visits of missionaries and others to their head-quarters, as it may convey the impression to them of our sympathy with, or fear of, them, and in either case they would be encouraged to present themselves in this neighbourhood.

There is a report, which I am inclined to believe, of a reply from the Emperor having been received to the Memorial addressed by Ho and Wang, inclosed in my despatch of the 29th June last. I am told it urges an arrangement which should stop our troops from going to the North, and that it expresses great indignation at the proposal of calling in foreign help against the insurgents, stating that the Northern army is sufficient to check the barbarians and put down the rebels. I cannot vouch, however, for the accuracy of this account, as I have not seen the document.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 42.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 16.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, July* 2, 1860.

MR. BRUCE has had the goodness to place the services of Mr. Wade at my disposal, in order that he may accompany the Special Embassy in the capacity of Chinese Secretary.

Mr. Wade's qualifications as a Chinese scholar and efficient public officer are well known to your Lordship, and require no commendation from me. He was attached in a similar character to my former mission, and there is no person whom I would prefer to have with me as an adviser at this critical conjuncture, when matters of great delicacy and importance affecting our future relations with China are likely to present themselves for consideration. At the same time, I think it not improbable that, during the course of the discussions which may take place, questions may arise upon which it would be a great advantage to me to have it in my power to consult Mr. Parkes. I have accordingly, with Mr. Bruce's consent and concurrence, addressed to that gentleman the letter of which a copy is herewith inclosed, requesting him, if he can be spared at Canton, to join me, at least for a limited period of time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 42.

The Earl of Elgin to Mr. Parkes.

Sir, *June* 30, 1860.

I AM aware of the great importance of the office which you fill at Canton, and I should be very unwilling to invite you to take any step which would interfere with the proper discharge of the duties appertaining to it.

At the same time, I cannot but feel that your ability and experience would be of great value to me in the North, if, at the present critical moment in our relations with China, I could have the advantage of your services in that quarter.

Should you, therefore, be of opinion that you could absent yourself from Canton, even for a limited period of time, without prejudice to the interests which are there entrusted to your care, I venture to request that you will, at your earliest convenience, join me in the Gulf of Pecheli.

The application which I now address to you has Mr. Bruce's sanction; and he desires me to say that he will take into consideration, and, if he deems it feasible, give effect to any arrangement you may suggest to him for facilitating your temporary absence from Canton.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 43.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 13.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, July* 5, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copies of an Address to me from the mercantile community of this place, and of my answer thereto.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 43.

Address of the Mercantile Community of Shanghae to the Earl of Elgin.

May it please your Excellency,

IN approaching your Excellency on the present occasion, we beg to assure you that we are fully sensible of the delicacy of the position which you have been called upon to fill.

We recall to mind, however, that we are addressing one who, on his first visit to China, was pleased of his own accord to invite the expression of our opinions; and we cannot doubt that we shall be excused if, at this more critical conjuncture, we venture, unasked, to lay before your Excellency, our views

egarding the policy which we conceive to be most to the furtherance of our permanent interests in this country.

Dependent as these interests are upon a state of peace, it is never without reluctance that we contemplate the necessity of a resort to hostilities; it cannot, however, have escaped your Excellency's penetration that our position in China has always in times past been prejudicially affected by a belief on the part of the Chinese that we are ready to submit to any sacrifice for the sake of trade; and, persuaded as we are that all sacrifices of the kind, if not wholly nugatory, are productive of but momentary benefit, we believe it not to be beyond our province, as merchants, to deprecate any course that might perpetuate this dangerous tradition in the minds of the Chinese, or that, by concluding too hasty a peace, may sow the seeds of a future war at no distant period.

The Treaty negotiated by your Excellency at Tien-tsin two years ago promises us many advantages. The success which has attended the perfidious attempt to deprive Her Majesty's Ministers of the Treaty-right of free access to Peking, we must think will encourage the Imperial Government to oppose the fulfilment of whatever stipulations do not accord with its pretensions to supremacy and exclusiveness; and its opposition to these, if successful, will, we venture to predict, be speedily extended to the new commercial privileges it is pledged to concede.

While, therefore, we do not assume to question the wisdom of Her Majesty's Government in entrusting the settlement of the difficulties now existing, to an officer of greater rank and power than those possessed by the Minister who so ably represented Her Majesty in this country, we take upon us to express a hope that the vigorous policy which, we feel, a want of means alone has rendered for the moment unsuccessful, will be firmly adhered to, and that no consideration for what may appear to be more immediately our interests as a mercantile community, will deter your Excellency from the prosecution of those measures which, although they temporarily interrupt our trade, will in the end secure us against a repetition of those international misunderstandings which may seriously and permanently injure it.

(Signed) JARDINE, MATHESON & Co.
DENT & Co.
LINDSAY & Co.
And 29 others.

Inclosure 2 in No. 43.

The Earl of Elgin to the Mercantile Community of Shanghae.

Gentlemen, *Shanghae, June 5*, 1860.

I HAVE frequently on former occasions, in the discharge of my duties in this country, availed myself of information furnished by you at my request; and I am glad that at the present conjuncture you should have come spontaneously forward to communicate to me your views and sentiments, in reference to matters in which you must necessarily feel the most lively interest.

Without departing from the reserve which it is my duty to maintain, I cannot, as you will no doubt at once perceive, discuss the questions of public policy which are raised in your Address; I may, however, remark that the Governments of England and France have sent large armaments to this quarter, with the intention of placing the relations between those countries and China upon a permanently pacified and satisfactory footing, and, as a first step towards that end, with the immediate purpose of enforcing on the Peking Court respect for the obligations of Treaties. It is highly creditable to your patriotism and public spirit that you should be willing, in your capacity of merchants, to make any sacrifice which you may be required to bear in order to render this lesson effectual.

You refer with much delicacy, yet in language of which the import cannot be mistaken, to the confidence and esteem with which the conduct of Her Majesty's Minister in China, under circumstances of great difficulty and trial, has inspired those who have had the best means of watching and appreciating it. This is a topic upon which, for obvious reasons, it is impossible for me to dilate; I may, however, state that his Excellency has placed unreservedly at my disposal

all the information necessary to enable me to estimate rightly the present state of affairs in this country, and that I believe there is no difference of opinion between us as to the course which ought to be pursued.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 44.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 13.)

(Extract.) "*Feroze,*" *Ta-lien-hwan, July* 11, 1860.

I REACHED this anchorage on Monday the 9th instant. The inclosed returns show the number of ships of war, transports, and troops collected here. All are in a condition of the highest efficiency. The arrangements in every department are excellent, and reflect the utmost credit on the Commanders-in-chief and others responsible for them.

It is manifest, however, that this perfection in arrangement and preparation has not been attained without a very considerable outlay. Every day's delay adds to that outlay.

On the day of my arrival at this place, I was informed by Vice-Admiral Hope and Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant that they had come to an understanding with the Commanders-in-chief of the French forces, to the effect that no hostile operation should be commenced before the 15th of the month, and that the Commanders-in-chief of neither force should make a movement in advance without giving ten days' notice to the Commanders-in-chief of the other.

The French authorities are making every exertion to complete their arrangements, and the delays have arisen from circumstances beyond their control.

I have hitherto refrained from making any overture to the Chinese Government, and even from communicating to it the fact of my arrival, because I apprehend that if I were to take any step of that nature, under existing circumstances, after an ultimatum has been tendered and rejected, and before any proof has been given of our ability to enforce our demands, my motive in doing so would be misunderstood, and that it would be supposed, either that we are ashamed of our former policy or distrustful of our strength. At the same time it is obvious that if the period of inaction lasts, and if the Chinese authorities take advantage of it to make advances towards me, I may find myself in a position of considerable difficulty: I may have to choose between the rejection of proposals apparently sufficient, and their acceptance under conditions not the most favourable to the establishment of permanently pacific relations with the Empire.

Inclosure 1 in No. 44.

NUMBER and Strength of Men-of-war for Service in the North of China, July 11, 1860.

Class.	Number.	Number Effective.	Guns.
Screw frigates	2	2	102
Paddle-wheel ditto	3	3	48
Sailing ditto	2	2	40
Paddle-wheel sloops	5	5	30
Corvettes	4	4	73
Despatch gun-boats	5	5	24
Gun-boats	18	18	36
Indian navy	6	1	8
Men-of-war transports	5		
Tenders, &c.	8	1	
Total	58	41	261

Inclosure 2 in No. 44.

RETURN of Transports in Ta-lien-hwan, July 11, 1860.

Cornet over.	Names.	Cornet over.	Names.
10		56	Vortigern.
12	Granada	57	Daniel Rankin.
13	Tasmania.	58	Nimrod.
14	Cressy.	59	Cambodia.
15	Octavia.	60	
16	Mars.	61	Lady Anne.
17	Walmer Castle.	62	Eranee.
18	Macduff.	63	Brandon.
19	Miles Barton.	64	Matilda Atheling.
20		65	Ocean Home.
21	Earl of Clare.	67	Queen of England.
23	Pioneer.	68	Punjaub.
24	Rajah of Cochin.	69	Dalhousie.
25	Michigan.	70	
26	Euxine.	71	Merchantman.
27	Zuleika.	72	York.
28	Elizabeth.	73	Mary Shepherd.
29	City of Poonah.	74	Sirius.
30		75	Frank Flint.
31	Athletæ.	76	Trimontaine.
32	Bosphorus.	78	Eastern Empire.
34	Burlington.	79	
35	Alfred.	80	
36	Hougoumont.	81	
37	Minden.	82	
38	Winifred.	83	
39	Iskender Shah.	84	
40		85	
41	Queen of the East.	86	
42	Statesman.	87	
43	Forerunner.	89	
45	Indomitable.	90	
46	Boyne.	91	Viscount Canning.
47	Shah Allum.	92	Armenian.
48		93	
49	Maldon.	94	Carthage.
50		95	
51	British Flag.	96	Lightning.
52	Clarendon.	97	
53	Dartmouth.	98	
54	Edith Moore.		

Cornet under.	Names.	Cornet under.	Names.
10	Scotland.	37	Will. Stevenson.
12	Khersonese.	38	America.
13	Melbourne.	39	Edward.
14	Mauritius.	40	
15	Thunder.	41	Zouave.
16	Powerful.	42	Henrietta Helena.
17	Sir W. Peel.	43	Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy.
18	Adelaide.	45	Forest Eagle.
19	Imperatriz.	46	Hurricane.
20		47	Faize Allum.
21	Chusan.	48	Good Success.
23	Azoff.	49	Celestial Breeze.
24	Kate Hooper.	50	
25	Fanny Mc Henry.	51	
26		52	
27		53	
28	Kennington.	54	Empress.
29	Natolia.	56	Dacotah.
30		57	Kingfisher.
31	Sebastopol.	58	Willy.
32	Regina.	59	Hollands Trouw.
34	Beloochee.	60	
35	Atiet Rahimon.	61	Flying Scud.
36	Prince of Wales.	62	Fearnought.

Cornet under.	Names.	Cornet under.	Names.
63	Patrician.	82	Norden.
64	Negotiator.	83	Auguste Hillman.
65	Jura.	84	Lincelles.
67	Albuera.	85	Punjaub Second.
68	Jessamine	86	Dayspring.
69	Fatte Shah Allum.	87	Maria Frederica.
70		89	Jacoba Cornelia.
71	Malabar.	90	
72	Ally.	91	Harkaway.
73	Lancashire Witch.	92	Glendower.
74	Drie Gebroeders.	93	Stately.
75	Commerce.	94	Queensberry.
76	Albion.	95	Virginie.
78	Mischief.	96	Shantung.
79	Norma.	97	Albert Edward.
80		98	Gamecock.
81	Alice Thorndike.		

Inclosure 3 in No. 44.

MORNING STATE of the Forces in China, under the Command of Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant, K.C.B.

Corps as Brigaded.	Present and fit for Duty at Ta-lien Bay.*						On Command at Hong-Kong, Chusan, &c.						Staff and otherwise employed, and Bâtmen.				Sick.						Troop Horses.		Alterations since Yesterday.									Remarks.
																	Present.			Absent.					Joined.		Quitted.		Died.		Horses.			
	Field Officers.	Captains.	Other Officers.	Serjeants.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Rank and File.	Field Officers.	Captains.	Other Officers.	Serjeants.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Rank and File.	Officers.	Serjeants.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers, Trumpeters, and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers, Trumpeters, and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Fit for Duty.	Sick.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Joined.	Died.	Cast.	
1st King's Dragoon Guards	1	3	4	12	3	169	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	...	...	...	...	...	6	...	...	...	183	2									
Probyn's Horse	...	1	E. 16* N. 16 E. 15	51	6	348	...	...	N. 1	1	...	9	...	...	...	...	N. 1	2	22	...	...	...	422	11	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	* E. 16, N. 16, means 16 European and 16 Native officers.
Fane's Horse	...	...	N. 11	35	8	276	...	...	...	...	1	3	...	...	...	...	...	1	16	...	...	...	325	2									
Royal Artillery	4	10	30	53	17	1,378	1	2	3	20	2	296	1	8	...	41	3	3	108	...	...	...	759	25									
Madras Mounted Train	...	1	E 6 N. 4	12	3	153	...	1	E. 2 N. 2	4	1	46†	...	...	...	...	...	3	4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	† 56 men at Chusan.
Royal Engineers	1	2	8	12	3	184	...	...	2	3	...	51	...	...	...	4	...	1	24														
Madras Sappers	...	1	E. 7 N. 3	9	4	214	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	16														
Military Train	1	5	21	21	4	220	...	...	...	3	...	6	1	...	...	1	...	1	13	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1,395 natives, 1,605 ponies.
2nd Battalion 1st Royals	2	6	19	36	14	455	...	1	3	12	1	111	3	...	...	38	2	2	30														
1st Battalion 2nd Queen's	2	6	20	26	18	555	...	1	1	4	1	87	3	6	...	46	2	...	18														
1st Battalion 3rd Buffs	3	6	16	40	16	694	...	2	2	7	2	279	5	5	...	82	1	1	56														
31st Regiment	3	6	21	39	18	815	...	1	...	4	1	73	2	7	...	46	...	3	91														
44th ditto	3	5	18	44	19	865	...	1	...	3	1	74	2	7	...	47	...	...	6														
Royal Marines	1	3	9	16	5	200	2	7	19	40	7	600‡	6	2	...	38	...	1	12	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	‡ At Shanghae, of which 200 are daily expected at Ta-lien Bay.
2nd Battalion 60th Rifles	3	2	22	46	16	628	...	1	1	4	1	79	3	...	...	18	1	4	84														
67th Regiment	4	6	21	40	20	738	...	1	2	9	2	127	...	3	...	60	...	1	15														* At Canton.
87th Royal Irish Fusiliers	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	6	22	50	19	953	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
99th Regiment	2	4	13	29	14	534	1	3	6	17	6	356§	3	3	...	38	1	1	6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	§ Detachment at Chusan.
3rd Bombay Native Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	2	E. 12 N. 23	61	23	976	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	} At Canton.
5th ditto	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	2	E. 12 N. 19	50	19	898	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
8th Punjaub Infantry	...	2	E. 13 N. 16	44	17	636	...	...	...	3	...	19	...	...	...	...	N. 3	5	42														
15th ditto	...	1	E. 13 N. 19	50	20	787	...	...	...	3	...	28	...	...	...	...	...	3	35														
19th ditto	...	1	E. 8 N. 8	30	14	353	...	2	E. 4 N. 5	21	6	185‖	...	...	...	...	N. 2	4	52	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	‖ Detachment at Chusan.
Regiment of Loodianah	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	3	E. 10 N. 19	47	16	586	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	At Shanghae.
21st Madras Native Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	...		5	E. 11 N. 18	57	20	1,051	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	At Hong Kong.
Total	30	71	300 77	645	239	10,302	11	41	113 87	423	129	6,894	32	39	...	459	10 6	36	656	...	...	...	1,689	40	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	

Grand Total, 20,199.

Head-Quarters, Ta-lien Bay, July 11, 1860.

(Signed) FREDK. STEPHENSON, *Deputy Adjutant-General.*

M 2

No. 45.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 13.)

My Lord, "*Feroze*," *Ta-lien-hwan, July* 12, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a letter from Vice-Admiral Hope to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant, and of a Memorandum placed in my hands by the latter, embodying the results of certain communications which have passed between the Commanders-in-chief of the English and French forces, with the view of fixing a time for a joint attack on the Takoo forts.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 45.

Vice-Admiral Hope to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Sir, "*Chesapeake*," *Ta-lien-hwan, July* 9, 1860.

AS I gather from General Montauban's letter to your Excellency that he may be prepared to proceed to the Peiho between the 20th and 25th July, and as I am precluded by a slight accident from leaving my ship at present, and will therefore be unable to accompany you to Che-foo, I have to suggest that we should make the inclosed proposition, as arranged in conversation between us, to General Montauban and Admiral Charner.

Should our proposition not be accepted, then it will be very desirable to keep matters open, which can be done by alleging the necessity of further consultation with myself and Lord Elgin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HOPE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 45.

Memorandum.

M. LE Général de Montauban écrira et indiquera le 20 Juillet, le jour précis de son départ de Che-foo.

M. le Général et M. l'Amiral Charner conviennent du point et comme mouillage des flottes.

M. le Général Montauban et M. l'Amiral Charner annonçent qu'il leur est nécessaire d'envoyer un bâtiment léger reconnaître la côte entre Che-foo et un point situé à huit milles du Peiho, mais qu'ils n'iront pas plus au nord.

Il reste entendu que les Commandants-en-chef Anglais pourront

1. PROPOSED that both the fleets shall leave for the rendezvous off the Peiho, on the earliest day that shall be agreed upon between the 20th and 25th July inclusive.

2. That the fleets shall be anchored about twenty miles from the shore, at either of the rendezvous marked A or B on the accompanying chart, of which B is exactly equi-distant from the Che-kaow and the Peh-tang, the proposed landing-places, and at a little to the northward, which appears to afford better water for anchorage. A sketch is added, showing the proposed mode of anchoring the fleet.

3. That it is expedient no further reconnaissance of the Peiho or its vicinity shall take place until after the fleets have left Che-foo and Ta-lien-hwan respectively, but that when this is done it is desirable that the Commanders-in-chief should push on to the rendezvous, in order, after meeting there, to complete any recon-

faire une reconnaissance au nord du Peiho.

Qu'une Conférence aura lieu au mouillage, &c., entre les Commandants-en-chef à ce sujet.

Le Vice-Amiral,
(Signé) L. CHARNER.
Le Général Commandant-en-chef,
C. DE MONTAUBAN.

naissance they may think proper as speedily as possible, and also that then such surveys of their intended anchorages as they should judge necessary shall be completed without delay.

4. It would probably be expedient at the same time to make something in the shape of a demonstration with a few ships off the Peiho, in order to draw off the attention of the Chinese from the real point of attack.

(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
J. HOPE.

No. 46.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Mr. Hammond.—(Received September 13.)

Sir, *Admiralty, September 13, 1860.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, extract of a letter from Vice-Admiral Hope, dated the 12th July, reporting generally on the arrangements made for the conduct of operations in China.

A copy of the chart showing the distribution of the force at Ta-lien-hwan Bay is also inclosed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. G. ROMAINE.

Inclosure in No. 46.

Vice-Admiral Hope to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

(Extract.) *"Chesapeake," Ta-lien-hwan Bay, July 12, 1860.*

YOU will be pleased to acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that I arrived here on the 25th ultimo, on which day the ships were at anchor in the Bay, the greater part of the expedition being assembled, and in force amply sufficient to commence operations.

On my way up, I visited the harbours both of Wei-hai-wei and Che-foo, and satisfied myself that in no respect would they have proved sufficient in size to hold a fleet of this description, with any regard to convenience, or even safety in bad weather. The entire absence of fresh water at the former, and the scanty supply at the latter of these harbours, barely sufficient for the use of the French expedition, would, even if the case had been otherwise, have placed them entirely out of the question as a rendezvous for this fleet.

On my arrival here, finding that the supply of water was likely to prove scanty, and feeling very confident that there was little prospect of the French force being able to move until the end of July, I requested Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to land the army immediately; and on the annexed charts their Lordships will observe the distribution of the force, selected with reference to the supply of water.

Without such a measure I should have found it impossible even to keep the supply of water in the fleet up to its then state. Now I hope to have the fleet complete prior to the embarkation of the army: and while on this subject I feel pleasure in stating that to the zeal and mechanical ability of Captain Lord John Hay, of the "Odin," I am much indebted for the prospect of such a satisfactory result.

The expedition having been provisioned at Hong Kong when the supplies were low, I was enabled to place only forty-two days' in each transport, and sixty days' more, for the troops, were placed in each, for their use when landed by the Commissariat of the army.

Such an arrangement, though at the time inevitable, being attended with serious inconvenience, I am now engaged in transferring all the Commissariat provisions of the European troop-ships to store-ships, and in completing them all to ninety days' naval provisions, which my means now enable me to accomplish; a quantity sufficient to take them back to India. By directions of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, the Deputy Commissary-General supplies the provisions for all native troops and coolies, which are not articles of naval victualling, and also forage. The transports, therefore, conveying native troops and coolies require no re-stowing.

From the resources which now exist in respect of provisions, both at Shanghae and Hong Kong, I hope that on the return of the "Vulcan" and "Urgent" to the fleet I shall be able to complete every ship, both vessels of war and European transports, to three months' from the 1st of August.

I am promised 500 bullocks per month from Shanghae (the first instalment of 250 has arrived to-day), which, if realised, will prove an ample supply. The following steamers are set apart for Commissariat service:—

Transport "Thunder," at Shanghae, for sheep;

Transport "Powerful," at Chusan, for bullocks;

Transports "Chusan" and "Azoff," Indian navy "Berenice" and "Sidney," at Japan, for transport of animals.

On the arrival of the "Walmer Castle" from Japan, I shall be able to appropriate the "Viscount Canning," a seventh steamer, to Commissariat service, and when the troops are landed, the "Australian," an eighth steamer, which will complete the demand upon me for steamers by the Deputy Commissary-General.

The supply of coal at present with the fleet, and in store at Japan, Shanghae, and Hong Kong, has enabled me to acquaint that officer that he may work these vessels in any direction he pleases.

The actual quantity of coal at present, the fleet being complete with the exception of about 1,000 tons which will be supplied from the colliers on passage from Japan, is:—

	Tons.
Welsh coal with the fleet, in colliers	6,000
On passage from Japan	1,200
In depôt at Japan	6,000
In depôt at Shanghae	4,700
In depôt at Hong Kong	2,000
Total	19,900
Less required to complete the fleet	1,200
Total	18,700

The supply of coal to be procured at Hong Kong, as well as that from Japan, has proved so much more reliable than I had any reason to expect, that I am of opinion their Lordships may safely keep back the whole, or such portion of the 25,000 tons demanded in addition for Hong Kong, in my letter of the 11th of April last.

Canton and the other commercial ports remain tranquil, with the exception of Shanghae, where the close vicinity of the rebels has paralyzed trade, and created much alarm.

I have no fear, however, for the safety of the British residents or property, an ample force being left for their protection; and, so far as has been ascertained, it being the wish of the rebels to keep well with the foreigners and encourage trade.

In conclusion, I have only to express the very deep regret I feel that circumstances should have delayed the commencement of operations so long, and to convey the assurance to their Lordships that no effort shall be spared on my part, when they do commence, to bring them to a speedy and successful issue.

No. 47.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, September* 19, 1860.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that I approve of the course which you have pursued in the present state of affairs in China, as reported in your despatch of the 11th of July last.

No. 48.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 29.)

My Lord, *"Feroze," Ta-lien-hwan, July* 24, 1860.

WHEN the Special Embassies left Europe, it was supposed that, on their arrival in China, they would find either, firstly, that the ultimata presented to the Chinese Government by the English and French Ministers had been accepted, and that pacific relations between England and France, on the one hand, and China on the other, had been accordingly re-established, or, secondly, that in consequence of the rejection of those ultimata, warlike operations had been already commenced.

The actual state of affairs does not altogether correspond with either of these hypotheses. The ultimata have been rejected; but this rejection has not been followed as yet by any acts of hostility, unless, indeed, the occupation of Chusan, and of certain other points on the coast of China, is to be considered as falling within this category.

I considered it therefore advisable that the French and English Ambassadors should come to some formal agreement as to the line of action which they ought to adopt in the position which this state of affairs had created for them, and I accordingly submitted my views on the subject to Baron Gros in a Memorandum, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith. From his reply, of which a copy is likewise inclosed, your Lordship will perceive that his Excellency entirely concurs in the opinion which I have formed respecting the course which our duty prescribes to us at this conjuncture.

I have addressed to the Commanders-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval and military forces in China a communication as nearly as may be in the terms of my Memorandum to Baron Gros.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 48.

Memorandum by the Earl of Elgin.

WHEN the Special Embassies left Europe, it was supposed that on their arrival in China they would find either, firstly, that the ultimata forwarded to the Chinese Government by the English and French Ministers had been accepted, and that pacific relations between England and France, on the one hand, and China on the other, had been re-established; or, secondly, that in consequence of the rejection of those ultimata, warlike operations had been already commenced.

The actual state of affairs does not altogether correspond with either of these hypotheses. The ultimata have, indeed, been rejected, but this rejection has not been as yet followed by any act of hostility.

It is, therefore, necessary that the Ambassadors should consider what course they ought to adopt in the position which this conjuncture has created for them.

It may be feared that if they notify their arrival to the Chinese Government before the Commanders-in-chief have made any forward movement, the Court of Peking will take advantage of the proceeding to raise discussions, which will occasion delays that are on every account greatly to be deprecated.

It is, moreover, almost certain that a notification to this effect tendered

under existing circumstances will be accepted by the Chinese authorities as an admission of weakness, and that it will strengthen the conviction of their superiority in the field, with which the occurrences of last year have, it is believed, inspired them.

It is needless to observe, that while this conviction endures there is little reason to hope for the satisfactory settlement of our present differences with China, and still less for the permanent establishment of pacific relations between England and France and this country.

It is, however, of course, proper and necessary that the Imperial Government should be in due time apprized of the presence of the Ambassadors in China, of their authority, and of the object of their Mission.

It appears to the Undersigned that the difficulties of the situation will be best met if the Ambassadors intimate to the Commanders-in-chief that, so far from wishing to interfere in any way with the execution of the plans now in contemplation for the reduction of the Takoo forts and the opening up of the route to Peking, at least as far as Tien-tsin, they are, on the contrary, desirous that effect should be given to them at the earliest period; that they intend to follow the movements of the allied forces, in order that they may be at hand in case any overtures should be addressed to them by the Chinese authorities, but that, unless circumstances should render an earlier communication advisable, they do not purpose to address to the Government of the Emperor any formal notification of their arrival until after they shall have reached Tien-tsin.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 48.

Memorandum by Baron Gros.

A bord du "Du Chayla," en Rade de Tché-fou, le 17 Juillet, 1860.

LE Soussigné a lu avec la plus grande attention le Memorandum confidentiel que son honorable collégue d'Angleterre lui a fait l'honneur de lui remettre, le 16 de ce mois, et il ne saurait mieux faire, pour y répondre, que de copier ici textuellement quelques passages de la dépêche qu'il a adressée à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, le 11 de ce mois; les voici:—

"Dès que je serai fixé sur le plan de campagne que les Commandants-en-chef alliés auront arrêté, je me rendrai auprès de Lord Elgin, en ce moment à Ta-lien-hwan, et nous conviendrons ensemble de l'attitude que nous aurons à prendre pendant les événements qui se préparent. Si rien ne vient modifier les Conventions provisoires que nous avons à peu près arrêtés d'avance, nous irons devant l'embouchure du Peiho attendre que les forts soient enlévés, la rivière rendu libre, et que Tien-tsin, au pouvoir des alliés, devienne de nouveau le séjour des deux Ambassadeurs. Ils y attendront les ouvertures que la Cour de Péking pourrait leur adresser, ou ils pourront faire eux-mêmes de nouvelles propositions au Gouvernement Chinois, avant d'en venir à prendre des mesures plus menaçantes pour le siège du Gouvernement que ne peut être l'occupation de Tien-tsin.

"Jusqu'à présent, le Cabinet de Péking, dont le dernier acte envers nous a été le rejet de notre ultimatum, a gardé le silence le plus absolu à notre égard. Ce silence nous devons l'observer aussi, puisqu'à notre arrivée nous avons trouvé les opérations militaires commencées (la prise de Chusan et le débarquement de deux armées à quelques lieues seulement de la capitale) et les affaires remises par les Ministres de France et d'Angleterre entre les mains des Commandants alliés.

"Notre rôle, à Lord Elgin et à moi, ne doit donc commencer maintenant que lorsque le premier coup frappé par les forces Anglo-Françaises aura prouvé au Cabinet de Péking, enorgueillé par le succès de Takou, que le parti qui le poussse à la guerre le compromet d'une manière dangereuse et que toute résistance étant désormais inutile, l'intérêt de sa propre conservation le force à accéder aux demandes que la France et l'Angleterre lui ont déjà adressées.

"Une seule éventualité me semble à craindre, je veux parler de la fuite de l'Empereur en Tartarie. Aussi croyons-nous, Lord Elgin et moi, devoir nous

arrêter à Tien-tsin, si, comme je l'espère, nous pouvons y arriver, et de là, bien plus menacer Péking que le frapper."

Le Soussigné adhère donc facilement au plan de conduite que son honorable collégue d'Angleterre a formulé dans son Mémorandum confidentiel, et il s'empressera d'adresser à M. le Général de Montauban et à M. l'Amiral Charner une communication qui devra les engager à poursuivre, avec toute l'activité possible, les opérations militaires déjà en voie d'exécution et dont le résultat doit être de donner aux deux Ambassadeurs la possibilité d'aller s'établir à Tien-tsin pour y agir en raison des éventualités qui se présenteront alors.

(Signé) BON. GROS.

(Translation.)

On board the "Duchayla," in the roadstead of Che-foo, July 17, 1860.

THE Undersigned has read with the greatest attention the confidential memorandum which his honourable British colleague did him the honour to forward to him on the 16th of this month, and he cannot do better, in reply, than copy here textually some passages from the despatch which he addressed on the 11th of this month to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs in France. They are as follows:—

"When I shall be assured of the plan of campaign which the Commander-in-chief shall have determined on, I shall join Lord Elgin, who is at present at Talien-whan, and we shall consult together respecting the attitude we shall have to take during the events now in preparation. If nothing occur to modify the provisional arrangements which have been nearly all determined upon beforehand, we shall proceed to the mouth of the Peiho, to wait until the forts are taken, the river rendered passable, and Tien-tsin, in the power of the Allies, becomes again the residence of the two Ambassadors. They will wait there the overtures which the Court of Peking may make to them, or they may themselves address further proposals to the Chinese Government, before taking measures more menacing to the seat of Government than the occupation of Tien-tsin can be.

"Up to the present time, the Cabinet of Peking, whose last proceeding towards us was the rejection of our ultimatum, has kept the most absolute silence as regards us. It behoves us to be equally silent, because on our arrival we found that military operations had commenced (Chusan being taken, and the two armies disembarked at a distance of a few leagues only from the capital), and that the conduct of affairs had been placed by the French and English Ministers in the hands of the allied Commanders.

"Our task, Lord Elgin's and mine, does not, therefore, now commence until the first blow struck by the Anglo-French force shall have proved to the Cabinet of Peking, still elated with its success at Takoo, that the party which urges the Chinese Government to war compromises it in a dangerous manner, and that all future resistance being useless, a regard for its own safety should force that Government to accede to the demands which France and England have already addressed to it.

"Only one eventuality appears to me to be dreaded, I speak of the flight of the Emperor to Tartary. We think, therefore, Lord Elgin and I, that we ought to stop at Tien-tsin, if, as I hope, we can reach it, and from thence, rather threaten Peking than attack it."

The Undersigned, therefore, readily assents to the plan of operations which his honourable English colleague has laid down in his confidential Memorandum, and he will hasten to address to General de Montauban and Admiral Charnier a communication enjoining them to pursue, with the greatest possible activity, the military operations already in course of execution, and the result of which ought to enable the two Ambassadors to establish themselves at Tien-tsin, there to act in accordauce with the circumstances which may then arise.

(Signed) BON. GROS.

No. 49.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 29.)

My Lord, *"Feroze," Ta-lien-hwan, July 25, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Sir Hope Grant, in reply to my communication to the Commander-in-chief, which is referred to in my despatch to your Lordship of the 24th July.

Admiral Hope has not yet acknowledged the communication in question, but I have reason to know that it has reached him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 49.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *"Granada," Ta-lien-hwan, July 24, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 19th instant, informing me of the intention of the Ambassadors of England and France not to communicate with the Court of Peking until after the allied forces shall have reached Tien-tsin.

I beg to inform your Lordship that the allied fleets will leave their respective ports of Ta-lien-hwan and Che-foo on the morning of the 26th instant, to rendezvous in latitude 38° 50′ north, and longitude 118° 15′ east, from whence they will proceed to the place fixed on for their disembarkation, viz., the neighbourhood of the Peh-tang river; and I trust to be able to carry out your Lordship's wishes with as little delay as possible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT.

No. 50.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 29.)

My Lord, *"Feroze," Ta-lien-hwan, July 25, 1860.*

I BELIEVE that it was Lord Malmesbury's original intention that Her Majesty's Representative in China should have the rank of Ambassador, and that a different arrangement was eventually adopted only because I agreed with the Commissioners at Shanghae that he should not reside permanently at Peking.

As it is not improbable that the transfer of Her Majesty's Representative from Shanghae to Peking may be one of the results of our present proceedings in this quarter, I venture to suggest whether it might not be advisable to furnish Mr. Bruce with a letter of credence, accrediting him as Ambassador to the Emperor of China, to be delivered, however, only in the event of his taking up his permanent residence at Peking, and being properly received by His Imperial Majesty.

I fear that if the Chinese were to discover that the Representative of Her Majesty at Peking was not an officer of the highest rank, they might make this circumstance an excuse for refusing him access to the Emperor, and perhaps for putting difficulties in the way of his intercourse with the principal dignitaries of the Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 51.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 29.)

(Extract.) *Shanghaé, August 1, 1860.*

A MAN called Heung-jin, a relation of Hung-tze-tsum, and who has been educated by, or has had considerable intercourse with Europeans, is now playing a prominent part among the insurgents, being, as I understand, the second man in authority among them. He has written a pamphlet, of which I trust shortly to be able to send a translation, advocating intercourse with foreigners on a footing of equality, the introduction of steam-vessels, railways, and other western inventions, and containing sounder and more enlightened views of Christianity. He entertains the highest admiration for the talents and virtues of his relation the "Heavenly King," and faith in the revelations which he professes to receive from time to time of the Divine will from the Divine Being himself.

I have as yet no means of judging whether Heung-jin is sincere, or whether, finding that the mass of the population are hostile to the insurgents, he has written this work in the hopes of enlisting the sympathies of Christendom in his favour. Nor do I know how far these opinions on foreign intercourse, so different from the tone and demeanour which have hitherto characterized the leaders of this movement, are making way among them generally. My impression is, that both the prospects of the extension of pure Christianity in China through the instrumentality of these men, and the success of the insurrection among the Chinese, viewed as a political movement against the Tartar Government, have suffered materially from the religious character Hing-tze-touen's leadership has imparted to it.

Not only the gentry and educated classes, but the mass of the people, regard with deep veneration the sages upon whose authority their moral and social education for so many generations has reposed. And the profession of novel doctrines resting on the testimony of a modern and obscure individual, must tend not only to deprive the revolt of its character as a national rising against the Tartar yoke, but must actually transfer to the Tartars and their adherents the prestige of upholding national traditions and principles against the assaults of a numerically insignificant sect.

On the other hand, the insurgents are obliged to fill their ranks with men taken by force in the districts they occupy, and to accept the services of the needy and dissolute, whose only object is robbery and pillage. These men commit excesses wherever they go; and as they are, I believe, compelled to participate in certain external practices considered as the badge of Christianity, the idea of our religion cannot fail to be associated in the minds of the mass of the peaceable population with the sufferings they endure at the hands of its so-called adherents, while its humane and merciful character, so fitted to recommend itself to and to evoke the higher qualities of our common nature, is tarnished by its alliance with men who openly wage a war of extermination against their enemies.

Heung-jin has sent a copy of this pamphlet to the Protestant missionaries, and has invited them to join him at Soo-chow; and the Rev. Mr. Edkins, a very estimable and learned person of that body, conversed with me on the subject. Though I did not consider myself entitled to interfere to prevent his going at a time when other persons were allowed to proceed unquestioned to Soo-chow for purposes of traffic, I addressed him the inclosed letter, pointing out the questionable propriety of the proceeding, and the prejudicial results it may have on the liberty of access hitherto enjoyed by mercantile men to the districts in rebel occupation.

Mr. Edkins, however, considers the call of duty to preach the Gospel to these men as imperative; and I only hope that the same zeal will lead him to protest against the sanguinary, destructive, and unchristian spirit in which these professors of Christianity carry on the war.

Heung-jin has also sent a letter to Mr. Meadows addressed jointly to the Consuls of the three Treaty Powers, through Mr. Jenkins, the Interpreter to the American Consulate, who has lately visited Soo-chow on a trading speculation. It is very undesirable in my opinion, that the Consuls should enter into any communication with the rebels, and I accordingly instructed Mr. Meadows to that effect. I also directed him in future to decline receiving any letter addressed

to others as well as himself, on account of the difficulty of dealing with these matters in common.

I do not like to dogmatize on the prospects of the insurrection. We are without information as to the number of those in its ranks who may be considered as really Christian, and who are said to be devoted to their Chiefs and amenable to discipline. I should infer from the accounts that they show greater determination in the field of battle than the Imperialists, though they are ill provided with fire-arms and ammunition. The possession of Shanghae, and the access thus given to foreign supplies, would soon render them a much more formidable body than they have hitherto been, and in conversation I know that one of their Chiefs expressed the intention, sooner or later, of effecting its capture; but at present the village population seem disposed to resist, and probably the insurgents will in the first instance try to gain foreign support by showing a friendly disposition to merchants and missionaries. None of their warmest advocates as yet assert that they have shown any capacity or wish to organize the districts in their possession. They appear to over-run them, extract their resources, and then abandon them with the exception of some walled towns, which soon lose under their sway all trace of industry and commercial activity. The Government seems unable to put them down, or even to turn to account the aversion felt for them by the rural population, who are thus left without any unity of direction or command to attempt an unavailing resistance, and then see their villages and property destroyed.

It is impossible to witness the calamities arising out of this civil contest without feeling sympathy and regret for the industrious and peaceable mass of the population on whom the burden of these calamities is made to fall.

Inclosure 1 in No. 51.

Mr. Bruce to the Rev. J. Edkins.

My dear Sir, *Shanghae, July* 28, 1860.

IN our rather desultory conversation this morning, I did not perhaps make my meaning perfectly clear.

I do not wish, for very obvious reasons, to be called upon to take part for or against the insurgents. I am not bound by Treaty to assist the Imperialists; and, on the other hand, similarity of belief and sympathy are not grounds sufficient to justify a foreign nation in taking part in a civil contest. The modifications of their pretensions to which you alluded, if accepted by the Chiefs, and their novel anxiety for foreign intercourse, so different from their former haughty tone, are to me strong presumptive proofs that the industrious and quiet part of the Chinese population remain as much indisposed as ever to join them.

At present, the Taipings are merely a body of men in arms against their legitimate Government; and, in my opinion, it is a question open to discussion how far foreigners, who are resident in China under the faith of Treaties with it, and whose privileges and security depend on their faithful observance, are justified in countenancing the movement by their presence and counsels. Certainly I should be very much at a loss to defend the proceeding on any recognized principle of international dealing, were the Chinese authorities to complain of it, or to remonstrate were they in consequence to take measures to put a stop to all intercourse with the district in rebel occupation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 51.

Consul Meadows to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Shanghae, July* 27, 1860.

A FEW days ago, Mr. Grew, of this place, having brought to me a Chinese despatch addressed by the chief authority of the Taipings in occupation of the city of Soo-chow to the Plenipotentiaries of England, France, and the

United States, I recommended him to deliver it to yourself directly; and I accompanied him, as well for the purpose of introducing him, as with the view of being at your hand to act as translator in the absence, at the North, of the Chinese Secretary, Mr. Wade. On that occasion you were pleased to decline receiving the despatch, my knowledge of which fact makes me deem it proper to apply to you for instructions under the following circumstances, instead of acting in the first instance according to my own judgment.

A foreign cover has just been handed to me, on opening which I find a Chinese envelope addressed from Soo-chow by Hung Jen-kan, holding the rank of Prince, and Military Councillor among the Taipings, to Messrs. Smith, Edan, and Meadows, as Consuls of the United States, France, and England.

There are convincing reasons for taking the writer to be a near relative of the "Heavenly Prince" Hung Seu-tseuen, the acknowledged Chief of the Taipings, and the originator of their Christianity. He, Hung Jen-kan, the writer of the letter just delivered, is well known to the Protestant missionaries of Hong Kong and Shanghae, among whom he lived as a Christian convert, and whom he left a few years back to join the Taipings at Nanking.

I have informed my colleagues of the United States and France that the letter is here and at their disposal, but that I myself await your instructions as to my course regarding it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOS. T. MEADOWS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 51.

Mr. Bruce to Consul Meadows.

Sir, *Shanghae, July* 31, 1860.

WITH reference to the letter addressed to you, in common with the Consuls of France and the United States, by one of the leaders of the insurgents, I am clearly of opinion that it is both inexpedient and objectionable on principle that Her Majesty's Consuls should hold any communication with the insurgents at Soo-chow, and I have, therefore, to instruct you to take no notice of it.

There are great difficulties in dealing with a letter addressed to the Consuls of different nations jointly, and I consider it will be expedient in future to decline receiving any letter in that form. A previous despatch from the insurgents, it is to be recollected, has been forwarded to Mr. Ward. As it, no doubt, contains some intimation as to their intentions, he will be in a position to consult with the Ambassadors of England and France as to the course to be pursued under existing circumstances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 52.

Colonel Foley to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 5.)

My Lord, *French Head-Quarters, Che-foo, July* 23, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I accompanied General de Montauban, on the 13th instant, to Ta-lien-hwan, when Sir Hope Grant took the opportunity of reviewing the Cavalry and Artillery belonging to his force.

General de Montauban, who is an old Cavalry officer, was much pleased with the review, and has frequently since expressed his admiration of both men and horses.

He was particularly struck with the equipment of the Artillery, and the fine condition of all the horses, which is really extraordinary considering the time they have passed on board ship.

On the 16th instant, the reconnaissance which had been sent by the French Commanders-in-chief returned, having surveyed the line of coast from Cha-koo to within eight miles of the Peiho forts.

The Chief of the Staff, in his report of the reconnaissance, describes the

great difficulty which would attend the landing of troops on this part of the coast, and the total impracticability of disembarking Artillery on account of the great distance to which shallow water extends, and the quantity of soft mud which it would be impossible to get across.

His Excellency the Earl of Elgin, who also arrived at Che-foo on the 10th instant, on being made acquainted, by General de Montauban, with the report of the reconnaissance, dispatched Captain Marten, R.N., in Her Majesty's ship "Roebuck," to request the presence of Sir Hope Grant and Admiral Hope. They arrived at Che-foo on the morning of the 19th instant.

A conference was immediately held, the four Commanders-in-chief being present, at which it was agreed :—

1st. That the two expeditions leave their respective ports on the morning of the 26th of July, to rendezvous at the point previously fixed upon.

2ndly. Admiral Hope undertakes to place a vessel to indicate the point of rendezvous to the south of which the French fleet is to be anchored, and the English to the north, as before arranged. The vessel at the rendezvous to carry the French flag at the fore, and the English flag at the mizen.

3rdly. Admiral Hope undertakes to have the anchorage off the Peh-tang surveyed in readiness for the arrival of the Commanders-in-chief, in order that they may determine the positions of their respective fleets.

It was further agreed upon that the four Commanders-in-chief should push on to the place of rendezvous on the 26th instant, and that immediately on arrival they should proceed together to reconnoitre the mouth of the Peh-tang river, and fix upon the place, or places, for the landing of the two forces, it being deemed totally impracticable for the French troops to disembark anywhere to the south of the Peiho forts.

The re-embarkation of the Artillery, horses, matériel, &c., is now being actively carried on, and I feel confident, should the weather continue favourable, that the French force will be ready to leave Che-foo on the morning of the 26th instant.

The French force to land will consist of 5,500 men, which includes 500 of the "Infanterie de la Marine" from the ships of war, and six batteries of Artillery, making a total of about 6,300 men.

In consequence of greater heat during the past week sickness has been rather on the increase; but on the whole, up to the present date, the health of the French troops has been wonderfully good.

One of the three iron gun-boats brought out in piece on board of the steam-ship "Weser" will be ready to launch to-morrow or next day; but they will not be fitted out in time to take part in the earlier operations about to commence.

The Russian Ambassador, General Ignatief, arrived here on the 20th instant, stopped twenty-four hours, visited the French camp, and left, as he gave us to understand, for the Peiho.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ST. GEORGE FOLEY.

No. 53.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 9, 1860.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 24th of July last, I have to express to your Lordship my approval of the Memorandum which you addressed to Baron Gros containing your views as to the line of action which should be adopted by the allies in China.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 54.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 16.)

My Lord, "*Granada*," *Peh-tang, August 7*, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Lordship's information, that Mr. Ward, Envoy Extraordinary from the United States to China, called on me yesterday. He told me that a correspondence had passed between himself and the Governor-General of this province, but, as he had with him a translation of the last letter of the series only, I have not had an opportunity of perusing any of the others. I gathered from his verbal statement that he had, in the first instance, written to the Governor-General of the province, not exactly tendering good offices, but informing him of his arrival in the Gulf; adding, that he was a neutral in the contest in which the English and French on the one side, and the Chinese on the other, were about to be engaged, and a well-wisher to both parties.

The Governor-General replied (if I rightly understood Mr. Ward) that, if the English and French Ambassadors chose to take the Peh-tang route, as he, Mr. Ward, had done the year before, they might go to Peking for the ratification of their Treaties.

Mr. Ward answered, that it would be useless to make such a proposal to them.

This provoked from the Governor-General the rejoinder of which Mr. Ward showed me a translation. It was not a very logical document, for it began by the admission—not very clearly expressed, however—that some of the concessions made to us at Tien-tsin in 1858 had been granted by the Emperor in order to get rid of us, and were not intended by him to be permanently binding upon him; and then went on to say that, if we proceeded to Peking in the proper way, we might have our Treaties ratified, as the Emperor did not desire war, but peace; ending with the suggestion that Mr. Ward had much better make known to us the benevolent intentions of the Emperor, as, if the war continued, we should infallibly be again defeated, in which case we should have good ground for reproaching Mr. Ward with his reticence.

Although Mr. Ward thought it right to let me know that these communications had been made to him by the Governor-General of the province, he did not seem to attach much importance to them. Indeed, he closed the conversation by informing me that he found his position here so false, and his chance of usefulness so small, that he intended to leave the Gulf and to return at once to Shanghae.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 55.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 16.)

(Extract.) *Peh-tang, August 8*, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a letter from Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to me, describing the occupation of Peh-tang, and other operations in which the force has been engaged since the 1st of this month, and the copy of my reply.

Inclosure 1 in No. 55.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Peh-tang Fort, China, August 6*, 1860

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the weather having become tolerably favourable, on the evening of the 1st August Admiral Hope was enabled to cross the bar of the Peh-tang river, and I landed with a brigade of Infantry to the south of the forts at the mouth of the river; General Montauban landing an equal force at the same place.

The troops advanced to the raised causeway which runs southward from Peh-tang and bivouacked there. During the night it was ascertained that the forts had been abandoned. At daybreak on the 2nd the town was occupied by the allied forces.

The same day I ascertained that there was no available place for landing higher up the river on the right bank, and large bodies of Cavalry having been observed about four miles to the south, a reconnaissance was made on the morning of the 3rd, along the raised causeway before mentioned. This reconnaissance was pushed forward to the end of the road and into the open country, and came in contact with a large force of the enemy, principally Cavalry; a large entrenchment was also visible.

The object of the reconnaissance having been attained, the troops returned to Peh-tang.

As soon as my Cavalry have landed I propose to push on, and occupy the open country where the enemy are now encamped.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 55.

The Earl of Elgin to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Sir, *Peh-tang, August* 6, 1860.

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter of this day's date, detailing the steps which have resulted in your occupation of Peh-tang.

I beg to congratulate you on the excellent condition in which the force under your command has arrived at this place.

I sincerely trust that nothing will occur to prevent your Excellency from making at once the forward movement which you inform me you have in contemplation; for at this advanced period of the year I cannot but fear that the objects of the expedition may be compromised by delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 56.

Colonel Foley to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 16.)

(Extract.) *French Head-Quarters, Peh-tang, August* 8, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the French troops, artillery, stores, &c., were all embarked by the evening of the 25th ultimo. General de Montauban and Staff proceeded on board of the "Forbin," having first witnessed the launching of one of the iron gun-boats, brought out, in pieces, by the steam-ship "Weser."

At 6 A.M. on the 26th, the French fleet, consisting of thirty-two vessels, weighed anchor, left Che-foo, and steamed slowly towards the rendezvous, about twenty miles from the Peh-tang river, where it anchored to the left of the English fleet, on the morning of the 28th ultimo.

The Commanders-in-chief immediately held a conference, at which it was agreed that the gun-boats should tow the boats with the troops on board into the river, as early as the tide would permit the crossing of the bar, on Tuesday the 31st ultimo.

On Sunday afternoon the wind got up, and caused such a heavy swell as to render it difficult for small boats to move about.

On Monday both fleets moved to an anchorage about six miles off the River Peh-tang, to be in readiness to disembark the troops the next day.

The wind continuing on Tuesday morning, it was considered by the Admirals in command imprudent to put the men into the boats; consequently it was not until 6·30 A.M. on the 1st of August that the order was given, and the troops, consisting of 2,500 French with four guns, and the same number of English soldiers, commenced disembarking.

The whole was admirably managed; the towing vessels crossed the bar

without accident or delay, and all were anchored by 2·30 P.M., in the river, about 2,000 yards below the forts.

The two Commanders-in-chief landed in the mud, with an escort, and finding it practicable, gave orders for the landing of their respective forces, which was soon effected, the mud at first coming up above their knees, lessening, till at about 500 yards they arrived at some higher and drier ground. About 150 Tartar Cavalry were seen watching the operation, but they soon disappeared, and did not trouble us during the night.

The troops bivouacked on the driest ground they could find, the greater part of them on a raised causeway (the only approach to the town in the rear of the fort), at the end of which was a bridge, which was taken possession of, and occupied throughout the night, by 400 French and English soldiers.

Arrangements were made for the gun-boats to steam up above the forts, as soon as the tide served, and at break of day to open fire upon them, the troops to be held in readiness to escalade, or otherwise assist, as soon as the gun-boats ceased firing.

At about 11 o'clock at night Mr. Parkes, having obtained permission from Sir Hope Grant, proceeded, with an officer of the Quartermaster-General's department, into the town. He found everything perfectly quiet, reached the gate of the fort, pushed it open, and found the whole place empty.

At 5 A.M. on the 2nd instant, the Commanders-in-chief entered the town and fort, and having given orders for a division of the former to be made, the French and English troops took possession of their allotted positions.

Several mines discovered in the fort were immediately destroyed, and the place rendered safe. The guns found were of wood encircled with hoops of iron.

The fort on the northern bank was taken possession of by French and English sailors.

On the 3rd instant a reconnaissance was made, with 2,000 French and English troops, of the country towards the Peiho. A considerable number of Tartar Cavalry were found posted at some distance from the town, who immediately opened a fire of jingals, and succeeded in wounding six French and six English soldiers, but they retired directly some guns were brought to bear upon them. An entrenched camp was seen about a mile and a-half beyond where the reconnaissance halted. The Commanders-in-chief having reconnoitered the ground to their front, and having found it more suitable than any yet seen for manœuvering, the troops returned to their quarters.

The disembarking of the rest of the troops, horses, stores, &c., is being proceeded with as quickly as the great distance of the vessels from the town, and the state of the tides, will permit.

Yesterday, the 7th instant, a conference was held on board of the "Coromandel," at which Admiral Hope agreed to assist Admiral Charner in disembarking the French horses, which would enable the two Generals to proceed on Friday next, the 10th, to take possession of the entrenched camp, and establish themselves there, till such time as everything shall be in readiness for the attack of the Peiho forts.

The troops are much crowded in the town of Peh-tang, and great difficulty is experienced from the want of water, which has to be brought in the gun-boats a distance of six miles. No vegetables or provisions of any sort are to be procured, as the inhabitants have left the town, and no chance, at present, of any communication with the country people.

There has been some very hot weather since our arrival here; still, notwithstanding the scarcity of water, the heat, the stench and filth which is met with at every turn, the health of the troops, I am happy to say, is very good.

No. 57.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 16.)

My Lord, "*Granada,*" *Peh-tang, August* 8, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the translation of a despatch which I received yesterday from the Governor-General of this province, with a copy of my reply.

The following are the circumstances under which this communication has reached me.

Admiral Hope stationed a few days ago at a point on this river, some five miles above Peh-tang, a gun-boat for the protection of water-tanks and other craft which he proposed to send to that spot, from time to time, to procure supplies of water of better quality than that furnished by this place.

On the left bank of the river, in the vicinity of the anchorage of the gun-boat in question, a body of Tartar Cavalry was posted. In order to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood, Admiral Hope requested Mr. Morrison, Her Majesty's Consul at Foo-chow, who is now acting as Interpreter on board the flag-ship, to proceed with a flag of truce to the Tartar camp, and to inform the Commanding Officer that his ship had not gone there with the view of making an attack, but that it would fire on the Tartar Cavalry if they approached too near to it.

The Governor-General, when the report of this proceeding reached him, took advantage of the opening afforded by it to address to me the despatch to the contents of which I now invite your Lordship's attention. You will observe that he affects to be believe that the Admiral's message had come from me, and that it was in the nature of a proposal for an armistice or suspension of hostilities.

Whether the belief which the Governor-General professed to entertain on this point was sincere or not, I thought it proper to take steps to remove it at the earliest moment. I accordingly wrote to Admiral Hope the letter which forms Inclosure No. 3 of this despatch, requesting him furnish the emissaries of the Governor-General with a written statement which should convey the precise import of the message taken to the Tartar camp by Mr. Morrison. In compliance with this suggestion, Admiral Hope handed to them the Memorandum, a copy of which is the fourth inclosure herewith transmitted.

The Governor-General does not state in his despatch to me that he is commissioned to apprize me that the Government of Peking assents to the conditions contained in the ultimatum transmitted to it by Mr. Bruce under instructions from your Lordship; nor is it even very clear, from its terms, that he has any specific authority from the Emperor to enter into communication with me. The pleas which he advances are simply dilatory, and I feel that I could not entertain them at this advanced season of the year without running the risk of forfeiting the advantages of our military position, and, it may be, compromising the object of the expedition which at great cost Her Majesty's Government has sent to this country.

In my reply, therefore, I have thought it my duty to remind the Governor-General that the unsatisfactory character of the answer returned by the Chinese Government to the ultimatum sent in by Mr. Bruce, has compelled that of Great Britain to have recourse to hostile measures, and that the overtures contained in his despatch to me are not such as would justify me in arresting the operations of the naval and military Commanders-in-chief.

I have added, that while I shall always be ready to give my best attention to any communication addressed to me by an Imperial Commissioner duly accredited, it must be distinctly understood that I have no power to recede from the demands set forth in Mr. Bruce's ultimatum.

It may be right to mention that I proceeded yesterday to the Gulf, where Baron Gros is now residing, read to him the translation of the Governor-General's despatch, and explained to him the nature of the reply which I intended to give to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 57.

Governor-General Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

HANG, a (titulary) President of the Board of War, President of the Censorate, Governor-General of Chih-li, and Superintendent of Military operations therein (1), Director-General of River Works, and Commissary-General of the Province, makes a communication.

A report having reached the Governor-General that the British Minister was on his way to this coast (or, port) to exchange the Treaties, as in duty bound he sent officers to wait at Peh-tang to wait for any official letter (there might be to receive). In course of time ships were seen to arrive, on which he withdrew the garrison of Peh-tang, in order that (the Minister's) movements might be unrestrained, and all ground for suspicion on his part avoided. He did not know whether the British Minister was arrived or not, and being without any communication from him, had not addressed any to him; when he received, a day or two ago, a letter from the Americans, apprising him that the British Minister had been here some days, and he was on the point of making an engagement with him. Several thousand British soldiers, however, at this conjuncture landed and took possession of Peh-tang, and on the 17th (3rd of August) a column went out of the village, apparently for the purpose of assaulting a fortified position of ours; checked by our troops, they returned to the village, and, satisfactory to relate, without loss on either side.

It does not follow that the British Minister was cognizant of this. It was, no doubt, a move which the troops and braves, knowing no better, wantonly took on themselves to make. That there should exist any absolute necessity for war (or, a battle) between our two nations is altogether ridiculous.

On the 19th (5th of August), the British Minister sent a person with a white flag, with the characters "mien-chan" (do not fight, or no fighting) upon it (2). (This proceeding), which is at once complete evidence of the British Minister's apprehension of what is right, as well as of his consideration for the soldiery, consistent as it is with the spirit of the words addressed by the Governor-General to the Americans, when he wrote that he feared lest harm should befall the soldiery, has to the utmost rejoiced and comforted the Governor-General. The character "mien-chan" having been thus employed by the British Minister, the Governor-General trusts that keeping faith throughout, he will lay the most stringent commands upon the troops on no account lightly to create occasion of hostilities; and the Governor-General will petition the Military Commander-in-chief to enjoin upon his officers and men that they are not from a greed of renown to occasion a breach of the good understanding.

He is now sending an officer (or, officers) for the express purpose of waiting on (the British Minister).

If there be any matters requiring deliberation (or, on which it would be proper to deliberate), he requests (the Minister) to communicate with the French in order that a day may be named and a place chosen for an interview.

The Governor-General has received instructions (3) to discuss and dispose of all questions (or, the rights of things) with the British Minister. As to what concerns the army, the Commander-in-chief is, of course, independent.

The Governor-General accordingly makes this communication, to which he hopes the Minister will forthwith reply. He avails himself of this opportunity to wish his Excellency the blessings of the season.

A necessary communication addressed to the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 6th moon, 20th day (6th August, 1860).

(Received 7th August, 1860.)

Notes.

(1.) This is the only addition not usual in a Governor-General's title. He has nothing to show that he has any power to discharge other than provincial functions.

(2.) This is the ordinary flag of truce: I believe perfectly understood by the Chinese to mean nothing more.

(3.) From the place of this word in the column, it cannot, I think, mean instructions from the Emperor, but from the high officer whom above he says he will "petition," and who, he goes on to say, is in military matters independent.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE, *Chinese Secretary.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 57.

The Earl of Elgin to Governor-General Hang.

Peh-tang, August 8, 1860.

THE Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge a despatch, dated the 6th instant, from the Governor-General of Chih-li, expressing his willingness to meet the Undersigned for the discussion of any questions now pending between their respective Governments.

The Undersigned would beg to remind the Governor-General that the demands of the British Government upon that of China were plainly set forth in a note addressed by Mr. Bruce in March last to the Great Council; and that it is in consequence of the unsatisfactory reply received to the communication of Her Majesty's Minister that the Commanders-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval and military forces have been called on to act.

The Undersigned regrets that it should be necessary to have recourse to measures of war, but he does not find in the despatch of the Governor-General now under acknowledgment any such assurance of a resolution on the part of the Chinese Government to adhere to its Treaty engagements as would justify him in interposing to prevent the further prosecution of the military operations which are now in progress.

The Undersigned will always be ready to give his best consideration to any despatch addressed to him in proper form by an Imperial Commissioner duly accredited; but it is absolutely necessary that the Chinese Government should understand that it is not in his power to recede from the demands set forth in ultimatum above referred to.

The Undersigned has but to add that any communication which the Imperial Government may have to make to the Government of France should be addressed not through him, but directly to the Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of the French.

The Undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to convey to Hang-fuh, Governor-General of Chih-li, the assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 57.

The Earl of Elgin to Vice-Admiral Hope.

Sir, *Peh-tang, August* 8, 1860.

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, an extract from the translation of a despatch to me from the Governor-General of the province, which was handed yesterday to Mr. Morrison by two Civil mandarins, who were charged with its delivery.

It appears from this extract that the Governor-General places, or affects to place, on the communication made a few days ago by Mr. Morrison to the Tartar troops on the left bank of the river by your Excellency's desire, a different construction from that intended by you. I venture, therefore, to think, that in order to remove all risk of misapprehension on so important a point, it may be advisable that your Excellency should direct Mr. Morrison to furnish them with a written memorandum, stating that the communication in question was not from me, but from you, and that it was not in the nature of a proposal for an armistice or suspension of hostilities, but simply an intimation that if the Tartar Cavalry came too near our vessel they would be fired upon.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 57.

Mr. Morrison to Governor-General Hang.

I AM directed by the Commander-in-chief of Her Britannic Majesty's naval forces to acquaint you that you have entirely misunderstood the nature of

my mission, which had nothing whatever to do with an armistice or suspension of hostilities, but simply to caution the troops in the vicinity of the British ship of war not to approach within the range of her guns, in order to avoid unnecessary effusion of blood.

Lord Elgin will despatch to the Tartar camp to-morrow a letter in reply to that sent to him.

No. 58.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 16.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, August* 17, 1860.

SHANGHAE is menaced with a serious attack from the insurgents. It appears that they feel the advantage they derive from the contest now being carried on in the North, and they declare that they will not lose this opportunity of making themselves masters of the city. I am inclined to think that the visits of foreigners and the sympathy for the rebel cause so openly expressed by many may lead them to suppose that if they appear in force we may be persuaded to give up the town to them.

Under these circumstances M. de Bourboulon agreed with me that it was desirable to state distinctly the intentions of the allies before they approach nearer, and that as the Commanders of the forces have instructions to hold the city of Shanghae as well as the Settlement, it might be advantageously done in the shape of a notification addressed in their name as in military occupation of this district. In this way the defence of the city can be stated as a purely military measure, whereas any declaration made, by us, would be neither quite consistent with the state of abeyance in which our diplomatic functions at present are placed, nor could it be so framed as to avoid some expression of opinion on the desire the insurgents have manifested to enter into relations with us, Mr. Edkins paid but a short visit to the insurgents. Their anxiety for spiritual instruction seems to have cooled considerably when they found that their great object of entering into friendly communication with us, and of thus obtaining possession of Shanghae, had failed. Indeed, Hang-jen, whom I mentioned in my despatch of the 1st instant, states in one of his replies to Mr. Edkin's questions that the religion of the God-worshippers (for the term "Christian" is a misnomer) had deteriorated, and that there is less enthusiasm and warmth of conviction even among the Kwang-si men, among whom it took its origin.

The accounts received are not very clear as to the position of the rebel expedition, but they show the merciless character of their proceedings. Two gentlemen who came down the river yesterday from the silk districts describe it above Sung-kiang as full of corpses; most of them had their arms tied behind them, and their throats cut, showing that they had been murdered in cold blood. The native trade on the river is stopped, and the country is full of trembling fugitives who have abandoned their homes at the approach of the forces. Looking to their previous doings and to the acknowledged inability of the Chiefs to restrain the excesses of the plunderers who swell their army, I am little inclined to attach weight to their assurances of respecting foreign persons and property, or to allow them, if it can be helped, to obtain possession of the city, where, with the arms and ammunition they would obtain, they would completely command the Settlement in the event of any misunderstanding, or should circumstances lead them to wish to plunder. In fact, if Shanghae is turned into their *place d'armes* its importance and security as a place of trade will be utterly destroyed.

No. 59.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1860.

IT appears to the Queen that, in the event of Her Majesty's Mission having to leave Shanghae and proceed to reside at Peking, it would be expedient that Her Majesty's Representative in China should be invested with the character of Ambassador.

Her Majesty has accordingly addressed the inclosed letter to the Emperor of China, accrediting you to His Imperial Majesty in the character of Her Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. You will, however, make use of this letter only in the case of your proceeding to reside permanently at Peking, and after Lord Elgin shall have quitted China.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 60.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1860.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that I have submitted to the Queen your despatch of the 25th of July last, in which you suggest that, in the event of Her Majesty's Representative in China having to transfer his residence from Shanghae to Pekin, it might be advisable to furnish him with a letter of credence in the character of Ambassador to the Emperor of China.

Her Majesty has been pleased to approve of your suggestion, and a letter to the Emperor of China will be forwarded to Mr. Bruce by the present opportunity accrediting him in the character of Her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Mr. Bruce is instructed to use it only in the case of his proceeding to reside permanently at Pekin, and after you shall have quitted China.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 61.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 2.)

My Lord, *"Granada," Peh-tang, August* 20, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a report by Mr. Parkes, detailing the circumstances of his visit to the enemy's camp at the southern Takoo forts, for the purpose of delivering to the Governor-General of this province the letter of which a copy is inclosed in my subsequent despatch to your Lordship of this day's date.*

It is remarkable that the Governor-General should have consented so readily to return to us certain coolies belonging to the Military Train who were captured by the enemy on the 12th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 61.

Mr. Parkes to the Earl of Elgin.

Head-Quarters of the Commander-in-chief,
My Lord, *August* 18, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with the verbal instructions conveyed to me last night by Mr. Loch, I proceeded this morning to Tang-koo, under a flag of truce, to deliver your Excellency's letter to the Viceroy Hang-fuh. The Honourable Major Anson was appointed by his Excellency Sir Hope Grant, and Majors Lumsden and Greathed by Major-General Sir Robert Napier, to accompany me on this service.

No notice was taken of us as we left our own lines and proceeded along the river's bank until we reached the abutment which marks the recent position of the floating bridge nearly opposite the building known as "Tau's yamun.' A boat was then launched from the opposite abutment, but as it did not

* No 62.

approach us I hailed the boatman, who gave me to understand that they were waiting for an officer. He appeared after about a quarter of an hour's delay and moved over to us. Having ascertained from him that the Viceroy Hang-fuh was in Tang-koo, I told him that I had been charged by your Lordship to deliver a letter to his Excellency, and wished therefore to visit the Viceroy for this purpose. He offered to take the letter himself, but as I demurred to his doing so, he sent across the river to inquire whether the Viceroy would receive us.

A favourable answer was soon received, and we were then ferried over by the officer to Tang-koo, and conducted by him through the streets of the town to the residence of the Viceroy.

His Excellency gave us a courteous reception, and on receiving from me your Lordship's letter, inquired whether I had to add to it any verbal communication. I told him that I had nothing to add to the contents of the letter, but after waiting to hear whether his Excellency had any observations to make upon it, I would deliver a message on another subject from the Commander-in-chief.

His Excellency then made rather a lengthy speech on the desirableness of the relations between England and China being those of a friendly instead of a hostile nature.

I found I could concur in most of these remarks, and added that nobody regretted more sincerely than Her Majesty's Government the interruption to friendly relations caused last year by the Chinese having fired upon our Minister when proceeding, in fulfilment of a previous engagement, to Peking, to exchange the ratifications of that Treaty, which it had been hoped would have secured permanent peace between both nations. His Excellency met this remark by asserting that the English commenced the attack; but I denied that this was the case, and having inquired whether his Excellency was present on the occasion referred to, and spoke from his own personal knowledge of what had taken place, he appeared anxious to explain that he himself was not at the fort, but had received his accounts from other parties.

Passing on, however, from that point, he went on to say that in whatever way the collision might have been brought about, the reverse which the English then sustained was certainly not more serious than the one inflicted by us upon the Chinese in 1858 upon the same spot, and that both parties being, as it were, in a parallel situation, there remained no injury to avenge on either side; that hostilities should therefore cease, and an accommodation be agreed to.

I reminded his Excellency that as early as March last terms had been proposed to, but declined by, the Chinese Government, and that the allies therefore were compelled to have recourse to hostilities. I added, however, that it was useless for us to discuss these questions further, and I would therefore mention to him the other subject on which I had to speak.

The Viceroy agreed that discussion on his part was useless, as he was charged neither with negotiations nor with military operations. Imperial Commissioners had direction of the former, and Military Commanders of the latter. All that devolved upon him was to report to Peking what now transpired, and that he should accordingly transmit there, without delay, your Lordship's letter, together with intelligence of the present suspension of hostilities.

I observed that he was altogether mistaken in supposing that there was any suspension of hostilities, and I desired him to re-peruse that portion of your Excellency's letter which states that you cannot interfere to prevent these until the conditions demanded shall have been agreed to by the Chinese. But flags of truce have been constantly passing between us, he replied. I was aware, I said, that four of these flags had been sent by him, and two by ourselves, since the force landed at Peh-tang, but that he had had abundant evidence that the reception or the sending of these flags had not led to an interruption of hostilities. A flag of truce, I explained, simply protects the bearer of a letter or message sent from one hostile party to the other, and the conduct of the Chinese only as late as yesterday proved, I added, their knowledge of the practice of war in such cases. In the morning their batteries had opened upon one of our detachments, although one of the Viceroy's flags of truce had been received but a few hours previously.

His Excellency waived the argument by observing, that being himself a civilian, it was natural that he should not be intimate with the rules of war;

but that with regard to the matter in hand, namely, your Lordship's reply, which meant, as he understood it, that we wanted to go to Peking by way of the Peiho, he would send it on at once to Peking, would communicate the instructions of the Emperor directly he received them, and that both parties should desist from further hostilities until the reply of His Majesty should have been received, and it could be seen whether our demands would be granted.

I again assured him that there was nothing in your Lordship's letter (every sentence of which, he admitted, was perfectly intelligible to him) that could lead him to think for a moment that our course would be any other than that of active hostility until the Peiho forts were in possession of the Allies, and every demand in their ultimatum of March complied with; also, that this course could not possibly be affected by any report that he—a functionary unauthorized to deal with these questions—might see fit to make to the Emperor. His Excellency received this notice of our intention to continue hostilities with evident dissatisfaction; but as we had arrived at a point where the conversation could not longer be continued with advantage, I declined to follow him any further in the discussion.

The remaining subject, namely, the interchange of prisoners, was soon disposed of, his Excellency readily agreeing to give up the thirteen Chinese coolies of the Military Train who had been captured in the affair of the 12th instant, in exchange for a number of wounded Chinese whom we had found in the intrenchments of Tang-koo.

On our return, we passed through lines of Tartar and Chinese troops who had probably been paraded for the purpose of effect. I confess to a feeling of disappointment in respect to these men, as, in point of equipment and martial appearance, they presented nothing superior to the troops I have been accustomed to see in other parts of China. In the streets, I observed a proclamation telling the people that hostilities were temporarily suspended, and that there was, therefore, no occasion for them to be alarmed, or to abandon their homes. But it would appear that this injunction had wholly failed to restore confidence, as we did not see an open shop, and the place was deserted, except by the soldiery.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES.

No. 62.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received November 2.*)

My Lord, "*Granada*," *Peh-tang, August 20, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose translations of three despatches which I have received from the Governor-General of this province, with a copy of my reply.

The rapidity with which these missives succeed each other, is evidence of the desire of the Chinese authorities to arrest our military operations.

It was not in my power to reply with corresponding celerity, because I thought it right, before so doing, to confer not only with Vice-Admiral Hope, who is on the spot, but also with Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant, at the head-quarters of the army, and with Baron Gros, whose residence is at the anchorage in the Gulf.

No reference is made in these despatches to the demands conveyed in Mr. Bruce's ultimatum.

It is, of course, impossible to listen to overtures which are marked by so significant an omission.

Moreover, I think it important, after all that has occurred, that the occupation of the Peiho forts by our military force, and the opening up of the river to Tien-tsin, should precede any serious negotiations for the re-establishment of peace; and, with this view, I have deemed it my duty to signify to the Commanders-in-chief my anxious desire that they will expedite to the utmost their measures for effecting these objects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 62.

Governor-General Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

HANG, Governor-General of Chih-li, &c., makes a communication.

Whereas the Powers along the seas that trade with, or while they trade with, China, are always held to be at peace with her; since the arrival of the British Minister he has been daily moving troops (or engaged in hostilities), the Governor-General cannot say with what intention. Himself looking up and identifying himself with His Majesty the Emperor's bounteous love for all living souls, on the receipt of the British Minister's communication he at once acquainted His Majesty with the truth (or made true report of its contents to His Majesty), and he has this day the honour to receive an Imperial Decree, to the effect that His Majesty the Emperor has appointed a Minister to await in the capital the British Minister's arrival there, in order that they may confer together.

In obedience to His Majesty's Decree (the Governor-General) makes this communication, to which he hopes (the British Minister) will be so good as to reply.

A necessary communication, addressed to his Excellency Lord Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 6th moon, 28th day (August 14, 1860).

Inclosnre 2 in No. 62.

Governor-Generdl Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Telegraphic.)

HANG, Governor-General of Chih-li, &c., makes a communication.

On the 28th instant (August 14), the Governor-General, as the records show, wrote to apprize the British Minister that he had had the honour to receive an Imperial Decree, to the effect that His Majesty had appointed a high officer to await in the capital the arrival of the British Minister to confer with him and settle matters.

The officer sent in with this, on his return, reported that a white flag was flying in the British camp, showing a desire for the suspension of hostilities (or indicating an intention to suspend hostilities). Evidence so complete of the British Minister's desire to maintain friendly relations unbroken, is extremely gratifying.

Although it was not the Governor-General who negotiated the Treaty of the 8th year (1858) with the British Minister, still as His Majesty has been so good as to appoint a Minister to await the British Minister's arrival in the capital, negotiations could at once be entered on.

It will doubtless be right, however, now that peace is solidly established between the two nations, that arms should be laid aside for evermore. As soon as the Governor-General shall receive the British Minister's reply, he will send an officer to learn what day it will suit him to fix for an interview, at which everything may be discussed.

A necessary communication, addressed to his Excellency Lord Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 6th moon, 29th day (August 15, 1860).

Inclosure 3 in No. 62.

Governor-General Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

HANG, Governor-General of Chih-li, &c., makes a communication.

The Governor-General has twice addreesed the British Minister, and has as yet received no reply.

On the 13th instant (August 16), about the hour of 8, he had the honour to receive an Imperial Decree, to the effect that "His Majesty had instructed an Imperial Commissioner to proceed (to this place) to negotiate, and that he will arrive immediately. Respect this."

It becomes his duty to communicate this to the British Minister, who, he trusts, will instruct the Military and Naval Commanders-in-chief to suspend

hostile operations, and so prevent any loss on either side, as this might occasion a breach of friendly relations.

He therefore writes a necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 6th moon, 30th day (August 16, 1860).

Inclosure 4 in No. 62.

The Earl of Elgin to Governor-General Hang.

Peh-tang, August 17, 1860.

THE Undersigned, the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in China, has received three despatches from his Excellency the Governor-General of Chih-li, under date respectively the 14th, 15th, and 16th instant.

The Governor-General announces, first, the appointment of a high officer, who is to await the arrival of the Undersigned in Peking; subsequently, the immediate approach of an Imperial Commissioner, and requests him to call on the Commander-in-chief of Her Britannic Majesty's forces to desist from further hostilities.

In his despatch of the 8th instant, the Undersigned apprized the Governor-General that the Military and Naval Commanders-in-chief had been called upon to act, in consequence of the unsatisfactory reply given by the Great Council to the demands of the British Minister, conveyed in his letter to the Council in March last; they are engaged in taking possession of the Takoo forts, and opening up a passage for the Undersigned to Tien-tsin. Until this object shall have been accomplished, and sufficient assurances given of the resolution of the Chinese Government to concede the points demanded in the letter in question, the Undersigned cannot call on the Military and Naval Commanders-in-chief to suspend their operations.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 63.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 2.)

My Lord, *"Granada," Peh-tang, August* 20, 1860.

WITH reference to my previous despatch of this day,* I have the honour to inclose translations of two more despatches which I have received from the Governor-General of this Province, the former announcing the appointment and early arrival of two Imperial Commissioners specially appointed to conduct me to Pekin, and the latter intimating that he has transmitted to Pekin the contents of my letter to him, of which the copy was forwarded to your Lordship in the despatch above-mentioned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 63.

Governor-General Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

HANG, Governor-General of Chih-li, &c., makes a communication.

The Governor-General has addressed several despatches to the British Ministers to which, as yet, he has received no reply.

His Majesty the Emperor, in consideration of the fact that the British Minister has come a great distance, has now specially despatched the high officers Wan-tsiun and Hang-ki from the capital to Peh-tang, to accompany the British Minister to the capital, there to exchange (the ratifications of) the Treaty, in order to the establishment of friendly relations for evermore; and the Governor-General hopes that he will inform him in his reply where he is, and on what day he proposes starting for the capital, that he may acquaint the Imperial

* No. 62.

Commissioners Wan and Hang of the fact, and enable them to proceed at an early date to meet (the Minister).

Herewith he makes a point of returning two Englishmen, who were taken by the Cavalry on the 26th instant (14th August).

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 1st day (17th August, 1860).

(Received August 17, 1860.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 63.

Governor-General Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

HANG, Governor-General of Chih-li, &c., makes a communication in reply.

The Governor-General has received and perused the reply which the British Minister sent him by the hand of an officer on the 2nd day of the 7th moon (18th August).

On receipt of the British Minister's reply of the 22nd day of the 6th moon (8th August), which reached him on the 25th (11th August), the Governor-General forwarded it to the Emperor, and as soon as he had the honour to receive His Majesty's commands regarding it, he wrote to the British Minister to that effect, as it is recorded.

The Governor-General will inform His Majesty of the contents of the communication now made by the British Minister, and will request the Imperial pleasure regarding it. As soon as he shall have had the honour to receive His Majesty's commands he will write a further reply.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency Lord Elgin.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 2nd day (18th August, 1860).

(Received August 18, 1860.)

No. 64.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 2.)

My Lord, "*Granada*," *Peh-tang, August* 20, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith translations of some very curious and interesting papers found by the gentlemen of my Staff immediately after the capture of Sin-ho on the 12th instant, in the room of the General Commanding the Chinese force on the north of the Peiho river. So precipitate was the General's flight, that the cup of tea on his table was still warm when they entered the apartment.

These documents, which consist of communications of a confidential character that have passed between the Military Chief in question and the Governor-General of the Province, were not intended for the eye of foreigners, and convey, accordingly, information respecting the views and policy of the Chinese authorities which is not to be found in their official communications.

It would appear from the terms of these documents that the Emperor is very anxious to avoid war, but they say nothing of his being ready to concede the demands embodied in the ultimatum transmitted by Mr. Bruce.

Each of the parties to this correspondence is, moreover, evidently solicitous to relieve himself from responsibility for the disasters which are but too surely impending. The General in his communications to the Civil functionary, expresses himself in substance as follows: "I know that the Emperor desires peace, and therefore I shall take care to avoid any hostile operations which might interfere with the success of your pacific overtures." The civilian replies: "True, the Emperor wishes for peace, but he is equally desirous that no military advantage should be lost. Do not, therefore, allow your solicitude for the success of my negotiations to stand in the way of the discharge of your duties as military commander."

The Governor-General intimates that my despatch to him of the 8th instant (the despatch of which a copy was inclosed in mine to your Lordship

dated the 8th instant) is not altogether intelligible. Whether this refer to its substance, or to the language of the Chinese version, or whether it be simply a pretext put forward by him as an excuse for not entering with his correspondent upon the discussion of matters with respect to which he was clearly desirous to communicate in the first instance with the Generalissimo Sang-ko-lin-sin, is a point which I cannot determine. To prevent, however, the repetition of such a complaint, Mr. Parkes, who took to the enemy's camp my despatch of the 17th instant, the copy of which is inclosed in my previous despatch to your Lordship of this day's date,* requested an interview with the Governor-General in order that he might deliver it to him in person. He read it over to him, and the Governor-General assured him that its contents were perfectly clear and explicit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 64.

I.—*Précis and Translation of Papers found in Sin-ho by Mr. Parkes and others, on the 12th of August*, 1860.

1. LETTERS from Teh, a Manchoo of rank, to a high official, announcing his own appointment to command on the north bank of the Peiho, the landing of the barbarians at Peh-tang on the 1st August, and their reconnaissance on the 3rd.

2. Memorial of Teh and Hang, Governor-General of Chih-li, upon the reconnaissance of the 3rd August.

3. Note to Teh from Sun, Intendant of Tien-tsin, promising to build a junk-bridge at Yang-hwui-chwang, and to send fifty tents according to order.

4. Draft note from Teh to Hang-fu informing him of a barbarian sortie on the 9th August. He did not attack lest he should interfere with Hang's pacific negotiations.

5. Hang to Teh, thanking him for the course pursued on the 9th, and begging him to take his orders from Sang-ko-lin-sin; dwelling on the faint prospect of peace in the present temper of the barbarians, who must be rudely checked if they advance too far. In a postscript he has received a reply from Lord Elgin, which is not very clear in its language. He will consult Sang-ko-lin-sin.

6. Hang to Teh, again insisting on the necessity of watchfulness, but approving Teh's suggestion that barbarian leaders, if captured, should be set free as a measure of conciliation. He is not sanguine about peace till the barbarians have been humbled. Teh must write Hang's name above his in reporting his victories to the Throne.

7. Teh to Hang, proposing rewards for captives.

No. 1.—Draft, apparently from Teh.

After adverting to their former acquaintance, and the obligations of the writer to the person addressed, as a former patron to whose intervention it was due that, although degraded for ill success against the rebels in the South, no worse punishment had befallen him, Teh, the writer, proceeds to say that, having been sent by the goodness of His Sacred Majesty to the Ku (Ta-ku, Tung-ku, &c., &c.) in Tien-tsin-fu, he has been commanded by Sang-ko-lin-sin (who is spoken of as the Generalissimo from, or in, the capital), to take chief command of the troops on the north bank, and is full of anxiety accordingly. The vessels of the barbarians, to the number of above 100, had arrived off the Ku, on the 15th of the moon (1st August). They had occupied the Peh-tang, and had commenced hostilities on the 17th (3rd August), on which occasion they had lost several tens (or, as it had been first written, six tens odd), the Chinese losing but a few. The Emperor is all for peace, but the barbarians are too intractable to make their pacification likely.

The writer is stationed at Sin-ho, a central position of the greatest importance on the north bank. All he can do is to be vigilant in defending it, and on no account to get into any scrape by carelessness.

6th moon, day.

* No. 62.

No. 2.—(Full translation.) Apparently, Draft of a Memorandum from Hang-fu and Teh.

(The Memorialists) present a memorial to your Majesty, showing that the officer sent to the American barbarians has returned to the camp with a communication from them, in which it is stated that the English and French are about to fight immediately; also that the barbarian vagabonds in Peh-tang had made a sortie with intent to attack out of that village;—on which memorial they pray the glance of your Sacred Majesty.

About 5 o'clock A.M., on the 17th of this moon (3rd August) the Lieutenant Tung Ngan-fuh returned to the camp with a despatch from the American barbarians, the purport of which is that there does not seem to be any way of managing matters. They also told the above officer that they were now in Peh-tang 5,000 Kwang-tung villains and 3,000 black barbarians, and that they were going to move round by (or to surprise by a flank movement) the road into the rear of the Takoo forts.

At about 5 o'clock A.M. the scouts reported that a body of about 1000 of the barbarians in Peh-tang had moved out with several guns on wheels, some drawn by men, some by horses, and were making straight for the works at Tang-sh-ku. Your slaves looked from the forts, and seeing these barbarians fire several rounds of musketry, and artillery keeping up the fire without cessation, Teh, accompanied by Shu-mingen, Cho-minga, To-lumpu and Teh-ching, of the Guards, the Tsoling Shu-tungeh and the Brigadier Chang Shen-pan, put himself at the head of the Cavalry of Kisin Teitschar, the league of Chelimir, the league of Chamouta, and Kwei Hwo-chang, met them. About noon they retired.

The loss on our side was three wounded amongst our men, with several wounded horses. The barbarians had both Cavalry and Infantry killed and wounded. The action on this day was occasioned by the barbarians moving a body out of the village above ten *li*, with intent to attack the works; this rendered their repulse necessary. As they had returned to the village, your slaves would still have written (or still proposed to write) to the American barbarians to desire them to tell the English and French barbarians to cease fighting and make peace; but it would not do after an engagement had taken place to return to the use of gentle and considerate language.

When they shall be anything further to report about the barbarians, and the answer from the American barbarians shall have been received, another respectful memorial shall be furnished (to your Majesty); meanwhile (your servants) with reference submit for your Imperial perusal copies of the reply of the American barbarians, and the reply of your slave Hang-fu to them.

This they report for the information of your Majesty, and prostrate implore thereon your sacred glance.

It is further proper to inform your Majesty that your slave Hang-fu, when sending this despatch to the American barbarians, took occasion to make them, by the hands of the officer detached, a present of melons, fruit, &c.

No. 3.—(Precise.) Semi-official note from Sun Chi (Taoutae or Intendant at Tien-tsin) to Teh. (No date.)

In accordance with Teh's orders just received, directing Sun to build a flying bridge at Yang-hwei-chwang, he has sent officers to move up 100 junks to that place. The Governor-General had the honour to receive yesterday an Imperial decree, to the effect that it was His Majesty's sacred pleasure that peace under any circumstances should be made. His Excellency sent a despatch yesterday to the English exhorting them to put an end to hostilities; but as yet he has received no answer.

The writer will send fifty tents he has been informed by his Excellency Sui that Teh requires.

No. 4.—Draft of a note apparently from Teh to Hang-fu. (No date.)

He is very grateful to Hang-fu for sending so many messengers to him. On the 23rd of the moon (9th August), about 5 o'clock, he saw the barbarians come out of Peh-tang with about 1,000 Horse and Foot. The Foot made direct for the tea-shed; the Horse made for Sin-ho: their routes were some distance

from each other. The Sin-ho road was not more than four or five *li* off. The troops in Sin-ho were so eager that they would not have waited, but Teh thought it right, as the Governor-General was engaged in the negotiations of peace with the barbarians, not to allow the troops to fire unless the barbarians began. About 7 o'clock A.M. they retired into Peh-tang; Teh is reporting the fact to the Board (of War). He sends a messenger to report to Hang-fu, and further indites this note to him.

P.S.—In reporting victories Hang-fu must not fail to place his (Tehinga's) name in the memorial, and will put his own after it.

No. 5.—Note from Hang-fu, Governor-General of Chih-li, apparently to Teh. Dated 7 o'clock of the 24th day of the moon (August 10th).

The writer has just received a note from his excellent younger brother (the person addressed); he is much obliged to him for his consideration in refraining from the infliction of such a chastisement as the barbarians put it in his power to give them on the occasion of their distant sortie yesterday; his ground for this forbearance being that he (the Governor-General) had received the Emperor's commands to conciliate the barbarians. He, Teh, had consequently abstained from opening fire upon them first. The nature of the barbarians is, however, like that of the dog or sheep: first, they send in a flag of truce, and now they refuse to admit that this was with the intent to negotiate peace.* The day before yesterday the Governor-General sent in a despatch to these barbarians; but, as they have not replied to it, he does not know what their purpose is. Now, although it be true that the Imperial Decree received yesterday (or recently) did command (or commission) the Governor-General to negotiate peace (*lit.*, conciliation) speedily and securely, enjoining on him, at the same time, the necessity of not allowing any failure (in war or peace) to occur, the Emperor has at the same time commanded Sang-ko-lin-sin to stand well on his guard, and expresses great anxiety that the troops should not be careless. The Governor-General, therefore, humbly thinks that it would be best if the barbarians do no more than parade outside the village, and do not open fire, that the troops should also confine themselves to standing watchfully on the defensive. There is no need, he should say, for them to commence the action; but if the barbarians are so confident in their strength as to advance to any great distance, their license must not be left unchecked; and "we must not sit still and see the day lost." The Governor-General is of opinion that the Sin-ho country, containing as it does the road into the rear of the forts on the northern bank, and the high road to Kuin-ling-ching (Chung-ling-che-eng, the wall depôt of the supplies of the army), is a central position of such importance that every effort must be made to keep (the enemy) back; he must on no account be allowed so to close on our troops as to leave them no room for action or to extend themselves. If he be allowed to get possession of Sinho, that important position, then he will so close in on our encampments (or intrenched camps) in all directions, the consequences would not be trifling. If the barbarians then show signs of pressing on, they must at the same time be met in front, and attacked on both flanks, "their ferocious advance (or vanguard) rudely (or painfully) held back;" this is the way to be victorious.

The Governor-General has sent Teh the Decrees he has received from day to day out of personal kindness, but in no way to influence his conclusions, nor must he allow himself to vacillate or be embarrassed. He should on all points take his orders from Sang-ko-lin-sin, and on no account suffer the day to be lost ("à coup manqué"), because of his (the Governor-General's) conciliatory negotiations. Were he, Teh, to disobey Sang-ko-lin-sin's orders, the Governor-General's responsibility would be greater than he could bear. Teh's military abilities are such that the Governor-General has the fullest confidence in his discrimination at the present crisis, &c.

(Signed) Your enlightened Elder Brother Hang-fu bows his head.

The shin-watch (7 o'clock), the 24th day (10th August).

P.S.—At 2 o'clock A.M. to-day Chang Kia-kau, who was sent with the despatch (to Lord Elgin), returned to the Ku with the answer of Elgin, Chief of

* The "mien-chau" flag, don't fight flag, is as well understood to indicate momentary or temporary suspension of hostilities as our white flag displayed for the same purpose.

the English barbarians. Its language is obscure, and much of it unintelligible. The Governor-General has decided on going to head-quarters to confer with the Commander-in-chief. He will let Teh know as soon as they have made their arrangements.

No. 6.—Note from Hang-fu to Teh (without date).

At 7 o'clock P.M. on the 24th (10th August), the Governor-General received Teh's reply, to the effect that not only was Sin-ho a place of importance, but that he should also pay the strictest attention to the defence of Tang-sh-ku, as it was the high road to Tien-tsin. The Governor-General is greatly impressed by this evidence of Teh's forethought and vigilance; Teh's propositions respecting the conciliation of the barbarians also thoroughly hit the plot: the important point being to bring their hearts to submission, he would wait until the barbarians came out in force to attack the troops, whose ardour being roused by one tap of the drum, they would attack them fiercely, and then if they took prisoners any of their leaders there would be no harm in sending them back alive.

The Governor-General thinks, however, that the barbarians, considering the high tone they are assuming (or the pride with which they are coming on) on this occasion, will certainly not be likely to give in because of a slight repulse. He has repeatedly received the commands of the Emperor, enjoining him to devote himself to the question of conciliation, and to make his arrangements speedily and satisfactorily.

But the temper of the barbarians is also tricky, and extravagantly rebellious. How will a solitary word or a single expression make them recognize our authority (conform to our limitations)? When the two armies are vis-à-vis each other, it will be a question of which cuts the sharper.* It would never do to sit by and see the day lost, and leave them to their savage license. Sin-ho and Tang-sh-ku are both place of importance. If these barbarians do attack, and venture to advance any distance, there is nothing for it but to assault them fiercely, and compel them to dread our martial prowess.

The Governor-General feels the greatest anxiety about the different camps (positions) on the North Bank. Happily, he can depend upon the extensive military knowledge of Teh, his excellent brother, which is as the Great Wall for the reliance to be placed upon it.

Teh requests him when he reports his victory (or victories) to the Throne, to place the name of his younger brother, of the empty vessel, with his own in his memorial, but to put his own in the second place. Though this is very modest of Teh, there is no need for him to be stiff on the point. The Commander-in-chief is certain to have some suggestions to make when the time comes.

Yesterday, about 9 o'clock P.M., the barbarians came out again in a body of some 300 or 400 men, and retired again after reaching the tea-shed. This was what Teh had surmised they would do—retire of themselves if there was no fighting. The Governor-General suspects them of some crafty design, and recommends increase of caution.

Compliments.

(Signed) HANG-FU, &c.

No. 7.—Draft of a note, apparently from Teh to Hang-fu, whom he addresses as "Yueh-tang, third of my elder brethren."

Teh has received Hang-fu's note, suggesting that when the two armies are vis-à-vis, it would not do to sit idle and lose the day. This shows the experience and sagacity of Hang-fu, by which Teh is deeply impressed. He (Teh) thinks that the grand secret in the employment of troops is to stimulate their ardour. If their remuneration be liberal you are certain of valour in your men. He has accordingly notified to every one about the Northern camps, military and non-military, that 1,000 taels shall be given for every high leader of barbarians, 50 taels for leaders of low rank, 5 taels for other villains, and 4 taels for every head; also that every one who distinguishes himself by ability or courage shall be recommended to the Throne.

* I am not sure of this expression's meaning.

P.S., Note.—Higher leaders 1,000 taels reward, lesser leaders 50 taels, other villains 5 taels, heads 4 taels. Saw the Commander-in-chief yesterday, but did not allude to it.

[Scouts to be rewarded with taels; recommendation made to the Throne when the time comes; notice has been given of this to every camp. Where your remuneration is liberal your men are certain to be courageous. Scouts to be given steps according to the occasion (whenever they render service), and to have some money given to them besides, not more than the sum above specified.

Could the (Governor-General) request the Commander-in-chief's pleasure (on this point).]

The two preceding paragraphs, between brackets, appear to be a Memorandum for a Proclamation,

(Signed) THOMAS WADE, *Chinese Secretary.*

No. 65.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received November* 2.)

My Lord, *Tang-koo, August* 22, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a despatch addressed to Baron Gros and me collectively, by Wan and Hang, announcing their appointmen by Imperial Commission to conduct us to Peking for the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, and of my reply to it; also of a second despatch from the same persons addressed to myself, and of a despatch to me from the Governor-General of the Province.

The two last-mentioned despatches were sent to the first North Takoo Fort immediately after its capture had been effected, on the forenoon of the 21st instant. I was there at the time, but I did not think it expedient to enter upon diplomatic discussions at such a moment. I accordingly requested Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to send to the person who had brought the despatches a verbal message to the effect that they would be duly communicated to the Ambassadors, but that he would not stop the operations in which he was engaged against the Takoo Forts until they were actually in his possession. This mode of proceeding was entirely justified by the result.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 65.

Commissioners Wan and Hang to the Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros.

(Translation.)

WAN, by Imperial Commission, President at Si-ning, and Hang, a high officer on the Military Establishment of the Household (late Hoppo or Commissioner of Customs at Canton), make a communication.

A Decree was issued by His Majesty the Emperor some time since, directing Hang, Governor-General of Chih-li, to write to the (Representatives of) the British and French nations so soon as they should arrive at (off the coast of) Tien-tsin, to exchange the Treaties, and give stability to the relations of peace. On its being subsequently reported that troops were landing, and hostilities in operation, the above high officers had the honour to receive an Imperial Decree specially deputing them to move forward, to acquaint the (British and French) Ministers of the fact.

Apprehensive that the Governor-General of Chih-li may have failed in making plain the desire (of the Chinese Government) for friendly relations, the high officers above named have come to Tien-tsin to declare it. It will be at the same time in their power to escort (or conduct) the Ministers to the capital, to exchange the Treaties, in order that friendly relations may be established,

It is their duty, accordingly, to make a communication to the Ministers, to which they hope they will immediately reply.

They avail themselves, &c.

A necessary communication addressed to the Ministers of Great Britain and France.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 2nd day (18th August, 1860).

(Received August 19, 1860.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 65.

The Earl of Elgin to Commissioners Wan and Hang.

THE Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge a communication addressed to him and his colleague, the Ambassador of France, by the Imperial Commissioner Wan-tsien and Hang-ki. In reply, the Undersigned begs to refer their Excellencies to a communication addressed by him to Hang, Governor-General of Chih-li, under date the 17th instant.

The Undersigned has nothing to add to that communication.

Inclosure 3 in No. 65.

Commissioners Wan and Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

WAN, President at Si-ning, and Hang, high officer of the Household, make a communication.

The above high officers wrote upon the 2nd of the 7th moon (18th instant), to acquaint the British Minister that they had come to Tien-tsin by command of His Majesty, to acquaint him of his desire for friendly relations, and that they were ready to conduct him to the capital to exchange Treaties, in order to the establishment of friendly relations. This despatch they sent by the hand of an official.

On the 4th of the 7th moon (20th instant), they received a despatch from the Great Council, informing them that His Majesty has now appointed an Imperial Commissioner to confer with him in the capital; that the fifty-six Articles of the Treaty having already formed matter of negotiation,* it would (will) be doubtless correct for him to (or he will, as a matter of course) enter the capital, and exchange the Treaties according to the American precedent of last year, in order that friendly relations may be established; that as regards the four Articles set forth in the despatch of the British Minister Bruce, dated last March, (the consideration of these can be) postponed until the British Minister shall have a conference with the Imperial Commissioner in the capital, when, if everything advanced by him be reasonable, there will be no objection to discussion and arrangement (of the questions at issue).

It becomes their duty to communicate this to the British Minister, who (they hope) will at once reply. They avail themselves of the opportunity to wish him enjoyment of the blessings of the season.

A necessary communication addressed to the British Minister.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 4th day (20th August, 1860).

(Received August 20, 1860.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 65.

Governor-General Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

HANG, Governor-General of Chih-li, makes a communication.

On the 5th of the present moon (August 21), the British Commanders-in-chief, naval and military, having proved, by the seizure of the forts in our rear, their superiority in fighting, our force was contented to submit (or to acknowledge

* The term used rather signifies that negotiations are in progress and not concluded.

itself defeated). The Governor-General consequently writes to the British Minister that there is no (further) occasion for him to prosecute hostilities.

An Imperial Commissioner, with full powers, will immediately arrive, and the British Minister is requested to proceed up the river by the Takoo mouth.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency Elgin, Her Britannic Majesty's Plenipotentiary, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 5th day (August 21, 1860).

No. 66.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received November* 2.)

My Lord, *Tang-koo, August* 23, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a despatch which I have received from Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant, covering the translation of a communication to the Commanders-in-chief from the Governor-General of the Province, surrendering the Takoo forts.

The attack on these forts, which took place on the 21st instant, was admirably planned and executed, and attended with entire success.

The Governor-General's letter to me of that day's date, the copy of which is inclosed in my despatch of the 22nd instant, implied that he felt resistance to be hopeless; but I did not answer it, because I felt it to be important that the forts should be surrendered, not to the Diplomatic Representatives of the Allied Powers, but to the Military and Naval Commanders-in-chief.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 66.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Head-Quarters, Tang-koo, August* 22, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Excellency a copy of the translation of a letter which has just been received from the Viceroy of Chih-li.

I have taken measures, as far as lies in my power, for the protection of the persons and property of the inhabitants of Takoo, as far as the British troops are concerned, and have requested General Montauban and the two Admirals to take similar steps.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 66.

Governor-General Hang to the Allied Commanders-in-chief.

(Translation.)

THE Undersigned, Hang-fu, Viceroy of the Province of Chih-li, addresses the following communication to the English and French (French and English) military and naval (naval and military) Commanders-in-chief.

On the 5th day of the present month (August 21), the Honourable Commanders-in-chief advanced upon the forts both by sea and land, and took those on the northern bank. This success proved the efficiency of the troops of the Honourable Commanders-in-chief; and the Chinese army, being defeated, tendered their submission. The latter have accordingly withdrawn from all the forts on the southern bank, and are now willing to surrender into the possession of the Honourable Commanders-in-chief all these forts, together with the whole of their munitions, and any fortified camps or entrenchments.

The Undersigned further engages to depute officers to point out to officers on the part of the Commanders-in-chief the position of any mines that may be in the forts, and of all secret defences placed in the river, in order that no injury

may be occasioned thereby to the honourable allies. It is understood that the delivery of the forts, as soon as effected, shall be followed by the cessation of hostilities in this locality, and also that no injury shall be done to the inhabitants, who shall be efficiently protected both in body and property.

A necessary communication.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th month, 5th day (August 21, 1860).

No. 67.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received November* 2.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, August* 25, 1860.

I INCLOSE herewith the translation of some very remarkable papers found by Mr. Parkes on the 12th instant, in the house of the Chinese General at Sin-ho.

They treat of the ultimatum presented in March last by Mr. Bruce, of the measures which it is presumed the English and French Governments are likely to adopt in order to enforce their views on that of China, quoting from English newspapers and from the debates in Parliament, and commenting on these quotations with a singular mixture of simplicity and shrewdness; and, finally, detailing the difficulties against which the allies would have to contend if they should attempt to force their way to Tien-tsin by the route of the Peiho. A great deal may be learnt from these documents respecting the real sentiments of the Chinese Government; and I venture to invite your Lordship's attention to them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 67.

II.—*Translation of Papers found in Sin-ho by Mr. Parkes, on the 12th August,* 1860.

1. MEMORIAL from Ho Kwei-tsing, Imperial Commissioner for the Superintendence of Trade and Governor-General of the Two Kiang, inclosing and commenting on the ultimatum of England and France.

2. Imperial Decree, issued on the receipt of the foregoing, warning Sang-ko-lin-sin, Prince of the Khorchin tribe, and Hang-fu, Governor-General of Chih-li, to be on their guard against English, French, and Russians. Any of the last appearing on shore at Peh-tang were to be sent in custody to Peking.

3. Memorial of Sang-ko-lin-sin and Hang-fu on the receipt of the above Decree, expressing confidence in the security of the Takoo position, doubt in the reality of a hostile purpose on the part of France and England, and condemning the course adopted by Ho Kwei-tsing when called on to forward the ultimata of those Powers; also reporting upon a fortification scheme into which they had been ordered to inquire.

N.B.—Ho believes, or affects to believe, that eight propositions were formerly submitted by the foreign to the native mercantile community, by the concession of which peace might have been purchased. This is the unfounded expansion of certain conversations between an individual Chinese merchant and an individual British merchant.

(Signed) T. F. WADE.

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1. Your Majesty's servant Ho Kwei-tsing, upon his knees, presents a memorial, showing that the Chiefs of the English and French have each addressed a communication to one of the Chief Secretaries of State, and that it is their object to constrain the barbarian merchants not to act on the side of China. This he forwards at the rate of 600 *li* a-day to your Majesty, and looking upward implores your sacred glance thereon.

He would humbly state that he has already, in memorials forwarded by couriers on the 27th of the 1st moon, and the 4th of the 2nd moon (18th and

25th February, 1860), reported to your Majesty the state of barbarian affairs at Shanghae, and the earnest endeavours of the merchants, Chinese (or civilized) and barbarian, to bring about an accommodation (or to restore the *status quo*).

He is now in receipt of a confidential letter from the members of the Great Council (reciting) the Imperial Decree which, on the 6th of the 2nd moon, of the 10th year of Hien-fung (27th February, 1860), they had had the honour to receive. He looked up grateful for the indication of the secret (or spring of policy) vouchsafed him by his sacred master, the condescension (or compromise) by which the great interest at stake was secured, and as on his knees he read it aloud, he was touched beyond the power of language (1).

The eight propositions of the barbarian merchants (2) he would humbly state having been one by one discussed and rejected by Sieh Hwan, Treasurer for the Kiang-ning (division of Kiang-su) were handed over by him to the Chinese merchants (with instructions to them) to deliver a special lecture to the barbarian merchants, who thereupon consented to wait for a time and confer together again.

The aspect of the (Civil) war at this crisis, both North and South of the Great River, was so serious, the whole neighbourhood of Soo-chow and Chang-chang so alarmed as though a thunderbolt had shaken it, that it was greatly to be apprehended that the public mind would be excited and unsettled were Sieh Hwan to proceed to Shanghae, and he consequently, for the time being, delayed his journey thither.

According to a confidential report presented at a later period by Wu Hu, Acting Intendant (Taoutae) of the Su-sung-tai Circuit, and the expectant Prefect Lau Wai-wan, the Chinese merchants had subsequently made out from barbarian merhants that the latter were unanimous in pronouncing Bruce utterly intractable (or uncompromising). The moment any one of them deprecates the employment of troops, he will exclaim, "I shall carry out my policy; I am not to be gulled by you." He is very wrath (they say) at having been enticed into a snare at Tien-tsin, and although we desire no more trouble, it is not so easy in a moment to bring him within bounds. We have now, too, further news from our own country that, as the French are increasing their forces, some more English troops will also be moved on.

The Chinese merchants replied if the French are increasing their forces, it is because they are going to give trouble, and in that case, now, can you ask us to disband our garrisons (3)? Unless some means be devised of modifying the eight propositions already brought forward, it will be quite impossible to ask any favour for you.

The barbarian merchants rejoined, the negotiation of peace (in which we are engaged) has its origin in the desire of the merchants for the security of trade. Bruce's secret determination, so far as one can see, is to force his own terms of peace when he shall have been victorious in war, so that he may have what he wants and nothing else. If an effort were made to concede our eight propositions, we might, perhaps, effect some accommodation, but this we fear will be impracticable if there be any delay. The Chinese merchants also interrogated other barbarian merchants, and were told much the same thing.

Such were the particulars (reported by the officers before mentioned); they also presented copies (of extracts) from the newspapers.

Your servant would observe that, while there is no proof that statements made in the newspapers are true, it is by no means certain that they are utterly without foundation, and that it would not be right, when the increase of the English and French forces is spoken of, not to be prepared against them. The report that the object of the English is Tien-tsing, and that the French desire to take possession of Chusan or Ting-hai-ting, tallies, besides, in general with what has been observed and reported before.

Canards of this sort (4), respecting appropriation of territory, interception of the grain supply, and the like, are daily current at Shanghae. At the same time, although too much credence is not lightly to be attached to such statements, Bruce and Bourboulon are, for all that, inseparables (5) in disloyalty (or wickedness), and their character is indeed sanguinary and treacherous.

Still, utterly objectionable as the eight propositions of the barbarians may be, your servant, feeling that it would not be so easy in a moment's time to produce a change in (*lit.*, melt, dissolve, the hardness of) these Chiefs, who would have heard of the serious nature of our military difficulties in various

directions, and that if he were to keep them quite at arm's length (so far from taking anything thereby) he would lose all chance of gaining the day, had resolved on receiving the commands your Majesty had deigned to issue, authorizing their admission into Peking to exchange Treaties in the same manner as the American barbarians, to desire Sieh Hwan to proceed in person (to Shanghae), to confer with them, and make the necessary arrangements.

Just as he was giving him his instructions, however, there came in a report from Wu Hu and his colleague, to the effect that there had been a talk of the English Chief proceeding to Tien-tsin to present a letter, but that the barbarian merchants had persuaded him to present it at Shanghae; that he had thereon confidentially conferred for several days with the French barbarian; and that, on the 17th day of the 2nd moon (9th March), one despatch and note had been brought from Bruce by the English barbarian, Wei To-ma (Thomas Wade), and another from Bourboulon by the French barbarian, Mei-wuh-tung (M. de Meritens), which they (Wu and Lau) now transmitted to your servant. Inclosed in each was a despatch to a Chief Secretary of State, which it was requested your servant would forward. Not venturing to stand on ceremony, your servant then and there opened these despatches, the language of which he found to be most detestably extravagant and insubordinate.

The English Chief commences by arguing that, in the Tien-tsin affair, the quarrel was not begun in any way by the barbarians, and he would have China apologise. This is an attempt to make us accept his culpability for him. He then says that, although non-residence in the capital was conceded by Elgin, this concession has been since reversed by the Ruler of his nation, in consequence of the fight at Tien-tsin (6). This is a pretext for shifting and changing; but if the other side is at liberty to make alterations, we are also at liberty to make alterations.

As to indemnity, the amount of which he says is to be greater or less according to the speed with which his different demands are acceded to, these are idle words employed to put us in a difficulty. If the other side have a right to exact expenses, we have also a right to exact expenses.

His other requirements, to wit, that he should notwithstanding be admitted into the capital to exchange Treaties, and treated with all courtesy, were fully to be expected.

The French barbarian makes four demands. He lays particular stress on an indemnity for war expenses; but he also attempts to put us in a difficulty, by requiring residence in the capital. In other regards, his letter is much the same as that of the English barbarian.

Wu Hu and his colleague further confidentially report, that the war-ships of these barbarians have indeed been dispatched (from their country), one after the other, but that they are much afraid of our military power (or prowess) at Tien-tsin; that the presentation of these despatches beforehand, consequently, is merely for the purpose of making it appear that the commencement of hostilities does not lie with them (the English, but with us), and that this is another crafty stratagem of Bruce's, who thereby takes such ground that if, as he apprehends, another defeat be sustained by him, the Ruler of his nation will be obliged to send troops to the rescue, at the same time that, by this means, he constrains the barbarian merchants not to do what will serve us. The French barbarian, not being in fact the person who began the quarrel, is merely mixing himself up in it at the instance of the other. Last year, when Hwa-jo-han (John Ward), the American Chief, was in the capital, Kweiliang and his colleagues told him that the fight at Tien-tsin did not proceed from any intention of the French Chief (or, did not take place on his motion), nor were the war-ships of the French barbarians numerous; and your servant thinks that the (English) barbarians must have heard that your sacred intelligence had long since apprehended (this fact—the part played by the French). Be this as it may, since the disturbance they made (or outrage they committed) at Tien-tsin, these Chiefs have never referred to an exchange of the Treaties, and now, without further notice, these despatches appear.

Your servant, in replies addressed separately to these Chiefs, has undertaken to forward them for them; and as they have named thirty days as the time they are to wait for the Secretary of State's reply, nothing serious (*lit.*, no smash) will probably take place within the thirty days.

It becomes the duty of your servant, on the one hand, to request instructions

from your Majesty, and on the other, in obedience to your commands, to direct Sieh Hwan to repair, before (the time expires,) to Shanghae, and, in company with his subordinates Wu Hu (7) and his colleague, confidentially to instruct the Chinese merchants to get round (8) the barbarian merchants, with a view to devise means to prevent any movement (*lit.*, holding in a pair of pincers).

The fourth instalment of the grain supply your servant imagines is ready for sea (*lit.*, the grain to be by sea transported is already weighed out), and your servant and the Governor Sü Yu-jin have confidentially instructed Sieh Hwan and Wu Hu to spy out and ascertain the temper (or attitude) of the barbarians, and to consider, with Wang Yu-ling, the Treasurer for the Soo-chow (division of Kiang-su), the steps to be taken in order that the regular supply may be duly cared for.

As regards the war-ships of the English barbarians at Shanghae, up to the 3rd of the 2nd moon (24th February) there were, in all, six still in port. Since that date there have come in six more, and five have left the port. Of the latter, it has been ascertained that two have sailed northwards.

The General (head of the troops) of the French barbarians, it is ascertained, has reached Hong Kong, and, it is reported, will arrive at Shanghae immediately.

The French barbarian Meritens, since Wu Hu and his colleague gave him his answer about the disbanding of the garrisons and the exaction of indemnity, has not either resumed the argument upon that point.

Your servant, in concert with your servant the Governor, will continue to give instructions to Sieh Hwan and his colleague to devise means for keeping (the barbarians) within bounds (*lit.*, tethering them), suiting their measures to the occasion. He will at the same time closely watch the temper (or proceedings) of the barbarians, and from time to time make report thereon to your Majesty.

He now seals and sends to the Council the letters these Chiefs have addressed to the Secretary of State, respecting which he ventures to await your Majesty's instructions.

It is, further, his duty confidentially to address a respectful Memorial to your Majesty, together with copies of an extract from the newspapers, and of the two communications, and the replies to them. These he has the honour to submit to your Majesty for perusal, and, prostrate, implores your Majesty's sacred glance thereon.

A respectful Memorial.

The following are the translations made from the newspaper dated the 10th of the English 1st moon, on the 18th of the Chinese 12th moon, which he has the honour to submit to your Majesty:—

The reinforcements being sent from England to China, exclusive of sailors, will amount to 10,000 troops, white and black.

The French, in addition to the 8,000 men already dispatched, are sending 2,000, which will make a total of 10,000.

The English and French will land 30,000 fighting men.

The store and arm-ships have been increased to the number of eight, each carrying 30,000 piculs (say 1,800 tons). From No. 1 to No. 5 have started; Nos. 6, 7, and 8 are shipping arms as fast as possible, and will sail immediately.

It is the purpose of England, in this expedition against China, to put forth all her strength. A great brass mortar will go to China; it has reached Sha-tun-tun (Southampton), and has been shipped on board the Hai-mi-lai-ya ("Himalaya"); thence it will go to A-lu-shan (Alexandria), and from A-lu-shan to So-ho-sz (Suez), as at Suez there will certainly be a ship to carry this mortar to Hong Kong.

The French force has already all started for China.

There is also an augmentation of the (British) navy, (*à propos*) of which there has been a discussion in England, lasting several days, upon the plan of campaign. One party says that this expedition ought not to attack China on the Tien-tsin country, as the Tien-tsin river is hard to enter, and the mud-banks extend several *li*. Peking, even when a landing has been effected, is difficult of access, as the roads are full of impediments and the water-ways numerous. There are bridges, but these are sure to be broken up; added to which, great danger is probably to be apprehended from the Mongol Cavalry making charges

in difficult ground. It were best, therefore, to take the course followed in Tau Kwang's reign, and re-occupy Nanking. No apprehension need then be entertained that peace will not made. The great river is deep and wide, and the passage up and down it, consequently, easy. The men-of-war can anchor at the foot of the city wall. This plan would be, without a doubt, a complete one.

On the other side it was urged that this plan is not a good one; that there is no analogy between the reign of Tau Kwang and the present time. Then, the grain supply of the capital was brought thither by the Canal; and that it was the blockade of the Canal by the foreign troops, not the occupation of Nanking, that was serious. The Canal being now blocked up, the capital is entirely dependent on the sea-route for supplies. It will be possible, therefore, in the present instance, when attacking Tien-tsin, to intercept the grain supply which is being brought up by sea. Besides, Canton has been in possession of foreign soldiers for two years without its producing any impression on China; would it not be useless, therefore, to occupy any other city? It may be remembered, too, that in 1858, before Elgin had been in Tien-tsin many days, the great question at issue was satisfactorily disposed of; which shows that occupation of Tien-tsin possessed many advantages over that of Nanking. Admitting all the difficulties: the impracticability of the mud-flats, the embarrassment of the roads, the destruction of the bridges, and the impetuosity of the Cavalry; the foreign troops are on this occasion well provided with floating batteries, wooden causeways (?) for the mud-flats, scaling-ladders, and flying bridges. If the Cavalry charge, the foreign soldiers have also Cavalry to receive them. Need any anxiety be felt lest, with 30,000 troops, Peking should not be reached?

The foreign troops have been looking, moreover, for water in the neighbourhood of Peh-tang, deep enough to enable them to land without difficulty; and, once landed, they will take the forts in rear, destroy these, and attack Tien-tsin, after which they will advance on Peking, and the business will be over.

It is said that the newly-appointed French Chief, by name Mòn-tau-pan (Montauban), has reached Hong Kong, and will arrive at Shanghae shortly.

It is also said that the French troops, on their arrival, will certainly make Chusan a military station.

[Here follow copies of the letters addressed to Ho by Mr. Bruce and M. de Bourboulon, and his (Ho's) replies.]

Notes.

(1.) Ho appears to be alluding to a Decree, to which he again adverts presently, authorizing the admission of the French and English into Peking on the same terms with the Americans.

(2.) See notice preceding these translations.

(3.) This was a proposition suggested by the Chinese, alluded to in the above notice. He said nothing pacific could be hoped for till Sang-ko-lin-sin and his force were withdrawn from Takoo.

(4.) This is a newspaper report, inclosed by Ho in his supplement.

(5.) "Inseparables." The term so translated is a compound of the names of two wild beasts—one a wolf—which are always found together.

(6.) Tien-tsin, it must always be remembered, is a term capable of including the whole Prefecture of that name.

(7.) *Lit.*, leading them on.

(8.) *Lit.*, cage and halter, yet soothingly, cajolingly, as those whose fierceness or energy has to be kept in check.

No. 2.—Confidential Letter from the Members of the Great Council to the Imperial Commissioners Sang (Sang-ko-lin-sin), Prince of the Khorchin tribe, and to Hang (Hang-fu), Governor-General of Chih-li.

Upon the 6th day of the 3rd moon of the 10th year of Hien-fung (27th March, 1860), we had the honour to receive the following Imperial Decree:—

"With reference to the Memorial submitted to us by Ho Kwei-tsing, representing that the Chiefs of the English and the French had each tendered a

communication, the aim of which was to put us in a difficulty, and the extracts from newspapers accompanying these, the Chiefs of the English and French had each presented a communication addressed to a Chief Secretary of State, requiring an apology on the part of China, the mission of an officer to Tien-tsin to receive (their Ministers), permanent residence in the capital, and indemnity for war expenses, (the purport of the two) was in general the same. Their language being extravagant and rebellious in the extreme, the Great Council have written to instruct Ho Kwei-tsing to reply to these barbarians.

"The translations of their newspapers he forwards state that the English and French have increased their force to the number of 30,000 men, and are bringing up guns and other arms to attack Tien-tsin again; also that they are surveying the coast on both sides of Peh-tang, in search of deep water, where they may land so as to turn the forts along the shores of Tien-tsin. Notwithstanding that full credence is not to be given to all this, still, considering that Bruce and Bourboulon are inseparables in dishonesty, by nature sanguinary and treacherous, when mention is made of an augmentation of their forces on these shores, with a view to their disembarkation for the purpose of taking our forts in rear, it would not be right not to stand on our guard. Let Sang-ko-lin-sin and Hang-fu make their disposition, therefore, according to the nature of the ground, so that they may thoroughly insure the safety of the position at all points, their plans being laid with such completeness as to make success certain; without relaxation of vigilance; and let copies of the Memorial (of Ho), and the extracts from the newspapers be given them to read.

"As to the Russian Chief, Ignatieff, who, because the proposition regarding the Kirin territory has not been sanctioned, is applying to present a communication, is asking leave to bring several vessels of war (or, states that several want to come) to Peh-tang, and begging that the letters of the Russian Chief (or Chiefs*) may be sent from the capital to Shanghae. His communication and the letters have been already returned, and as it is now warm spring (and the port is consequently accessible), if any vessels of war of the Russian barbarians do present themselves at Peh-tang, Sang-ko-lin-sin and his colleague will at once declare that there is no mention of vessels of war (having authority) to come there in the Treaty, and that under the particular clause (referring to Peh-tang), the Russians are authorized to come to the port (or coast) only in quiet times; that just now the coast is being placed on the defensive, and if they come up followed by vessels of war, as there will be no means of distinguishing their language or appearance from those of other nations, it is much to be feared that (ships of) other nations affecting to be theirs may create disorder (be guilty of outrage), and should (their people) be injured by the Imperial troops by mistake (so far from any good being done by their coming), a breach of friendly relations would ensue; that they must, therefore, not linger off the coast, as their so doing may be productive of great inconvenience. If these barbarians should pretend that they are bringing cannon and small arms, let them nevertheless anchor outside the bar, in accordance with our former Decree, and let small vessels be sent out to them to bring (the arms) in, the strictest of precautions (against surprise or invasion) being all the while observed.

"As to the despatch of persons to Peh-tang by the Russian Chiefs in Peking, of which they speak, there is no saying that there may not be herein some other artful design. Should any Russian barbarians, therefore, come to Peh-tang from the capital, we recommend the high officers aforesaid, so soon as by strict search they shall have discovered them, to seize them and dispatch some one with them in custody to the capital, that they may not be enabled to gain any information for themselves. This is of the greatest importance.

"Let these commands be confidentially made known to them.

"Respect this."

In obedience to His Majesty's will we send this note.

(No. 3.)

(Sang-ko-lin-sin and Hang-fu) present a Memorial; for that, having in obedience to your Majesty's commands, made such dispositions as they find

* The members of the Mission at Peking.

required by the nature of the ground, they present a respectful Memorial, whereon they pray for the glance of your Sacred Majesty.

Your slaves would humbly state, that on the 8th of this moon (29th March, they received from the Council a letter, informing them that on the 6th day of the 3rd moon of the 10th year of Hien-fung, they had had the honour to receive the following Imperial Decree:—

"Ho Kwei-tsing having informed us by Memorial that the English and French Chiefs have each tendered a communication, and having sent up copies of extracts from newspapers, to the effect that the English and French forces are being increased to the number of 30,000 men, and that they are landing on either side of Peh-tang, to find a way by which they may get to the rear of the forts on the shore of Tien-tsin, we command Sang-ko-lin-sin and Hang-fu to make dispositions according to the nature of the ground, so as thoroughly to ensure the safety of the position at all points, their plans being laid with such completeness as to render success certain.

"The Russian Chief wants to come to Peh-tang, and the Russian Chiefs in the capital talk of sending persons to Peh-tang. As there is no saying that there may not be herein some other artful design, we command the high officers aforesaid to make strict search (for any such messengers), and on discovering them to make them prisoners, and send some one with them to the capital, &c.

"Respect this."

It being affirmed that the English and French Chiefs are augmenting their forces to the number of 30,000 men, although of course implicit credence need not be attached to this statement, it would not be right not to bestow increased attention upon the defences. The ground in the neighbourhood of Peh-tang, however, although the place itself is without a garrison (or, unfortified, or not armed for defence), being as it is all salt-flat (or salt-marsh), the barbarians will not find it easy to land upon it, and should they be so rash as to throw themselves across the salt-flats, there are camps (or bodies) of Horse and Foot along the road leading to the rear of Peh-tang, so that the barbarians will not be able even then to turn the forts. If it be the fact that the barbarian force does amount to 30,000 men, our Cavalry and Infantry is now reinforced, and is so distributed from point to point as perfectly to enable it to repel any attack; (which information) it is hoped will comfort the Imperial bosom.

As regards the intention of the Russian Chiefs to send some one to Peh-tang, your slaves have already given confidential instructions to trusty officers to make careful search, without sign or sound, in the neighbourhood of Takoo, Lutai, Ying-ching,* and Peh-tang, and if any Russian barbarians come thither spying, so soon as they shall have apprehended them, to send them in custody to the capital.

(The line taken with the English and French is to be condemned. In their policy three things were clear:—)

(1.) After receiving their chastisement in the 5th moon of last year, the abstinence of their Chiefs from any immediate attempt at retaliation is to be attributed to the fact that their force was insufficient, and that they were consequently in dread of a second defeat, which would have discredited their nation: hence they would have sued for peace; but being alarmed lest we should demand indemnity for our war expenses, and lest (the Representatives of) the other nations beyond sea should henceforth look down upon them, while on the one hand they signified in a vague way to the barbarian merchants their desire that they should bring about an adjustment, they continued to utter empty threats, trusting by their means that they would save their reputation.

This was the first point in their policy which was perfectly plain.

(2.) Last year, when these barbarians came up to the coast with war-ships and cannon, they did mean to constrain us (or put us in a difficulty) by force of arms. This was why, although they well knew that the Secretary of State Kweiliang and his colleague had been long waiting for them at Shanghae, they would not visit them at all, their only fear being that their ill (or dishonest) purposes would have been detected, and measures of precaution adopted, which would have rendered the gratification of their extravagantly rebellious (propen-

* Or the walled city near Lutai.

sities) impossible. This year (the case is different), if they were really increasing their forces to avenge themselves, they would never have allowed the slightest rumour of their intention to get abroad at Shanghae. Ho Kwei-tsing has been reporting time after time that he finds the barbarian force stated by some at 25,000, by others at 30,000; their war-ships at so many, their guns at so many; that they are running up more sheds at Shanghae, which the troops will shortly arrive to occupy; that such a dealer has undertaken to supply them with bread, such another with beef. This undisguised exhibition of courage, this reckless publicity, would not have been the game of the veriest fools, and they are not the veriest fools. The shaft of war is in this wise: when one is going to surprise an enemy 1,000 *li* off, the mouth should be gagged, the drums muffled; the sally should be made when he is least expecting it; the attack when he is not on his guard. Who would give him notice beforehand so as to enable him to be in readiness? This shows that what they want is to sue for peace, but they do not choose to be the first to speak of it. This is the second point in their policy which is perfectly plain.

(3.) Between barbarian Chiefs and barbarian merchants, what distinction is there? It is not easy to divine a man's wishes, unless the words shall have come out of his mouth. Now the barbarian merchants have divined that Bruce wishes China to say the first word (or write the first letter), recommending him to stay hostilites, engaging him at such a time to return to Tien-tsin, at such a time to enter the capital, and undertaking that there shall be no indemnification for war expenses on either side; that he, the Chief Bruce, shall be treated with all honour. On these conditions an arrangement will be practicable. This means that the Chief Bruce is willing to submit himself to our conciliation, and is giving the barbarian merchants to understand as much; but he perversely makes difficulty by (naming to the merchants) a number of propositions which can scarcely (or cannot) be granted, on purpose to make us address him first. This was the third point in their policy which was perfectly plain.

In the series of discussions which took place between the Intendant Wu Hu and his colleagues and the barbarian merchants at Shanghae, (those officers), taking neither too high nor too low a tone, succeeded fairly enough. Their whole course was what the occasion required; but in that pursued in the present instance, in their acceptance of the communications addressed by these barbarians to the Secretary of State) and their promise to request (the Governor-General) to forward them for them, they seem to have committed themselves. It matters not in what terms of extravagance and insubordination they present their conditions. The important point is this, that a communication having proceeded from them first, we prick our fingers in the arguments we have to construct. These Chiefs had been at Shanghae nearly a year, blustering a threatening, idly affecting a high tone, conceiving a hundred artifices; their deceit had all discovered itself, and because we would not fall into their snare, they became too impatient to wait. Hence this new petty trick, this transmission of a communication to the Secretary of State, by which they avoid the incitation of a pacific overture. Besides (as to the violence of their language), these barbarians have been for the last twenty years feeding their pride; and it was certainly not to be expected that in one day they will hang down their heads, and lay back their ears, and wag their tails, and ask for mercy. In their communications, therefore, it was inevitable that there should continue to be language that was extravagant and rebellious. But Wu Hu and his colleague should have told them that the Governor-General of the Two Kiang is an officer of high consideration in the establishment of China, and at the same time Imperial Commissioner for the management of barbarian affairs; and that their letters would not be sent to the capital, but must be submitted to the Imperial Commissioner for him to dispose of them; and the Commissioner on receiving them should have at once replied, commencing with a reprimand to them for the fault they committed last year in not obeying the just commands issued to them, and then ensuring their pacification by mild admonitions, promising, if they declared themselves sincerely penitent, to move your Majesty of your favour to excuse them the payment of a war indemnity, and to continue to them permission to trade. Should they still have persisted in their desire to take revenge for their chastisement at Takoo, then (he might have told them that) of course they must go to Takoo again and fight it out. (Thus he might have said), you will save the dignity of your nation, and if you are victorious, you will do what you please; but if you fail again

(remember), it will be too late for you to repent. Had such a reply as this been made to them, nothing serious (no smash) would have come of it. The barbarians would of course have debated the point in violent language, but little by little they would have given in to our authority; and if they still contemplated insisting on some concessions of advantage (to trade), there would have been no objection to vouchsafe them a few that would do no violence to propriety (on our side), and would avail them on the other. Thus obtaining a certain amount of what they required, they would have suffered no loss of repute; and by this one move, hostilities might have been terminated, and the conciliation of the barbarians brought about.

This opportunity has been lost, and the further management of the question greatly complicated (rendered very circuitous). The barbarians took the initiative in writing in this instance, of course, because they were too impatient to wait, but then it has given them their opportunity of making an experiment, of seeing what kind of answer we should return; and the Commissioner in precipitately undertaking, as he has done, to transmit their communication to the capital, has simply shown his (or our) weakness. The barbarians, now that they have detected this, will hereafter be imposing some other conditions—aye! and not one only—for which we are not prepared; and if their will be even slightly thwarted, they will attempt coercion by (threat, or act of) war. When Ho Kwei-tsing, Governor-General of the Two Kiang, shall have had the honour to receive your Majesty's rescript, he will of course communicate with the barbarians, but as their rejoinder will be certain to contain some fresh demand, it is submitted that your Majesty might, if there be no objection to that course, direct the Governor-General in question to be guided by circumstances; instructing him that, if the barbarians prove respectful and obedient in feeling and language, and that they ask for what there appears no objection to, it will be of course his duty to make a representation on their behalf, and to request your Majesty's pleasure thereon. If they continue extravagantly rebellious and that their requests are inadmissible, then he must instruct (his subordinate) to reject them. He should neither be over-yielding, nor over-ceremonious. (If he be the former,) he will make the barbarians think the concessions too easily attainable.

(As to their point of attack, if they make war,) the barbarians will not disturb Shanghae, as it is a place at which they trade. What they are sure to do, is to seek (some spot) along the coast. Of our dispositions at Takoo, and of the nature of the country, the barbarians are well aware; and unless they have some very complete plan, they will not venture on any wanton proceedings (against it). Their coming thither, therefore, should they come, will amount to no more than an anchoring off it, or hanging about it, under pretence of handing in letters to gain information, on which they may have some stratagem. Your slaves have consulted together, and are agreed that no letter the barbarians present shall be received, and that they shall be told to return to Shanghae, and make their statement to the Commissioner specially charged with the administration of barbarian affairs. It will be then seen what course they adopt.

It only remains now (for your slaves) carefully and quietly to set about putting every fort and entrenchment in a state of security. The soil, however, is not firm; as it dries it crumbles and cracks. After a heavy rain, or a rise of the tide, it falls away. (The works) stand in constant need of replacement; the present is a moment when the question of defence is of the highest importance, and though they well know that there is a deficiency of means for paying the army (your slaves), dare not, on the other hand, allow stint in the expenditure to occasion a failure in this regard. Several thousand men have been added to the force of Takoo and the Shan-hai-kwan (barrier at the sea terminus of the Great Wall), and their monthly pay amounts to a very considerable sum. Your Majesty, of your Celestial bounty, has happily been so good as to issue from the Board of Revenue's treasury 200,000 taels, which, with the contributions set on foot in the province of Chih-li, and the subsidies in aid made up out of the Provincial Treasury, it is calculated will last until the end of the 4th moon. After the expiry of the 4th moon (18th June), there will be nothing to come upon. Your slaves will, without loss of time, take steps for the provision of means, and will spare no pains in promoting voluntary contributions; whether these produce the total required or not, they will apprise your Majesty in another memorial, and request your instructions thereon.

On the 11th of the 2nd moon (3rd March), your slave Sang-ko-lin-sin received a message from the Council to the effect that, on the 10th of the 2nd moon, they had had the honour to receive your Majesty's pleasure as follows:—

"The Censorate informs us that Tau Wei-tsing, graduate by purchase, of Shan-tung, has brought to their court for presentation an illustrated treatise on fortification. Let this be sent to Sang-ko-lin-sin to see whether there is anything worth selecting in it, and let the proper Board send Tau Wei-tsing to him to answer any questions he may choose to put him.

"Respect this!"

Your slaves very carefully examined the work, which treats of and illustrates various kinds of fortifications. It is very minute and explicit. Its matter shows no want of experience. The soil of the sea-shore at Takoo, however, is moist and of no consistency; the rise and fall of tide uncertain. To ascertain whether works could be constructed there on the principles laid down in the treatise it was necessary to call in Tau Wei-tsing, and consider with him the experiments to be made. On the 27th of the 2nd moon accordingly, Tau Wei-tsing was brought by the local authorities to the camp, where he was closely interrogated by your slaves, and desired to go round and inspect all the camps and works along the sea-shore, and to point out faithfully whatever he found in any degree defective, either in the construction of the works or the disposition (of their arms or garrisons), that so they might have something to guide them in their selection (from his propositions): he was to stand on no ceremony, and to conceal nothing. In course of time he reported that the land on the coast was too low to suit (his) fortifications, and that though the desire he had long entertained had now been gratified, (his plans) were of no further use (here). At two feet below the surface of the ground there was water, which made it difficult (or impossible) to reduce his theory to practice. He prayed therefore, that he might be desired to return home.

The graduate having represented that his fortification scheme cannot be tried, there is no occasion to consider it further; but as he has gone round and inspected the whole of the ground, and all the works on the shore, your slaves do not take upon themselves to pronounce whether or not he shall be directed to return home, but prostrate await your Majesty's instructions on the point.

The steps taken by your slaves, in obedience to your Majesty's commands, to look well to the defence of the coast, and to consider together the dispositions to be made, are all detailed in this their respectful reply, whereon, prostrate, they implore the sacred glance of your Majesty.

A respectful memorial.

No. 68.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received November 2.*)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, August* 26, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a despatch to me from the Governor-General of the Province of Chih-li, which was sent on board Admiral Hope's vessel when he reached this place on the 24th instant; also of a despatch to me from Hang and Wan, announcing the appointment of Kweiliang, with whom I negotiated the Treaty of 1858, and Hang-fuh, the Governor-General of the Province of Chih-li, to be Imperial Commissioners to treat with me at Tien-tsin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 68.

Governor-General Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

HANG, a President of the Board of War, Governor-General of the Province of Chih-li, makes this communication.

* No correct return yet made out of guns captured in this fort.

I beg to inform you that I, having in the first instance retired from Takoo to Tien-tsin, have now caused to be withdrawn from the latter place all the troops forming its garrison, and also to be removed the guns from all the batteries.

As we are now establishing friendly relations between our two countries, I hope that when your Excellency comes to Tien-tsin, you will not bring many vessels of war, which I fear might excite alarm in the minds of the inhabitants. To this end I address you.

A communication.

To his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 7th day (August 23, 1860).

Inclosure 2 in No. 68.

Commissioner Wan to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

WAN, by Imperial appointment Minister Resident of Sening, and Hang, by Imperial appointment Minister Comptroller-General of the Household, &c., make this communication.

On the 9th day of the 7th month (August 25), we received at Tien-tsin an Imperial Decree, dated the 8th day of the month, in the following terms:—

"We hereby appoint Kweiliang and Hang-fuh Imperial High Commissioners. Let Kweiliang proceed by express to join his colleague, and transact business.

"Respect this."

On the same day we received another Decree, as follows:—

"Let Hang-ki remain at Tien-tsin, to transact business under the orders of Kweiliang and Hang-fuh. Wan-tsun is to come immediately to the capital.

"Respect this."

We make known the above to your Excellency, and we request that you will await the arrival of his Excellency Kwei, Imperial High Commissioner and a Member of the Council, who is to come to Tien-tsin, and in concert with his Excellency Hang, Imperial High Commissioner and Governor-General of the Province of Chih-li, conduct negotiations with your Excellency.

This is important.

A communication.

To the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 9th day.

No. 69.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 2.)

(Extract.) "*Granada*," *Tien-tsin, August* 26, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I arrived last night at this place.

My despatches of the 20th and of the 22nd instant* inclose translations of several communications which I have received from the Chinese functionaries; and those of the 20th and of the 26th instant,† translations of some papers not intended for the eye of foreigners, which were taken in the residence of the Chinese General at Sin-ho.

A perusal of these various documents will, I think, satisfy your Lordship that the Emperor of China desires peace, although he has not yet quite made up his mind to concede all that I am instructed to demand. His reluctance to do so will, no doubt, be surmounted in due time.

Vice-Admiral Hope and Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant have exerted themselves to the utmost to prevent the calamities of war from falling with severity on the peaceable inhabitants of the country. This course is recommended by policy as well as by humanity; for here, as in other parts of China, the people, when unmolested, prove to be the most useful purveyors for the wants of the army.

* Nos. 62, 63, and 65. † Nos. 64 and 67.

The Cavalry brigade, consisting of two squadrons of King's Dragoon Guards, and Fane's and Probyn's Horse, with Sterling's 6-pounder battery, have just arrived. They performed the journey from Sin-ho to this place by land. Mr. Wade, who at my request accompanied them, reports that their march has been most prosperous; that the people, though greatly alarmed at their appearance, took heart when they found that they were not maltreated, and offered readily for sale such supplies as the country affords.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant has found a suitable encampment for them in the vicinity of the town.

The persons (gentry of this place) who were appointed to procure supplies for Sang-ko-lin-sin's army have, at Mr. Parkes' instance, undertaken to perform that service for us.

No. 70.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received November* 2.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, August* 26, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a very interesting report which I have received from Mr. Parkes, who, at my request, accompanied Vice-Admiral Hope when he advanced upon Tien-tsin, on the 23rd instant, and who has, since the Admiral's departure, been rendering the most useful services in making arrangements for the reception of the allied troops and Ambassadors at this place.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 70.

Mr. Parkes to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, August* 26, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to make the following report to your Lordship of particulars which have come under my notice during the proceedings of the last three days.

After quitting your Lordship on the morning of the 23rd instant, I joined Admiral Hope, who proceeded up the Peiho in his tender, the "Coromandel," accompanied by a division of five gun-boats.

At half-past 2 P.M., the forts of Shwang-keang were passed, and found to be deserted. The people of the various villages on the banks of the river turned out to look at the steamers as they passed along, and, far from evincing any feeling of hostility, gave proof of their goodwill in hauling, entirely of their own accord, at the hawsers or ropes that had occasionally to be landed, and also in bringing fresh fruit and vegetables to the boats that were sent ashore on this service.

At 7 P.M. our small squadron anchored at a point ten miles below Tien-tsin' and I had an opportunity of conversing with a number of respectable persons who represented themselves as a deputation sent by the people of the city to pay their respects to the Allied Commanders. From them I learned that the authorities entertained no idea of defending the extensive works recently thrown up by Sang-ko-lin-sin for the defence of Tien-tsin, and that both garrison and guns had been withdrawn; that Sang-ko-lin-sin himself had passed by the place the previous day (or within twenty-four hours of his abandonment of the southern Peiho forts), but only with a small body of 100 or 200 jaded horsemen, and that he himself was too dispirited to enter the city. The Viceroy Hang-fuh, they said, had also arrived from Takoo this day at noon.

Admiral Hope having determined, upon receipt of this intelligence, to occupy Tien-tsin with the small force he had with him, the gun-boats pushed on the following morning, and having landed parties of Marines at the two forts which command the approach to Tien-tsin, arrived off the city about 9 A.M. Several subordinate officers came off with polite messages from their superiors,

in reply to which the Admiral requested the Viceroy to come himself to the "Coromandel." His Excellency complied without hesitation, and was accompanied by Hang-ki and Wan-tseuen, the officers commissioned by the Emperor to escort your Lordship to Peking.

Admiral Hope informed them that they must consider Tien-tsin to be in possession of the Allied forces; that the people would be scrupulously protected, and the Civil authorities allowed to remain in the exercise of their functions: and he showed them a proclamation which I had prepared by his direction for the purpose of apprising the people of this change in their position. The Viceroy and his companions made an ineffectual attempt to induce Admiral Hope to regard them as the Governors of the city, but a reference made by them to Canton led the Admiral to observe that the situation of the two cities, and of their respective native authorities, must be considered parallel.

While this interview was proceeding, a party of Marines had taken possession of, and hoisted the English and French flags on, the east gate of the city, and the above-mentioned proclamation was posted in the same public thoroughfare.

The Admiral having desired me to remain at Tien-tsin, and to act with Captain McCleverty as occasion might require, I proceeded to inform myself of the condition of the city. Having found out the temporary residence of the Viceroy and Commissioners, I had a long and friendly conversation with them on the position of affairs, my object being to make it plain to them that the Chinese Government had it in their power to arrest the progress of hostilities—hostilities which they, by their faithless acts, had entirely brought upon themselves, by agreeing unconditionally to the terms of your Lordship's letter to the Viceroy of the 17th instant, and that delay in doing so was full of peril to them. The Viceroy told me that he had forwarded that letter to Peking the moment he had received it, but no further instructions had reached him on the subject. I pointed out that, during the short intervening period, all the Takoo forts and Tien-tsin had fallen, and that our army was now on the march; remarks which led them to offer many personal assurances of their wish for the restoration of peace, &c.

Having knowledge that a Committee of Supply had been formed by Sang-ko-lin-sin at Tien-tsin, to assist him in his operations, I requested the Viceroy to direct the native gentry who compose this Committee to act as a Board for the supply of our troops with fresh provisions, and before the evening had closed in, I had the satisfaction of arranging with several members of this Committee the manner in which large supplies of bullocks, sheep, fruit, and vegetables were to be brought in for our use.

The following morning, the 25th, the first supply of provisions that had been ordered was punctually delivered, and the Committee rendered me further assistance in a search which I then made for suitable quarters for your Lordship, and undertook the repair of another building which may be required for the public service.

At an interview which I had with the Commissioner Hang-ki, he showed me an Imperial Edict, dated the previous day (24th), appointing Kweiliang and Hang-fuh (the Viceroy) to be Imperial Commissioners for the transaction of business with your Lordship, and ordering the former to travel by post to Tien-tsin.

I spent the greater part of this day in visiting many of the streets of the city, and the country around it; and wherever I went, although I was unaccompanied by any guard, the people received me in a very friendly manner, and evinced but little alarm at the new state of things. I observed that women were being taken out of the city; but bullocks, droves of sheep, forage, &c., were being brought in, and most of the shops remained open. At one place, Pei-tsang, five miles from Tien-tsin, 300 or 400 of the villagers set themselves willingly to work, by my desire, to clear out some granaries which I thought might be required for the accommodation of our troops.

I have noticed that the Viceroy has removed from the streets, as I requested him to do, the recent hostile proclamations of Sang-ko-lin-sin. But one met my notice, issued only six days ago, in which the people are informed that the Allies have been defeated, and we are now suing for peace, and that therefore the people need not be alarmed, nor remove from the city.

This morning I again had occasion to see the Commissioner Hang-ki, and

he showed me an Imperial Edict depriving Sang-ko-lin-sin of his three-eyed peacock's feather, his honorary position in the body-guard, and his command-in-chief of the Manchoo-bordered blue banner. The Edict characterizes the above as a "light punishment."

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES.

No. 71.

Colonel Foley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 2.)

(Extract.)

French Head-Quarters, Tung-ko, Peiho River, August 25, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the allied forces are in possession of the Peiho Forts, and that the river is now open up to Tien-tsin, whither it is the intention of the Commanders-in-chief to proceed immediately, each with 1,000 men and a battery of Artillery. The remainder of the allied forces to move up to some eligible ground within about sixteen miles of Tien-tsin.

In consequence of the heavy rains, the troops were unable to leave Peh-tang until the morning of the 12th of August, when a force of 2,000 French and English, with two batteries of Artillery, marched along the causeway to attack the Chinese entrenched camps situated about five miles from Peh-tang; General Jamin's division followed. Sir Robert Napier's division had previously moved to the right by a sort of cross-road which was supposed eventually to diverge towards the same direction. On arriving within range of the first camp, the Artillery opened and soon drove the Tartar Cavalry, &c., out of it; the same with the second. Whilst this was going on, a large body of Tartar Cavalry came down and actually rode within 200 yards of Sir Robert Napier's Artillery. The Infantry opened fire, our Cavalry charged, and dispersed them, causing them considerable loss.

General de Montauban then marched a force with Artillery along a causeway to attack what appeared to be a large entrenched camp close to the River Peiho, but upon opening fire, found that nothing could be effected from the causeway, the ground on either side being impracticable; he sounded the retreat and encamped his force on the ground between the two entrenched camps taken in the morning.

Monday was employed in building bridges, &c., over the various creeks. On Tuesday morning a division of each force with its Artillery, the English to the right, and the French to the left, marched to the attack of the entrenched camp above-mentioned. The Artillery opened fire, and gradually approached to within 400 yards, silenced the fire of the Chinese guns, the Infantry with difficulty crossed two big ditches, scaled the walls, and captured the camp and village of Tung-ko. Sir R. Napier took up his quarters in the place with his division. The French marched back to their camp. The losses in killed and wounded was slight on the part of the Allies, the total not exceeding twenty.

On the 15th instant, the Emperor's fête-day, salutes were fired.

The time was employed till the 18th in getting up provisions, building various bridges (the tide constantly flooding the whole country), and in fixing upon a spot for one to be built over the Peiho, where the French Engineer having crossed the river with two companies of Chasseurs to reconnoitre the ground on the other side, was attacked by the Tartar Cavalry, and a fire of jingals, &c., opened upon him. The Chasseurs drove away the Cavalry, and more troops having crossed the river, the Chinese withdrew. The construction of the bridge immediately commenced.

Sunday and Monday nights were employed by Sir Robert Napier in throwing up batteries, &c., and on Tuesday the 21st, about 5 A.M., a force of 1,500 English and 1,000 French, with all the heavy guns which could be brought up, commenced the attack of the forts; the Chinese being the first to open fire. The firing of our Artillery, English and French, was excellent, and soon told with great effect upon the fort, a powder magazine inside of which was blown up. The besieged made a most determined resistance, and it was not till after two hours' heavy cannonading that the Infantry were ordered to advance.

Nothing could surpass the desperation with which the besieged fought, every description of missile being brought to bear upon the attacking parties. At length, after a very prolonged resistance the English and French succeeded in getting a footing in different parts of the fort, each much about the same time, and the allied flags were planted upon the top of the cavalier in the fort.

The Chinese Commander-in-chief, a near relation of Sang-ko-lin-sin's, was killed in the fort, the whole of which was strewed with the bodies of the dead and dying. The French loss in the attack was about 130 killed and wounded, and the English about 200. The gun-boats during the attack upon this fort fired at long range upon the North Fort, nearest the mouth of the river, in order to create a diversion. They also succeeded in blowing up a magazine in that fort.

During the time given to rest the men after gaining possession of the fort, a flag of truce was sent from the other side of the river, but as it was merely bringing a letter for Lord Elgin, and the object appeared to be to gain time, the order for the attack of the Lower North Fort was given at 2 P.M. To our surprise we approached without a shot being fired, and, having crossed with great difficulty the various ditches, &c., entered; no resistance being made by about 1,500 men whom we found in the fort. It soon became evident from the appearance of the Great South Fort opposite, that it had been evacuated. A small force was despatched across the river to occupy it.

No sooner had we entered the Lower North Fort, than a tremendous storm came on, which soon rendered the whole country impassable for heavy artillery, and would have prevented our carrying on operations for some days, had they not luckily been, just in time, brought to a conclusion.

During the night the navy removed the various barriers at the entrance of the river, and at daylight the English Admiral, accompanied by several gun-boats, ascended the river as far as the village of Tang-koo, and the day before yesterday some of them were sent on to Tien-tsin.

Thus, in one day, we got possession of all the forts, the prisoners taken were set free, and some of our troops have already commenced their march upon Tien-tsin by land: 2,000 French and English have also started for that place in gun-boats. Tien-tsin, I hear, has been made over to us by the Chinese authorities.

I am happy to inform your Lordship that in all the intercourse which has taken place between the allied Commanders-in-chief, departments, &c., the utmost cordiality has prevailed, and has mainly contributed to produce the happy results which I have herewith briefly brought to your Lordship's notice.

P.S.—Upwards of 500 guns have been taken in the forts, more than 100 of brass, 50 of which are of a very large calibre.

No. 72.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 2.)

(Extract.) *Shanghae, September 4, 1860.*

AS the last mail-steamer was leaving Shanghae, the rebels commenced their attack. It took us by surprise. It was not known they were so close, and, from information I received two days before, I was led to infer that if they did attack, it would not be for a fortnight.

The steamers we dispatched up the river with the notifications, returned without having been able to deliver them. The interpreter, Mr. Forrest, was told by the people that the insurgents had received intelligence of their coming, and fearing the expedition might come with hostile intentions, had withdrawn from the river among the numerous small creeks that abound along its course.

They were perfectly, however, aware of our intention to defend the town. It was explained to them in the most unequivocal manner by Mr. Edkins during his late visit to Soo-chow, to whom they seem to have attributed an official character. It probably conduced to the ungracious reception he met with, for an American missionary who was at first very well received, but who in conversation gave them the same information, states, that their manner to him changed at once, and that he was told to leave Soo-chow next day. In fact, the civil reception accorded to missionaries and traders was due, I have no doubt, to the

impression those visits gave to the insurgents, that we would give them the town and enter into a Treaty with them as legitimate rulers of China.

After driving in the Imperialist troops, they pressed up to the walls without any summons or parley, until checked by the fire of artillery and musketry. It seemed probable that, finding their advances resisted by foreign troops, and foreign flags flying over the gates, they would draw off. But they continued to attack with the same feebleness, but with equal pertinacity, for five days, which can only be explained by the smallness of our force, and by their counting on an insurrection within the city in their favour.

It is ascertained that the Canton and Chan-chew men, several thousands in number, were in league with them. They seized the native Custom-house in a suburb called Nan-tow, distributed badges among their adherents, and commenced massacring the few respectable Chinese in that quarter, and plundering. Their leader is the man who farms the opium duty, and owes a large sum to the Government on its account. He calculated on the support of the West-country junks which were moored off the Custom-house, and as securing a retreat and means of carrying off the plunder; but in this he was disappointed, as, on the day before, all the junks had been compelled to remove, and anchor below the foreign shipping. This movement in the suburb on the part of the idle and bad characters which abound both in the city and the Settlement, was the most dangerous feature of the affair; and before it was put down, the greater part of the suburb was destroyed by fire.

On Sunday, a letter was brought to me by a chair-bearer of the American Consulate, of which I inclose a translation. M. de Bourboulon and I endeavoured to send a reply through the same channel, but the man, on being questioned, declared that he did not know the person who had given the letter to him. I have no doubt it came through some of the foreigners with whom the rebels are in communication, but who did not wish the fact to be known.

There was considerable difficulty in deciding how the notifications of the Commanders were to be sent; Mr. Forrest, however, volunteered to take them, and, accompanied by an orderly, he proceeded about a mile from the walls to a place where they had established a camp. By this time the insurgents seem to have discerned that they could not carry the town; they received him with civility, and took charge of the communications, which they promised to deliver to their Chief, who was quartered at Se-ka-wei, the Jesuit establishment near the city, and promised an answer next day; the place and manner of delivering it were settled.

Next day, however, they retired, having sent a letter of which I inclose a copy; as to which I have only to remark, that in the letter, written I presume before the attack, inclosed above, nothing is said as to their having been invited by foreigners to come to Shanghae. Of course I cannot presume to say what language may have been used by the individuals who sought them for the purpose of supplying them with arms, opium, &c., in exchange for the wealth acquired by the plunder of Soo-chow and other towns. But the missionaries who went among them, though they may have misled the rebels by ill-judged expressions of sympathy and deference, informed them distinctly that they would be opposed if they advanced on Shanghae, of which fact indeed they could not have been ignorant after our Proclamations, considering the accurate intelligence they possessed, through native and foreign agents, of everything that passed at Shanghae.

It is remarkable, also, that the charge of misleading the rebels is brought more pointedly against the French than any one else, though they of all foreigners are the least likely to have made any advances to, or have professed any sympathy for, them. However that may be, it does not appear that they have been materially influenced by any considerations connected with our attitude. On retiring, they left proclamations stating that they should return within a few days; and there is no doubt that, under stringent orders from the heads of the insurgents, every effort has been made to induce the force to renew the attack. But it appears that the "Pioneer's" heavy guns produced a great impression on the men, and mutinies and dissension have since prevailed in the camp, the men refusing to expose themselves again to be mowed down by European artillery. It is now reported that the rebels have directed their forces on Hang-chow.

I have gathered some interesting information as to the views of the rebels

and the composition of their force from a person who was in their camp during the attack. On the morning after the delivery of the notifications, he visited one of the Shanghae residents, and told him that Le, the Commander-in-chief, was in a position of great difficulty; that in attacking Shanghae, he had acted according to the most positive orders of the rebel leaders, which enjoined him at all risks to take the city; that he was now conscious of having made a great mistake, and was anxious to withdraw, if he could find some plausible ground for representing to his superiors that he had not failed in effecting their object; that he understood we and the French had agreed to defend the town for 500,000 taels (about 160,000*l.*); and that if we gave up the city to him, he would guarantee us the undisturbed possession of the Custom-house revenues during a year; and he proposed, as an alternative, that we should turn out the Chinese authorities, and occupy the town in the name of the allies.

It is certain that even Heng-jin (his rebel title is Kan-wang), from whom, as educated in a missionary school, and therefore better instructed in religious doctrine, and of more liberal views than the Taipings in general, the Protestant missionaries expected great things, declined to abandon or postpone the attempt on Shanghae. When urged to do so by one of the missionaries, he replied, that the insurgents could not waive the present favourable opportunity of obtaining possession of this port, and thus forcing us to enter into relations with them; that at present we and the Imperialists were at war, but when our differences were settled the insurgents felt that they might have to contend against these united forces. I suppose he calculated that if once they were in possession of Shanghae, we should feel indisposed to risk the safety of the Settlement by attacking people who claim our sympathies on religious grounds.

The attacking rebel force did not exceed 3,000 men. Of these a small number only were tolerably armed, and belonged to the original Nanking force, the remainder consisting of desperadoes who join them for the sake of plunder, and of men taken from the villages, and forced to serve in the ranks.

Admitting that the original adherents are willing to serve for food and clothing, without pay, and that the influence of the Chiefs is sufficient to deter them from robbery and crime, it is idle to suppose that anything but plunder will keep together the remaining and far larger part of the force.

The accounts I have received from Soo-chow represent the place as deserted by the respectable Chinese, and the coolies as walking about clad in silks. The rebels form small bands, and visit the villages for the purpose of extorting money and valuables from them, with which they pay for arms, opium, &c., supplied to them by Europeans from Shanghae. The approach of their force to this place was heralded by flames in every direction; and the villagers are unanimous in accusing them of rape and pillage, and of carrying off men to make soldiers of them.

I have no doubt that this system of terror is pursued in part with the view of inspiring panic, and of thus reducing the country to submission, but it is inconsistent with the notion of the movement being a national one, and it inspires the population with the strongest aversion to the cause. Had the Government authorities courage or energy, the inhabitants of the rural districts would rise against the rebels to a man.

I inclose copy of a Report on the condition of the villages in this immediate neighbourhood after their retreat.

Heng-jin has sent to the missionaries in manuscript a pamphlet which has made a considerable impression upon them, though, as he professes to believe in the revelations of his relation Heng-tze-tsuen, and practises polygamy, out of regard, he says, for the scruples of his less enlightened brethren, I see no guarantee for the soundness of his doctrine or for the purity of his life. I rather look upon his pamphlet as a crafty device to conciliate the support and sympathy of the missionary body at the time when the insurgents meditated the seizure of Shanghae.

In this he has been partially successful. The English missionaries still look to him as the instrument by which a revival and purification of religion among the insurgents may be brought about.

On the other hand, the most influential of the American missionaries, whatever they may think of Heng-jin's sincerity, have arrived at the conclusion that the term "Christian" cannot be applied with propriety to the religious profession of the Tai-pings.

I inclose herewith a very interesting account given by a Mr. Holmes, a Baptist American missionary, of a trip he has made lately to Nanking. He went there favourably impressed towards the rebels by his reception at Soo-chow, and has returned wofully disappointed. I beg particularly to call your Lordship's attention to Mr. Holmes' general reflections at the close of his letter, as you will find stated in more positive language, and grounded on actual observation, the same opinions as those I have ventured to submit to your Lordship in various despatches on the character and prospects of the insurrection. In doctrine and practice its adherents have undoubtedly deteriorated very considerably since their first origin. Every day shows more strongly that no principles or ideas of policy animate its leaders. Even the extermination of the Tartars, the only principle put forward, seems rather a pretext for upsetting all government and authority, and enabling the stronger to pillage the weaker, than an object necessary in itself, as a step towards establishing a mere national government. The framework of society is entirely broken up in the districts occupied by them, by the flight of the educated and respectable classes, to whom the common people look up with respect as their natural leaders, and who are at once their bulwark against oppression, and the guardians of order and public tranquillity. The absence of this conservative element would render the task of reconstruction very difficult, even for men of administrative ability, had such a character belonged to the leaders of the insurrection. But as the Chief is an ignorant fanatic, if not an impostor, and the bulk of his adherents are drawn from the dangerous classes of China, the result is the rule of the sword in its worst form, the consequent destruction of confidence, capital, and commerce, and the pillage of large districts, the fruits of which are remitted for the support of the Chiefs at Nanking.

Their system differs in nothing, as far as I can learn, from the proceedings of a band of brigands organized under one head. I have no doubt that Mr. Holmes is right in anticipating, were the Imperial Government overthrown, that the Commanders of the different forces would soon quarrel, and turn their arms against each other. About three years ago the Eastern King with 20,000 of his followers were massacred at Nanking, his pretensions, as the chosen instrument of the Holy Ghost, having made him a dangerous rival to the Chief Heng-tze-tsuen.

I must call your Lordship's attention to the edict published by the Chief on the occasion of Mr. Holmes' visit. It begins, "I, Tien-wang, issue this Edict for the information of such leaders of soldiers as there may be in the outer tribes." It proceeds to say that the Elder Brother Christ had announced that the Kingdom of Heaven "comes near, and will shortly arrive;" that the Heavenly Father and Christ have descended on earth, and established this Heavenly Kingdom, having taken Heng-tze-tsuen himself, and his son the Junior Lord, to manage the affairs of the world. The Father, Son, and Royal Grandson, are Lords of the New Heaven and Earth. The Saviour and the Junior Lord are Sons of God in the same sense; and God the Father, Jesus Christ, and Heng-tze-tsuen form the Trinity. To the Junior Lord is due the obedience of the world, &c.

While stating these extravagant pretensions, he calls foreign nations "outer tribes," and their Representatives "leaders of soldiers;" terms the depreciating meaning of which is well known to those who are conversant with the language of Canton in its most palmy days of arrogance and fancied superiority.

Though the language of the subordinates may be modified when, as in the late affair at Shanghae, they have a great object to gain, the pretensions of the Chiefs remain the same, and will render abortive any attempt at treating with them on an equal footing. Indeed, they cannot be addressed officially, without either implicitly admitting their pretensions by using their titles, or without mortifying them by withholding them. We can be on no terms with them unless we are prepared to take an attitude incompatible with any friendly relations with the Imperial Government; and their object in attempting at all hazards to carry Shanghae was, by the command thus obtained over our material interests, to force us into that position.

We can only maintain a *de facto* neutrality by keeping them at a distance, and unless they are driven by the Imperialists out of Soo-chow and this province, we shall not be able to do so after the withdrawal of our forces, unless they receive a chastisement severe enough to deter them from approaching in future the places foreigners reside at.

My impression is that their strength is much over-rated, and that if boldly met, and once checked, it would dissolve: the people of the country would soon dispose of the fugitives.

I inclose a published account of the attack on Shanghae. Some persons advocated taking the offensive against the insurgents, but the Commanders—I think wisely, considering the smallness of our force, the season, and the danger of insurrection in the city—decided on maintaining a strictly defensive attitude. Politically speaking, I think this was the best course, and the one least calculated to fetter the proceedings of the Ambassadors in the North. The 44th Regiment, a regiment of Sikhs, and a strong detachment of Artillery, have since arrived.

I may be allowed to express my sense of the judicious arrangements made by the commanders, and particularly Colonel March, who had the largest force under his command, and my admiration of the readiness with which the community in general, after providing for the security of their residences, formed themselves into a corps of volunteers, and guarded the barricades, thus rendering disposable, for other purposes, a considerable portion of the troops. It must not be supposed that there was not ground for much anxiety. The reports as to the number and organization of the rebels were very alarming, and no means existed of ascertaining the truth, the Europeans who sympathized with them being either misled by the tone of the rebels or by their own fears, and others, who must have known that the rumours were exaggerated, keeping back the information until they retired.

I cannot in justice omit to state to your Lordship that Colonel Neale commanded the volunteers, and that his energy and military knowledge enabled him to render important services in suggesting means for the defence of the place.

P.S.—Mr. Forrest deserves great credit for the courage he displayed in carrying the notifications to the rebel camp.

Inclosure 1 in No. 72.

Le, the Loyal Prince of the Heavenly Dynasty, to the Ministers of Great Britain, France, and the United States.

(Translation.)

LE, the loyal Prince of the Heavenly Dynasty, &c., &c., addresses this communication to you, the Honourable Envoys Extraordinary of Great Britain, France, and the United States of America.

Previous to moving my army from Soo-chow I wrote to you, acquainting you that it would soon reach Shanghae, and that if the residences of your honourable nations and the mercantile establishments would hoist yellow flags as distinguishing marks, I would give immediate orders to my officers and soldiers prohibiting them from entering or disturbing them in any way. As you would, consequently, have received and perused my letter, I supposed you would act according to the tenour of it.

I was not aware, however, till yesterday that the people of your honourable nations had erected churches in other places in the prefecture of Sung-keang, in which they taught the gospels, when my army, being at the town of Szeking, fell in with a body of imps (Imperial soldiers), who resisted its progress, when my soldiers attacked and destroyed a number of them. Amongst these imps there were four foreigners, one of whom my soldiers killed, as they did not know to what country he belonged. However, in order to maintain my good faith, to treat foreigners well, I caused the soldier who had killed the foreigner to be at once executed, thus keeping my word.

Afterwards seeing that there was a church at Szeking I then knew, for the first time, that the people of your honourable nations came there to teach the gospel, and that although they had not hoisted a yellow flag, they had not been assisting the imps.

But though the past is done with, precautions can be taken for the future. My army is now about to proceed directly to Shanghae, and in the towns or villages through which it will pass, should there be churches, I earnestly hope that you will give orders to the people of them to stand at the doors to give information that they are churches, so that there may be no mistakes in future.

My forces have already arrived at Tseih-paon, and will soon reach Shanghae; I therefore earnestly hope that you, the honourable Envoys, will call the people of your nations before you, direct them to close their doors, remain inside, and hoist yellow flags at their houses, when they need have no fear of my soldiers, as I have already given orders to them that they must not, in that case, molest or injure any one.

As soon as I myself arrive I propose personally discussing with you all other business. In the meantime I send this hasty communication, and take the opportunity to inquire after your health.

Tae-ping, Teen-kwo, 10th year, 7th moon, and 9th day.

To the Honourable Envoys Extraordinary of Great Britain, the United States of America, and France.

Inclosure 2 in No. 72.

Notification.

REPORTS having reached us of an armed force having been collected in the neighbourhood of Shanghae, we, the Commanders of the military and naval forces of Her Britannic Majesty at Shanghae, hereby give notice, that the city of Shanghae and foreign settlement are militarily occupied by the forces of Her Britannic Majesty and her ally the Emperor of the French; and they warn all persons that, if armed bodies of men attack or approach the positions held by them, they will be considered as commencing hostilities against the allied forces, and will be dealt with accordingly.

Shanghae, August 16, 1860.

Inclosure 3 in No. 72.

Extract from the "North China Herald."

THE following translation of a letter from the Chung Wang, addressed to the various Consuls at this port, has been kindly forwarded to us for publication. The date, "Tae-ping Teen-kwo, 10th year, 7th moon, and 12th day," corresponds, in the "Rebel Calendar," to the 21st August:—

"Le, the loyal Prince of the Heavenly Dynasty, &c., &c., &c., addresses this communication to you, the honourable Consuls of Great Britain, United States of America, Portugal, and other countries.

"That good faith must be kept is the principle which guides our Dynasty in its friendly relations with other peoples; but deceitful forgetfulness of previous arrangements is the real cause of foreign nations having committed a wrong.

"When my army reached Soo-chow, Frenchmen, accompanied by people of other nations, came there to trade. They personally called upon me, and invited me to come to Shanghae to consult respecting friendly relations between us in future. Knowing that your nations worship, like us, God the Heavenly Father, and Jesus the Heavenly Elder Brother, and are therefore of one religion and of one origin with us, I placed entire and undoubting confidence in their words, and consequently came to meet you at Shanghae.

"It never occurred to my mind that the French, allowing themselves to be deluded by the imps (the Chinese Imperial authorities), would break their word and turn their backs upon the arrangement made. Not only, however, did they not come on my arrival to meet and consult with me, but they entered into an agreement with the imps to protect the city of Shanghae against us, by which they violated their original agreement. Such proceedings are contrary to the principles of justice.

"Now supposing that the French take under their protection the city of Shanghae and a few *li* (a mile or two) around it, how will they be able, within that small space, to sell their merchandize, and to carry on conveniently their mercantile transactions?

"I have also learnt that the French have received no small amount of money from the imps of Hien-fung (the Manchou Emperor), which they have without doubt shared amongst the other nations. If you other nations have not

received the money of the imps, why did several of your people also appear with the French, when they came to Soo-chow and invited me to Shanghae to confer together? It is clear as daylight that your people also appeared at Soo-chow, and urgently requested me to come to Shanghae. Their words still ring in my ears; it is impossible that the affair should be forgotten.

"My army having reached this place, if the French alone had broken their engagements, coveted the money of the imps, and protected their city, how was it that not one man of your nations came to consult personally with me? You must have also taken money from the imps of Hien-fung, and divided it amongst you. Seeing again, you committed a wrong, without taking into consideration that you would have to go to other places than Shanghae to carry on commercial business. You do not apparently know that the imps of Hien-fung, seeing that your nations are of the same religion and family as the Heavenly Dynasty, used money to establish a connection: this is employing others to kill, and using schemes to cause separations.

"The French have been seduced by the money of the imps, because they only scheme after profits at Shanghae, and have no consideration for the trade at other places. They have not only no plea on which to meet me, but still less have they any ground on which to come before God the Heavenly Father, and Jesus the Heavenly Elder Brother, or even our own armies, and the other nations of the earth.

"Our Sovereign Lord was appointed by heaven, and has ruled now for ten years. One half of the territory he possesses contains the rich lands in the East and South. The national treasury contains sufficient funds to supply all the wants of our armies. Hereafter, when the whole face of the country is united under our sway, every part will be contained within our registers, and our success will not depend on the small district of Shanghae.

"But with human feelings, and in human affairs, all acts have their consequences. The French have violated their faith, and broken the peace between us. Since they have, in advance, acted thus contrary to reason, if they henceforth remain fixed at Shanghae to carry on their mercantile business they may so manage. But if they again come into our territory to trade, or pass into our boundaries, *I*, so far as I am concerned, may in a spirit of magnanimity bear with their presence, and refrain from reckoning with them on the past. Our forces and officers, however, who have now been subjected to their deceit, must all be filled with indignation, and desirous of revenge; and it is to be feared that they will not again be permitted, at their convenience, to repair to our territory.

"On coming to Soo-chow I had the general command of upwards of one thousand officers, and several tens of thousands of soldiers, a brave army, which has power to put down all oppositions, and whose force is as strong as the hills. If we had the intention of attacking Shanghae, then what city have they not subdued? What place have they not stormed?

"I have, however, taken into consideration that you and we alike worship Jesus, and that after all, there exists between us the relationship of a common basis and common doctrines. Moreover, I came to Shanghae to make a Treaty, in order to see us connected together by trade and commerce. I did not come for the purpose of fighting with you. Had I at once commenced to attack the city and kill the people, that would have been the same as the members of one family fighting among themselves, which would have caused the imps to ridicule us.

"Further, amongst the people of foreign nations at Shanghae, there must be varieties in capacity and disposition; there must be men of sense, who know the principles of right, and are well aware of what is advantageous and what injurious. They cannot all covet the money of the impish dynasty, and forget the general trading interests in this country.

"Hence, I shall for the present repress this day's indignation, and charitably open a path by which to alter our present positions towards each other. I am extremely apprehensive that if my soldiers were to take Shanghae, they would not be able to distinguish the good from the bad, in which case I shall be without grounds to come before Jesus, the Heavenly Elder Brother.

"Out of a feeling of deep anxiety on your behalf, I am constrained to make an earnest statement to you foreign nations, as to what is wisdom and what folly in these affairs, and as to the amount of advantage and injury of the different

courses open to you. I beg you, foreign nations, again carefully to consider what course would be gainful, what a losing one.

"Should any of your honourable nations regret what has occurred, and hold friendly relations with our State to be best, they need have no apprehensions in coming to consult with me. I treat people according to right principles, and will certainly not subject them to any indignities. Should however, you, honourable nations, still continue to be deluded by the imps, follow their lead in all things, without reflecting on the difference between you, you must not blame me if hereafter you find it difficult to pass along the channels of commerce, and if there is no outlet for native produce.

"I have to beg all you, honourable nations, to again and again weigh in your minds the circumstances; and now write this special communication, and trust you will favour me with a reply. I beg to make inquiries after your health.

"Tae-ping Teen-kwo, 10th year, 7th moon, and 12th day."

Inclosure 4 in No. 72.

Lieutenant Pritchett to Lieutenant-Colonel March.

Sir, *Shanghae, August* 31, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in compliance with your orders, I proceeded, yesterday afternoon, to reconnoitre the villages and country in the vicinity of the Bubbling Well and Sic-a-way.

Accompanied by a mounted escort and by Mr. Forrest, who acted as Interpreter, I left the race-course about 5 P.M. Proceeding at a trot in the direction of the Bubbling Well, I could find no traces of the rebels, till, arriving at a small hamlet about a quarter of a mile from the well, I was informed the rebels had been there; but as I was also told they had killed and carried off "myriads," I think no reliance can be placed on details, especially as regards numbers.

On arriving at the village close to the Bubbling Well, about 5·20, I found several houses had been burnt and destroyed. A detachment of the rebels seems to have visited this place, and carried away, according to one informant, 100, and according to another (which seems most probable), 5 men. They had, moreover, besides raping several women, plundered and destroyed to some extent.

On the road from here to Sic-a-way we passed through a large village called Fei-who. Here nearly all the houses seem to have been entered, and a few burnt; and the village altogether presented a deserted appearance. The same story was told of pillage, rape, and kidnapping; but the rebels had evidently visited this place in some force. One of my informants estimated them at 3,000. I could not hear of any having been seen in European clothes, and very few with European arms. A few, I was told, were mounted.

Pushing on from here at a brisk trot, we arrived at Sic-a-way about 6 P.M. Here two French priests very kindly showed us over the church and other buildings, where the rebels had left everything in a state of great filth and confusion; but, although they had broken a great deal of furniture and fittings, they do not seem to have done very much damage as far as the building is concerned. They had, however, I was told, killed fifteen children belonging to the establishment, and an Italian, but naturalized French, priest. Owing to so many conflicting accounts, it is impossible to place much dependence in numbers; but they had evidently been here in great force.

Leaving Sic-a-way about 6·30, I proceeded to return to Shanghae along the banks of the Yan-kin-pau Creek, but, owing to the lateness of the hour and the darkness, I was unable to make any inquiries on the way home.

I passed by the entrenched camp lately occupied by the Imperial soldiers, which was utterly deserted.

I arrived at the race-course about 7·30 P.M.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. M. PRITCHETT.

Inclosure 5 in No. 72.

Extract from the "North China Herald" of September 1, 1860.

To the Editor of the "North China Herald."

Mr. Editor,—I OFFER for your readers some notes of a recent trip to Nanking, and translations of several documents received from the rebel seat of Government, which may serve to throw some light upon their religious and political character.

As your readers will not, probably, be interested in a particular narrative of my journey, it will suffice to say that, leaving Shanghae in a large sized boat on the 28th of July, we proceeded up the Yang-tze-kiang from Woo-sung, and after much delay, on account of head winds and a strong current, which ran continually against us after we had reached a point sixty or seventy miles from Woo-sung, we reached Ching-kiang-foo on the 7th of August. We passed this place in the evening with a strong breeze in our favour which enabled us to stem the swift current. A strong Imperial fleet consisting of lorchas, generally of southern construction, and one foreign vessel, a brig, we found posted here. Our boat was in range of their guns for a distance of two or three miles, and we thought it probable that a shot across our bows would be the signal at some point in our progress that we must stop, and satisfy them before we would be allowed to proceed. In fact, we were somewhat apprehensive that they might send it through our vessel's sides in defiance of the civilized precedent in such cases. We passed on, however, unmolested, and when opposite the foreign brig, it laying further up than the rest, a boat rowed by twelve or fifteen men, with two officers on board, came across and hailed us, asking where we were going. To Nanking we replied, giving them my name, and stating the purpose for which I went—to preach and gain information. I then handed them the boat's letter to look at, at which they seemed partially assured, and afterwards I gave him a note to the Commander of the forces at the place, explaining where we were going and the object of our visit; the letter being sealed, they departed with it, apparently satisfied that its contents would be satisfactory, and we proceeded on our way, preferring to hear his Excellency's comments upon it on our return. We ran all night, and next morning, 8th August, at about 9 o'clock, anchored in the mouth of the creek which leads from the river up to the city of Nanking, and abreast the fort or rather walled village situated there. On inquiring for some one with whom we could communicate, I was invited to enter the fort, and on doing so was received by a tall Kwang-si officer, clothed in a gaudy robe and wearing a brassy looking hat or helmet. He greeted me as his "ocean brother," and drawing me down to a seat beside him in the place of honour, entered at once into conversation. On being informed who I was, and for what I came, he immediately sent a messenger into the city to announce my arrival to the higher authorities. At half-past 3 o'clock P.M. horses were sent by the Chang Wong and an officer to escort us to his house. We found the gates near the river on the northern side of the city all closed, and were obliged to ride outside for about three miles till we reached one of the west gates, where we entered, and after passing about half-a-mile through half-ruined streets reached the Chang Wong's dwelling—a building distinguished from ordinary Chinese establishments only by the large number of its apartments—altogether covering, with intervening courts, near an acre of ground. We were received by a venerable looking and very polite old man whom we learned to call Pung-ta-jun (his Excellency Mr. Pung). He had been requested by the Chang Wong to entertain us with supper, he said, after which that dignitary would see us. Said Pung was dressed in a long blue robe, and wore a sort of hood with a cape. He was, we learned, an adherent of the Tien Wong's, and was merely present upon this occasion as a sort of representative of his master. His office was something like that of chaplain, according to the account we had of its functions. We found him exceedingly polite and affable, and I thought I could discern some appearance of real religious character, which is more than I can say of any other man I met; for in general it did not appear to me that their religious motives were nearly so strong as those suggested by a rich city to be opened, or dignity to be obtained, which would give to them in turn an establishment like those they now helped to grace. This man, however, spoke freely of his religious faith, and though his ideas were exceedingly crude and

mingled with superstition, he appeared to be in earnest. He remarked in course of conversation that we had long had the Gospel, whereas they had had it but a short time, and acknowledged our ability to instruct them in religious matters.

After supper we were led into the presence of the King. We found him seated in a raised recess behind a long table, on which were placed burning candles (it being after dark) and various ornamental articles. He was dressed in a richly embroidered robe, and had on his head a sort of gilded mitre or crown. His officers formed an avenue before him, through which we were led up to a seat in the recess in which he sat himself, while a series of discordances of a most excruciating character were produced by fire-crackers, gongs, and drums outside. On being seated, he began the conversation as follows :—

"'Wha seen sung' (be assured). Foreigners and men of the heavenly kingdom are all brethren. We all believe in the Heavenly Father and Son, and are, therefore, brethren. Is it not so?" I assented, when he proceeded, "The tree has its root, the stream has its fountain, and man has his origin. He is a very wicked man who is unfilial to his earthly parents; how much more he that neglects the Heavenly Father, the giver of all good. He is the Creator of heaven and earth and all things, and yet this Manchu Dynasty, and its adherents, persist in worshipping wooden and stone idols. Are we not right, then, in styling them imps?"

I replied that such conduct was, no doubt, very wicked, and yet I questioned the propriety of calling them imps, as they were still living men and might still repent. We, too, were once unbelievers.

He then said something about the people of this world having much intercourse with the spiritual world, the bearing of which I did not see, and after a few passing remarks and questions, he added, "We could not in three days and nights finish talking about religious matters. Have you other matters to speak of?"

I then mentioned the object for which I had come, speaking of the deep interest which had long been felt in their cause by foreign Christians; how we had hoped and feared as to the purity of their doctrines, and as to their success if they indeed Christians.

After receiving from him assurances of their gratification at my arrival, we retired.

We were visited next morning by Mr. Pung, who remained with me for some time, discoursing upon the many proofs which they had of the truth of their doctrines, one of which had occurred to himself on this wise: on the 20th day of the 9th month of last year there was a fall of snow, and his little girl called his attention to the fact that in one spot there had fallen a number of drops of snow in the shape of the "mei" flower; afterwards in the same spot fell some drops in the shape of stars, and then again a perfect cloud of little "mei" flowers. They had also had something similar to Pharaoh's dream of fat and lean kine.

The Tien Wong, we were informed on the evening of our arrival, was much gratified at our coming, and wished to see us next morning. We thought best therefore to remark at once that we would not be able to comply with his etiquette if it required kneeling. This led to some discussion among the officers and a consultation with Chang Wong, upon which it was decided that my presentation would be deferred one day in order to arrange the matter. On the morning of the 9th the following edicts, whose issue was occasioned by our visit, but which appear to be intended for the instruction of "outer barbarians" generally, came down from the Tien Wong and his son.

(Translation.)

"Edict from Tien Wong.

"I, Tien Wong, issue an edict for the information of such leaders of soldiers as there may be in the outer tribes. The ten thousand nations should submit to the Heavenly Father, Lord above, Supreme Father. The ten thousand nations should submit to the Saviour of the world, the Great Brother, Christ: heaven, earth, and man, the past, the present, and the future, are all then at peace. The Father formerly descended into the world and proclaimed his laws with reference to the present time. The Elder Brother formerly bore the sins of men, calling the knife to slay the evil spirits. The Elder Brother had previously said, 'The kingdom of Heaven comes near and it will surely arrive.'

The Father and the Elder Brother have descended upon earth and established the Heavenly Kingdom, and have taken me and the Junior Lord to regulate affairs appertaining to this world. Father, Son, and Royal Grandson are together Lords of the new Heaven and Earth. The Saviour and the Junior Lord are Sons of the Heavenly Father, Shang-ti; also the Great Brother Christ's Son, and my Son, is Lord. The Father and the Elder Brother, together with me, three persons, constitute one. They have truly commanded the Junior Lord to be the head of the ten thousand nations. Know all of you, your Eastern and Western Kings, and that the holy will of the Supreme and of Christ are given me through them, that I may from them thence take the people up to Heaven and lead them to the Heavenly abode. In ancient times, and at present heretofore, and hereafter, all submit to the Heavenly Father. All 'neath Heaven are happy in ascending together to the Heavenly Capital and to the Heavenly Palace. The Father and the Elder Brother's precepts are obediently handed down through all ages. The Father laboured six days, and all should glorify the great Heavenly Supreme. In the year Tien-yow, the Father sent and took me up to Heaven. The Elder Brother and I will, in person, expel the serpent, the devil, and cast him into hell. In the year Yuh-shun, the Father and Elder Brother, descended into the world, in order, through me and the Junior Lord, to establish endless peace. The Gospel has long been preached, —you now behold true happiness and glory. The Father and Elder Brother, merciful and loving, are truly omnipresent. Let all rulers and people beneath the Heavens rejoice and be glad. Thus I decree."

To the above translation, in which, as in those that follow, I have availed myself of a number of suggestions kindly made by the Rev. M. S. Culbertson, it will be well, perhaps, to add a few comments given us when we first read it at Nanking. By "leaders of soldiers," in the first sentence, is meant the chiefs of the foreign tribes, or, in other words, the heads of foreign nations. The "Junior Lord" is a son of Tien Wong, who is now proclaimed to be the adopted son of Jesus. He is said to be about twelve or fourteen years of age. "The Heavenly Capital" is Nanking, and the "Heavenly Palace" is the dwelling of His Majesty Hung Siu-Tsuen, which are the great centres around which radiate the rest of the terrestial creation. The reason given for these edicts being addressed to foreigners generally was that they would serve equally well to inform me personally, if so addressed, as to embrace the opportunity to inform all concerned.

(Translation.)

"*First Edict of the 'Junior Lord.'*

"In obedience to my Heavenly Grandfather, my Heavenly Father, and my Father, I issue an edict to inform the outer tribes. I commend you because you glorify the Supreme true God. I commend you because, with a faithful heart, you trust in Christ. I commend you because you look toward Heaven and the True Lord. I commend you that now, on your return to the capital, you faithfully show gratitude to the nation. I commend you in that you support the cause of Heaven by destroying the imps. I commend you in that with one heart you support the Heavenly Kingdom. I commend you for having a determination to promote peace. I commend you in that you are indeed a leader of Heavenly soldiers. I commend you for the toil you undergo in preaching the Gospel. My Grandfather, my (adopted) Father, my Father, and myself, will see you. In supporting the cause of Heaven and repaying this favour to the nation, let there be no change. By complying with this edict you will acknowledge that we are the Peaceful Heavenly Kingdom, that the ten thousand nations should submit to the Heavenly Father, this is true doctrine. All should bring forth the fruits of faith, that they may appear before the Supreme through Christ's blood poured out. With an earnest heart attend ye to heavenly affairs. Write your meritorious acts, when you come to the palace, and let me know them. Those having great merit will have a great reward. The Gospel has long been preached, it is now fulfilled. Thus I decree."

On the evening of the same day the Chang Wong's chief officer conferred with us again as to the etiquette to be observed when presented to the chief. Would I kneel? No. Would I put on a yellow robe and a hood prepared for

me? No, I would put on my own clothes, such as I would wear when presented to my own country's Wong, whom I had several times seen, and treat Tien Wong as I did him. Would I receive a title and rank which Tien Wong proposed to bestow. This I explained would not be consistent with my calling, and declined it. Would I bow to the Supreme when they all did? I might, and might not; would not promise, that was not my duty to Tien Wong but to God himself. I suggested the rule that every nation should use its own etiquette as the only one that would always work without difficulty. He then proceeded to inform his master of the result of the interview, upon which they concluded to delay another day in order to hear what Tien Wong himself would say to my style of etiquette. After this, the Chang Wong invited me in to see him again. Being quartered in his house it was quite convenient to go in at any time. He remarked that the evening before had been so warm, and so many were present, that we had not enjoyed a satisfactory conversation. He then proceeded to give an outline of Christianity, which, though very loose and general, contained little that could be objected to:—God, the Creator of all things, Jesus, his son, the Saviour of the world, the Holy Spirit—the words correct in the main, though I afterwards became convinced that neither he, nor any of them, had any adequate idea of their true signification. "Was this what we believed also?" he asked, when he had finished his recapitulation. I gave him to understand that I had no objection to make to what he had said, but that they appeared to have other doctrines which I did not understand the import of; for example, Mr. Pung had spoken of worshipping the Heavenly Father, the Heavenly Brother, and the Tien Wong, and of these three being one. To this he simply replied that Mr. Pung had preached erroneously.

August 10.—Spent the day mostly in conversation with visitors, among whom was a brother of the Chang Wong, and one of the Chung Wong whose royal curiosity was excited by the visit of the "Ocean brother." We were attended by a number of boys, all of whom had, as we learned, been carried away from their parents: some had been in their present situation a number of years, some but a short time. It appears to be their policy to take all the boys they can get, and they use them for servants while they are small, and for soldiers when they are large enough to fight. I asked one of them if he would like to return to his parents again. He replied that he would, but if he tried to escape the consequence would be what he indicated by drawing his hand across his neck—his head would be taken off. In the course of the day there came another edict from the Junior Lord, who is now, as we were informed, the temporal representative of the dynasty, his father's office being at present exclusively spiritual. Its main object was to inform us that he and his father had concluded to see us. The following is a translation of it:—

(Translation.)

"*Second Edict of the 'Junior Lord.'*

"In obedience to the command of my Heavenly Grandfather, my Heavenly Father, and my Father, I issue an edict to inform the Western Ocean outer tribes. You truly honour your Father and know Christ the Saviour of the World. You are indeed sent of Heaven, and are a leader of soldiers. If indeed faithful and true, and if you come at the command of Heaven, with a strong heart, uphold the cause of heaven, and promote peace. Faithfully honour Grandfather, (adopted) Father, Father, and me. If true and faithful in repaying your obligations to the nation, you will be faithful and true. I will commend you as faithful if you are indeed patient in faithfulness. In preaching the Gospel for a long time yours is a great merit, at which Grandfather, (adopted) Father, Father, and myself are all pleased. When you behold Grandfather and Father, there will be bestowed a high rank. I will commend you if with a faithful heart you honour the Supreme. If you all know the Grandfather and Father the way to Heaven is open. Earnestly, faithfully, and with a strong heart ascend the Heavenly Kingdom, and Heaven will bestow upon you a rank the highest of ten thousand thousand. Thus I decree."

At night (August 10th) we witnessed their worship. It occurred at the beginning of their Sabbath, midnight of Friday. The place of worship was the Chang Wong's private audience-room. He was himself seated in the midst of his attendants—no females were present. They first sung, or rather chanted,

after which a written prayer was read and burned by an officer, upon which they rose and sang again and then separated. The Chang Wong sent for me again before he left his seat, and asked me if I understood their mode of worship. I replied that I had just seen it for the first time. He asked what our mode was. I replied that we endeavoured to follow the rules laid down in the Scriptures, and thought all departure therefrom to be erroneous. He then proceeded to explain the ground upon which they departed from this rule. The Tien Wong had been to Heaven, he said, and had seen the Heavenly Father. Our revelation had been handed down for 1,800 years; they had received a new, additional revelation, and upon this they could adopt a different mode of worship. I replied that if the Tien Wong had obtained a revelation we could determine its genuineness by comparing it with the Scriptures. If they coincided they might be parts of the same; if not, the new revelation could not be true, as God did not change. He suggested that there might be a sort of disparagement, which was yet appropriate, as in the Chinese garment, which is buttoned at one side. To this comparison I objected, as comparing a piece of man's work with God's work. Ours were little and imperfect; his great and glorious. We should compare God's works with each other. The sun did not rise in the east to-day and in the west to-morrow. Winter and summer did not exchange their respective characters. Neither would the Heavenly Father capriciously make a law at one time and contradict it at another. His Majesty seemed rather disconcerted at thus being carried out of the usual track in which he was in the habit of discoursing, and we parted, proposing to talk further upon the subject at another time.

August 11.—At daylight we started for the Tien Wong's palace. The procession was headed by a number of brilliantly coloured banners, after which followed a troop of armed soldiers; then came the Chang Wong in a large sedan, covered with yellow satin and embroidery, and borne by eight coolies; next came the foreigner on horseback in company with the Chang Wong's chief officer, followed by a number of other officers on horseback. On our way several of the other Kings who were in the city fell in ahead of us with similar retinues. Music added discord to the scene, and curious gazers lined the streets on either side, who had no doubt seen kings before, but probably never witnessed such an apparition as that which accompanied him. Reaching at length the palace of the Tien Wong, a large building resembling very much the best of the Confucian temples, though of much greater size than these generally are. We entered the outer gate and proceeded to a large building to the eastward of the palace proper and called the "Morning Palace." Here we were presented to the Tsau Wong and his son, with several others. After resting a little while, during which two of the attendants testified their familiarity with, and consequent irreverence for, the royal place by concluding a misunderstanding in fisticuffs, we proceeded to the audience-hall of the Tien Wong. I was here presented to the Tien Wong's two brothers, two nephews, and son-in-law, in addition to those whom I had before met at the "Morning Palace." They were seated at the entrance of a deep recess, over the entrance of which was written, "Illustrious Heavenly door." At the end of this recess, far within, was pointed out to us His Majesty Tien Wong's seat, which was as yet vacant. The company awaited for some time the arrival of the Western King, whose presence seemed to be necessary before they could proceed with the ceremonies. That dignitary, a boy of twelve or fourteen, directly made his appearance, and entering at the "Holy Heavenly Gate" took his place with the royal group. They then proceeded with their ceremonies as follows:—First they kneeled with their faces to the Tien Wong's seat and uttered a prayer to the Heavenly Brother, then kneeling with their faces in the opposite direction, they prayed to the Heavenly Father, after which they again kneeled with their faces to the Tien Wong's seat, and in like manner repeated a prayer to him. They then concluded by singing in a standing position. A roast pig and the body of a goat were laying with other articles on tables in the outer court, and a fire was kept burning on a stone altar in front of the Tien Wong's seat, in a sort of court which intervened between it and the termination of the recess leading to it. He had not yet appeared, and though all waited for him for some time after the conclusion of the ceremonies, he did not appear at all. He had probably changed his mind, concluding that it would be a bad precedent to allow a foreigner to see him without first signifying submission to him: or it may be that he did not mean to see me after learning the stubborn nature of our principles; but, anxious to have us carry away some account of the

grandeur and magnificence of his Court, had taken this mode of making an appropriate impression, leaving the imagination to supply the vacant chair which his own ample dimensions should have filled. We retired to the "Morning Palace" again, where Kings, Princes, foreigner, and all were called upon to ply the "nimble lads" upon a breakfast which had been prepared for us, after which we retired in the order in which we came.

In the course of the afternoon, after our return, the Chang Wong invited me in to see him privately. I was led through a number of rooms and intervening courts into one of his private sitting-rooms, were he sat clothed loosely in white silk, with a red kerchief round his head and a jewel in front. He was seated in an easy chair, and fanned by a pretty slipshod girl. Another similar chair was placed near him, on which he invited me to be seated, and at once began to question me about foreign machinery, &c. He had been puzzled with a map, with parallel lines running each way, said to have been made by foreigners, which he asked me to explain. He then submitted to my inspection a spy-glass and a music-box, asking various questions about each, evidently supposing every foreigner to be an adept in the construction of such articles. After this he became quite familiar, and was ready to see me at any hour. At the next interview, which occurred on the day following, I referred him to various passages in the New Testament, which conflicted with the doctrines of Tien Wong. Found it impossible to gain his attention to these matters. He was ready enough to declaim in set speech about all men being brethren, but it was easy to perceive that his religion, such as it was, had little hold upon his heart. He confessed carelessly that the revelation of Tien Wong did not agree with the Bible, but said that of Tien Wong, being later, was more authoritative. I found him but little disposed to have his faith tested, either by reason or revelation, or indeed to think about it all when it was abstracted from public affairs.

The two days which yet elapsed before our departure were spent mostly in conversation with various persons connected with the establishment of the Chang Wong and other kings. These conversations, informal and desultory, gave me an opportunity to ascertain something of the practical working of Hung Siu-tsuen's principles upon the masses of his adherents. I could not perceive that there was any elevation of character or sentiment to distinguish them from the great mass of the Chinese population; indeed, the effect of his pretensions to a commission to "slay the imps" appears to have annihilated in their minds all consciousness of crimes committed against those who are not of their own faith. To rob and murder an adherent of the Manchou Dynasty is a virtuous deed. To carry away his wife or daughter for infamous purposes, or his son to train up for their army, are all legitimate acts. We questioned some of the boys who were sent to wait upon us as to their nativity; some were from Ngang-hu-ai, some from Hupeh, some from Honan, and others from Kiang-si. Wherever their armies had overrun the country they had captured the boys and led them away with them. The large proportion of comely looking women to be seen looking out at the doors and windows showed the summary way in which these celestial soldiers provided themselves with wives.

Anxious to gain some further insight into the views of their chief, and hoping to call his attention to some of his errors and inconsistencies, I copied, with the aid of my teacher, who accompanied me, a number of passages from the New Testament, and prefacing them with the remark that they were passages which foreign Christians would find among the most difficult to reconcile with the doctrines which he taught, and remarking that if he had been in communication with the Heavenly Father he would doubtless be both able and willing to explain them, addressed them to Tien Wong. The principal passages were the following, with the subjoined questions accompanying them:— John i. 1: Christ is here pronounced to be God; does Tien Wong claim to be God or man? Matt. xxii. 29, 30: How is this to be reconciled with the statement that the Western King has contracted a marriage in the other world? Matt. xx. 25-26: How is this to be reconciled with the Tien Wong's assumption of authority in spiritual matters? John iii. 13; Gal. i. 8; Rev. xxii. 18, 19: How can Tien Wong have another revelation? This document the Chang Wong was afraid to present to his chief. He returned it to me, and I supposed that I should hardly find a man bold enough to keep it in his possession.

On Wednesday (15th August) we had determined to return. On announcing our intention we were entreated to remain a few days longer. He

also invited me to come back again, and bring with me my family, offering to give me a place in his own house. On our departure a sum of money was offered us to "buy tea," as it was stated, "on our way home." This we declined, and when assured that it was simply the usual present made to a guest on his departure, informed him of the evil constructions that might be put upon the reception of money, especially such a sum, however pure the motive might be. He insisted that he would have no face if he sent away a guest without making him some present, and substituted a piece of silk, which, with several little articles received before, are preserved as memorials of the visit. A present of a small globe, with several other foreign articles, were very gladly received on his part.

On returning to our boat we were called upon again by his Excellency Mr Pung. He had not seen us for several days, because, as he said, being an adherent of the Tien Wong he could not freely go out and in at the Chang Wong's without some special errand. I had at once drew him into conversation about the Tien Wong's doctrines, and showed him the paper which I had prepared but could not have presented to him. He seemed quite startled when he saw the difficulties propounded, and especially at a dilemma which was further added with reference to the Western King's pretended marriage with the daughter of the Heavenly Father. Clutching the paper eagerly, he asked me if he might keep it. If Tien Wong had erred in anything he might change it, he said. We were of course very glad to leave it with him. So bidding him and Nanking good-bye, we confided ourselves once more to the bosom of the "Ocean's Son," and receiving a friendly visit from some of the Imperial officers as we passed Ching-kiang, reached Shanghae with about forty hours' sailing.

I might add many miscellaneous items of information gathered while in the insurgent capital, but as my communication has already reached an undue length, I shall content myself with a few general reflections upon the state and prospects of this movement. I went to Nanking predisposed to receive a favourable impression; indeed, the favourable impressions of a previous visit to Soo-chow led me to undertake this journey. I came away with my views entirely changed. I had hoped that their doctrines, though crude and erroneous, might notwithstanding embrace some of the elements of Christianity. I found to my sorrow nothing of Christianity but its names, falsely applied, applied to a system of revolting idolatry: whatever they may be in their books and whatever they may have believed in times past, I could not escape the conclusion that such is the system which they now promulgate, and by which the character of their people is being moulded. Their idea of God is distorted until it is inferior if possible to that entertained by other Chinese idolaters. The idea which they entertain of a Saviour is likewise low and sensual, and his honours are shared by another. The Eastern King is the Saviour from disease as He is the Saviour from sin. The Holy Spirit they make a nonenity. The whole transformation may be concisely stated in the language of Scripture:—"They have changed the truth of God into a lie, and they worship the creature more than the Creator." Among the features of their theology that shocked me most may be mentioned the following:—They speak of the wife of the Heavenly Father, whom they call Tien-Ma (Heavenly Mother); and of the wife of Jesus, whom they call Tien-Sau (Heavenly Sister-in-law); also the Senior Western King has married a sister of Jesus, the daughter of the Heavenly Father, and is hence called Te Sue (Supreme Son-in-law). With reference to this last union, I learn that some well-informed persons are disposed to believe that the defunct Western King was simply a brother-in-law of the insurgent Chief, and that in giving him the above title they do not intend to indicate a divine alliance. I can only say with reference to this, that in all my conversation with the rebels, although I used various arguments to convince them that they could not with propriety speak of the Heavenly Father having a natural daughter, no one denied that this was their meaning. She was once a woman living upon earth (according to my teacher's account, who pressed the inquiry farther than I did), but like the Saviour, she came down from Heaven, and was the daughter of the Heavenly Father, as Jesus was his son. Furthermore, they do hold that Tien Wong is the son of God as really and in the same manner that Jesus is. Some of their most intelligent men, with whom I conversed, defended their worshipping him upon precisely this ground:—"He is the Son of God, and in worshipping him we worship God," they said. That this worship is of the same character as that

addressed to Jesus and to the Heavenly Father there can be no doubt. No one defended it upon the ground that it was not. On the other hand, they defended it upon the ground of his claim to divine worship. The assumptions which he makes in his proclamation, it appears to me, moreover, would unmistakeably indicate the kind of worship he would demand. The son of the Chief is likewise a member of the divine family. He is the adopted son of Jesus, and is appointed to be the head of all the nations. So it is stated in the edict translated above, and so it was explained to us by those familiar with their theories. Polygamy is another dark feature of their system. The Tien Wong has married about thirty wives, and has in his harem about 100 women. The other Kings are limited to 30. The other high officers are also allowed a plurality of wives.

I had hoped, too, that though crude and erroneous in their notions, they would yet be ready to stand an appeal to the Bible, and to be instructed by those competent to expound its truths. Here, too, I was disappointed. They have a new revelation which is to be their criterion of truth, and are quite competent to instruct us. In fact, they bear in their hands a divine decree to which we are to submit, according to their account. To be sure, they invite missionaries to come—they invited me to remain, or to return and remain with them. But it is easy to see how long they would be willing to tolerate a man who would preach doctrines radically opposed to those which they themselves promulgate, and upon which they found their claim to the obedience of China and the rest of the world. Their willingness, if indeed they are willing to receive Christian missionaries among them, is doubtless founded upon a misapprehension of their true character. They suppose that the missionary will prove an instrument which they can bend to suit their own purposes. Exceptions might, perhaps, be made in favour of individuals—it is of those who hold the reins of power that I speak.

The city of Nanking is in a ruinous condition. It would be no exaggeration to say that half the houses have been destroyed. The country around is not half cultivated. Provisions are very scarce and expensive. Their trade is very limited. We observed instances in which workmen were compelled to labour without compensation. All indicates a policy that has little regard to the welfare of the people, or to any interests other than those immediately connected with war, and with the indulgence of their Rulers.

The present state of their political affairs would indicate that Hung Siu-tsuen's career must close before the present Dynasty can be supplanted. His horrible doctrines, which had served to break down every distinction between right and wrongi n the minds of his soldiers, and send them forth to perform every enormity without remorse, have secured him the lasting hatred of the masses of the people. The scenes of internal discord which so nearly proved their destruction a few years since would doubtless be enacted again, and upon a large scale, when, with their enemies vanquished, they came to a final division of the spoils. One of their most popular Generals, Shir-ta-ki, is now the leader of what will, in all probability, prove a rival rebellion. He left Nanking accompanied by a large army, without the leave of the Tien Wong, and it is said disbelieves his doctrines. He is described as a good man, who will not kill, but strives to conciliate the people; is reverenced by both soldiers and people, and preaches that "he is a good man who acts the good man." He now holds the capital of the province of Sz'chuen, and probably has control of as much territory and as large a population as Tien Wong himself. They have as yet come to no open rupture, but it is doubtful if he will ever come again under the sway of the present Chief. The pretensions of Hung Siu-tsuen must also, sooner or later, if he continues at the head, bring him into collision with foreign Powers, in which case, one of the claims which he founds upon his character as a religious teacher would have to be yielded. His prestige thus destroyed, it is doubtful whether his influence would survive it. In fine, while we are not without hopes that God will so over-rule this movement as to bring great good out of it, we find little or nothing in the character of the leaders with whom we have met, or in the doctrines which they believe, upon which to found a hope except as the "wrath of man shall praise Him."

Yours respectfully,
(Signed) J. L. HOLMES.

Inclosure 6 in No. 72.

Extract from the "North China Herald" of August 25, 1860.

THE ADVANCE OF THE TAI-PING INSURGENTS ON SHANGHAE.—This week has proved a most eventful one for Shanghae; never was the model settlement in a greater state of excitement. The Tai-ping insurgents have according to promise come down in large numbers from Soo-chow and the neighbourhood. Their approach was marked by the conflagration of many towns and villages, and the numerous fires on the western horizon on Friday, the 17th, clearly showed on which side we had to expect them. At 6 o'clock on Saturday morning, Her Majesty's gun-boat "Kestrel," and the French steamer "Hong Kong," started up the river to deliver some documents to the insurgent Chiefs, if they were to be met with, as was supposed, in the neighbourhood of Sung-keang. Scarcely had these two steamers reached the village of Ming-hong and got out of sight of Shanghae, when the insurgents advanced in large numbers on the village of Zee-ka-wei, and at once took possession of the Jesuit Church and College there. This place has since been the head-quarters of the Chung Wang, who has come from Soo-chow to command the expedition. About a mile from Zee-ka-wei, and two from the west gate of Shanghae, was a camp supposed to contain 300 Imperialist soldiers, but which, from a peculiarity the Chinese have of counting in all Government matters, only contained about fifty. The camp had an earthwork all round, on which several American cannon were mounted. Since the allied occupation of the city all executions have been perpetrated here.

Against this place the rebels advanced with unusual boldness. The Chinese soldiers and officers fought for some time with great spirit, but at last ran away away as fast as possible, followed by the insurgents, who hoped to rush pell-mell with them to the city, and get through the West Gate. This is a very favourite ruse of the rebels, and has led to the capture of several most important cities; but it was not successful this time, although a number of the Imperialist fugitives actually got through the gate in safety. Captain Cavanagh then ordered the bridge to be destroyed, and gave the insurgents a rather warm reception from the city wall with rifles and canister.

Captain Budd, Royal Marines, commanding the South Gate, and senior officer in the city, had meanwhile been very busy putting a finish to the measures of defence, in the preparation and direction of which he has been engaged for many weeks. He had originated the very good idea of having high wooden look-outs erected at the various stations along the wall and the Ningpo Joss-house. From the great height of these the country could be scanned, and the insurgent advance clearly traced.

Captain Maxwell commanded, with some Sikhs, at the Little South Gate; and certainly the measures taken for the defence of these two positions were complete in every respect.

In the course of the afternoon two guns of Captain Mc Intyre's Madras Mountain Train were seen coming along outside the city wall, with only a small moat between them and the foe, who were dodging along behind graves, houses, and trees, towards the South Gates, but, curious to relate, not a shot was fired. This did not prevent the coolies from deserting, however; so Captain Mc Intyre was obliged to run on a-head to get assistance, which, having been promptly granted, the guns were soon in safety and position.

By this time the enemy had secreted themselves in great numbers under cover of the houses in the South suburb. One missionary, whose account of the affair we publish separately, was surprised to find his house invaded by genuine Chang-maos, who asked for powder, but who, on learning the occupation of the gentleman, left the house untouched.

Meanwhile the action in this part of the position had commenced by a sharp fire directed from the city wall to a body of men advancing with the Imperial flags which had been captured at the camp before mentioned. As soon as the firing had begun they assumed their true flags, and returned some jingall shots, which happily did no harm to the foreign troops.

The nature of the country outside the gates gave ample scope for the enemy to secret themselves, as it is covered with houses, graves, and almost impenetrable beds of flags and tops of trees; so it was only when a group could

be observed, that the howitzers and a Chinese gun—the latter under Gunner Warwich—could be used with effeet. The insurgents, however, are certainly no cowards, and constantly showed themselves near the wall from the South to the West Gates.

The firing of the foreigners both from the cannon and rifles was excellent. As soon as canister was useless, the foe were treated to shell, thrown time after time into the very middle of their flags.

When driven back from the South Gate, the rebels retired past the south-west angle, where Lieutenant O'Grady, who was waiting for them in the picquet-house with some Marines and Sikhs, gave them another dressing, compelling them to retire for the night towards the Baby Tower, where some officer of importance was living in a foreign house.

Captain Maxwell, at the Little South Gate, had given his Loodianahs plenty to do, and although they were only armed with Brown Bess, they inflicted no small loss on the enemy.

Gunner Deacon, Royal Marine Artillery, had rigged up a gun belonging to the Taoutae, and worked it in the coolest manner and with great success.

Among others killed on the enemy's side was an European who had made himself very conspicuous. Accompanying him was a half-caste, who unfortunately managed to escape. There were several foreigners to be seen among the insurgents, and another is supposed to have fallen outside Captain Budd's position.

As soon as it could be done in safety, parties were sent from the various posts to burn down such houses in the suburbs as could afford shelter to the enemy, and the fires raged outside the West and South Gates during the whole of Saturday night. While the South Gate party were engaged, an old woman was found in a cottage, who refused to leave the coffin on which she was sitting, asserting that she would like to be burnt. To avoid this she was got into the coffin, which was converted into a boat, and hauled over the city moat. Several jingalls were also captured, and as many dead as could be collected put in a house, which was immediately afterwards burnt to the ground. A rebel captured outside the West Gate was disembowelled and beheaded by the Chinese soldiers before the English had time to prevent it. Orders were, however, given to prevent any prisoners being delivered to the Chinese authorities by the allies.

Thus ended the first day's work, with no small loss to the enemy, but without a single casualty to report on the foreign side.

Sunday morning broke on a scene of conflagration and destruction. During the night the enemy had advanced in large numbers to the water suburb, firing a few jingalls at the South Gate *en passant*. A large number, too, concealed themselves in the ruins both at the South and West Gates during the morning, but for some two or three hours, during which time the Rev. J. Hobson read his usual service, no firing was kept up. The insurgents had, however, worked their way round almost to the French quarter, and had planted some flags on the temple of the Queen of Heaven.

Our gallant allies set to work, in a manner peculiar to themselves, to drive away the danger, and to prevent its recurrence fired the suburb, which is by far the richest and most important collection of native houses. It is here that the Chinese wholesale merchants live. An immense quantity of goods, especially sugar, was stored there, and as the conflagration in its rapid progress licked up a sugar hong or soy factory, the flames sprang up with fearful grandeur.

About 2 o'clock the "Kestrel" and "Hong Kong" came steaming down against a strong tide past the burning suburb, with the news that the rebels had evacuated Sung-kiang, and could not be heard of near there. Twelve conflagrations that were burning round the city told them that they would not have to go far for them now. The firing, too, had recommenced at the South Gates from double-shotted guns and howitzers.

Driven from their cover by these means, and compelled to take up a new position, the enemy laid himself open to some fine rifle-practice. Mc Intyre's guns were too well handled to let them hide in any of the buildings yet standing, and Lieutenant O'Grady, with some Marines, opened a most destructive fire from the look-out. This gallant officer is really an excellent shot: the braves at Canton have some cause to remember him, and we believe it is reckoned that in this affair twenty men fell to his rifle, with scarcely one intervening miss.

The immense range of the Enfield bothered the enemy terribly, and they soon became anxious to get beyond it.

On Sunday night they were quiet enough, and it was a very striking sight to see their camp fires dotting for an immense distance the country on the south-west, while on the east the fire raised by the French was burning with great brilliancy, leading the foreigners to believe from the noise made by the falling houses, that the musketry had recommenced.

On Monday morning, the 20th August, the enemy had advanced in greater strength than ever. It was really a curious sight to see them moving along every one of the little paths which run parallel to the city walls, each man carrying a flag, and all moving in Indian file, but in excellent order, and quite calm and steady. On they came without hesitation perfectly within range, and seemed to direct their attention principally to the West Gate. Lieutenant O'Grady had been sent there with some Marines, to assist Captain Cavanagh, and the Madras artillerymen having rigged up a Chinese gun, a heavy fire was kept up, and the insurgents have to thank the nature of the ground that their loss was not very large. Strange to say, scarcely a shot was returned, and the Imperialist soldiers, after firing a couple of times, got up on the battlements of the wall, hung their legs over, and smoked away without any apparent fear, although the foe was lurking among the graves and rushes below.

The cracking of the rifles seemed to have had no effect in changing the line of march of the insurgents, who now seemed to threaten the English settlement in great numbers. They actually planted some flags within 200 yards of the Race-course Stand, but were met with a shell or two from a gun commanded by Lieutenant Williams. Lieutenant Crease fired a couple of rockets at them too, so that they gradually retired.

During the night the despatch-boat "Pioneer" had proceeded up the river, and began dropping 13-inch shells in among the rebel flags. One of these exploded right in the very centre of about 100 red banners, which immediately afterwards disappeared.

About 1 the despatch-boat "Nimrod" threw a shell clean over the settlement away out into the fields an astonishing distance. This practice was kept up slowly for about two hours, when the insurgents retreated out of range.

The "Pioneer" continued firing until the evening had far advanced, but the enemy had had enough of it, and retreated so far out towards Zee-ka-wei that they were out of all possible danger.

On Tuesday but very little work took place, as the rebels had retreated quite out of range, and with the exception of one or two small bodies, none were seen near enough to fire at. The conflagration raised by the French in the water suburb was still raging, and it was melancholy to see hong after hong full of valuable goods falling a prey to the devouring element. But nothing could possibly be done to stop it, as the houses are constructed of the most inflammable materials, and crowded together as thick as possible.

On Wednesday Mr. Forrest volunteered to take to the insurgents the despatches that had been sent to Sung-keang in the "Kestrel" and "Hong Kong." His offer was accepted, and every aid afforded him for effecting what seemed to all a sufficiently daring ride. Accompanied by a single soldier named Phillips, who had a white napkin attached to his bayonet, Mr. Forrest rode out of the South Gate, skirted the city wall to the south-west angle, and then rode for the bridge which crosses the Zee-ka-wei canal. A good system of signals had been arranged with the West Gate, one dip of the flag on the bayonet meaning all right, and three dips, all wrong. Finding no one at the bridge, it was determined to proceed to the rebel camp, which was about a mile a-head. On nearing the flags, a man was observed on the roof of a house, and on being hailed by Mr. Forrest, descended, and by the appearance of many soldiers running to the camp, evidently gave the alarm. The two foreigners thereupon rode through the first lot of flags up to the gate of the camp, and were met by several soldiers almost all having European arms in their possession. On the request being made that some officer should be sent for, a mass of about 200 rebels came down bearing a huge white flag, in the centre of which was painted the "pa kua," and a fine daring-looking man, dressed in purple silk, then presented himself as an officer. After the usual civilities, the officer complained of the resistance that the foreigners had offered to them, asserting at the same time that the insurgents

had been invited to Shanghae by foreigners of all nations. Mr. Forrest was pressed to proceed to Zee-ka-wei and see the Chung Wang, but declining the request, that gentleman delivered his despatches and made his way back to the city wall, making signal that all was well. About twenty corpses were passed on the path alone; by the tainted atmosphere the locality of many more was designated where they could not be seen; and the loss of the insurgents, taking what was seen on this ride as evidence, could not have been inconsiderable.

On Thursday Captain ———, Lieutenant Ozzard, and Mr. Forrest, went out to receive a reply which had been promised by the insurgents, but although during the morning several white flags had advanced towards the West Gate, they had soon afterwards retreated; and on riding to the camp, but a few very badly-clothed rebels, and no officer of any rank, were to be seen by the expedition. The answer had, however, been sent through ahother channel. It contained an immense amount of bombastic nonsense, and asserted that the insurgents had been invited down by men of all nations, especially the French. In the evening a couple of gentlemen visited the church at Zee-ka-wei, found a few flags and men made of straw planted about, the pictures and statues very much damaged, and the rebels all gone. The insurgent visit to this church will be long remembered for the unnecessary and gross crimes committed in it. As the rebels entered, they were met by a priest dressed in Chinese clothes, and several of the children educated at the seminary. Some of the children's heads severed at a single blow told the master but too plainly of the fate that awaited him; and the stab that dismissed him from the world will long be remembered by his countrymen the French, and be repaid with interest when opportunity shall occur.

Apart from all questions of policy, we must congratulate ourselves on the excellent arrangements that had been completed for the defence of the city and settlement. Colonel March has been untiringly energetic since he has been here, and the result has proved that his measures were most judiciously planned, and effectively carried out. He has not only superintended the arrangements of his own peculiar department, but has also afforded assistance and advice in the formation of the Volunteer Corps, of which more anon. In the city itself too much praise cannot be given to Captain Budd, who as senior officer there has had the preparation of all defences: he has had, moreover, to be in constant communication with his Excellency the Taoutae and other Chinese authorities, and has compelled even these difficult gentry to place implicit confidence in him and his arrangements. Assisted by Lieutenant O'Grady, he soon turned the the South Gate inside out, so that Chinamen did not know it again. Captains Cavanagh and Maxwell worked away so deliberately and energetically at their respective gates that the numerous Chinese officers had to remark more than once that they really should hire coolies to do their work. Some pretty examples might be given of the splendid way the shooting was carried on. Captain McIntyre had scarcely got his guns in position when a large black banner was observed in the centre of a large body of men carrying smaller flags. The gun was laid at 800 yards, a shell knocked the flag and bearer over, and those of his companions who could took to their heels and escaped. A large number of yellow-flag rebels were observed to enter a long white house about three quarters of a mile distance: Captain McIntyre put a shell through the roof, and among others is supposed to have wounded the second officer in command of the rebel army.

Inside the British settlement the least possible alarm seems to have been felt, probably owing to the excellence of the arrangements for defence and the confidence of the residents in Colonel March. The Volunteers stood to their barricades night and day, and have certainly discovered the way to make duty as little irksome as possible. At most of the barricades may be seen tables and chairs, creature comforts of all kinds, not forgetting various beverages which are, however, rigidly denied to the sentry on guard. One barrier is held in particular favour, and certainly if a nice cold supper laid out in a pleasant garden can render the life of a Volunteer at once pleasant and cheerful, the gentlemen of that particular location are greatly to be envied. The guards are certainly always wide awake, and the challenges are given in no undertone; although the noise of merriment is no stranger to the various posts, yet the gentlemen do their duty with energy and caution. Colonel Neale, commanding the Volunteers, goes round every night between nine and eleven, and convinces himself that all is

safe; he has also taken a great deal of trouble to see that the arms and defences are all in proper order. It is needless to add that the Volunteers place implicit confidence in him.

No. 73.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1860.*

I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in the views stated in your despatch of the 4th of September, with regard to the proceedings of the Tae-ping insurgents and the policy which the Allied Powers should adopt towards them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 74.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 10, 1860.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches to the 26th of August, inclusive.

Her Majesty commands me to convey to you her gracious approbation of the firmness with which you refused the repeated applications of the Chinese Government to be permitted to negotiate. On the 17th of August you very properly informed the Governor of Chih-li that, in consequence of the unsatisfactory reply received, in March last, to the demands of the British and French Plenipotentiaries, the military and naval Commanders had been called upon to act; that they were engaged in taking possession of the Takoo forts and opening up the passage to Tien-tsin, and that, until this object should have been accomplished, and sufficient assurances given of the resolution of the Chinese Government to concede the points demanded, your Excellency could not call upon the military and naval Commanders to suspend their operations.

So far from sufficient assurances being given of a compliance with the demands of the allies, I do not see, in the letters of the Chinese officials, even a promise of the payment of the indemnity of 8,000,000 taels demanded by the allies.

I take for granted that you will not have suspended military and naval operations without having obtained, not only a Treaty or Convention stipulating for the payment of this sum, but also sufficient securities for its actual discharge. The chief Custom-houses of China may, in no long time, yield a sufficient income to free China from these obligations; but unless the money is at once paid, or those revenues of Customs are made payable to the allies, we may be again defeated by stratagem and evasion.

The determination your Excellency has shown, however, not to listen to negotiations until the Takoo forts and Tien-tsin were in our hands, convinces Her Majesty's Government that you will show the same consistent resolution in obtaining material securities for the fulfilment of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, and the payment of the indemnity so justly demanded.

The conduct of Her Majesty's military and naval forces, and the brilliant valour of our allies, have excited Her Majesty's warmest approbation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 75.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 13.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, August 30, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a letter to me from the Governor-General of Chih-li, informing me of the appointment of Hang-ki to be

Assistant Imperial Commissioner, and a copy of my letter to the Governor-General, acknowledging the receipt of this and of a previous letter from him, the translation of which was inclosed in my despatch to your Lordship of August the 26th.

I inclose likewise the translation of a further communication from the Governor-General of Chih-li, announcing the intended arrival of Kweiliang at this place on the 31st instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 75.

Governor-General Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

HANG (Hang-fuh), Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General of Chih-li, &c., and Hang (Hang-ki), Assistant Commissioner, a high officer in the Household, &c., make a communication.

The Imperial Commissioner had the honour to receive, on the 12th of the 7th moon (28th August), an Imperial Decree as follows:—

"We have appointed Hang-ki Assistant Commissioner."

It is the duty of the above Commissioners to communicate this to the British Minister.

A necessary communication, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 13th day.

(Received 29th August, 1860.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 75.

The Earl of Elgin to Governor-General Hang.

THE Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the despatch of his Excellency the Governor-General of Chih-li, under date the 25th instant, apprizing him that His Imperial Majesty had been pleased to associate him with his Excellency Kweiliang in the Commission for the arrangement of the exchange of Treaties and other matters.

The Undersigned has also had the honour to receive a despatch, dated August 29, from his Excellency the Governor-General and his colleague, Hang-ki, high officer of the Household, communicating a Decree by which the latter high officer has been appointed Assistant Commissioner.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 75.

Commissioner Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

HANG, His Chinese Imperial Majesty's Special High Commissioner, a President of the Board of War, and Governor-General of the Province of Chih-li, makes this communication.

On the 9th day of the 7th month (25th August), I received an Imperial Decree, dated the 8th day (24th August), to the following effect:—

"We hereby appoint Kweiliang and Hang-fuh Special High Commissioners. Let Kweiliang proceed by express to Tien-tsin, to join his colleague and transact business. Respect this."

I, the Minister, am now in Tien-tsin, awaiting the arrival of his Excellency the Special High Commissioner and Secretary of State Kwei, who was to leave the capital when he had received our seal of office, and who has fixed the 15th day of this month (31st August) for his arrival at this place. We shall thereafter have the honour of conferring with your Excellency.

I beg leave now to forward a despatch which has been sent to me for your

Excellency from the Secretary and Commissioner Kwei, to which I hope that you will give your attentive consideration.

Accept my wishes for your felicity.

A communication to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th month (August 1860).

No. 76.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received November* 13.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, September* 5, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a correspondence between myself and the Imperial Commissioner Kweiliang, in which he, on his side, explains the nature and extent of his powers, and I, on mine, state the demands which I prefer on behalf of the British Government, and which must be satisfied before I can call on the naval and military Commanders-in-chief to suspend their operations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 76.

Commissioner Kweiliang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

KWEI (Kweiliang), Imperial Commissioner with full powers (1), &c., makes a communication.

The Commissioner has had the honour to receive His Majesty's commands to proceed to Tien-tsin, and in concert with Hang (Hang-fuh), to make the necessary arrangements for (or, to arrange all details affecting) the exchange of the ratifications.

The Commissioner brings with him the seal ("kwan-fang") of Imperial Commissioner, and will not fail to arrive at the city of Tien-tsin by the 15th of the moon (31st August).

Of the propositions (or Articles) set forth (in the letter of) the British Government of the 2nd moon (March last), there is none which it is not in the power of the Commissioner to discuss and dispose of; and as soon as he reaches Tien-tsin he will immediately confer with the British Minister upon one and all of them.

A necessary communication.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 9th day (25th August, 1860).

Note.

(1.) Kweiliang's title declares him possessed of "full powers,"—the term we have been in the habit of using; but also (as in 1858), of "power to do that which the occasion requires."

(Signed) T. F. WADE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 76.

The Earl of Elgin to Commissioner Kweiliang.

Tien tsin, August 29, 1860.

THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, &c., has the honour to acknowledge a despatch from his Excellency Kweiliang, Imperial Commissioner, informing him, that by command of His Majesty the Emperor of China, he is on his way to Tien-tsin, to arrange all matters connected with the exchange of Treaties, and that he is further empowered to discuss and dispose of all the conditions enumerated in the despatch Her Majesty's Minister was instructed to address to the Imperial Government in March last.

The Undersigned must remind the Imperial Commissioner that the despatch in question was written with the view of affording an opportunity of adjusting amicably, and without recourse to arms, the differences that had arisen between the two countries, in consequence of the outrage offered to the British Minister in the year preceding, when he was on his way to Peking for the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

The Chinese Government refused to avail itself of this opportunity of effecting a pacific settlement, and the British naval and military authorities were accordingly required to act. The Takoo forts and the city of Tien-tsin are already in the possession of the British and French forces, and the head-quarters of the allied armies is now established at the latter place.

The Undersigned thinks it proper to inform the Imperial Commissioner, that it is not in his power to call on the Commanders-in-chief to suspend their operations until all the demands contained in the despatch in question have been acceded to by the Government of China. With reference to that Article which states that "the outrage at the Peiho having compelled Her Majesty's Government to increase her forces in China at a considerable expense, the contribution that may be required of the Chinese Government towards defraying this will be greater or less according to the promptitude with which the demands above made are satisfied in full by the Imperial Government," the Undersigned has to acquaint the Imperial Commissioner that if his demands be immediately acceded to, he is authorised to accept 4,000,000 taels, in addition to the 4,000,000 taels already stipulated for in the Treaty of Tien-tsin towards the defrayment of the very heavy expenses of the war.

As a material guarantee for the faithful observance of its engagements by the Chinese Government, the Undersigned also requires that the port and city of Tien-tsin be immediately opened to foreign trade. The British forces will thereupon retire to Takoo and Tang-chau, which places they will continue to occupy until the indemnity, amounting in all to 8,000,000 taels, shall have been paid in full.

When the foregoing stipulations shall have been included in a Convention duly signed and sealed by his Excellency on the one part, and the Undersigned on the other, the Undersigned will proceed to Peking for the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

It is, on the other hand, the duty of the Undersigned to state, that in the event of any attempt on the part of the Chinese Government to evade or postpone the concession of the demands insisted upon, he must at once apply to their Excellencies the Commanders-in-chief to push forward from Tien-tsin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 76.

Commissioners Kweiliang and Hang to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

KWEILIANG, Chief Secretary of State, &c., and Hang-fuh, Governor-General of Chih-li, &c., Imperial Commissioners with Plenipotentiary powers, with Hang-ki, Assistant Commissioner, makes a communication.

The letter of his Excellency the British Minister (Lord Elgin's despatch of the 29th August) was received by us on the 14th instant (30th August), and the perusal of it satisfies the Commissioners that his Excellency is fully resolved to preserve relations of peace, and has no fixed purpose to prosecute hostilities. It was this point which it behoved the Commissioners, on coming hither by His Majesty's commands, to negotiate.

They now write this despatch to give the most positive assurance that the Treaty negotiated in the year Wu Wu (1858), is of course, as before (agreed), to be faithfully (*lit.*, obediently) observed, and all the points (or Articles) enumerated in the despatches of the British Government dated the 16th of the 2nd moon (8th March), and the 13th day of the 7th moon (29th August), conceded in full, and they have to request the British Government will forthwith desist from further hostilities, that strength may be added to friendly relations.

As to the indemnity, a satisfactory arrangement must at once be come to

regarding the proportions in which this is to be charged on the Customs revenue of the different ports.

Pending the transmission of another communication for the appointment of a day for a conference on this subject, and for the disposal of all matters relating to his Excellency's entry into Peking capital, in order to exchange the ratifications, that peace may endure for evermore, the Commissioners forward this despatch.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 17th day (2nd September, 1860).

(Received 2nd September, 1860.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 76.

The Earl of Elgin to Commissioners Kweiliang and Hang.

Tien-tsin, September 3, 1860.

THE Undersigned, the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, has the honour to acknowledge the despatch of their Excellencies the Imperial Commissioners under date the 2nd instant.

The Undersigned learns with satisfaction that the demands preferred by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty are conceded in full. In accordance with the tenor of his despatch of the 29th ultimo, he is now preparing the draft of a Convention which shall formally embody the conditions referred to, and record their acceptance by the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China. The Draft shall be forwarded to their Excellencies as soon as it is ready.

The Convention signed, the Undersigned in performance of the promise given in his despatch above quoted, will immediately call on their Excellencies the Commanders-in-chief to desist from further measures of hostility, and so soon as the necessary arrangements can be completed for his reception in the capital, he will proceed thither, accompanied by an escort suited to the high rank which he holds as the Representative of Her Britannic Majesty, for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, and delivering to the Emperor of China a letter to His Majesty, with which he has been charged by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 77.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 13.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, September* 8, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of the draft Convention which, in accordance with the promise contained in my letter to Kweiliang of the 7th instant, the copy of which is inclosed in my despatch to your Lordship of the 5th instant, I commissioned Messrs. Parkes and Wade to submit to him and his colleagues on the 6th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 77.

Draft of Convention.

HER Majesty the Queen of England, &c., &c., &c., and His Majesty the Emperor of China, &c., &c., &c., desiring to terminate existing differences, and to restore and secure against further interruption relations of peace and friendship between their respective dominions and subjects, have appointed as their Commissioners and Ministers Plenipotentiary the following high officers, namely:—

On the part of the Queen of Great Britain, &c., &c., &c., James, Earl of Elgin, &c., &c., &c.; and on the part of the Emperor of China, &c., &c., &c., Kweiliang, &c., &c., &c., and Hang-fuh, &c., &c., &c.; and these aforesaid Ministers Plenipotentiaries, after communicating to each other their resqective full powers, and finding them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.

His Majesty the Emperor of China, on his part, regrets that the friendship established between the two Governments by the Treaty signed at Tien-tsin in the year 1858, should have been interrupted by the act of his officers in charge of the forts at Takoo, who obstructed the passage of Her Britannic Majesty's Plenipotentiary when he was proceeding to Peking for the exchange of the ratifications of the above-named Treaty in the month of June 1859.

ARTICLE II.

In order to prevent all risk of dispute regarding the right of the Queen of England to appoint a Minister to reside in permanence at Peking, it is expressly declared, that the condition on which Her Majesty agreed to limit the exercise of that right as conceded by the Treaty concluded at Tien-tsin in June 1858 having been violated by the act of the Chinese officers in charge of the forts at Takoo, the understanding entered into between Her Majesty's Ambassador the Earl of Elgin and the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana, in the month of October 1858, is at an end; and that the Queen of England resumes the unqualified exercise of the authority accruing to Her Majesty under Article III of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

ARTICLE III.

It is agreed that preparations shall be made immediately for the journey of Her Britannic Majesty's Minister to Peking, and for his reception in that capital in a manner becoming his high rank as the Representative of the Queen of England, and that, so soon as this Convention shall have been signed, he shall proceed thither for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

ARTICLE IV.

It is agreed that full effect shall be given to the provisions of the Treaty of Tien-tsin as soon as the ratifications shall have been exchanged, excepting in so far as these provisions are modified by this Convention.

It is also agreed, that it shall not be necessary that ratifications of this Convention be exchanged, but that, without that formality, its provisions shall be equally binding with those of the Treaty of Tien-tsin npon the Governments of England and China; also that they shall have effect from the date of the signature of this Convention.

ARTICLE V.

It is further agreed that, immediately after the signature of the Convention, the city and port of Tien-tsin shall be opened to foreign trade, and that the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall be entitled to trade and reside thereat under the same conditions as at all other cities and ports of China at which they have by Treaty a right to trade and reside.

ARTICLE VI.

The Separate Article relating to indemnities annexed to the Treaty of Tien-tsin is hereby abrogated; the Emperor of China agreeing, in lieu of the sums therein specified, to pay, in fine Sycee silver, or Mexican dollars of equal value, the sum of 8,000,000 taels, and that the same shall be paid in the following manner:—1,000,000 taels to be paid at Tien-tsin within two months from the date of the signature of this Convention; 333,333 taels to be paid at Canton on or before the 1st day of December next; and the remainder to continue a

charge upon the amount of duties collected on foreign trade at the open ports, one-fifth of the gross collection at which shall be paid every six calendar months into the hands of any Agent Her Britannic Majesty's Minister shall appoint to receive it, until the sum of 8,000,000, as above, shall have been paid in full: and it is further agreed, that the first period of six months shall be held to terminate, and the first payment, as above, described to fall due, upon the 31st day of March, 1861. A certain number of officers shall be deputed on the part of both Governments to verify the amounts, and to satisfy all forms proper to the payment and receipt of our indemnity.

To prevent misapprehension it is further agreed, that of the said sum of 8,000,000 taels, 2,000,000 shall be applied to cover the losses sustained by British subjects at Canton, and the remaining 6,000,000 as a contribution towards the indemnification of Her Britannic Majesty's Government for the naval and military expenditure entailed upon it by the Chinese Government.

ARTICLE VII.

It is agreed that, as soon as the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin shall have been exchanged, Her Britannic Majesty's forces now stationed at Chusan shall evacuate that island; that as soon as the sum of 1,000,000 taels shall have been paid, as stipulated in Article VI of this Convention, Her Majesty's forces stationed at the city of Tien-tsin shall withdraw thence to the forts of Takoo, the Prefecture of Tang-chau, and the city of Canton; and lastly, that so soon as the whole amount of the indemnity herein stipulated for, namely, 8,000,000 taels, shall have been paid, Her Majesty's forces shall evacuate each and all of the cities and places above enumerated.

ARTICLE VIII.

It is further agreed that, as soon as the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin shall have been exchanged in Peking, instructions shall be immediately issued to the high authorities of every province in the Empire to publish the said Treaty in proper form, and Article V of this Convention, throughout their respective jurisdictions.

No. 78.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received November* 13.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, September* 8, 1860.

MY despatches of August 30 and September 5 cover copies of the correspondence which has taken place since I reached Tien-tsin between me and the Imperial Commissioners appointed to negotiate with me. Concurrently with this correspondence, officious communications have been constantly passing between the Commissioners and Mr. Parkes, who has exhibited in the conduct of these proceedings, his usual zeal, ability, and tact.

In pursuance of an arrangement previously made, Messrs. Wade and Parkes waited, by my desire, on the Imperial Commissioners, on the 6th instant, with a draft of the Convention, which it was understood was to have been signed on the 8th. The Commissioners, who had already been unofficially apprized of its terms, made little objection to any portion of it, except the clause providing that of the total indemnity of 8,000,000 taels declared to be due by China to Great Britain, 1,000,000 should be paid before Tien-tsin was evacuated by the British troops. After some conversation, however, in which they betrayed manifest signs of uneasiness, they announced to my Secretaries that they could not stipulate that the Convention should take effect without previous ratification, and that so far from being ready to sign it on the 8th instant, they could not do so at all until it had been submitted to the Emperor for his approval.

This intimation led to a discussion respecting the extent of the powers held by Kweiliang and his colleagues.

It is not very easy to apprehend the precise import of the phraseology employed in Imperial Decrees on subjects of this nature. It was very obvious, however, from what passed during the course of this discussion, that Kweiliang either had not, or did not at this particular moment wish it to be supposed

that he had, powers equal to those which he held when he made a Treaty with me here in 1858; although the first communication which I received from him, announcing his appointment to the title which he assumed, and the language which he employed, were calculated to convey the opposite impression.

It was impossible to attribute this departure from a precedent so recently established, and established in the person of Kweiliang himself, to anything but a deliberate design to create delay, which might throw us into the winter, and thereby extricate the Peking Government from its present embarrassments. To check this policy by an act of vigour was manifestly indispensable, unless we intended to forfeit all the advantages secured by our advance to this point; and I accordingly resolved, with Baron Gros' concurrence, to intimate to the Imperial Commissioners that in consequence of the want of good faith exhibited by them in assuming the title of Plenipotentiaries when they could not exercise the authority which it implied, and of the delays which the alleged necessity of constant reference to Peking would occasion, I had determined to proceed at once to Tung-chau, and to enter into no further communications with them until I should have reached that place.

Inclosure No. 2 in this despatch is a copy of the letter in which I conveyed to them this determination, and Inclosure No. 1 a copy of the report in which Messrs. Wade and Parkes narrate what passed at the interview to which I have been referring.

My letter to the Imperial Commissioners produced a reply, of which Inclosure No. 3 is a copy. But although civilly worded, and abounding in promise, their reply was, in fact, an admission of the charge that they had been hitherto negotiating under false pretences. Inclosure No. 4 is a copy of my answer, and simply states that I adhere to the resolution communicated to them in my former despatch.

With the infelicity which so often characterizes the proceedings of Chinese negotiators in such cases, the Imperial Commissioners betrayed their want of candour in this matter on the day succeeding that on which Major-General Sir R. Napier reached this place with the 2nd Division of the force under Sir Hope Grant's command. The army was therefore in the best possible condition for a movement in advance, and I officially apprized the Commander-in-chief, who has been throughout fully cognizant of the course of the negotiations in which I have been engaged, of the cause of my desire to proceed to Tung-chau, in a letter of which the copy forms Inclosure No. 5 of this despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 78.

Memorandum of an Interview between the Assistant Imperial Commissioner Hang-ki and Messrs. Wade and Parkes.

Tien-tsin, September 7, 1860.

UNDER instructions from his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, who had communicated his wishes to that effect to the Commissioners in a despatch of the same date, we proceeded, about half-past 4 on the afternoon of the 6th instant, to the yamun of the Salt Commissioner, in which the Imperial Commissioner Kweiliang is staying, and at which it had been arranged we should meet the Assistant Commissioner Hang-ki, to deliver to the latter the draft of a Convention, on signature of which Lord Elgin promised, in his earlier despatch of the 29th August, to call on the Commanders-in-chief to desist from further hostilities.

The substance of this Convention had been made fully known to the Commissioners so early as the 3rd instant, and a draft of the whole Convention, with the exception of one Article, was non-officially handed to Hang-ki on the evening of the 5th instant; and it was then distinctly understood, after he had read it over, that the preliminary interview with the Ambassador should take place on the 7th, and the Convention be signed on the 8th instant. The single Article to be added, as we then told Hang-ki, concerned the troops, the distribution of which, in the South, was not yet absolutely decided; but we repeated what he already knew, that the moment the 1,000,000 taels stipulated

for in the Convention was paid, the force would be withdrawn from Tien-tsin. The Article, as it now stands, was of course added to the draft officially handed to him last evening.

The condition affecting the movements of the troops, however, seemed comparatively of little interest. His grand difficulty, to all appearance, was the payment of the money demanded. He had suggested some verbal changes and omissions in the despatch already in his hands, but nothing that would not have admitted of modification without compromising any principle.

When now reading over the preamble, however, he was reminded that, before signature, the powers of the Plenipotentiaries would have to be produced, that is to say, on the part of the Chinese the Imperial Decree, describing more or less the nature of the case requiring the appointment of Imperial Commissioners, and defining their authority to deal with such case. He did not seem much disturbed by this remark, but presently, on coming to the Article which provides for the immediate operativeness of the Convention, "without the formality of a ratification," he said that these words could not be inserted by any Chinese in a Treaty, and that, in fact, without first receiving the approval of the Emperor, the Commissioners could not sign the Convention at all.

This induced us to remark that the two Commissioners, Kweiliang and Hang-fuh, have each of them in their titles the words "pien-i-hing-sz," implying power to act as the occasion shall demand; and we went on to inquire what words describing the question they were charged to dispose of had accompanied such other words as invested them with the "pien-i-hing-sz" powers, in the Imperial Decree which we never doubted they had received.

Hang-ki then said that they had not received any other Decree than that already communicated to Lord Elgin in Hang-fuh's and Hang-ki's despatch, without date of the day (received 25th instant), and of this, Tsung-han, the Commissioner of the Salt Gabelle, who, partly as host and partly in satisfaction of Chinese usage, was assisting at our conference, went to procure a copy. He returned presently with one, which he subsequently admitted had been made from a "Peking Gazette," which he also produced. The Decree is identically the same with that recited in the above despatch. It does not state what the Commissioners are to discuss or dispose of, nor does it state that they are invested with "pien-i-hing-sz" powers. It makes no allusion even to foreign affairs.

We continued to press Hang-ki regarding this Decree, firmly persuaded that, as in 1858, the Emperor had issued one, declaratory of the nature of Kweiliang's mission, and his authority to deal with us. Hang-ki suggested that Kweiliang must have got his orders at his last audience of the Emperor, but that such a Decree as we spoke of might possibly be in the possession of Hang-fuh, who was at his own residence, but as Tsung-han continued to pass back and forward between Hang-ki and Kweiliang, it was deemed advisable to request an interview with the latter. This, after a little delay, was acceded to. Kweiliang informed us that he was very seriously indisposed: he looked so, and appeared at the same time rather to exaggerate his infirmity. He seemed, at the same time, fully conscious, as did the other two mandarins, that there was something wrong.

It was explained to him that our commission had been simply to confer with Hang-ki, with a view to putting the Convention, the terms of which he was already aware of, into shape, and that one of the first points to which we had naturally come, was the exhibition of the powers referred to in the preamble, which would have to precede the signature of the Convention itself; that understanding from Hang-ki that there was no Decree on the subject except the short one of the 24th ultimo, we had deemed it advisable to hear this from his Excellency Kweiliang's own lips, as we thought it useless to proceed with the further consideration of the draft we had brought, until we had informed Lord Elgin of the fact.

Kweiliang, as Tsung-han had done previously, fell back upon his first interview with Lord Elgin in 1858. He said he had then produced a Decree which was rejected as insufficient, because he was not furnished with a "kwan-fang," and that he had now brought a "kwan-fang" without a special Decree.

He was reminded that the former Decree was objected to as being in itself incomplete, even had he possessed a "kwan-fang," but that that Decree did at

least declare that he was armed with the plenipotentiary powers he assumed in his title, and he was again urged to say when, or by what Decree, he was now invested with the same title, to his employment of which alone was to be attributed Lord Elgin's acceptance of him as a Minister qualified to treat of the matter in hand.

Kweiliang endeavoured to impress upon us that he was sure to be regarded at Peking as possessing the necessary powers, as in Lord Elgin's letters to him, which he had forwarded to the capital, he had always been addressed by Lord Elgin as Plenipotentiary Minister. After some beating about the bush, however, he admitted that he had no Decree save the one before us, but would immediately write to Peking for the powers required.

We then took our leave.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE,
HARRY S. PARKES,
Joint Chinese Secretaries.

Inclosure 2 in No. 78.

The Earl of Elgin to Commissioners Kweiliang, Hang-fuh, and Hang-ki.

Tien-tsin, September 7, 1860.

THE Undersigned, Earl of Elgin, &c., has the honour to acknowledge the note of their Excellencies the Imperial Commissioners, proposing an interview with him this day.

The Undersigned has since received the report of his Secretaries, Mr. Wade and Mr. Parkes, who were yesterday sent to deliver officially to the Assistant Commissioner Hang-ki the Draft of the Convention which, as stated by the Undersigned in his despatch of the 29th August, it was necessary should be signed before he could apply to the Commanders-in-chief to desist from offensive operations.

Independently of the plain language used in the Undersigned's despatch above referred to, the nature of the stipulations to be entered into by this Convention having been communicated in various conversations, dating so far back as the 3rd instant, and a Draft of almost the whole Convention placed in their hands on the 5th instant, it is with no little surprise that the Undersigned has learnt that their Excellencies declare that they have no authority to sign the Convention until it shall have been submitted to His Majesty the Emperor, and that they are unable to produce any Decree investing them with the powers implied by certain words forming part of their official titles, and their assumption of which alone induced the Undersigned to regard their Excellencies as competent to the negotiations which their despatches of the 23rd of August and 25th of August declared them qualified to undertake. The Undersigned will not dwell on the want of good faith indicated by this proceeding. It is enough for him to observe that the alleged necessity of reference to Peking, from a point so distant as this, involves delays to which he will not submit. He has accordingly called upon his Excellency the General commanding Her Britannic Majesty's army in China, to provide him with such a force as will enable him to proceed, without loss of time, to Tung-chau; and he has further to intimate to the Imperial Commissioners that he can neither receive their visit nor enter into any Convention with them for the re-establishment of peace, till he shall have reached that city.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 78.

Commissioners Kweiliang, Hang-fuh, and Hang-ki to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

KWEILIANG and Hang-fuh, Imperial Commissioners, and Hang-ki, Assistant Commissioner, make a communication in reply.

The Commissioners have this instant received the letter of his Excellency the British Minister; and having thoroughly acquainted themselves with its

contents, would urge that a representation has been made to the Throne regarding the question raised at their interview of yesterday with his Excellency's Secretaries, Messrs. Wade and Parkes, and that His Majesty's Decree may be expected in a day or two. Peace between the two countries having become matter of negotiation (or negotiations being already on foot), a certain amount of indulgence, they think, may be allowed in all deliberations. It is their duty to state this to his Excellency the British Minister, and to request him, notwithstanding what has happened, at least to wait three days or so at Tien-tsin, so as to enable everything to be settled satisfactorily, to the more perfect re-establishment of friendly relations. This will be best. They accordingly address this communication to him.

A necessary communication.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 22nd day (7th September, 1860).

Inclosure 4 in No. 78.

The Earl of Elgin to Commissioners Kweiliang, Hang-fuh, and Hang-ki.

Tien-tsin, September 8, 1860.

THE Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the communication received last evening from their Excellencies the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang, Hang-fuh, Hang-ki, urging him to delay his departure from Tien-tsin for a few days.

The Undersigned begs to state, in reply, that he has nothing to add to the despatch which he had the honour to address yesterday to the Commissioners.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 78.

The Earl of Elgin to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Sir, *Tien-tsin, September* 8, 1860.

I REGRET to say that I have been compelled to break off, for the moment, negotiations for the re-establishment of peace with China, in consequence of its having been unexpectedly intimated to my Secretaries, Messrs. Parkes and Wade, by the Imperial Commissioners, that they have not the requisite authority to treat with me.

As this is evidently a device to gain time, I have thought it my duty to inform them that negotiations are closed for the present, and that they cannot be resumed until I shall have reached Tung-chau.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 79.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received November* 13.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, September* 9, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the translation of a semi-official note which I received from the Imperial Commissioners yesterday, urging me to delay my departure for Tung-chau, in consequence of the alarm which it would occasion to the people; and intimating that it was their desire to visit me. I informed them in my reply, of which I inclose likewise the copy, that I could not alter the determination on these points which I had already announced to them; but that the Commander-in-chief had taken measures to assure the people that they would not be exposed to molestation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 79.

Commissioners Kweiliang, Hang-fuh, and Hang-ki to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

[SEMI-OFFICIAL note, accompanied by the cards of the Imperial Commissioners.]

The Commissioners beg respectfully to state that the movement which they understand his Excellency the British Minister is making northward will alarm the people. They are well aware that the British Government never inflicts (or, the British never inflict) injury on the people, but the latter are so simple that they are sure to be frightened; and as it is beyond doubt the duty of the Imperial Commissioners to consider the people they are coming to-day to the residence of the British Minister in order to press him to defer his departure. They will be obliged to his Excellency, therefore, to appoint an hour at which they may pay their respects to him.

(Received September 8th, 1860.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 79.

The Earl of Elgin to Commissioners Kweiliang, Hang-fuh, and Hang-ki.

THE Undersigned begs to acknowledge the note he has just received from their Excellencies the Imperial Commissioners.

In his official communication of yesterday, the Undersigned informed their Excellencies that he must decline meeting them at Tien-tsin, and he cannot alter the decision recorded in that despatch.

The Imperial Commissioners do no more than justice to the desire of the British nation to inflict no unnecessary injury upon the common people; and he has much pleasure in acquainting their Excellencies that the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's land forces is issuing a proclamation to assure the people that they will be as heretofore carefully protected against molestation.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 80.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 13.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, September 20, 1860.*

THE insurgents have made no fresh attack on Shanghae, though parties of them have visited the villages in the neighbourhood, and have extorted money and maltreated the inhabitants, as usual.

The Intendant of Shanghae and Sieh, who is still here, have requested us to detach troops and vessels of war to protect the villages; but I have considered it advisable to confine our efforts to the protection of the town and settlement, and to avoid taking any step which might be considered as taking the offensive against them; and in this view the naval and military authorities, as well as M. de Bourboulon, concur. If intervention in this quarrel be decided on hereafter, it would be expedient to attack them at Soo-chow or Nanking itself, rather than to fritter away our strength in driving them out of open villages, which they can abandon or occupy at their pleasure. It is reported that they made an unsuccessful attempt on Cha-poo.

Raw silk comes down as usual from the interior, the insurgents contenting themselves with levying a small tax on it, and on boats that navigate the river; but, whether it be owing to the flight of the artizans, or the ruin of the establishments, the silk goods which are manufactured at Soo-chow, to a great extent, are no longer to be had, and this source of wealth and employment to the population is for the present, apparently, cut off.

Beyond what is required to clothe their troops, the insurgents seem to buy little but opium and arms.

I cannot discover that they are making any progress in the direction of Hang-chow-foo. They seem occupied, chiefly, in extracting all they can from

the villages in the shape of money. No doubt one of their principal objects in attacking Shanghae was, to obtain possession of the revenue derived from the Custom-house at this place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

P.S.—I have the honour to inclose an extract from a letter which has just been received from Mr. Interpreter Forrest.

Inclosure in No. 80.

Mr. Forrest to Lieutenant-Colonel Neale.

(Extract.)

THE rebels have made a grand advance towards Hoo-chow, and have taken all the places near that city, on both sides. Report says that Hoo-chow itself has fallen.

An officer of the Taoutae's, with whom I had some business yesterday, told me that he had been up the river to Sung-keang, and was informed that all genuine rebels, with very few exceptions, had returned to Soo-chow, but that large parties of peasants were committing horrible excesses in the villages on both sides of the river, almost up to Shanghae itself.

Those villagers who have not assisted the rebels are trying to exterminate those that have; but as both parties are pretty well matched, the fighting is likely to go on for some time.

No. 81.

Colonel Foley to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received November* 15.)

My Lord, *French Head-Quarters, Poo-kow, September* 11, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that General de Montauban arrived with the French force at Tien-tsin on the 31st of August. The French troops encamped about the fort, on the left bank of the River Peiho, about two miles and a half from the town.

In consequence of Kweiliang, the Chinese official nominally sent down to treat with the Ambassadors, having declared that he had no powers to do so, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros immediately decided that a force should move up to Tung-chau within twelve miles of Peking. General de Montauban with 3,000 men left Tien-tsin yesterday morning, and arrived at this place; Sir Hope Grant with his force being one day in advance. The Ambassadors accompany the troops. It is expected we shall reach Tung-chau in five days.

A mandarin has just arrived to say that two very high officials are *en route* from Peking with full powers to treat.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ST. GEORGE FOLEY.

No. 82.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received November* 18.)

My Lord, *Camp, Yang-tsun, September* 11, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to report that we reached this place yesterday morning, having performed about twenty miles of our march on Tung-chau without encountering resistance or difficulty of any kind. A heavy shower of rain last night, and the disappearance of a portion of our baggage animals, may delay us here for a few hours beyond the time originally fixed for our advance.

Meanwhile the effects of this decided step are already beginning to make themselves felt. I received this morning a communication, of which I inclose the translation, from two of the highest functionaries of the Empire, Tsai, a near relation of the Emperor, Prince of I, and President of the Clan Court, and Muh-

yin, President of the Board of War, informing me that they are appointed Plenipotentiaries to treat with me, and that they are proceeding to Tien-tsin for this purpose.

I have thought it right to adhere to my determination not to engage in further negotiations with any Chinese functionary until I shall have reached Tung-chau, and I transmit a copy of the despatch in which I apprize them of this determination, and of the grounds on which it rests.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 82.

Commissioners Tsai and Muh to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

TSAI, a Prince of I, a Captain-General of the Imperial Guard; and Muh, Member of the Great Council, and a President of the Board of War, Imperial Commissioner, make a communication.

In a Memorandum forwarded express by Kweiliang, under date the 23rd of the moon (8th September), it is represented that his Excellency the British Minister had stated that he would proceed to Tung-chau, and there negotiate, and that he could have no more correspondence with Kweiliang and his colleagues.

In the Decree of instructions issued by His Majesty the Emperor to Kweiliang and his colleagues regarding the various propositions enumerated in a series of despatches received from the British Government, the following words were used:—"There is nothing that they are not competent to discuss and dispose of;" the meaning of which was simply that they were desired to discuss and dispose of the forms (or rules) which the different Articles when assented to, were to be arranged in (1), that a Treaty might be concluded, and, this accomplished, take effect.

Kweiliang and his colleagues, instead of acting up to the spirit of the Imperial commands, have been querying and requiring explanations of these; the consequence of which is that his Excellency the British Minister has proposed to negotiate at Tung-chau.

But with negotiations of peace on foot between the two nations, a journey to and from Tung-chau will be a waste of time; and not only this, it will too probably create mistrust and apprehension in the minds of the army and the people. Besides, as the different propositions brought forward by the British Government have already been conceded, there cannot surely be anything that cannot be settled in a Conference. The Commissioners have accordingly received His Majesty the Emperor's commands, specially directing them to proceed to Tien-tsin, to consider everything that has to be considered with the British Minister. They will commence their journey immediately, and as soon as they have had an interview with his Excellency, they will conclude a Treaty embodying everything, in order to the strengthening of friendly relations.

As in duty bound, they notify (their intention) to his Excellency the British Minister.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 25th day (September 10, 1860).

(Received September 11, 1860.)

Notes.

(1.) The words quoted, and which were in Kweiliang's first despatch, have never appeared in any Decree communicated to us. The explanation of them, given as it stands in Chinese, is literally, "to deliberate and settle regulations, (embodying) assent to each Article," or "each Article assented to." It is possible that in consideration of the text with a native, some passages of the translation may be revised. The general meaning is what I have made it.

(2.) Tsai is Tsai-yuen, a near relation of the Emperor, President of the Imperial Clan-Court.

Muh-yin is one of those known as a member of the clique who during the past year or two have been in reality the Government.

(3.) The seal used is to all appearance new, and bears the characters "Prince, Imperial Commissioner," or "Prince, &c."

(Signed) THOMAS WADE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 82.

The Earl of Elgin to Commissioners Tsai and Muh.

Camp, Yang-tsun, September 11, 1860.

THE Undersigned, &c., Earl of Elgin, &c., has the honour to acknowledge a despatch received this morning from the Imperial Commissioners Tsai, Prince of I, and Muh, President of the Board of War, acquainting him that they have been directed by His Majesty the Emperor to repair to Tien-tsin, to confer with the Undersigned, and requesting him to spare himself the trouble of proceeding to Tung-chau, lest the people and soldiery should be alarmed.

The Undersigned must impress upon the Commissioners that, in awaiting the arrival of his Excellency Kweiliang at Tien-tsin, and at once entering into communication with his Excellency and his colleagues, he gave the strongest evidence of his desire to bring the present misunderstanding to a peaceful termination.

The fullest explanations were furnished to their Excellencies the above Commissioners, and in correspondence extending over several days, left them in no doubt whatever as to the nature of the Convention it would be necessary to sign before the Undersigned would call on the Commanders-in-chief of Her Britannic Majesty's forces to desist from hostile operations. Their Excellencies the Commissioners had declared their readiness to sign the Convention on the 6th instant. To meet their convenience that day had been changed to the 7th instant, when, on the evening of the 6th they declared that, without a further reference to the Throne, signature would be impossible.

Without laying stress on the bad faith evinced in these evasions, the Undersigned, conceiving it established that further attempts to conclude negotiations at Tien-tsin would but result in further delays, at once decided on removing to some point nearer the capital. He accordingly informed their Excellencies that he would sign no Treaty before arriving at Tung-chau, and to this decision he must beg to adhere.

As regards the alarm of the people, it will be gratifying to their Excellencies to learn that, both by word and deed, the Commander-in-chief has done everything in his power to prevent it; but if any such consequences as their Excellencies appear to anticipate, should arise from the present proceedings of the Undersigned, he must most distinctly state that he holds the Chinese Government solely responsible for them, as it is on account of the want of good faith shown by the Chinese Government that this expedition to Tung-chau has been undertaken.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 83.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 27.)

My Lord, *Ho-se-woo, September* 16, 1860.

ON the early morning of the day succeeding that on which I addressed to your Lordship my despatch of the 11th instant, from Yang-tsun, and when I was already on horseback, two white-buttoned mandarins arrived in hot haste from the North, bearing with them a letter to me from Prince Tsai and his colleague; the translation of which is the first of the documents herewith inclosed. This communication, as your Lordship will observe, was somewhat defiant in its tone. The writers expressed surprise at my having started with a force from Tien-tsin, in spite of their letter of the previous day, which letter had not, however, reached me until two days after my departure from that place; and required me to return thither in terms slightly imperious. It appeared to

me that the proper way of dealing with such a communication was to take no notice of it whatever; and accordingly, without making any reply to it, I accompanied the advancing column of the army to Nan-tsie-tsun, a village which had been already fixed upon as the limit of that day's march, and which was about eight miles beyond Yang-tsun.

At abou 7 o'clock in the evening a further communication from the same personages reached me at our new halting-place. Its translation forms the second inclosure of this despatch. It purports to be a reply to my communication to them, of which the copy was sent to your Lordship in my despatch referred to above. Both in letter and in spirit it is more modest than that which I had received from them only twelve hours before. It concedes unconditionally almost all the points in controversy between us. A strong desire is expressed that the British army may not be permitted to go beyond Ho-se-woo, a village one day's march in advance of Nan-tsie-tsun, and this request is accompanied by the somewhat ingenuous remark that, if halted there, it will still be sufficiently near to be called into play should any hitch occur in the conduct of negotiations.

Before replying to this communication, which could not manifestly be treated with the same disregard as its predecessor, I addressed to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant a letter, the copy of which, together with a copy of his reply, form Inclosures 3 and 4 of this despatch, with the view of ascertaining whether or not we were in a position to continue, without interruption, our hostile advance on Tung-chow. If the answer to this inquiry had been in the affirmative, I might, perhaps, have deemed it expedient to decline to listen to any overtures from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, until I should have been either under or within the walls of that city. When I learnt, however, that in the judgment of the Commander-in-chief, it would be necessary, before undertaking a march which might end in the assault of Tung-chow, to create a large depôt of stores at Ho-se-woo, and to bring up heavy guns, operations which would occupy from eight to ten days at the least, and which might, perhaps, involve a much more considerable expenditure of time, I resolved, with his entire consent and concurrence, to make a communication to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, which might, perhaps, have the effect of bringing matters to a speedier issue, and enable us to avoid delays, which at this season of the year, and in the present low state of the river, are not unattended with hazard. I may add, that I do not think I could possibly, for the space of ten days or a fortnight, during which the General would have been engaged in concentrating a large army at Ho-se-woo, have turned a deaf ear to such overtures as Prince Tsai and his colleague were making, without justifying the belief that the avowed object of our march on Peking was not the real one, and that while we professed to be enforcing the stipulations of a Treaty, we were, in point of fact, bent on the conquest of the Empire. A desperate attempt to resist, involving, probably, an appeal to the patriotism of the populations in our rear, or a speedy flight into Tartary, would have been the only alternative open to the Emperor and his advisers, if this conviction had obtained possession of their minds.

The communication which, under these circumstances, I determined to address to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, was in substance to the effect that the British army would continue its advance on Tung-chow, crushing all opposition which it might encounter. But that if the Chinese authorities gave me the securities for their good conduct which I required, I would cause it to halt at a point within an easy stage of that city, and proceed from there with an escort of 1,000 men to Tung-chow, for the signature of the Convention, and to Peking for the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin. I embodied these conditions in a letter which I entrusted to Messrs. Wade and Parkes for delivery, recommending them at the same time to endeavour, if possible, to obtain a personal interview with the Prince and his colleague, as I thought that what they might say verbally, in explanation of our real views and objects in China on such an occasion, when for the first time a functionary of the highest authority was about to come into contact with us, would be likely to produce a much more salutary effect than anything which I could write. For reasons which they explained on their return, and which were perfectly satisfactory to me, these gentlemen eventually decided not to deliver my letter. But they obtained access to the Prince and his colleague, and conducted all the other duties of their important and somewhat hazardous mission with a courage and ability which does them the greatest honour.

A letter to me from Mr. Wade narrating briefly the principal incidents of this mission, the translation of a communication from Prince Tsai and his colleague, which crossed them on their way, and of a further communication from the same persons which Messrs. Wade and Parkes brought back with them from Tung-chow, form Inclosures 5, 6, and 7 of this despatch.

On their return I put Baron Gros and Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant in possession of the information which they had gathered during their mission, and the following plan of proceeding was, after deliberation, agreed on. The Commanders-in-chief resolved to proceed on Monday, the 17th instant, from Ho-se-woo, to the point at which it had been arranged that the bulk of the allied army should halt, and which it was understood would be reached in two days' march; at the same time, or rather before the departure of the army, Mr. Parkes undertook to start from Tung-chow, accompanied by some of the gentlemen of my suite, who were to proceed thither for the purpose of making preparations for the reception of the Embassy at that place, and to procure for us the means of transport, in which we were sadly deficient. Sir Hope Grant also determined to take advantage of Mr. Parkes' return to Tung-chow, to send with him officers of the Quartermaster-General's Department, and of the Commissariat, and to furnish an escort for the protection of the whole party.

The French Ambassador and Commander-in-chief resolved, on their side, to adopt somewhat similar measures.

The last inclosure of this despatch is the copy of a letter which I requested Mr. Parkes to deliver to the Prince Tsai and his colleague on his arrival at Tung-chow. It informs them that I agree substantially to the terms for effecting a pacific settlement of our pending differences with China which they had been induced by Messrs. Wade and Parkes to offer. I required, however, that a proclamation should immediately be issued to apprize the people that it was at the request of the Chinese Commissioners themselves that the British army halted at the place fixed upon, and I added that I would come under no obligation to withdraw it from this advanced position until I should have been satisfied that the Chinese Government had resolved to keep its Treaty engagements. I also adverted in this communication to the fact that I was the bearer of a letter from Her Majesty to the Emperor of China, which I should desire to deliver on my arrival at Peking.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 83.

Commissioners Tsai and Muh to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

TSAI, Prince of I, &c., and Muh, President of the Board of War, &c., Imperial Commissioners, make a communication.

The Prince and his colleague having had the great honour to receive His Majesty the Emperor's gracious commands to proceed as Ministers Plenipotentiary* to Tien-tsin, and there in conference with his Excellency the British Minister definitively settle the form in which the stipulations accorded were to be arranged, addressed a despatch to that effect to his Excellency the British Minister upon the 25th instant (19th September). Presuming that his Excellency cannot fail to have informed himself of these facts, they are, indeed, astonished to learn that his Excellency has, notwithstanding, again arrayed his troops, and is moving forward from Tien-tsin.

The purpose of his Excellency's Government being relations of friendship to endure for ever with the Government of China, is this hostile movement (literally, array of troops) reasonable? If a hostile movement be necessary, then friendly relations do not exist: in view of these circumstances, it appears to the Prince and his colleague that it would be inexpedient, on their part, to hurry forward without further deliberation, and it becomes their duty to request his Excellency the British Minister to send back to their quarters in Tien-tsin the whole force he has brought hence with him, thereby to show that he has no feeling of animosity, and to put it in some degree in the power of the Prince and his

* Our term, not the usual Chinese equivalent.

colleague to proceed to Tien-tsin, and in conference with him dispose of whatever there is to be deliberated about; such being the course (consistent with professions) of eternal friendship.

They would add that if what is required is the execution of the Treaty now concluded, without any additions extraordinary, they are not like the Chief Minister Kweiliang,* they will assuredly nor eat their words.

But if the British Minister insists on advancing with a force, if he will not send back his troops, it is plain that he is not earnest in his desire for friendly relations. The troops of Government hold positions throughout the neighbourhood of Ho-se-woo, and if there should be any misunderstanding between them and the others, the negotiations of peace will be seriously prejudiced by it; nor is it possible for the Prince and his colleague to interfere. They can only hope that his Excellency will think over what has been stated. They are already at Matan,† where they will wait until his Excellency write a reply to say that his troops are returned to Tien-tsin; that thereupon they may proceed to Tien-tsin.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin.
Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 20th day (11th September, 1860.)
(Received September 12, 1860).

Inclosure 2 in No. 83.

Commissioners Tsai and Muh to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

TSAI, Prince of I, and Muh, President of the Board of War, &c., &c., Imperial Commissioners, make a communication in reply.

On the morning of the 7th day of the present moon (12th September), the Prince and the Minister his colleague received a despatch from his Excellency the British Minister, in which he states that "he had never desired any other than a pacific solution of the present question." These words, which prove his Excellency is sincere in his desire for friendly relations, are most gratifying to the Imperial Commissioners. His Excellency proceeds to say, "that it was only because Kweiliang showed himself unable to sign the Convention immediately that his Excellency had felt it his duty, in order to prevent further loss of time, to move to some place nearer (the capital); and had accordingly resolved to proceed to Tung-chow."

The Prince and his colleague have had the honour to be appointed, by the gracious commands of His Majesty the Emperor, Special Plenipotentiaries for the negotiations of peace. They have reached Matan, where it had been their intention to wait until the forces of the British Minister should be withdrawn to Tien-tsin, and then to proceed to Tien-tsin and there sign the Treaty (the Convention?) as originally considered, and so bring the question to a pacific termination, that no further time might be lost. His Excellency, fearing a further loss of time, adheres to his intention to proceed to Tung-chow; and seeing that if the Prince and his colleague were to return thither now that they have reached Matan, this moving back and forward would occasion a further postponement of the day (of signature), it would be best (they think) that there should be a conference between the parties. If, therefore, the British Minister will retire his forces to Tien-tsin, the Prince and his colleague will have it in their power to repair at once to Tien-tsin for a conference for the consideration and dispatch of business. But if his Excellency be apprehensive that time will be wasted by these movements to and fro, there would be no objection whatever to his halting his force at Yung-tsun, and selecting some place midway (between that town and Matan) near enough to suit his convenience, at which business might be discussed and disposed of. Let his Excellency decide whether it shall be Ho-se-woo or Ngan-ping, and inform the Prince and his colleagues which he chooses, and they on receipt of his reply will name a day for a conference; and having then, at whatever spot within reach (he shall name), or without travelling further, concluded a Treaty (containing) the propositions originally brought forward, seal it and sign it. Thus, assuredly, there will be no delay. If negotiations should not

* Kweiliang's name is mentioned without any respect. He is not impossibly degraded.
† Matan, ordinarily a landing-place or port, here specially of a place some miles from Peking.

run smoothly, what difficulty would his Excellency have in recommencing his march upon Tung-chow? It would never be too late.

His Excellency is requested to act with all speed. The Prince and his colleague will make a point of awaiting his reply to shape their course.

They have to add that, on receiving their special commission to come forward and negotiate peace, they set out in such haste that is impossible that there should be perfect uniformity in the paper, seals, &c., which they use; but let this occasion no doubt or apprehension to his Excellency.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 27th day (12th September, 1860).

(Received September 13, 1860).

Inclosure 3 in No. 83.

The Earl of Elgin to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Sir, *Ngau-tsai-tsun, September* 12, 1860.

IN my despatch of the 8th instant I informed your Excellency that I considered it to be my duty, in consequence of the want of good faith shown by the Imperial Commissioner Kweiliang, to intimate to him that I should call on your Excellency to convey me to Tung-chow, and that I should not conclude any Treaty with the Chinese Government until I had reached that place.

Since I left Tien-tsin I have been apprised of the nomination of new Imperial Commissioners of very high rank and official standing. These Commismissioners assure me that they hold powers from the Emperor of the most certain character, and invite me to confer with them at some point near to this place.

Before I answer this, I should be glad to learn from your Excellency whether there are any military difficulties in the way of an immediate advance on Tung-chow: that there are none which would not be superable by your Excellency and the force under your command, I confidently believe; but if there be any which would, in your judgment, occasion delay, it would be my duty to consider them in dealing with these overtures of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 83.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to the Earl of Elgin.

Head-Quarters, Camp, Ho-se-woo,

My Lord, *September* 13, 1860.

IN answer to your Excellency's letter of the 12th instant, I have the honour to state that it will be inexpedient for the army under my command to move from Ho-se-woo for seven or eight days at least. The force I have with me at present is small, and must be reinforced. The heavy guns now on their way up by water cannot arrive for several days, and it will be necessary for me to form a depôt at this place for supplies to make me independent of the country, from which it is very uncertain whether I shall be able to get a sufficiency. Supplies are expected up by the river, but it will take several days before they arrive.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT.

Inclosure 5 in No. 83.

Mr. Wade to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Pa-li-chiau, September* 23, 1860

IT had been, of course, the intention of Mr. Parkes and myself to report formally to your Excellency the result of our expedition to Tung-chow, and

the evening before Mr. Parkes left Ho-se-woo, we carefully went over the whole ground together. From our joint recollection of what took place, aided by some rough notes made during our interview with the Commissioners by Mr. Parkes, I prepared a memorandum of considerable dimensions. This was to have been put into shape and signed by us both, but my own movements, as your Excellency is aware, have been such as to render its rédaction impossible, and I must, therefore, limit myself to a précis of the paper, trusting that ere the departure of next mail I shall be able to present it to you with Mr. Parkes's signature.

We reached Tung-chow about noon on the 14th, not having spent the night at Ma-tan, the village at which your Excellency had expected we should find the Imperial Commissioners Tsai and Muh. Ma-tan is a most wretched place, and the Commissioners had left it, I presume, on hearing of our advance to Ho-se-woo.

Along the road to Tung-chow we saw sufficient evidence of the neighbourhood of a large force, but none of the works or batteries found by the allied force on the 18th instant.

We reached the city about noon, and took up our abode in the yamun of the chief civilian, and about 4 o'clock proceeded to the Temple outside the east gate, in which the Commissioners were waiting our arrival. Our approach had been announced the evening before from Ma-tan.

We were shown into a side room, and the Commissioners almost immediately followed. The Prince Tsai (I Tsin-wang) is a tall dignified man, with an intelligent countenance, though a somewhat unpleasant eye. Muh-yin, the President of the Board of War, softer and more wily in his manner, but also intelligent. Both were extremely polite, the Prince especially, and without condescension or affectation.

The Commissioners relieved us of the necessity of producing our letter of credence, by requesting to be informed what had dissatisfied your Excellency, to whom they had written once and again. We said that your Excellency found difficulty in deciding whom to trust as Representative of the Chinese Government, or by what forms it would consider itself bound, and, in explanation, we reviewed briefly the history of our intercourse for the last three years. The Prince deprecated allusion to the past, defended Kweiliang as very old and infirm, and insisted on the guarantee afforded by his own high rank for the validity of any engagements he might accept for his Government. We contended that reference to the past was unhappily inevitable, and closing with what he advanced in support of his own superiority as Imperial Representative, we endeavoured to draw from him what authority he would be able to produce to your Excellency for his exercise of the Plenipotentiary powers assumed by Kweiliang.

He denied that the formula employed by Kweiliang was Chinese. We cited the Decrees of 1842 and 1858, and after much discussion on the nature and object of powers, and in particular upon the national obligations arising out of contracts signed by Plenipotentiary Ministers, the Prince having first declared that what he signed would be as though the Emperor signed it, agreed to procure such a Decree as would correspond to our definition of the powers required.

This obtained, he wished to know what would he be required to sign? We assumed that he knew what had passed at Tien-tsin. He ignored the Convention altogether, although in two of his despatches already written, he had promised to sign it. I reminded him of this, and produced a copy of the Convention which I had in my pocket. He read it rapidly, remarking at first that if he could promise all the rest, he could not promise the payment demanded within two months at Tien-tsin. If the money were not forthcoming, we should be charging China with another breach of faith. Could we not promise to make the term five months? Of course we could promise nothing. Then he could not promise anything till he had conferred with your Excellency.

I think he here rose and left the room; Muh-yin meanwhile perused the draft, and although he had professed difficulty in understanding our Chinese, and had even affected a little deafness, he showed himself well up in all that had just passed, and, indeed, in all the questions at issue.

Presently, the Prince returning, Mr. Parkes asked him whether he would point out any other Articles to which he took exception, and he then objected to the disposition of the troops, the residence of Her Majesty's Minister at Peking, the payment of indemnity, the opening of Tien-tsin to trade, and lastly, though

this was not in the Convention, to the escort which he had heard was to accompany your Excellency: all this, however, with little show of earnestness. The old arguments against our coming North at all, the climate, the disposition of the people, &c., were urged, but not as if it was expected they would influence us. After a vast deal of desultory debate, however, we arrived at the following position:—

We explained that your Excellency having declared your intention not to sign the Convention elsewhere than at Tung-chow, would infallibly come to that city for that purpose; that it would make no difference to your Excellency whether you came with the large force now on its way from Tien-tsin or the escort originally mentioned to Kweillang: but that your Excellency, assuming that it would make every difference to the Chinese Government, had sent us to wait on the Prince and his colleague for the purpose of impressing upon them the conditions on which the advance of the force upon Tung-chow might be stayed. We were come simply as witnesses to your Excellency's desire for a pacific termination of the present misunderstanding, should it be possible; but we were not authorized to promise any abatement of the demands already known to the Chinese Government: indeed, it was rather to be assumed from what had passed since our arrival at Peh-tang, that further postponement of the satisfaction of these would but lead to the addition of others. The most we could undertake to say was, that if we were enabled to report to your Excellency that the Commissioners were ready to sign the Convention, to produce the necessary powers, and to furnish some adequate guarantee for the adherence of the Chinese Government to the engagements he was to contract for it, the British force would not advance beyond a camping-ground to be selected to the south of Chang-kia-wan, an old town of some substance about four miles south of Tung-chow. We had already had a long conversation upon the character of the escort which was to be sent with your Excellency, and the readiness with which we admitted the perfect right of the Chinese Commissioners to be attended by an escort of equal strength, or if they wished it of greater strength, had disposed of that difficulty. The greatest opposition was now offered by the Prince to our proposal to encamp near Chang-kia-wan. Indeed, more than once he seemed determined to run all risks rather than concede this point. A distance of five *li*, say a mile and a half, he at last admitted would suffice, and I withdrew to another room to prepare a draft of the letter to be written by the Commissioners to your Excellency.

The difficulty in this was the guarantee for the future. The Prince again appealed to his position in the Empire, repeating that what he signed was as though the Emperor signed it, &c.; and after a little discussion as to how he should state this, the declaration as it now stands was agreed to.

During my absence, the Prince had been in conversation with Mr. Parkes, who, in answer to one of the general expressions of a hope that henceforth friendly relations would continue uninterrupted, had remarked that an increase of intercourse would doubtless make us better friends, and that he rejoiced in the prospect of an acquaintance between the Representatives of foreign Governments and the three Princes. Your Excellency will bear in mind that, from all we have ever been given to understand, the actual Government of the country is in the hands of Prince Hwui, the Prince of Ching, and the Prince of I, to whom Mr. Parkes was speaking. He started at the words "the three Princes;" by whom, added Mr. Parkes, we have been much misunderstood: and he immediately rejoined, Not by them alone; but also by (writing the character with his forefinger in the air, *à la Chinoise*) the "Han" (Chinese). He then rose, went round the table, and again whispered the word "Han." They then became very friendly; and, in answer to Mr. Parkes' assurance that our real wish had ever been to do the country service, the Prince at once suggested that we might help them much in supplying the capital with grain; hinting at the same time that we should not, he hoped, attempt to make too great a profit upon it. He then tried to sound Mr. Parkes upon the question of co-operation against rebels, but finding him avoid this question, returned to the grain supply.

My return with the draft put an end to the conversation, and as soon as it had received its final correction, it was sent to be copied. We did not wait for it, as the Commissioners' seal was at their residence in the city; and as it was now well past midnight, we took our leave, very weary of an interview which had lasted upwards of eight hours.

The earnestness, and even vehemence, with which the Prince had discussed,

first, the question of powers, and lastly, the position of the force, induced us both to believe that his surrender at last was *bonâ fide* for the purpose of preventing further hostilities. I think so still; the deep sighs with which Muh-yin perused the despatch we were to carry away may have had other causes, but they appeared to me at the time not unfavourable symptoms.

The expected letter arrived, shortly after us, at our lodgings, and at 5 o'clock we started for Ho-se-woo.

South of Chang-kia-wan we observed numerous Cavalry videttes, but no large body, and none of the works upon which our force came two days later.

In the neighbourhood of Matan, long lines of a very wretched Cavalry presented themselves in parade order. The officers to whom we spoke inquired eagerly if there was a prospect of peace; and the following day were withdrawn throughout the country in question. Mr. Parkes, who had occasion to accompany a civil mandarin, who had been waiting our return beyond our lines, is my authority for this statement.

I think it worth mention, that a prisoner taken on the 21st, in the course of conversation, volunteered the remark that the fighting was all the doing of Sang-ko-lin-sin, who was as anxious for it as the Prince Tsai was opposed to it. This accords with other reports.

In the absence of Mr. Parkes, I may be permitted to state that, as on all similar occasions, the greater part of the work of discussion and persuasion fell to his share. His name was evidently well known to the Commissioners, and they treated what fell from him with particular attention.

I have, &c.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 83.

Commissioners Tsai and Muh to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

TSAI, Prince of I, and Muh-yin, President of the Board of War, Imperial Commissioners, make a communication.

The Prince and his colleague addressed a communication to his Excellency the British Minister, on the 26th instant (12th September), and a reply to a communication received from his Excellency on the 27th instant (13th September), and being aware that both despatches have been received by his Excellency, they are really at a loss to understand why he has not replied to them.

The Prince and his colleague having been sent from the capital, by His Majesty's commands, for the purpose of negotiating peace with the British, their sole desire was to meet his Excellency, and, in person, effect with him a restoration of friendly relations; but the garrisons stationed north of Ho-se-woo are under the command of the high officers in charge of the force; the Prince and his colleague have nothing to say to them; and, were the troops accompanying his Excellency (which they understand have reached Ho-se-woo) to advance so far as to come in contact with these garrisons, the inevitable consequence would be a misunderstanding between the two bodies, which would disappoint the hope, strong as it is, entertained by the Prince and his colleague, that friendly relations may be firmly established; a consequence seriously to be deplored.

In the British Minister's reply of the 26th instant, he stated that his only object was to proceed to Tung-chow. The Prince and his colleague have really no object to baulk his Excellency's worthy purpose; and they now engage that, if he will station his force at Yang-tsun-tsai-tsun and Ho-se-woo, without making further movement onward, and will then meet the Prince and his colleague, according to the Article proposed by him at Tien-tsin on the subject of his admission into Peking, with a small suite unarmed, the Convention, they promise, shall be concluded, sealed, and signed; and this done, a day chosen for his Excellency's entry into Peking for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications, that no further time may be lost.

The carriages and other vehicles required by his Excellency shall be provided by the local authorities, and shall be sent forward as soon as the number of his suite shall have been stated. Orders shall at the same time be given to the military authorities to furnish an escort; and the Prince and his

colleague will write to the high officer commanding the forces to explain to the troops, in peremptory terms, that there is to be no alarm or unruly conduct. Thus will his Excellency be enabled to advance with all speed.

The Prince and his colleague can further desire, that the local authorities supply the British force with everything it may require at the points at which it is stationed.

If matters can be arranged in this sense, the Prince and his colleague may be more or less spared the disappointment of their desire for the establishment of friendly relations. They assume that his Excellency entertains a corresponding desire, and they trust that he will have the goodness to reply to them as soon as possible.

A necessary communication, addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 18th year, 7th moon, 28th day (13th September, 1860), about 10 P.M.

(Received September 14, 1860.)

Inclosure 7 in No. 83.

Commissioners Tsai and Muh to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Commissioners, Tsai, Prince of I, and Muh, President of the Board of War, make the following communication.

His Excellency the Ambassador having sent his Secretaries, Messrs. Wade and Parkes, to Tung-chow, the Prince and his colleague were informed by them, on their arrival here to-day, of all those points upon which the Ambassador insists, and there is no one of these which is not now thoroughly understood by the Prince and his colleague.

On the subject of the powers which are to be produced by the Plenipotentiaries on both sides when they meet at Tung-chow for the discussion of business, the Prince and his colleague have no difficulty in engaging that the necessary Imperial Edict shall be forthcoming on their part.

To the inquiry made on behalf of the Ambassador as to what security can be given for the faithful execution of the engagements now entered into, the Prince and his colleague have to reply, that no comparison can be drawn between the authority vested in them and that held by other Ministers who may have been charged with negotiations, and that this fact affords a positive assurance of the future observance of good faith on the part of their Government.

The Prince and his colleague having further been called upon to state whether they can engage to conclude and sign a Convention identical in every respect with that recently communicated to the Minister Kweiliang, and, this effected, that the Treaty of 1858 shall be exchanged in Peking, they willingly undertake the performance of both these stipulations.

The Prince and his colleague having thus accepted the above conditions without exception, have now to express an urgent wish that his Excellency the Ambassador will not bring up the main body of the British forces to Tung-chow, but will limit his escort to about 1,000 men: also, that the former shall not occupy any position nearer than five *li* from the town of Chang-kia-wan.* They have further to urge that the English forces shall make no onward movement after the Convention shall have been sealed and signed, and that this being done, they shall be withdrawn at an early date.

A necessary communication to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 18th year, 7th month, 29th day (September 14, 1860).

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* Chang-kia-wan is 12 *li* (or rather less than 4 miles) from the south face of Tung-chow: the distance alluded to will therefore be about five miles from the latter city.—H. S. P.

Inclosure 8 in No. 83.

The Earl of Elgin to Commissioners Tsai and Muh.

Ho-se-woo, September 16, 1860.

THE Undersigned, &c., has received a despatch from their Excellencies the Imperial Commissioners, Prince of Tsai, and Muh, President of the Board of War, under date the 13th instant. The despatch of their Excellencies of the 14th instant, brought back by his Secretaries from Tung-chow, has also reached him.

In reply, the Undersigned has the honour to state that he is willing, if all the conditions specified below be faithfully carried out, to stipulate that the main body of the British force shall not advance beyond five *li* on this side of Chang-kia-wan. It will commence its march towards that place to-morrow, and it will commit no hostile act upon the route, unless it encounters opposition.

In order, however, to prevent misunderstanding, it will be well that their Excellencies should cause a proclamation to be forthwith issued, to the effect that as peace negotiations are on foot, and as the British Ambassador and Commander-in-chief have agreed, in compliance with the request of their Excellencies, that the main body of the British force shall halt at the point in question, the people should at once return to their homes, unclose their shops, and re-open their markets. This is essential for the protection of the people themselves. All supplies required by the troops will be punctually paid for, if they be offered for sale, but the country will infallibly be scoured to obtain them if no markets be opened.

When the Proclamation above referred to shall have been issued, and all necessary preparations shall have been made at Tung-chow for his reception, the Undersigned will proceed to Tung-chow with an escort of about 1,000 men, and having there signed the Convention, will go on accompanied by the same escort to the capital, there to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, and to present to His Majesty the Emperor the autograph letter with which he has had the honour to be charged by Her Majesty the Queen of England.

After these several acts shall have been performed, it is the intention of the Undersigned to take steps without delay for withdrawing the British troops from the vicinity of the capital, and placing them in the positions specified in Article VII of the Convention. But he must remind their Excellencies, that by their own admission he has been twice deceived by functionaries professing to hold from the Emperor of China full powers to enter into Treaty engagements with him.

Whether, therefore, he can be able to give effect to that intention sooner or later, will depend mainly on the evidence which the Chinese Government shall furnish of its determination to carry out faithfully all the Articles of the Treaty of 1858, and of the Convention about to be concluded at Tung-chow.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 84.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 27.)

My Lord, *Pa-li-chiau, September* 23, 1860.

IN my despatch of the 16th instant I did myself the honour to submit, for your Lordship's information, a statement of the incidents which had occurred here between the 11th instant, when the first communication from Prince Tsai and his colleague reached me, and that date. I now proceed to narrate what has taken place subsequently.

The arrangements detailed at the close of my despatch above mentioned, as having been determined on after the return of Messrs. Wade and Parkes from Tung-chow, were exactly carried out.

Mr. Parkes started for that place at a very early hour on Monday the 17th instant, accompanied by Colonel Walker, Quartermaster-General of the Cavalry Brigade, Mr. Thomson, of the Commissariat Department, Mr. Loch, my private Secretary, Mr. de Normann, one of Mr. Bruce's Attachés, who volunteered to go with him to assist him, and Mr. Bowlby, and escorted by five men of the

King's Dragoon Guards, and twenty of Fane's Horse under the command of Lieutenant Anderson. The allied force and the Commanders-in-chief commenced their march somewhat later.

I received no communication from either during the course of that day. On the following morning, however, at about 10 A.M. the sound of Artillery was heard in the distance, and at noon a Sikh trooper arrived from Sir Hope Grant's camp. He brought me a letter from Mr. Parkes, but no news from the camp, except the verbal report that a brisk cannonade had commenced half-an-hour after he left it.

Mr. Parkes in his letter informed me that the Commissioners had raised the three following objections to my despatch to them of which he had been the bearer :—

First. To the indefinite date assigned for the withdrawal of our troops, which they contended should take place immediately after the signature of the Convention.

Secondly. To my proceeding to Peking with an escort, or at least with an escort equal to that which I had stated would accompany me to Tung-chow; and,

Thirdly. To the delivery of Her Majesty's letter to the Emperor at an audience.

It was on this last objection that they chiefly insisted. I do not inclose the copy of Mr. Parkes' letter, as it was marked private, but the closing sentences are so characteristic that I beg leave to quote them. He dates it at 4·30 A.M. from Tung-chow, which is six miles from the proposed place of the encampment of the army, four miles from Chang-kia-wan, and twenty-four miles from Ho-se-woo, where I was residing, and he writes :—

"I am now starting with Colonel Walker and a Chinese officer to attempt the arrangement of the first of these points (the camping ground for the army). I then go to Chang-kia-wan to start supply work (also for the army); then come back to Tung-chow to get out the Proclamation, upon which block-cutters have been at work during the night; and if time and physical strength will then admit, I shall ride back in the evening to Ho-se-woo that I may know your Lordship's views on the question of audience, which the Chinese authorities will, I am sure, again recur to, the moment they see me."

At about half-an-hour after midnight, I received a letter from Sir Hope Grant, describing the circumstances which led to the engagement of the 18th, its successful issue, and inquiring how I considered the negotiations in which I was engaged for the re-establishment of peace to be affected by this incident. The General's letter was in pencil, and I cannot now furnish a copy of it. But I inclose a copy of my reply, which I dispatched at 4 A.M. of the 19th instant to the head-quarters of the Commander-in-chief, by the hands of my Military Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Crealock. I followed myself at 5 A.M., as I thought that the detention of Mr. Parkes and the others who were with him might give rise to questions in the determination of which I should take my share of responsibility.

I found that Sir Hope Grant had established his head-quarters at Chang-kia-wan, and soon after my arrival there we proceeded together to the residence of the French Commander-in-chief, in order that we might confer with his Excellency as to the best means of recovering the subjects of Her Majesty and of the Emperor of the French who were missing.

It was agreed that a reconnaissance of British Cavalry should proceed forthwith to Tung-chow, and that Mr. Wade should accompany it with a notification to the chief mandarin of that city to the effect that the Commanders-in-chief of the allied armies required all English and French subjects to return to the head-quarters of their respective armies, and that, if any impediment was put in the way of their return, the city of Peking would forthwith be attacked and taken. It was added that Tung-chow would not be molested if the inhabitants kept aloof from all resistance to the allies. Mr. Wade, in the execution of this mission, endeavoured, in the first place, to communicate with a Tartar camp situated on the Pekin side of the city of Tung-chow. But he could get no one to acknowledge his flag of truce, and was fired at more than once. He succeeded, however, at length in obtaining access to the chief mandarin of Tung-chow, who spoke of our countrymen who had been in the city with great calmness, saying that he believed a party of upwards of twenty had left it some

time before the firing on the 18th had commenced. This conversation left on my mind the painful impression that, on their way back to the camp, they had been cut down by the Tartar army in its retreat—an impression which the fact that we had received no communication from the Chinese authorities after the defeat of their army on that day tended to confirm. In a further reconnaissance, however, which was made by Major Probyn on the day following, an intelligent native was captured, who afforded us some relief by assuring us he had seen some of our countrymen proceeding in a cart to Peking. No communication was, however, received from any Chinese authority respecting the fate of these persons, and the Commanders-in-chief, with great propriety, as it appears to me, resolved to prosecute their movement in advance. On the 21st instant, accordingly, a large body of Tartar troops on the road from Tung-chow to Peking was attacked and dispersed, and their camps, which covered a space of several miles, were taken and destroyed.

On the morning of the day following, I received a communication from the brother of the Emperor, informing me that, in consequence of the mismanagement of affairs by the Prince Tsai and Muh, he had been appointed Imperial Commissioner to treat with me, and proposing an armistice, with a view to the re-establishment of peace. I answered by referring them to the notification which had been already delivered to the chief mandarin of Tung-chow, in the name of the Commanders-in-chief, and informing them that, until the British subjects detained in Peking were restored, I could not take any steps to stay military operations. I inclose herewith the copy of this correspondence.

I may be expected to say something respecting the origin and cause of the renewal of hostilities which took place on the 18th instant. To hazard conjectures as to the motives by which Chinese functionaries are actuated is not a very safe undertaking; and it is very possible that further information may modify the views which I now entertain on this point. I am, however, disposed at present to doubt there having been a deliberate intention of treachery on the part of Prince Tsai and his colleague; but I apprehend that the General-in-chief, Sang-ko-lin-sin, thought that they had compromised his military position by allowing our army to establish itself so near his lines at Chang-kia-wan. He sought to counteract the evil effect of this by making a great swagger of parade and preparation to resist when the allied armies approached the camping-ground allotted to them. Several of our people, Colonel Walker, with his escort, my private Secretary, Mr. Loch, Baron Gros' Secretary of Embassy, Comte de Bastard, and others, passed through the Tartar army during the course of the morning on their way from Tung-chow without encountering any rudeness or ill-treatment whatsoever. At about a quarter to 10, however, a French Commissariat officer was assaulted by some Tartar soldiers under circumstances which are not very clearly ascertained; and this incident gave rise to an engagement, which soon became general. On the whole, I come to the conclusion that, in the proceedings of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries and Commander-in-chief in this instance, there was that mixture of stupidity, want of straightforwardness, suspicion, and bluster, which characterizes so generally the conduct of affairs in this country; but I cannot believe that after the experience which Sang-ko-lin-sin had already had of our superiority in the field, either he or his civil colleagues could have intended to bring on a conflict in which, as the event has proved, he was so sure to be worsted. At the same time, the facts that he covered by his guns, and with a portion of his troops, the ground assigned to us, and that a French officer, returning from Tung-chow with the knowledge and consent of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries was assaulted and killed on his lines, entirely justify both the charge of bad faith which has been brought against the Chinese authorities for their conduct in this instance, and the proceedings of the allied Commanders-in-chief which have ensued therefrom.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 84.

The Earl of Elgin to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

My dear General, *Ho-se-woo, September* 19, 1860, 3·30 A.M.

I RECEIVED your letter at midnight.

The bad faith of the Chinese releases us, in my opinion, from any obligation to restrict our advance, and leaves us free to move forward if we deem it expedient to do so.

I think, moreover, that the safety of Mr. Parkes, and of those who are with him, will be best consulted by a forward movement on your part; but you may probably have received information, ere this reaches you, which will enable you to arrive at a sounder judgment than I can on that point.

As far as I am concerned, therefore, you are perfectly free to go on. Indeed, I shall be glad to hear that you have done so.

If there be no troops at Tung-chow, it would be a pity to drive the respectable inhabitants out of the place: you might probably send a message to say that, in consequence of the bad faith of the Chinese authorities, you had resolved to advance, but that if not resisted you will treat it as you treated Tien-tsin.

Dew is pretty confident that he can carry on his boats to Tung-chow. At any rate up to this point there is no difficulty whatsoever.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 84.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince Kung, Imperial Commissioner, with full powers, &c., makes a communication.

Tsai, Prince of I, and Muh, President of the Board of War, not having managed matters satisfactorily, His Majesty's Decree has been received, depriving them of their Imperial Commission. The Prince Kung having had the honour to be named Commissioner, with Plenipotentiary powers, will at once dispatch Hang-ki and Lau-wei-wan to have an interview for the discussion of the question of peace. Let his Excellency the British Minister temporarily suspend hostilities, in order to the establishment of friendly relations.

A communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 8th moon, 7th day (21st September, 1860).

(Received September 22, 1860.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 84.

The Earl of Elgin to the Prince of Kung.

Pa-li-chiau, September 22, 1860.

THE Undersigned, the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in China, has the honour to acknowledge the despatch of His Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung, Minister Plenipotentiary, &c., under date the 21st September.

The Prince must be aware that, on the 19th instant, the chief authority at Tung-chow was called on by the Allied Commanders-in-chief to intimate to the various officers and gentlemen, subjects of England and France, who had not yet returned, to repair without delay to the head-quarters of the forces of their respective Governments.

It was further intimated, through the same channel, that if any hindrance were offered to the safe and speedy return of any of the persons missing, the consequences would be most serious to the Imperial Government.

The Undersigned has the honour to inclose a written order to all subjects of Her Majesty now in Peking at once to comply with the above requisition.

He has only to add, that until they reappear, he shall not feel at liberty to call on the Commanders-in-chief to suspend hostilities, or to recommence negotiations upon the subject of peace.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 84.

Notification.

Pa-li-chiau, September 22, 1860.

I, THE Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador and High Commissioner in China, hereby require all the subjects of Her Majesty that may be present in Peking to return forthwith to the head-quarters of the British army; and should any attempt be made on the part of the Chinese authorities to detain them, I authorize them, individually or collectively, to protest against this proceeding of those authorities, and to warn them of the consequences.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 85.

Colonel Foley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 27.)

French Head-Quarters, Chang-kia-wan,
September 20, 1860.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that General de Montauban with the French army, accompanied by Baron Gros, arrived at Ho-se-woo on the 14th instant, where Lord Elgin and Sir Hope Grant had already established themselves.

On the 16th instant, it was agreed that both forces should march on the following day *en route* for the encamping ground, about twenty-two miles off, five miles on this side of Tung-chow, where we expected to be amicably received and supplied with provisions.

Mr. Parkes, with some English and French Staff officers and a small escort of Cavalry, preceded us to make the necessary arrangements for the requirements of the respective forces. We noticed nothing particular on the first day's march, except the absence of inhabitants in the different villages we passed through. On the second day, about half-way, we were surprised to see a very large body of Tartar Cavalry, numerous guns, and masses of Infantry drawn up as if intending to dispute our further passage.

The halt was sounded, and time given to concentrate all our baggage; the return of the officers from Tung-chow was anxiously looked for, should treachery be intended. All doubt was soon dissipated by their firing upon Colonel Walker who had escaped from their hands, after witnessing the murder of a French Commissariat officer.

The order for attack was immediately given; the French to turn the enemy's left, and the English to attack to the front.

The movement succeeded admirably, the Tartars being completely routed with great loss, the French killing great numbers in the village on the left, the Cavalry cutting them up as they were driven out into the plain beyond.

The English occupied the town of Chang-kia-wan, the French encamping on this side of it.

Lord Elgin arrived yesterday morning, and Baron Gros in the evening.

Great anxiety prevails respecting the fate of Mr. Parkes, officers, and men who still remain in the hands of the enemy. The Generals-in-chief have written to threaten the capture of Peking should they be murdered or ill-used.

To-morrow we are to attack an entrenched camp, about three miles beyond Tung-chow.

Your Lordship will, I trust, excuse the shortness of detail in this despatch, owing to the little time I have had at my disposal since the 18th, and the sudden departure of the mail.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ST. GEORGE FOLEY.

No. 86.

Colonel Foley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 27.)

French Head-Quarters, Pa-li-chiau,
My Lord, *September 22, 1860.*

THE mail having been detained, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the French and English forces attacked and captured the Tartar camps, situated near the direct road to Peking, on the banks of the canal which runs from Tung-chow to Peking.

The enemy met us in the open; their force composed of many thousand Cavalry, large masses of Infantry, and numerous guns. The Tartar Cavalry charged up to within a hundred yards of the guns and Infantry, the fire from which drove them back. On the French left the King's Dragoon Guards arrived just in time to charge and cut up a great number of them. The enemy, after much resistance, was gradually driven back to the canal, our Artillery causing them great loss.

They made a last stand on the bridge crossing the canal, having ten guns placed there. The French 12-pounder guns soon silenced these, and the whole Tartar army retired towards Peking, leaving their camps in our possession.

Sir Hope Grant's force was engaged on our left at some distance off, and succeeded in inflicting great loss upon the enemy.

Sang-ko-lin-sin is said to have commanded in person. We captured upwards of forty guns. Our loss was comparatively small, the exact detail of which has not yet been sent in. I am happy to say there is every reason to believe that the English and French officers, &c., detained prisoners by Sang-ko-lin-sin, have been sent to Peking.

Official letters have this morning arrived from Peking for Lord Elgin and Baron Gros.

The Commanders-in-chief propose stopping in our present encampment, about eleven miles from Pekin, for some days, in order to receive reinforcements, ammunition, and supplies; the two latter to arrive in junks by the River Peiho, which has been found sufficiently deep for water-communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ST. GEORGE FOLEY.

No. 87.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 27, 1860.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches of the 16th and 23rd of September.

It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to judge whether the conduct of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries has been influenced by the motives you ascribe to them; or whether there existed a deliberate plan to deceive; or lastly, which seems the most probable conjecture, whether Sang-ko-lin-sin, having the command of the army, and a very high position, was determined to thwart the pacific dispositions of his colleagues.

But whatever may have been the motives of the Chinese it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the sending Kweiliang to Tien-tsin without full powers to treat; the subsequent attempts to detain the army at Tien-tsin and to induce them to return there; and finally the hostilities commenced after an arrangement had been concluded and the terms of peace nearly settled, together with the detention of Mr. Parkes and his colleagues, showed such a change of conduct and such bad faith in observing engagements apparently binding, that the task of negotiation became one of extreme difficulty.

I am happy to be able to assure your Excellency that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, you have conducted yourself in these arduous circumstances with equal firmness and moderation.

It is to be hoped that after the two defeats sustained by the large armies of the Chinese, Prince Kung will have seen the necessity of accepting the terms proposed, and of delivering Mr. Parkes and his companions from captivity.

At all events Her Majesty's Government rely on your Excellency and Baron Gros, and the Commanders of the allied forces, for taking such measures as the circumstances of the time may require.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 88.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received December* 15.)

My Lord, *Camp before Peking, October* 8, 1860.

AT the close of my despatch of the 23rd of September, sent by the last mail, I informed your Lordship that a brother of the Emperor of China, by name Kung, had written to apprise me that he had been appointed to treat with me in the room of Prince Tsai and President Muh, who had been superseded because of their mismanagement of affairs, and that I had referred him, in reply, to the notification which the Commanders-in-chief had issued some days previously, and which was to the effect that if the British and French subjects illegally detained in captivity by the Chinese authorities were not at once set at liberty, Peking would be assaulted.

On the following day I received a further letter from Prince Kung, which stated that the persons in question had been captured after the fight had commenced on the 18th ultimo, and that they could only be restored after Her Majesty's fleets and armies should have left Takoo. The Prince added that there had been a dispute between Mr. Parkes and the Imperial Commissioners Tsai and Muh on the subject of the presentation of the Queen's letter to the Emperor of China.

As I had the good fortune to be within reach of Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant at the time when this letter reached me, I thought it proper to confer with him before answering it. I found that he inclined to the opinion that it would be advisable to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by it to re-state to the Prince, not only the serious consequences which would ensue if he refused to deliver up the British subjects whom he had illegally captured, but also the conditions on which, if they were accepted within a period of three days, peace between Great Britain and China might still be concluded. I was, moreover, desirous to inform the Prince that the Queen's letter to the Emperor had not been, as he insinuated, mentioned by me, for the first time in the despatch to Prince Tsai and the President Muh, of which Mr. Parkes had been the bearer, but that I had referred to it in the very same terms, in a letter written to Kweiliang at Tien-tsin; and, further, that I had always treated the question of its presentation as one of courtesy, not of war. I inclose a copy of this communication of Prince Kung, and of my answer; also of my correspondence with Sir Hope Grant, and of a letter from me to Baron Gros in reference thereto. Further letters between Prince Kung and me, the copies of which are likewise inclosed, followed on this correspondence. Notwithstanding, however, various endeavours on his part to raise discussions which might, as he hoped, enable him to escape from the necessity of categorically accepting or refusing the conditions offered, I deemed it to be my dutyto adhere to them, and to require that Her Majesty's subjects detained at Peking should be restored before any steps for arresting hostile operations were taken. I could not admit the principle that they should be dealt with as prisoners legitimately made during war. At the same time, as their lives might have been put in jeopardy if the Chinese authorities had been driven to despair, I thought it proper to intimate that their unconditional surrender would cause the prospects of peace to improve.

On the 5th instant, the Commanders-in-chief, having received from the fleets and from Tien-tsin the supplies and munitions of war which they required, advanced on Peking. On the afternoon of the 6th, the main body of the English force was encamped on the north face of the Tartar city, and the French army, with the British Cavalry, at the Summer Palace of the Emperor, having encountered on their march to these points no enemy, except a few straggling Tartars who fled on their approach.

On the morning of the 7th instant, I received a despatch from Prince Kung, of which I inclose the translation, in which he goes a great way towards the

acceptance of the conditions prescribed by me in the communications which I had previously addressed to him. I may mention, that he refers in it to a letter written to me on the day preceding, which, however, has not yet reached me. It was agreed that the authorities in Pekin should be informed that the city might still be spared the calamities of an assault if Her Majesty's subjects therein detained were immediately restored, and one of its gates given up to the allies, and that Mr. Wade should require a mandarin of proper rank to meet him at some point between it and our camp, in whose hands he might place, with suitable explanations, a paper stating these conditions in the names of the Commander-in-chief.

I inclose a copy of the document which, in pursuance of this arrangement, was delivered by Mr. Wade to the mandarin sent to confer with him. Mr. Wade leads me to hope that Mr. Parkes and others who are with him may be restored this evening. But as Prince Kung has left the city, and is now at a considerable distance from it, some time must elapse before we learn what view he takes of the demands preferred in the final summons of the Commander-in-chief.

I have,.&c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 88.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication in reply.

The Prince has just received the despatch of the British Minister, requiring that the officers of his Excellency's Government who are still absent should be desired to return to the army without delay. The officers of his Excellency's Government had, on an earlier occasion, in person, discussed at Tung-chow, with the late Imperial Commissioners the Prince I and his colleague, eight propositions, to the whole of which assent was given, it is to be presumed to the satisfaction of his Excellency the British Minister. The discussion of the question of personal presentation of the national letter* had not yet been satisfactorily terminated, when the British officers in question, going off in anger, fell in with the troops by the way; an encounter ensued, and they were seized in the mêlée. It is not, therefore, the Chinese Government that has been at all wanting towards the maintenance of friendly relations.

The officers in question are now in the capital; none of them have suffered harm :† but with peace still unconcluded, it is scarcely possible that they should be sent back again. The city of Tien-tsin and the forts of Takoo have both been taken, and are still in possession of the British Government. What occasion is there then for alarm about a few British subjects who may be missing? If the two Governments are indeed to be friends, if (the British Government), desiring a cessation of hostilities, will take its men-of-war out of the fort of Takoo, the Chinese Government, so soon as the different concessions it is asked to make shall have been discussed and disposed of, will send back the officers in question, such as they shall find them to be,‡ in order to the perfecting of friendly relations.

The letter addressed by his Excellency to his officers could hardly be delivered while the present state of hostility continues. It shall be delivered as [soon as ?] the force has been withdrawn.

A necessary reply, addressed to the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 8th moon, 9th day (23rd September, 1860).

(Received September 24, 1860.)

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* The autograph letter of Her Majesty.

† Mortal injury.

‡ This is a mere formula, which might be almost as well untranslated. It might be rendered, "all in good order."

Inclosure 2 in No. 88.

The Earl of Elgin to the Prince of Kung.

THE Undersigned has received a despatch under date the 23rd instant, from His Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung, and makes this communication in reply.

The subjects of Her Majesty the Queen of England now detained in Peking were at Tung-chow, or on their return from Tung-chow to the British camp, under the protection of a flag of truce, and with the knowledge and consent of the Imperial Commissioners the Prince Tsai and the President Muh, when the bad faith and imprudence of the General-in-chief Sang-ko-lin-sin brought on a conflict between the armies of England and France and that of China on the 18th instant. Their arrestation under these circumstances was a violation of the law of nations, and their subsequent detention an act of perfidy which exposes the Chinese Government and its officers who have taken part in these proceedings to the just vengeance of the British army, which is now quartered at a distance of thirty *li* from the gates of Peking.

The Prince states that a dispute had arisen with respect to the mode in which the letter from Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain to His Majesty the Emperor of China, of which the Undersigned is the bearer, should be presented, and gives it to be understood that this letter was alluded to, for the first time in the communication of the Undersigned to Prince Tsai and his colleague which Mr. Parkes took with him to Tung-chow on the 17th instant. This is an error, and if the case has been represented in this light to the Imperial Prince, His Imperial Highness has been deceived. In his communication to Kweiliang of the 3rd instant, the Undersigned referred to the letter in question in the same terms in which he referred to it in his communication to the Prince Tsai and the President Muh, of which Mr. Parkes was the bearer. Neither at Tien-tsin nor at Tung-chow did he propose to make the delivery of Her Majesty's letter to the Emperor the subject of a Treaty stipulation. The presentation of letters from Sovereign to Sovereign, and the reception by Sovereigns of Ambassadors from other Sovereigns with whom they seek to cultivate relations of friendship, are matters of courtesy understood and practised in all civilized States. A State affecting to be civilized, which refuses to reciprocate such acts of courtesy, necessarily exposes its professions of amity to suspicion.

In order, however, to give further proof of his sincere desire for the re-establishment of peace between Great Britain and China, and to afford the Imperial Prince a last opportunity of averting a blow which will entail the destruction of Peking, and the probable fall of the Dynasty now ruling in China, the Undersigned makes the following proposals :—

If within the space of three days from the date of this letter the British (and French) subjects detained at Peking be sent back to the head-quarters (of their respective nations), and if the Imperial Prince intimates his readiness to sign the Convention placed in the hands of Kweliang at Tien-tsin, the bulk of the British army will not advance beyond its present halting-place. The Convention will be signed at Tung-chow, and after it shall have been signed the Undersigned will proceed with a sufficient escort to Peking for the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin. When these acts shall have been accomplished the British army will commence its movement towards Tien-tsin, at which point it will remain until the spring, as the bad faith, evasions, and delays of the Chinese Government and its agents have made it inexpedient to proceed further before the winter.

Should these conditions be accepted deputies can be named on either side for the completion of such preliminaries as may be necessary. If they be not accepted the British army will advance on Peking, and in common with that of France take measures to prove that the laws of nations cannot be violated in the persons of British and French subjects with impunity.

Inclosure 3 in No. 88.

The Earl of Elgin to Baron Gros.

M. le Baron, *Pa-li-chiau, September* 25, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for your Excellency's perusal a draft of my proposed reply to the letter of the Imperial Prince Kung, received by me yesterday.

I think that as regards the subjects of our respective nations detained in defiance of the law of nations at Peking, we should adopt the principle of entire solidarité. I have, therefore, as your Excellency will observe, put the restoration of the subjects of His Majesty the Emperor of the French on the same footing as the restoration of the subjects of Her Majesty the Queen in the draft letter herewith transmitted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 88.

The Earl of Elgin to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Sir, *Pa-li-chiau, September* 25, 1860.

I INCLOSE the draft of a letter which I propose to address to the Imperial Prince Kung, in reply to his communication to me, the translation of which I have the honour to transmit herewith. I believe that it is your Excellency's opinion that the Chinese authorities, before the extreme measure of an assault of Peking be resorted to, should be distinctly apprized that they have it in their power to make peace if they surrender Her Majesty's subjects now illegally detained by them, and concede all the other points which have been demanded.

I propose to stipulate that a portion of the army under your Excellency's command shall remain at Tien-tsin until the spring, because I think that it would be inconvenient to have to move it from Tien-tsin to Takoo and Tungkoo during the winter, which might be the case if the Article respecting the disposition of our troops in China which was inserted in the Convention drafted at Tien-tsin were to remain unaltered.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 88.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to the Earl of Elgin.

Head-Quarters, Camp, Pa-li-chiau,
My Lord, *September* 25, 1860.

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of this date, forwarding draft of a letter addressed to the Imperial Prince Kung, I have the honour to state that I fully concur in the terms of your Excellency's communication.

As regards the occupation of Tien-tsin during the winter, I shall be quite ready to do so if your Lordship considers it to be necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HOPE GRANT.

Inclosure 6 in No. 88.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication in reply.

He has received and thoroughly acquainted himself with the despatch of the British Minister. To the wrong doing of former Commissioners in the transactions conducted by them, to which it alludes, the Prince was no party. He is

himself an immediate relation of the Emperor's, and in the weighty office he has had the honour to be especially appointed by his Majesty to fill, he has full authority for every step he takes, nor will his acts assuredly be the same as those of the former Commissioners. In his conduct towards men the Prince is sincere, and he assumes that the British Minister is beyond doubt of like mind.

Every condition of the Treaty (or Treaties) negotiated at Tien-tsin being conceded, if while, on the one hand, the Prince departs not from this promise, no change whatever is, on the other hand, introduced by the British Government, peace, evermore to endure, is doubtless attainable.

With reference to the presentation of the Government letter, when his Excellency shall have arrived in the capital, some place suited to the solemnity shall be chosen, and an incense table (or altar) having been there set up, the Prince will receive the letter* of the British Government, and will place it on the table that due honour may be shown to it.

The words in the despatch under acknowledgment regarding the attack on and destruction of the capital, and the downfall of the Dynasty, are words which indeed it is not fitting that a subject should use. Can it be right for the British Minister, when declaring that he still entertains a desire for peace, to employ them? If a war to no purpose is to be carried on so long as troops are left, a struggle which is not to cease, then though the British Government have the troops it has in the field, China has yet besides the stout hands in her forces here at present, her troops from beyond the frontier, and those which it will behove her to move up from the different provinces. It would seem, then, better that neither side should do injury to friendly relations, by further talk of the struggle between them.

As regards the capture by our army in the confusion of the fight of the British officers returning from Tung-chow, it is true that the former Commissioners† did seize them, bind them, and confine them; but the Prince when this came to his knowledge, which was but recently, gave orders to the officer in charge to release them from confinement, to lodge them comfortably, to attend to the hurts of those who were wounded, and to treat them with every courtesy. In evidence of the Prince's sincerity towards man, he is bound before he does anything else to oblige the British Government to put away utterly its suspicions; and he now incloses the card sent by the British Consul Parkes to his Excellency Hang (Hang-ki) to engage him to come and speak with him this day, that it may be known that this person is safe and well, and has come to no harm.

The letter under acknowledgment proposes that deputies should be sent on either side to confer respecting all matters that have been discussed and disposed of. These shall proceed as soon as an answer has been received naming a time (for a conference).

A necessary communication, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 8th moon, 13th day (September 27, 1860).

(Received September 27, 1860, at midnight.)

Inclosure 7 in No. 88.

The Earl of Elgin to the Prince of Kung.

Camp, Pa-li-chiau, September 28, 1860.

THE Undersigned has received the despatch of His Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung, under date the 27th instant.

Notwithstanding the protestations of good faith and desire for peace with which it abounds, His Highness has not returned the prisoners unlawfully detained in Peking, nor has he stated positively when and where he will sign the Convention negotiated at Tien-tsin.

The Undersigned regrets to observe, on the other hand, allusions to the military resources of China which argue a strange forgetfulness of the reverses sustained by the Imperial arms in the last few weeks at Sin-ho, Takoo, Chang-kia-wan, and Pa-li-chiau.

Let no more time be wasted in words so unmeaning. The term of three

* The word "letter" is here raised in the column, not as it has been usually written, but with more honour.

† The term "Commissioners," is, on the other hand, not accorded here the honour commonly paid it.

days allowed for the satisfaction of the demands of the Undersigned he would remind His Highness will expire to-morrow night. The prisoners must be sent in in the course of to-morrow, and the Imperial Prince must write to say when and where the Convention shall be signed. The single modification which will be needed in it has been intimated to His Highness in the Undersigned's despatch of the 25th, and has been rendered necessary by the bad faith, evasions, and delays of the Chinese Government and its agents. The letter of Her Majesty the Queen can be presented to the Emperor only in one way; if not so presented, it cannot be presented at all: but, as the Undersigned has already explained, he has throughout considered this to be a question of courtesy, and not a *casus belli*.

There is consequently no ground whatever for the apprehensions apparently entertained by His Highness that other changes than those known to him are in contemplation.

Let His Highness then at once appoint his deputies and name a place at which these may meet the deputies of the Undersigned, in order to the form of preparation of the Convention for signature. The meeting may take place to-morrow if His Highness see fit, and at the same time as the prisoners are restored.

The Undersigned will not repeat the words of warning which he addressed to His Highness in his last despatch. He will only add that if the subjects of Her Majesty the Queen now illegally detained in captivity at Peking be not returned in the course of to-morrow, the British force will forthwith resume its march in advance, and that all responsibility for the serious consequences that may ensue will rest upon His Imperial Highness.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 8 in No. 88.

The Earl of Elgin to Baron Gros.

M. le Baron, *Camp, Pa-li-chiau, September* 29, 1860.

I INCLOSE herewith the translation of a communication which I received yesterday from Prince Kung, and a copy of my reply, which I have already had the honour of submitting to your Excellency in draft.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 9 in No. 88.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication in reply.

The Prince is in receipt of his Excellency the British Minister's reply of the 15th instant (29th September), and has acquainted himself with its contents.

The British officers captured by the army outside Tung-chow were seized* because an engagement was going on at the time. This was, moreover, an act of the late Commissioners, to which the Prince was no party. It was but recently that he ascertained the facts, and he then immediately gave orders to the officers in charge to lodge them comfortably, according to their degree, (intending) of course that, as soon as peace was concluded, they should be sent back with all proper attention.

As regards the presentation of the letter of Government, His Majesty the Emperor is obliged by law to hunt in the autumn, and has already set out on his journey. It is for this reason that the Prince will, with all solemnity, receive it for him, and place it on the incense table. Ample honour will thus be done it. The Prince explicitly stated this in his last reply, and he now re-states it in answer to the despatch under acknowledgment. As concerns the British officers (detained), he must wait until the British and French forces have fallen

* The combination is, strictly, "seized and bound."

back some distance; they shall then be sent back with all proper attention. The two armies are at this moment so near the city that a good deal of alarm (defensive feeling) is felt, and were they hurried out of it, it might not be quite possible to ensure their safety, some farther harm might befall them. It were best, therefore, that the British force should fall back, and as soon as the Treaty is concluded, it will of course be the Prince's part to have them sent back with all proper attention, which will be much more *comme il faut.*

There is no objection to the appointment of deputies to confer together, but the British and French armies must, under any circumstances, fall back to the neighbourhood of Chang-kia-wan; this effected, within three days of their so doing it can be arranged to send deputies from either side to some point between this and that, to settle in conference the time and place at which the Tien-tsin Convention is to be sealed and signed.

The Prince is in his dealings with man most sincere; whatever he says is the truth. The British officers (in his hands) are being treated with courtesy, and shall be sent back with all proper attention as soon as peace shall have been concluded. But he cannot refrain from stating beforehand, that if the British force advances to attack the city it will, he fears, be difficult in that case to answer for their safety.

He therefore replies.

A necessary communication addressed to the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 8th moon, 15th day (September 29, 1860).

Inclosure 10 in No. 88.

The Earl of Elgin to the Prince of Kung.

Pa-li-chiau, September 30, 1860.

THE Undersigned, &c., is in receipt of the despatch of the Prince of Kung, under date the 29th instant.

His Serene Highness declines to name time or place for the signature of the Convention negotiated at Tien-tsin, until Her Britannic Majesty's forces retire to a greater distance from Peking, nor until the Convention shall have been signed will he release the officers and subjects of Her Britannic Majesty treacherously seized when under protection of a flag of truce by Prince Sang-ko-lin-sin, and now illegally detained by His Serene Highness.

The Undersigned can regard this answer in no other light than as a rejection of the terms plainly set forth in his previous letters to His Serene Highness, and the delay of three days accorded the Chinese Government having expired, he has no option but to acquaint his Excellency the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's forces of the unsatisfactory result of this correspondence.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 11 in No. 88.

The Earl of Elgin to Baron Gros and Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

M. le Baron,

Sir, *Camp, Pa-li-chiau, October* 1, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a despatch from Prince Kung, which I received yesterday morning, and a copy of my reply, which is drawn up in pursuance of the resolution adopted at the conference of the Allied Ambassadors and Commanders-in-chief, held at the head-quarters of his Excellency General de Montauban, on that day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 12 in No. 88.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication in reply.

The Prince received the letter of the British Minister this morning, about 8 o'clock, and has acquainted himself with its contents.

As regards the rendition of the British subjects (detained), the Prince has already made it plain that, while peace negotiations were still unconcluded, it would not be treating them with proper attention were they to be hurried back.

The Treaty of the year "Wu-wu" (1858) and the Convention of Tien-tsin having both been agreed to, why does the letter under acknowledgment allege that no proposition (or measure) has been assented to? His Excellency the British Minister cannot have carefully studied the replies of the Prince; the Interpreter, he suspects, has misapprehended the text of these. Were the British Government to attempt constraint by an exhibition of force, not only would this have a deplorable effect upon the question of peace as already settled, but the safety of the British subjects in Peking would also, too probably, be compromised. The British Consul, Parkes, is well versed in the Chinese language, written and spoken, and the Prince is now in the act of sending an officer to settle with him all matters necessary for the sealing and signing (of the Treaties) at a Conference. Why, then, do the British still thus abound in doubts?

A day can be named for the dispatch of Deputies from either side to confer together.

The Prince accordingly replies.

A necessary communication, addressed to the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 8th moon, 17th day (1st October, 1860).

Inclosure 13 in No. 88.

The Earl of Elgin to the Prince of Kung.

Pa-li-chiau, October 2, 1860.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of His Serene Highness the Prince of Kung's despatch of the 1st instant.

In his despatch of the 30th ultimo, the Undersigned acquainted His Serene Highness that he had informed his Excellency the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's land forces of the unsatisfactory result of his correspondence on the subject of the Convention, and the rendition of Her Britannic Majesty's subjects unlawfully detained in Pekin.

Her Majesty's troops have, in consequence, already advanced some distance along the road to the capital.

The Government of China has already been so fully apprised, in various despatches, of the exact nature of the demands of the Undersigned, that it is impossible it can entertain any doubt as to what is really required of it. If, therefore, it be indeed sincerely anxious for peace, let an officer qualified to arrange all necessary preliminaries be sent immediately to the advanced posts of the army, and let the prisoners accompany this officer.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 14 in No. 88.

The Earl of Elgin to Baron Gros and Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

M. le Baron,

Sir, *Pa-li-chiau, October* 2, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a further letter which I have received from the Imperial Prince Kung, and a copy of my reply, the

substance of which I have already had the honour to communicate to your Excellency.

I think it right to observe that, in my opinion, the correspondence furnishes no reason for any relaxation in the immediate and energetic prosecution of the measures for the attacking of Sang-ko-lin-sin's force we were agreed upon at the Conference held at the head-quarters of the French army on the 30th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 15 in No. 88.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication.

He has received and has acquainted himself with the contents of a despatch he has received (from the British Minister).

The Treaty of the 8th year (1858) and the Tien-tsin Convention of this year having been already agreed to, and the promise given regarding them will assuredly not be retracted; while, on the other hand, in the late (or former) despatch of the British Government it is stated that nothing is required in excess of the eight Articles now negotiated at Tien-tsin, and the Treaty concluded there in the year Wu-wu (1858), there is nothing to be added; both parties are, in fact, perfectly in accord. The Prince, however, bearing in mind that the insecurity of peace, as negotiated during many years past, has been entirely owing to the fact that peace has always been negotiated in presence of an armed force, and that it has been impossible to have explanation of the different conditions of the Treaty Article by Article, the consequence of which has been doubt and suspicion on both sides; (the Prince, bearing these facts in mind,) and having here present the British Consul, Parkes, who is well acquainted with Chinese, written and spoken, and the French officer surnamed I, who also speaks Chinese, has, before going farther, sent officers to confer with the officers Parkes and I (Abbé de Luc?), to discuss and satisfactorily dispose of the Treaty (of 1858) already agreed to, and the Convention of Tien-tsin of this year, and as soon as this discussion shall have been brought to a satisfactory issue, a letter will be written to his Excellency the British Minister. It is assumed that there is nothing, therefore, that cannot be arranged (or, that to this arrangement there cannot be any objection).

As this discussion is still in process, it is impossible to send back the British subjects here.

As regards the Chinese army, this has been desired by the Prince to fall back for a while, which being so, there can be no doubt that the British force ought similarly, for the time, to retire. If troops continue to be brought forward, then peace negotiations will be, as before, conducted in presence of a force; there will be every difficulty in the way of sending officers from either side to the other; peace negotiations will too probably fail, and injury befall the British subjects in the city. Let his Excellency, however, think over this. The Prince in this despatch has spoken plainly, and it is his hope that his Excellency the British Minister will cause the interpreter in his camp to translate very carefully for him what the Prince has said.

The two bags and the note for Consul Parkes have been received and handed to Consul Parkes.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 8th moon, 19th day (October 3, 1860).

Inclosure 16 in No. 88.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication.

The two British officers, Messrs. Parkes and Loch, having sent in four notes

to the Prince, it becomes his duty to send a special messenger with them to his Excellency the British Minister, whom he will thank to receive them and acquaint himself with their contents.

The Prince hopes to receive without delay a reply from the British Minister, to the effect that, as he proposed in his earlier reply to his Excellency, the propriety of retiring the armies on either side, so as to admit of a conference between deputies from both, at some spot midway between them, shall be taken into consideration, and that in accordance with what has passed, the understanding entered into between the British Consul and the deputy of the Prince, peace shall be established on a permanent basis.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 8th moon, 19th day (October 3, 1860).

(Received October 4, 11 A.M.)

Inclosure 17 in No. 88.

The Earl of Elgin to the Prince of Kung.

Chang-kia-wan, October 4, 1860.

THE Undersigned has received two despatches from His Imperial Highness the Prince Kung, under date the 3rd instant.

In that which reached the Undersigned this morning was a letter from Mr. Parkes, to the effect that the Chinese Government desires some neutral spot there to arrange the preliminaries of a permanent peace.

Mr. Parkes' efforts in the cause of peace have the entire approbation of the Undersigned; neither Mr. Parkes' letter however, nor the despatch under acknowledgment, contain any satisfactory reply to the demand so frequently made by the Undersigned for the immediate liberation of the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty unlawfully detained in Peking. The conditions upon which alone peace can be negotiated remain as the Imperial Prince will find them stated in the despatch of the Undersigned, and to these he must beg once more to refer His Imperial Highness.

The Undersigned will be obliged to the Imperial Prince to forward the inclosed to Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch, together with the accompanying articles for which they have applied.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 18 in No. 88.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication.

The Prince addressed a communication yesterday, the 21st instant (6th of October), to his Excellency the British Minister; his Excellency has not replied to it, and the British troops have resumed their movements forwards. How is this? It does not look like peace. (Inclosed) is a note from the British Secretary Parkes. If the intentions of the British Minister be really pacific, it is the hope of the Prince that his Excellency will immediately cause the British force to fall back for the present to a distance of some *li*, in order that an officer may be sent out for a conference, on the 24th instant (8th October), when the opportunity will be taken to return the British subjects now in the capital with due honour. If the troops do not fall back and hostilities continue, there can be no real friendliness in the relations between the two countries (or, no sincerity in the professed desire for friendly relations), and how under such circumstances is either the conclusion of the Treaty or the rendition of the British subjects to be effected? It is for his Excellency alone to consider this.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 8th moon, 22nd day (7th October, 1860).

(Received October 7, 1860.)

Inclosure 19 in No. 88.

Note, in Chinese, from Mr. Parkes to Mr. Wade.

Kaou-mean (Temple), October 6, 1860, 3 P.M.

PA-HIA-LI (Harry Parkes) to Wei-To-ma (Thomas Wade).

I beg to state that Chinese officers have this day come to say that the 24th instant (8th October) has been named as the day on which the French and English detained are to be sent back to the head-quarters of their respective forces, with all honour; also that the Chinese Commanders have been this day written to, to fall back some *li* from the positions now occupied by their forces, in order to the conclusion of a *bonâ fide* peace.

If they do so fall back, I may be allowed to assume that the allied forces will in fairness make no further advance.

8th moon, 22nd day.

(Signed in English) HARRY S. PARKES.

Inclosure 20 in No. 88.

Note addressed to Hang-ki, a Deputy of the Imperial Commissioner the Prince of Kung, and handed to that officer on the evening of October 7, 1860.

Pa-li-chiau, September 25, 1860.

THE Undersigned has the honour to state that he has been sent here (to the Hwa-zing-sze), by the Commanders-in-chief of the allied forces.

Their Excellencies have been given to understand by their Excellencies the Ambassadors of their respective nations, that His Serene Highness the Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, has officially informed their Excellencies that there is nothing to which he does not assent, either in the Treaties concluded the year before last, or in the Conventions negotiated this year at Tien-tsin.

The Commanders-in-chief have consequently no remark to offer regarding the Treaties, but unless the Chinese Government immediately send in to their respective camps the officers and subjects of the two Powers still in its hands, their Excellencies will cause the capital city of Peking to be stormed, in order to show to those who break faith and do injury to others, that sooner or later their offence will be punished.

If, on the other hand, the Chinese Government send back those now in its hands without delay, and at the same time depute a competent officer to prepare the Conventions and other documents, their Excellencies the allied Ambassadors will name a day for the signature of the Conventions, the exchange of ratifications, and similar formalities.

Late events, however, considered, it will not be proper that faith should be placed at random in the Chinese Government or its people. It becomes expedient to take measures of precaution beforehand against evil that may be done. Before, therefore, their Excellencies enter Peking, a gate of the capital will have to be occupied by a escort detached from both armies. The Commanders-in-chief will decide which of the gates, and the Chinese troops will be then required to fall back, for the time being, from the gate their Excellencies choose to hold.

This effected, if the officers and people of the capital remain quiet without giving trouble, as in the case of Tien-tsin and Tung-chow, the allied forces will conduct themselves towards them as they have done towards the officers and people of those two cities.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE, *Chinese Secretary.*

No. 89.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 15.)

My Lord, *Camp before Peking, October* 9, 1860.

I HAVE much satisfaction in informing your Lordship that the anticipations in which I ventured to indulge at the close of my despatch of yesterday's date have been realized, and that the English and French prisoners detained in Peking, numbering eight in all, were sent to this camp in the afternoon.

The subjects of Her Majesty thus restored are, Mr. Parkes, my Private Secretary (Mr. Loch), and a trooper of Probyn's Horse; the French subjects are, M. l'Escayrac de Lanture, who is at the head of a scientific mission, and four soldiers.

To no one of their numerous friends is the return of these gentlemen a matter of more heartfelt gratification than it is to me. Since the period of their arrest, I have been compelled, by a sense of duty, to turn a deaf ear to every overture for their restoration which has involved the slightest retrograde movement of our army, or the abandonment of any demands previously preferred by me against the Chinese Government. I have felt that any such concession on my part would have established a most fatal precedent, because it would have led the Chinese to suppose that by kidnapping Englishmen they might effect objects which they are unable to achieve by fair fighting or diplomacy. I confess that I have been, moreover, throughout of opinion, that in adopting this uncompromising tone, and boldly setting the national above the personal interest, I was in point of fact, best consulting the welfare of our friends who were in durance; but it was not to be expected that all persons would view in the same light a question of policy so obscure; and apart from the warm personal interest which I feel in their safety, your Lordship can well understand that it relieves me from a great load of anxiety to learn from the result that the course which I have followed was not ill-calculated to promote it.

The account which they give of what they have gone through since their capture on the 18th ultimo is most interesting. I have requested each of them to put down his recollections on paper, as I can submit them to your Lordship most accurately in this form. A copy of Mr. Loch's narrative I inclose herewith, but Mr. Parkes has been so much engaged on public duty to-day that he has not been able to complete his. Enough has already transpired to convince me that these gentlemen have exhibited, under circumstances of great trial, constancy and courage of the highest order; an example nobly followed by the fine old Sikh trooper who was in attendance upon them.

The Chinese officials treated them at first with much brutality, obviously with the intention of working on their fears, and through their fears influencing in some degree the counsels of the Ambassadors. When this plan failed, they resorted to gentle methods, and endeavoured to establish a claim on their gratitude. Such was the conduct of persons whose demeanour towards them was prescribed by authority. It is, however, remarkable that they experienced much kindness and respect throughout from prisoners, and some others of the humble classes with whom they came in contact.

It is a matter of great concern to me, that we know as yet nothing certain respecting the fate of Mr. Bruce's Attaché, Mr. de Norman, Mr. Bowlby, the special correspondent of the "Times," and the nineteen troopers (consisting of eighteen Sikhs and one Dragoon) who formed the escort, and were under the command of Lieutenant Anderson, of Fane's Irregular Horse. This portion of the party became separated from Messrs. Parkes and Loch, when the latter, at the commencement of the conflict of the 18th ultimo, were taken up to Sang-ko-lin-sin, for the ostensible object of obtaining a safe-conduct from him. Since that time we have heard nothing authentic about them, but we are assured that though they are not now in Peking, they will soon be restored to us.

I take this opportunity of mentioning that several valuable papers have been found in the Emperor's summer palace, Yuen-ming-yuen, which has been seized by the French. Some are in the Emperor's holograph. The most important, so far as a hurried examination enables us to decide, are some memorials discovered by Mr. Morrison. In one of these, Sang-ko-lin-sin ascribes the loss of the Takoo Forts to the explosion of a magazine, and strongly urges the Emperor to withdraw from the capital;—a proposal strenuously resisted by other memorialists. Many of the papers show a determination to resist the barbarians even after the fall of Takoo. Great exertions had been made, and it was supposed, with the reinforcements expected, the force available for the defence of the capital would amount to 300,000 men. The allies are put at 10,000. I hope, by the next mail, to be able to furnish translations of these very interesting documents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 89.

Mr. Loch to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Camp before Peking, October 9, 1860.*

MR. PARKES will no doubt inform your Lordship at greater length than I shall be able to do, of the events that preceded our capture, and of the subsequent occurrences; but as for the first twelve days we were separated, I send your Lordship this short report of what came under my own observation, however imperfect it may be from my want of knowledge of the language.

On the morning of the 17th of September, I accompanied Mr. Parkes, with your Lordship's sanction, to Tung-chow, to make arrangements for the moving of your Excellency's camp to that place, when the day was decided on for the signature of the Convention.

We arrived at Tung-chow about 10 A.M., and nearly the whole of that day was occupied by discussions on various questions connected with the Convention, between the Imperial Commissioners, Tsai, Prince of I, and Muh, President of the Board of War, and Mr. Parkes; endeavours being made on their part to draw Mr. Parkes into a decided expression of opinion on the question of your Lordship's delivering the letter of credence to the Emperor. Towards 6 o'clock, however, in the afternoon, Mr. Parkes thought he had succeeded in showing them that that was a question he was not empowered to discuss, having no instructions on the subject, and that moreover it was a question not included in the Convention, but one left open for negotiation. It was not until this late hour that Mr. Parkes could get their serious attention to the various arrangements necessary for encamping our troops, and for opening markets for their supplies, and sending carts for the conveyance of your Lordship's camp to Tung-chow, but they then appointed officers for these various duties, and everything seemed satisfactorily understood and agreed to.

Colonel Walker, who had also accompanied Mr. Parkes to Tung-chow, for the purpose of examining the ground agreed on for the encampment of the troops, decided on starting early in the morning to make arrangements for their arrival on the ground, and therefore at about 5·30 A.M. on the 18th, Mr. Parkes, Colonel Walker, and Mr. Morrison, with an escort of five King's Dragoon Guards and four Sowars, started for this purpose, leaving the remainder of the party, which consisted of Mr. de Normann, Mr. Bowlby, and Mr. Anderson, who commanded the whole escort, and fifteen Sowars, in Tung-chow, to await our return, when we intended to look for a suitable residence for your Lordship.

The yamun in which we were lodged was in the western suburb. The shortest way to gain the road to Matou was through the country, and not through Tung-chow, which road we had been brought in by the previous evening. We advanced at a quick trot, and as we approached Chang-kia-wan, we observed many detached parties of matchlock-men and Cavalry hurrying to the front. As we passed through Chang-kia-wan the numbers increased, and became massed, as if being moved forward to take up certain positions. Observing large body of men to our right, I rode across a field, and found about 500 Cavalry dismounted in a dry watercourse. Being joined by Mr. Parkes, we proceeded along their front until we came to a village, through which we passed, and suddenly found ourselves in the middle of a battery of twelve guns in position, and commanding the very ground on which it had been agreed the night before that our troops were to encamp. Although somewhat surprised at our sudden appearance amongst them, they merely told us to go on to the road, where we joined Colonel Walker and the escort. We had now arrived on the ground decided on for our camp. A narrow stream of water runs close up to the road from the eastward, an embankment or bund running at some twenty yards distant from it. This bund was lined with matchlock-men, extending to the left as far as we could see. We rode a short distance along this bund. In front of it, at about 100 yards distant, was a long line of Cavalry skirmishers, extending the whole length of their position, which appeared a sort of semicircle. Mr. Parkes asked some of the men where their General was, and was told he was many *li* distant. We held a consultation on the threatening appearance of affairs, and Mr. Parkes at once decided on returning to Tung-chow, and find out from the Prince of I the meaning of the Chinese force occupying our position, while I was to pass through their force to give the General as early

intimation as possible. Colonel Walker, with five King's Dragoon Guards and one Sowar, was to remain on the embankment until either joined by Mr. Parkes or he received orders from Sir Hope Grant to retire.

I met the army with Sir Hope Grant on the march, within half a mile after passing through the Chinese line of skirmishers. I informed him of the position of the Chinese army and of the position of our party, and the course Mr. Parkes had decided on following. Sir Hope Grant told me it would be necessary to occupy the ground as already decided on, and drive the Chinese back if they offered any resistance; but that, if a shot was fired, he would capture Tung-chow. As the enemy's Cavalry was moving round to our right, it was necessary to act as soon as possible, and to withdraw Mr. Parkes and his party from Tung-chow. He therefore gave me leave to return to Mr. Parkes with this message, and gave me two Sowars of Major Probyn's regiment to accompany me with a flag of truce; Captain Brabazon was also ordered to return with me, so that he might see the ground. The Chinese made no difficulty about allowing us to pass through their lines. On arriving at the bund, not being able to see anything of Colonel Walker, we proceeded at a rapid rate straight to Tung-chow.

On arrival at the yamun, we found all the gentlemen of the party were absent in the town; but I gave orders to the escort to saddle their horses, and be ready to start at a moment's notice, and in a few minutes the gentlemen returned. Mr. de Normann and myself, accompanied by four men, then started through the city to look for Mr. Parkes, who had gone to the Prince of I's residence. We had not gone half-a-mile when we met him. He said not a moment was to be lost in escaping.

On our arrival at our yamun, the whole party were mounted and ready. It consisted of Mr. Parkes, Captain Brabazon, Mr. de Normann, Mr. Bowlby, Mr. Anderson commanding, one King's Dragoon Guard, and seventeen Sowars, and myself—twenty-four in all. We proceeded at a sharp canter. After proceeding half-way, we took a wrong turn to the left; this, however, did not delay us five minutes, and we made straight for Chang-kia-wan, the streets of which place we found full of soldiers. As we cleared the town we heard the guns open, and saw the smoke of guns on both sides, at which time we were within half-a-mile of being clear of the Chinese line. As we went at a canter, a body of Cavalry ranged up on either side, began blowing their matches, and getting their matchlocks and bows and arrows ready. As this had rather the appearance of flight on our part, and as the Cavalry might have opened a cross fire upon us at any moment, we halted to consult. The Chinese Cavalry, about 300 in number, then drew up in front, and on either flank, supported by a large body of Infantry. They said civilly enough that, as fire had opened, we could not pass through their lines without an order from their General, who was close by. We had to consider whether we should attempt to force our way through this body of men, and some 3,000 who were beyond them, and between us and our army, or act as this officer proposed, and go to the General, by which course we should not forfeit the protection of the flag of truce. Mr. Parkes said he would go to the General, and asked me to accompany him. Taking one Sowar to carry the flag of truce, we galloped off in the direction indicated. As we turned the corner of a field of millet, which hid us from our escort, we found ourselves in front of about 150 Infantry, who rushed forward with their matchlocks pointed, and had it not been for a Chinese officer, who knocked them up, we should have been shot down.

These Infantry were on the bank of the small stream I have before referred to, beyond which we saw several mandarins on horseback. We pushed through the Infantry, and Mr. Parkes addressed one whom he was informed was Prince Sang-ko-lin-sin, and asked for a safe pass for our flag of truce, but he only received abuse in reply.

After a few words, Mr. Parkes turned to me and said, "I think we are prisoners." At that time we were surrounded by men, who seized both us and our horses. It was hopeless to resist; we dismounted, our arms were laid hold of and twisted behind us. In this position we were taken across the stream, over a bridge formed by a boat, and shoved down on our knees in front of Sang-ko-lin-sin. I was knocked forward and my head rubbed in the dirt. Sang-ko-lin-sin spoke to Mr. Parkes with much vehemence. He accused Mr. Parkes of being the cause of all the difficulties that had arisen, and of the

action that was now taking place. He then ordered our being taken to the Prince of I, and sent an officer to tell our escort to return to Chang-kia-wan. We listened anxiously for any firing or signs of resistance from that quarter, but heard none.

We were removed to a tent close by, where another General was seated. He treated us more civilly, and allowed us to sit down until the arrival of a cart. While waiting, two French prisoners, belonging to their Commissariat, were brought in from the front. The firing becoming much heavier; a message came for the General whom we were with, and a cart was sent for us at the same time, into which all five of us were put, and, surrounded by an escort of some twenty men, were hurried into Tung-chow. The jolting was great over the rough roads of the country, but that over the paved streets of Tung-chow was most painful to bear. The Prince of I having left the city, we followed him out on the Peking road.

Crowds of soldiers were hurrying into the city, and we saw large camps on each side of the road. After going about six *li*, we came to a large bridge which crosses the canal; this we passed over, but apparently our escort had difficulty in finding where the Prince of I was, for we were turned back, and had to re-cross the canal, and were taken to a large camp a short distance from the bridge. There we were taken out of the cart and taken before Jui-lin, one of the Principal Secretaries of State; we were made to kneel down, and an examination was commenced: this went on for some time. The heat and dust had greatly exhausted us, and Mr. Parkes, to bring this tiresome and useless examination to a close, pretended faintness, and we were moved to a room of a small farm-house close by. Here we were allowed to lie down for a short time, but were soon made to get up by people coming to search us. They took from us all our letters, papers, watches, &c. We were then removed to a small temple and taken before some mandarins, whom Mr. Parkes recognized as belonging to the Prince of I's suite. They made us kneel, and commenced a long and troublesome examination, which was suddenly interrupted evidently by some panic, either by an advance of our troops or from some other cause. Our examiners hurriedly disappeared, and a number of soldiers rushed in with loud cries, who bound our hands tightly behind our backs; from their language and gestures Mr. Parkes anticipated we were about to be executed, for they shook their spears and swords at us in a threatening manner. We were taken thus bound into the court of the temple, when some change seemed to take place in their plans, for they hurried us back again, and took us outside, when they put us into a common country-cart, which they drove off at a quick pace; this, with our hands bound behind us, caused us agonies.

We soon got on to the Peking paved road, but had they not occasionally taken the cart on to the side road, I do not think we could have lasted out the seven hours we were in it. From pain, dust, and heat our thirst became intense. Once or twice they gave us water. After a time they took out one of the French and Sikh prisoners and put them into another cart, some of their officials taking their place in ours. These men caused me great tortures by lifting up my arms, which seemed tearing them out of their sockets. The old Sikh sowar behaved with calm endurance. I told him not to fear, we were in God's hands. Ah! Sahib! he said, I do not fear, I am sixty; if I do not die to-day I may to-morrow, and I am with you; I do not fear.

It was getting dark ere we reached the suburbs of Peking; they were not so long as we expected, for after about half-a-mile we reached the gate, which, from its great height, has an imposing appearance. The crowds of people could hardly be kept back who pressed forward to see us.

The street we entered on passing the gate was some fifty feet broad, but the houses, on either side, were small, and only of one story. Darkness coming on we could not see anything, even if we had had the strength to look about us.

We rolled through street after street, and the way seemed interminable; we passed through another gateway, and shortly afterwards turned into a large court-yard. Mr. Parkes saw on the lanterns "Hsing-poo," or the Board of Punishments. We were kept in the court some quarter of an hour; Mr. Parkes was then pulled out and taken before the examiners; after ten minutes' anxious suspense I saw him pass loaded with chains. I was then taken into a small room dimly lighted; chains, and various other evidences of prisons and tortures,

were hung about the walls. The examiners sat behind a table, in front of which I was forced down upon my knees; a number of questions were put to me, which of course I did not understand, but a man who seized me by the hair, and another by the ear and beard, gave me a shake and cuff each time I failed to answer. After five minutes of this I made signs I wanted my hat that had been knocked off and was lying in front of me. At this the examiners abused me, and I was knocked forward on my face; a large iron collar was put round my neck, with a long heavy chain attached to it, and I was removed into an inner court-yard, where, by the dim light of a lantern, I saw Mr. Parkes seated on a bench. Few words passed between us; two chains were here made fast to my legs, passing through the long chain which was attached to the collar round my neck. We were then made to get up, and the saddest moment of the day then came, for I saw Mr. Parkes being led away in one direction while they took me another. I could only say "God bless you, Parkes!" and we were separated.

They led me through long open passages into a court-yard, which had a long barn-like building on one side, with grated windows, through which a strong light shone. The jailors rapped at the door, when the most unearthly yell arose that I ever heard. The door was opened with a bang, and I found myself surrounded by about forty half-naked, savage, villanous-looking fellows as I ever saw in my life. They were criminals of all descriptions, murderers, thieves, &c.; some twenty of them were chained like myself. One end of the room seemed kept apart for their use; at the other end were the prisoners who were not chained, and seemed of a better class. As soon as I had entered, the door was closed behind me, and the jailors pinioned my elbows, although my hands were still bound. By this time, I had lost all use of my fingers; they felt bursting: and my hands were greatly swollen. After a little time, they loosened the rope at my wrist, but only to put on irons. They gave me a cup of tea, which was very grateful, for I was greatly exhausted. I was glad to see that they intended to place me among the better lot of unchained prisoners, for the others were covered with itch and vermin. They laid me down on a board like a guard-room bed, and chained me up by my neck-chain to a beam over my head. I was able to lay at full length, and, worn out utterly, I fell into a deep sleep.

The next morning my waking was very sad. A little after daylight the doors were thrown open, and we were unchained from the beams, and every one went into the court-yard. The yard was about sixteen yards square, and a large verandah was in front of the prison. In one corner of the yard was the cook-house, on the other three sides were small wards, or prisons, for one or two favoured prisoners.

At about 9 o'clock, two mandarins came in to superintend the distribution of the food for the prisoners. The food the Government supplies is only boiled millet, with occasionally a little salt vegetable; a large bowl twice a-day is given to each prisoner. The millet is brought in in a large tub by two men, and served up hot. Only those in chains are on this food; the rest of the prisoners, among whom I was included, received some rice, green vegetables, and a little chopped meat, and French beans, with either bread or biscuit; this we got twice daily. This food is found and paid for by one of the prisoners, it being a way by which they are allowed to work off a portion of their term of imprisonment. The man who supplied us was imprisoned for thieving, and the cost of feeding the prisoners could not have amounted to less than two taels a-day.

The prisoners were very civil and kind; three were appointed to watch and guard me, and at night one always sat at the head of my bed. They helped me by carrying my chain, by getting me water to wash my face and hands, and by getting me a seat to myself if I wanted one.

I found out that of my three attendants, two were murderers, and the third was imprisoned for biting his father's finger off. I was surprised to see the good and kindly feeling that existed between all the prisoners; they seemed to feel for each other, and I have often seen a man who had a little better food than his neighbour give him half. During the twelve days I was in prison with them, I only heard one quarrel.

On the first morning of my imprisonment, the officials of the prison, two white-button mandarins, made me go down on my knees, and asked me a

number of questions which I did not understand. In the afternoon I was taken into the court-yard again, and made to kneel for a long time before a number of red-buttoned mandarins, who, from their manner, evidently abused me. I was then taken back and chained up.

I had succeeded in saving my prayer-book up to the time of being brought into the prison, but it was then taken from me; by signs, however, I got it returned to me the second day. What attracted the greatest curiosity amongst the prisoners and the mandarins who visited me, were my boots and this book. The second and third day I was also much visited; sometimes had out to kneel and be abused, other times the visits seemed private: after then I was seldom visited.

I made various efforts through the official visiting mandarins to obtain an interview with Mr. Parkes, and although they sometimes by signs led me to hope that such might be granted, it never was. I heard of Hang Ta-jin having been to see Mr. Parkes frequently, but I was utterly ignorant of the subject of his visits. The days passed wearily by. I calculated and re-calculated the time that would be required for the various movements: I found reasons for delays as days passed, and no change came to our situation, but I fed myself with the hope that we should all be released. I had many anxious thoughts as to what had happened to the rest of our party; our impression was that they had escaped. So the days passed until the morning of the 29th September; there had been two great jail-deliveries during the period of my confinement, and on the 29th all excepting the men in chains were liberated.

About the middle of that day, while I was lying down, one of the men who watched me, putting his mouth close to my ear, whispered Pa Ta-jin and Hang Ta-jin, and made signs my iron collar was to be removed. About two hours afterwards I was taken into one of the side rooms, and there Hang came and ordered my chains to be taken off. I was then removed to another yard, and shortly afterwards joined by Mr. Parkes. That moment repaid me for much suffering.

I did not know whether this was our final release or not, and it was not till the evening that I learnt all that had occurred from Mr. Parkes.

We were placed in separate carts, but this time in the proper carriage-cart, well cushioned. We were taken to the Kao-miao temple, which is close to the north gate. Here we found a good room prepared for us, and another for our attendants, who were some of our old jailors. We had a good sized court-yard in which we were allowed to walk. A remarkably fine guard of Manchoo Cavalry, consisting of twenty men, had us under their especial charge.

Hang accompanied us to the Temple, but soon left, promising to return in the morning. I then learnt from Mr. Parkes of the frequent visits Hang had paid him during his imprisonment, and I cannot be too grateful to Mr. Parkes for his noble and disinterested conduct towards me, in his firmly refusing to accept any of Hang's offers of release unless he was accompanied by me.

In fact, during the whole of the first day, and during the latter portion of our imprisonment which we passed together, I cannot express myself in terms of too great admiration of his fearless and determined bearing throughout the trials and difficulties that surrounded us; and I am convinced that one great cause of the happy termination of those dangers, was the firm and consistent language he held to those mandarins who were sent to attempt to gain some admission from him, either through his hopes or fears.

From the 29th September to the 8th instant we were confined in the Kao-miao Temple. Almost daily Hang came and held long conversations with Mr. Parkes, who will inform your Lordship, at much greater length than I am able to do, of what passed on those occasions. I will not enter, therefore, at length on this portion of our imprisonment. It was a period of great anxiety and trial, for although we were well treated, we knew that our release, indeed our existence, depended greatly upon how the movement of our troops outside the city might affect the feelings of the Chinese and mandarins inside. We felt that in any sudden panic, when they would be scarcely masters of their senses, they might rush in and wreak on us their vengeance. This was our real danger: as long as they gave themselves time to reflect we were in comparative safety. This, under God's Providence, with the steady advance of our troops, and the consistent and determined line of your Lordship's policy, resulted in our happy release.

Up to within the last few days we were kept in utter ignorance of all that had occurred, but Mr. Wade's letter of the 4th instant made us pretty well acquainted with what had passed.

Hang. came yesterday morning with Mr. Wade's letter, calling on the Chinese Government to surrender one of the gates of the city to be occupied by our troops. He said it was impossible, and it was long before he would say whether we could be released. However, at last he did so, and at 2 o'clock we were put into a cart together, and conducted under a strong escort to the West Gate. The streets were deserted, and the shops closed.

On leaving the gate our escort left us, and we were left by ourselves to reach the camp, where, I thank God, we arrived in safety at 3·30 P M. The Sikh Sowar and five Frenchmen were released at the same time.

This report has grown to much greater length than I anticipated: I only regret that the information I have been able to give your Lordship in it is so meagre.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY B. LOCH.

No. 90.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 1.)

My Lord, *Camp, before Peking, October* 13, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a despatch which I received yesterday afternoon from Prince Kung, and which purports to be a reply to the summons addressed to him three days ago by the Commanders-in-chief; also a copy of the letter in which I transmitted a translation of this despatch to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

The north-eastern gate of the city was handed over to the allied armies without condition at noon of this day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 90.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication.

The Prince having repeatedly written to say that he had deputed officers to treat the British Secretary, Mr. Parkes, with all honour, and that as soon as they and he had satisfactorily settled together all questions relating to the sealing and signature of the Convention (the rest of) the British subjects could be returned (as well), conduct towards the British Government which was not illiberal, how comes it that the British troops have carried their outrages into the Garden Palace of the Emperor, and have fired His Majesty's audience-halls and dwellings? Is it reasonable that the nation of the British Minister, being one acquainted with the obligations of man to man, with discipline long established in its army, while its troops have wantonly fired and plundered the Garden Palace, the Commanders of the two armies and the British Minister should affect ignorance of this? The British Minister should by right state plainly in his reply what steps are to be taken with regard to these proceedings.* This day, however, to his surprise the Prince has received a despatch from his Excellency General Grant, the British Commander-in-chief, to the effect that he is about to take possession of the An-ting Gate, and to preface this by the erection of a battery, and that, in the event of a refusal, he will assault the city on the 29th instant (13th October).

That the soldiers the British Minister might bring with him when he comes to the capital to exchange the Treaties should be distributed without the walls, and that his escort should accompany him into the city, were indeed conditions inserted in the Convention, and to which, of course, effect will be given, as (the

* What punishment inflicted on the troops, what reparation made for losses, &c.

Convention) has been *in toto* assented to both by the former Commissioners and the Prince. The British Minister having also stated in a despatch which the Prince has received that there should be no alteration whatever in the Treaty—this, too, can be at once exchanged, that a good understanding may be established, to endure for ever. But the words of the Convention had reference to the British Minister's entrance into the capital for the purpose of exchanging the Treaties: the city gates have ever been under the surveillance of high officers specially charged to see them opened and closed; and if they be thrown open at this moment before (peace be concluded), and the duty of inspection and search recklessly neglected, the disorderly of the place will probably seize the opportunity to commit all sorts of irregularities. It is indispensable, therefore, that proper precautions should be taken.

The letter received from the British Government (Sir Hope Grant's despatch) says that the An-ting Gate will be occupied by a body of troops, and the two nations being now at peace, this is an arrangement which can of course be made; but the reply to this despatch should specify certain regulations for the occupation of this gate, and when the British Minister's reply to this effect shall have been received, a day can be named for the signature of the Convention and the exchange of the Treaties, in order that before that day all necessary arrangements may be duly considered, to the establishment of a good understanding.

The British officers (still detained) were seized by the late Commissioners. A certain number were missing after the fight, or have died of their wounds, or of sickness. The Prince gave orders to the officers whose business it was to find out where they were, to make them comfortable, and to put them under medical treatment, and he now returns them as his former despatch promised that he would return them, keeping his word without any abatement or modification.

The Prince's correspondence during the last few days has been all carried on with the British Minister, and he thinks it proper to continue to address himself to his Excellency, although he has received the despatch of his Excellency the British General, as the good understanding has been restored.

He therefore writes this despatch.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 8th moon, 28th day (12th October, 1860).

Inclosure 2 in No. 90.

The Earl of Elgin to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Sir, *Camp before Peking, October* 13, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Excellency's information, the translation of a despatch which I received last night from the Prince Kung. I consider its tone to be by no means satisfactory, and I trust that the Commanders-in-chief will adhere to their determination to require the unconditional surrender of the gate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 90.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Camp before Peking, October* 13, 1860.

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of this date, I have the honour to state that I sent officers this morning with Mr. Parkes to meet the Chinese deputies with respect to the surrender of the An-ting Gate.

These latter made various excuses to postpone the surrender, but were informed that, if the gate were not given up by noon to-day, the guns would open fire on the walls.

I have just now learned that this has been effected quietly, and the allied troops are now in possession of the An-ting Gate, upon which their respective flags are planted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT.

No. 91.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 15.)

My Lord, *Camp before Peking, October 13, 1860.*

DURING the afternoon of yesterday, nine prisoners were returned to this camp; eight troopers of Fane's Irregular Horse, and one French soldier. All were suffering more or less severely from the effects of the ligatures with which their wrists had been bound. I grieve to say that the evidence given by them leads us to fear the worst for Lieutenant Anderson, of Fane's Irregulars, and Mr. de Norman, Mr. Bruce's Attaché. They seem to have sunk under circumstances of much suffering from the consequences of the maltreatment to which they were subjected. I inclose herewith copies of the depositions of two of the troopers. I was not personally acquainted with Lieutenant Anderson, but he is spoken of by all who knew him as an excellent officer. Mr. de Norman was a young man of remarkable promise. With considerable abilities, great assiduity, singular steadiness of character, and courage of no common order, he had every promise of achieving eminence in his profession. We all mourn most bitterly his untimely end.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 91.

Evidence of Mahomed Khan, 4th Troop, Fane's Horse.

WHEN we got to the camp of the Chinese near Chang-kia-wan, we heard the firing commenced. Messrs. Parkes and Loch left us with one sowar of Major Probyn's regiment. Mr. Anderson waited for about half-an-hour, and then wanted to go in search of them, but we were stopped by the Chinese.

We were eventually taken outside Tung-chow, and our arms taken away from us. We then remounted, and went over the stone bridge along the paved road, to a joss-house about a mile or two miles on this side. The next day Captain Brabazon and a Frenchman left us, and we were taken through Peking to a garden on the other side (this place was near a lake, and temples round). We were there put into tents, six in each; Mr. Anderson told off the numbers to each. This was about 2 o'clock in the day. About half-an-hour after our arrival, Mr. de Norman was taken out under the pretence of having his face and hands washed: he was immediately seized, thrown on the ground, and his hands and feet tied together behind. Mr. Anderson was then taken out and tied in the same manner; then Mr. Bowlby, and then the Frenchman, and then the sowars. After we had all been tied, they put water on our bonds to tighten them. They then lifted us up, and took us into a court-yard, where we remained in the open for three days exposed to the sun and cold. Mr. Anderson became delirious the second day from the effects of the sun, and want of water and food. We had nothing to eat all that time. At last they gave us about two square inches of bread and a little water. In the daytime the place was left open, and hundreds of people came to stare at us; there were many men of rank amongst the spectators. At night a soldier was placed on guard over each of us. If we spoke a word or asked for water, we were beaten and stamped upon. They kicked us about the head with their boots; if we asked for something to eat they crammed dirt down our mouths. At the end of the third day irons were put on our necks, wrists, and ancles, and about 3 o'clock on the fourth day we were taken away in carts. I never saw Mr. Anderson again. In our two carts there were eight of us, viz., three Frenchmen, four Sikhs, and myself. One Frenchman died on the road; he was wounded with a sword-cut on the head. We were then taken away towards the hills. That night we stopped at a house to eat and rest, and travelled all the next day. We stopped again at night, and late the next day arrived at a walled town as big as Tien-tsin. There was also a large white fort outside the town about two miles off. The place was surrounded on three sides by high hills. We were taken into the jail inside the town. A Frenchman died after we had been in jail about eight or nine days, and Sowar Prem Singh, about

three or four days after that. They both died from maggots eating into their flesh, and from which mortification ensued.

The mandarin in charge of the jail took off my irons about ten days ago. The Chinese prisoners were very kind to us, cleansed and washed our wounds, and gave us what they had to eat.

True translation.

(Signed) WALTER FANE, *Captain,*
Commanding Fane's Horse.

Camp, Peking, October 13, 1860.

Evidence of Jowalla Sing, Duffadar, 1st Troop Fane's Horse.

WHEN Messrs. Parkes and Loch left our party for the purpose of seeing Sang-ko-lin-sin, there were Mr. Bowlby, Lieutenant Anderson, Captain Brabazon, Mr. de Norman, one man King's Dragoon Guards, one man 1st Sikh Cavalry, and our own party of seventeen men. We stood waiting for half-an-hour; when Lieutenant Anderson asked to be taken to where the other gentlemen were gone; he was told to remain till they came back. After another half-hour the army assembled in large numbers and surrounded us, told us to get off our horses, and, leading them, to come with them. Then, the whole army, as Lieutenant Anderson remarked, about 10,000 men, took us back to Tung-chow, and made us rest for about a quarter of an hour, and give up our arms. They then made us remount, and paraded us through the army, and then took us on the road to Peking, and rested for that night in a joss-house. In the morning they again mounted us on our horses and took us to Peking. In Peking they made us dismount, and fed us. They then took us through the city to a place about two miles beyond it; they there made us dismount and gave us tents, the English officers and the natives separate. Then they took us away one by one, and bound us lying on the stomach, with hands and feet tied behind the back. They kept us there in this position for three days. They gave us food three times, and that only a mouthful at a time. They then threw us, bound as we were, into carts and took us, as I think, about twenty coss—the mules were trotting and galloping all night. We arrived in the morning at a fort,* and were there put into prison, confined in cages, and loaded with chains. At that time we were seven in all.† I know nothing of the others; they were taken further on. We were kept in the place three days, so tightly bound with cords that we could not move; the sowars bound with one cord, the others with two. At the first place we got nothing to eat; after that they gave us a little as before. After the first day at the second place,‡ Lieutenant Anderson became delirious and remained so, with a few lucid intervals, until his death, which occurred on the ninth day of his imprisonment. Two days before his death his nails and fingers burst from the tightness of the cords, and mortification set in, and the bones of his wrist were exposed. Whilst he was alive worms were generated in his wounds, and eat into and crawled over his body. They left the body there three days, and then took it away. Five days after his death a sowar named Ramdun died in the same state. His body was taken away immediately. Three days after this Mr. de Norman died. On the evening of the day of Lieutenant Anderson's decease the cords were taken off our hands, but our feet were still kept bound, and from that time we were better fed. Our feet were unbound two days after this, and kept so until our release yesterday evening. When Lieutenant Anderson and our comrades called on us to help him by biting his cords, the Chinamen kicked us away. When we arrived at the joss-house between Tung-chow and Peking, Captain Brabazon and a Frenchman went back, and Lieutenant Anderson told us they were going to the Commander-in-chief to give information and obtain our release.

True translation.

(Signed) WALTER FANE, *Captain,*
Commanding Fane's Horse.

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* Showja, I think it is called. † Anderson, De Norman, one duffadar, four sowars.
‡ Outside the King's palace, about three miles from Peking.

No. 92.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 15.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, October 17, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch I had occasion to address to the Earl of Elgin, with its inclosures, relating to the late proceedings of the insurgents in this province, the spirit of the country-people, and the manner in which the Chinese authorities of this place have represented to the Court of Peking the defence of Shanghae, to which I beg to call your Lordship's attention.

I may add that the silk is coming down in unusually large quantities from the interior. Sometimes it has to pay a "squeeze" to the insurgents, though not always to the same amount; at other times it passes without any exaction being levied. Opium and arms are the return articles, and a few minor luxuries, but the trade in staple imports is completely at a stand-still. The consumers are either ruined or afraid to buy. The insurgents move about from one place to another, committing great havoc, and I infer from their proceedings that their object is to inspire terror among the inhabitants, and that they are not really masters of this province, though they hold some of the principal towns.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 92.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Shanghae, October 15, 1860.*

I INCLOSE translations of a petition for protection addressed to me by sundry Chinese merchants of Shanghae, and a copy of Sieh's Report to the Emperor on the defence of the city; also of the Decree rewarding him and others for their conduct in that affair.

The description of the part taken by the Chinese in repelling the attack; is a tissue of unmitigated falsehood from first to last. Nothing could exceed the abject fear and helplessness of Sieh and the other civil and military authorities. The petition of the inhabitants is valuable, as a proof of the feeling among the Chinese on the subject, and the Report is instructive as showing the nature of the representations made by the provincial authorities to Peking of events that occur within their jurisdiction.

I have returned no answer to the petition.

As respects the course to be adopted here, I have directed that every assistance should be given in checking the importation of arms and ammunition, and I have urged the Chinese to exercise their undoubted right of examining all boats going up the rivers and creeks and confiscating those on board of which arms are to be found. But I have directed Mr. Meadows not to allow Chinese in British employ to be seized within the settlement on the charge of dealing with the insurgents. If they are caught outside the limits, *flagrante delicto*, I should not interfere in their behalf; but I do not think it advisable that we should lend ourselves to political persecution, under existing circumstances, independently of the risk that charges would be trumped up against compradores and others in foreign service, for purposes of extortion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 92.

Petition.

(Translation.)

WE, Chwang-hing Chung, &c., in all thirty persons, gentry of Shanghae, beg respectfully to petition your Excellency Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary.

After the Imperial camps before Nanking were lost, Soo-chow, and one district after another on this side of it, fell.

On the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st, the rebels even dared to approach on Shanghae, and were advancing direct on the Maloo, when fortunately the forces of your honourable country attacked them and drove them back, after which they disappeared in the distance, and tens of thousands of the inhabitants' lives were saved from destruction. To your Excellency's graciousness, therefore, the lives of tens of thousands of our people have really, as it were, been resuscitated.

The bodies of rebels are beyond all number, and the whole country is swarming with them. At Kea-ting and Tsing-poo, which lie only a few *li* from Shanghae, they have strongholds, and they destroy houses, plunder the people, and ravish the women, without ceasing.

On the 12th and 13th instants the rebels appeared at Ta-chang and Keang-wan, even getting to within three or four *li* of Woo-sung. They are now at Lew-ho, where they are burning houses, plundering the inhabitants, and cruelly trampling them under feet, owing to which every one is enraged beyond measure. The refugees, who fled from the rebels, have reported to us that the rebels have the intention of secretly getting into the Poo-tung districts.

We humbly find, on examination, that Poo-tung adjoins Shanghae, Pau-shan, Nan-hwai, Chuen-sha, Tung-keen, and Kin-shan, places all connected by the left bank of the Hwang-poo river; and that in one tide communication can be held with these places and Woo-sung. Now, the port of Woo-sung is an important place for the merchant-vessels of your honourable country, where they are coming and going; and the upper part of the Hwang-poo river is used by Chinese merchants in carrying on their trade, both the upper and lower parts of the Hwang-poo river being accordingly connected with the trade of Shanghae.

At present Chinese vessels anchor at Kaou-keaou, Yui-keang-kang, which are places where business is carried on; should these places, therefore, be disturbed not only will the water and land traffic be interfered with, but merchants and traders will not have any place at which to establish themselves, and the channels of traffic will be interrupted. This will greatly interfere with the trade of Shanghae.

We have humbly taken into consideration that your honourable Government loves its people as a father loves his sons, and that it treats other peoples with the same benevolence; as your Excellency has been pleased to protect us already, we have dared to hope that we shall in future still be protected and saved from injury.

Under these circumstances, we have to request your Excellency Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary will be pleased to have compassion on our people, and to send a communication to the Chief of the forces to station vessels of war at Lew-ho, Nan-tsaou-pang, Kaou-keaou, Yui-keang-kang, Ming-hong, Chow-poo, and Tang-kow, to protect the routes, and to prevent the rebels going from the districts in the East to those of the South. For this favour we shall be for ever grateful.

For his Excellency Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 8th moon.

Inclosure 3 in No. 92.

Memorial.

(Translation.)

SIEH, Acting Governor, &c., memorialises to the effect that the district city of Shanghae was surrounded and hard pressed by thieves for seven days and seven nights. That the officers and soldiers under his command luckily met and overcame the danger. The facts having been carefully recorded for the Emperor's information are forwarded at the rate of 600 *li* a-day.

The sacred glance is solicited thereon.

The thieves in multitudes having surrounded Shanghae, in order to take it, your servant led his officers, both civil and military, to the different battlements to resist, and on the 4th day of the 7th moon (August 20) addressed a memorial which was forwarded by a man lowered from the city wall by a rope for that purpose. Immediately after his departure the vagabonds came against the city on every side with the greatest violence and impetuosity. Your servant

standing on the West Gate saw the smoke and flames ascending from beyond the Great and Little South Gates until the very sky was obscured. Knowing that this conflagration was a ruse employed by the thieves to fill the hearts of my troops with dismay, and so facilitate their own entrance into the city, your servant gave directions to the Sub-Prefect You Hsi-kang to address the soldiers and braves, and so set their minds at ease. Soon after this the thieves were discovered in masses like ants making for the south-west angle of the city. Wu, the Taoutae, and Liu, the city Magistrate, thereupon ordered the soldiers on the wall to open fire with guns and cannon. Large numbers of thieves bearing black and yellow flags were slain; but such was their number that no check was given to the vagabonds, who now advanced with the intention of crossing the city moat, their bullets coming over the wall into the town. The soldiers, however, kept up their fire, throwing also stones and lime, for a long time: a large number of the thieves were thus destroyed.

Another body of the enemy had made a turn in the fields from the east to the west, but your servant had already directed the Acting Provincial Judge to lead certain soldiers and braves to the protection of the wall from the West to the North Gates. He was to assist Colonel Tang Kuotung. Lieutenant Wang-wei-lung was directed most carefully to watch the three water-gates on the east, south, and west sides of the city. The City Magistrate was directed to order the people to join the braves in the defence of certain unprotected portions of the wall. This measure was necessitated by the paucity of troops in the garrison. The thieves under red flags led the van, those under the black and white followed. More than a myriad advanced, like a swarm of wasps. In their centre were horsemen, many hundred in number, moving backwards and forwards. The soldiers on the wall never uttered a sound; like stones planted there they never moved, they waited patiently until the thieves were almost within the West Gate, and the thievish bullets hit the house on the wall, passing over the head of your servant. Brigadier Ho-shun thereupon directed the men at the various guns to open fire all at once. More than 100 thieves rolled over, not a few men and horses were killed, and the vagabonds commenced a retreat, but soon afterwards moved in a body towards the North Gate. Not far from the Ningpo Kungsoo, a party of Ningpo braves, under the command of Expectant Taoutae Yang Fang (Takee), met them with a smart fire from cannon, utterly routing them, and killing an untold number.

The thieves once again made a desperate attack on the city; but Chiang Chun-chi and Tang Kuo-tung ordered the soldiers to keep up the firing without intermission. The men on both sides of the West Gate set up a shout, and killed large numbers of the foe. The smallness of our numbers prevented the order to open the City Gate, that the soldiers might make a sortie, from being given.

Thieves had come from all parts to the capture of the city, and although vast numbers had been killed and wounded, still their appearance was very formidable. Just at the very nick of time (*lit.*), a steamer on the Hwang-poo opened fire, and killed a great many vagabonds with her shells. The thieves finding themselves without resource, all fan away towards the west; troops were thereupon ordered to pursue them for some distance. The pursuers killed some 200, captured about 70, and took two flags, one having a dragon, and the other the Pa-kua, worked upon it. They also captured about forty ladders, some made of bamboo, and others of cord and wood, together with an immense quantity of arms, and flags of all colours. The vicinity of the West Gate was swept clean of thieves, and as it was getting dark, all further pursuit was deemed unadvisable; so the soldiers were recalled. During the night, the vagabonds displayed innumerable flags and lamps, for purposes of intimidation, towards the south and west sides of the city, while they themselves burnt and plundered all the villages within reach.

On the 5th (August 21), the foe had divided themselves into several parties, one of which had stopped the road by which supplies reach Shanghae from the North. An advance was again made towards the south and west sides of the city. The officers and soldiers on the walls had not a moment's rest the whole day long. The steamer on the river, too, and the Artillery on the wall, kept up a fire until late in the evening, when the thieves gradually retired. I learned from spies that a party of rebels had crossed the river to Chow-poo, intending to take various places in the Nan-hui-hsien. The country people, who had been

well drilled, resisted them; but their courage was fast giving way before the determined look of the thieves when a steamer opened fire, killing upwards of 100 rebels, whereupon the rest all fled.

On the 6th and 7th (August 22 and 23), the rebels were burning and ravaging at no great distance from the city. A fire had been kept up against places where lamps and flags were visible among the reeds; but it is probable that no men were concealed near. The smallness of the garrison prevented soldiers from going any distance to seize the thieves.

At dawn of the 8th (August 24), not the slightest sound of the foe could be heard near Shanghae; the flags that could be seen were not even fixed firmly in the ground; soldiers were ordered to reconnoître in every direction; when, near some ruined houses, were discovered some men made of straw, properly dressed, each carrying a flag and lamp. The country people said that the thieves had fled in a westerly direction.

This is a true account of all that took place, both by day and night, from the 4th day of the moon until the thieves retreated. The vagabonds surrounded the city, and then fled.

Your servant caused all the captives, from Chao Yu-kuei downwards, to be examined. They all asserted that Le-hsui-chung, the man at Soo-chow, who falsely calls himself the Chung-wang, was quite aware that Shanghae was prepared to resist him, and had consequently determined not to move against the place. But a certain Canton blue-button Chief, named Le, assured the Chung-wang that a certain Kwang-si man, Yü-e-cheu by name, was in the city itself, ready to make a disturbance and open the gates on the arrival of the thieves. A myriad and several thousand men were then marched against Shanghae. Little did they expect several days' hard fighting with our troops, during which more than 1,000 of their men were placed *hors de combat;* while no internal disturbance was allowed to take place. The ruffian Le himself was wounded. The captives asserted that the person seen outside the South Gate with four bearers and a large yellow umbrella, was the Chung-wang. Their examination having been completed, the captives were all executed at the same time.

Yu-i-cheu had been decapitated by my orders some time previously, but your servant fearing that many such men were hidden in the city, directed soldiers and braves to search for them day after day, in order that such danger might be cleared away as it were by the very roots.

Knowing that people's mind were not easy during the defence of the city, Wu, the Taoutae, Chiang, the Provincial Judge, and other officers, went round and personally excited the valour of the troops by commendation and explanation of their great duty; showing them that they divided the bitter and sweet equally with them, and that it depended entirely on their obedience to command whether the masses of thieves burst into the city or not, for that the danger was exceedingly great.

The garrison of the city consisted of about 1,000 men; in vain did I look for the arrival of reinforcements, not one came. Your servant, with the other civil and military officers, directed the operations by day, and by night went rounds of inspection. For seven days and seven nights we never closed our eyes, for we were all of one mind.

But the victory is gained and the danger is over; we have been enabled to protect this important place, the money-spring of the Two Kiang, although we never thought it was possible to do so. But it is all a portion of the felicity of the Holy Lord, which is as heaven itself. The evil has been turned aside as the empire wishes it, and the people are lucky. But although the danger has been overcome the magnificent mercantile establishments outside the city have been reduced to ashes, and the villages on all sides are torn to atoms. Words cannot express the wretchedness of the scene, and it will take a very long time to restore everything to its former state. Moreover, the thieves have retreated no very great distance from Shanghae, for they are still living at Tsing-poo, Kai-ding, and elsewhere. The captives assured us that the Chief had returned to Soo-chow to lead his very best troops to the attack, so we are still obliged to use the utmost caution.

Your servant sent letters in every direction to hasten the arrival of reinforcements, and thirty Chang-lung boats have entered the port of Woo-sung, but no more are reported elsewhere. Your servant is anxious for the arrival of

troops in order that parties may be sent out against the thieves, which will have more effect than the mere guarding of Shanghae. It is to be hoped for the restoration of tranquillity in the Two Kiang, that Tsing Kuo-fan, Tu Hsing-ngo, and Jui Chang, will speedily lead their armies here, that a plan may be arrived at by which certain points may be protected, while certain places are being wrested from the thieves. If they arrive but slowly, rebellion, it is to be feared, will have spread everywhere, and nothing will remain to be done.

Your servant can only command the civil and military officers to use their utmost strength and vigour in defending this side corner, for unless we have some standing-place operations for the recapture of other places are impossible. All the officers, high and low, civil and military, are aware of this, as are those persons who have for the time the management of Government affairs. They have exerted every nerve in fighting against the thieves. Although this is nothing but their duty, yet their meritorious services on this occasion are so different from their former every-day labour, that your servant looking up to the celestial compassion of the Emperor ventures to inform him and solicit some reward for the most deserving, in order that emulation may be excited among all.

Your servant presents a list which awaits the Imperial will; he would ascertain whether from the number of deserving officers a further list might be offered.

This memorial, travelling at the rate of 600 *li* a day, was inscribed for the Imperial information and satisfaction, to announce that after seven days and seven nights of fighting the thieves have retreated from the city of Shanghae.

Looking up, the Imperial sacred glance is solicited thereon, and the Imperial pleasure sued for.

Inclosure 4 in No. 92.

Imperial Rescript.

(Translation.)

SIEH has memorialized that the siege of the city of Shanghae has been raised, and petitions that commendation and rewards be bestowed on all officers who distinguished themselves on that occasion by their exertions.

Let the Lieutenant-Governor Sieh receive a button of the highest rank.

Of the rest of those deserving reward there is Wu, Acting Intendant (Taoutae) of Soo-chow, Sun-keang, and Tai Tsang-chow. He has already been promoted to the Office of Acting Provincial Treasurer, with the clear blue button. Let him now wear a red button of the second rank.

Let the name of Chiang Chin-ke, Acting Provincial Judge, and Expectant Intendant, be put on record for an Intendantship of Circuit.

The expectant Sub-Prefect, Yeu Hsi-kan, to be speedily promoted to the rank of Expectant Prefect.

Let Liu Hsing-kao, the Magistrate of Shanghae, wear the button of a Prefect; let his name be recorded for speedy promotion to a Prefecture.

Tang Kuo-tsung, a Colonel, to be recorded for the command of a battalion.

Wang Szu-lung, Lieutenant, to be recorded for a Company.

The expectant Intendant Yang-fang (Takee) is to remain in Keang-soo. His name is to be recorded in the Office of Merit and Demerit, for the very first Intendantship of Circuit that falls vacant. Let him hand over the usual fee forthwith.

Let Sieh investigate the claims and merits of all others and memorialize.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 7th moon, 26th day (12th September, 1860.)

No. 93.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received December* 15.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, October* 21, 1860.

THE painful intelligence reached me last night of Mr. de Norman's death in the hands of his Tartar captors. I inclose the statement of a Sikh Duffadar who shared but happily survived his captivity, and has been able to rejoin the army.

I had given leave to Mr. de Norman, at his earnest request, to accompany the expedition to the North, partly to give him a respite from the uninterrupted labour of the office that devolved on him after Mr. Rumbold's departure, and partly on account of the benefit I hoped to derive from his observation of what took place, and further, because of the assistance he might be able to afford Lord Elgin in questions of detail, which he had thoroughly mastered. Your Lordship will have heard from Lord Elgin of the circumstances which led to his falling into the hands of the Tartars, and of the barbarous treatment which ended in his death, a subject on which I cannot bring myself to dwell.

It has not been my fortune to meet with a man whose life was so much in harmony with the Divine precept, "not slothful in business, fearing the Lord." With a consistency unparalleled in my experience he brought to bear on the discharge of every duty, and to the investigation of every subject however minute, the complete and undivided attention of the sound abilities, the good sense, and the indefatigable industry with which God had endowed him. A character so morally and intellectually conscientious, striving to do everything in the most perfect manner, neglecting no opportunity of acquiring fresh and of consolidating previous knowledge, promised a career honourable to himself, and, what he valued far more, advantageous to the public, had it pleased God to spare him.

Now there remains to those who knew him intimately only this consoling conviction, that death, however sudden, could not find him unprepared.

He appears to have died on or about the 5th October.

I had indulged in sanguine expectations of his restoration to us, and am perfectly unhinged by this unexpected blow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 93.

Evidence of Jowalla Sing, Duffadar, 1st Troop Fane's Horse.

[See Inclosure in No. 91.]

No. 94.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1860.

ON reading over the despatches which have been received from your Excellency and Sir Hope Grant relating to recent events in China, I am forcibly struck with the insincerity and inhumanity of the persons employed by the Chinese Government.

It would be unreasonable to expect that the Chinese should observe the technical laws and regulations which have been concurred in by European nations as the rules of peace and war.

But the most ordinary notions of justice and humanity teach the rudest of mankind that when an engagement is made, justice requires that it should be observed; that when men have gone into a foreign camp with a view of making peace, humanity ordains that they should not be murdered by slow torture.

Yet such has been the conduct of the Chinese officials. Messrs. Parkes, Loch, De Norman, Lieutenant Anderson, and Captain Brabazon, with an escort and some French officers, having gone to Tung-chow to prepare for the meeting of your Excellency and Baron Gros with the Chinese Commissioners in order to settle the terms of peace, the Chinese army, instead of falling back from Chang-kia-wan as had been agreed upon, occupied the ground assigned by agreement to the allied armies. When this breach of engagement had produced a collision, as it was sure to do, not only were our peaceful Agents detained as prisoners, but Mr. de Norman, Lieutenant Anderson, and Mr. Bowlby were killed by ill-usage, and by the most horrible and protracted cruelty.

When these things are considered, one is led to doubt whether any European is safe whose liberty and life are dependent on the mercy of the Chinese.

I wish you, therefore, to consider whether Mr. Bruce can be permitted to reside in any town where he cannot be guarded by European troops. Her Majesty's Government would rather hear that he was in security in Tien-tsin or Shanghae than that he was in Peking liable to outrage or insult, only to be avenged by a fresh war, or to be submitted to in a spirit of humiliation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 95.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1860.

HER Majesty's Government have learnt, from your Excellency's despatch of the 13th October, that Peking was surrendered by the Chinese on that day, and that the allied armies had possession of two of the gates.

Her Majesty's Government have since been informed, by telegraph from St. Petersburgh, that peace had been signed and ratified on the 26th of October, and that the army marched upon Tien-tsin on the 5th November.

I congratulate your Excellency on the termination of the war by the taking of Peking, and the signing of a Treaty by which, so far as it appears, the objects the Allied Powers had in view have been fully attained.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 96.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Camp before Peking, October* 21, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the translation of a draft note in the vermilion pencil (and, therefore, purporting to be the Emperor's autograph), found, with several other papers, at the Palace of Yuen-ming-yuen. It relates to the question of the presentation of the American Minister, Mr. Ward, to the Emperor when he visited Peking last year. It is important, inasmuch as it contains a distinct assertion on the Emperor's part to the effect that Mr. Ward's offer to pay to him the same marks of respect as to his own President was absurd, because it implied the placing of China on an equal rank with the barbarian nations.

The Emperor's affectation of superiority is not, in itself, of much consequence to other Sovereigns; but it has an unfavourable bearing as regards the validity of the Treaty-rights which they obtain from him on behalf of their subjects, because it imparts to them in some sort the character of concessions made of pure grace by a Suzerain to vassals, and enjoyed, therefore, under some not very definable conditions of fealty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 96.

Draft of an Imperial Rescript in Vermilion, that is, in Autograph, found in the the Palace of Yuen-ming-yuen on the 7th October, 1860.

(Translation.)

WE have this day perused the reply of the American barbarians to the communication of Kweiliang and his colleagues.

(It shows that), in the matter of their presentation at Court, nothing more can be done to bring them to reason (1). Besides, these barbarians, by their averment that their respect for His Majesty the Emperor is the same as that they feel for their Pih-li-si-tien-teh (President), just place China on a par with

the barbarians of the South and East (2), an arrogation of greatness which is simply ridiculous.

The proposition of yesterday, that they should have an interview with the Princes, need not either be entertained.

Notes.

(1.) *Lit.*, there cannot be any more good means for bringing them round (to the right way). Argument is exhausted, so let the question of an audience drop.

(2.) The Mivan, ancient barbarians of the South, the "I" of the East.

No. 97.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Camp before Peking, October 22, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of an Imperial Decree, which seems to have been issued shortly before the action of the 18th ultimo, and which may, perhaps, account for the arrest of Mr. Parkes and others on that day.

The narrative of our recent differences with the Emperor of China given in this Decree is drawn up with a good deal of art. We are throughout denounced as guilty of rebellion; and, finally, it is announced that the Emperor is ready to expend all his treasure in rewards to those who blow up our ships, deliver our chiefs alive, or bring in the heads of our common soldiers. A special appeal is made to the "Fo-kien and Kwang-tung men captives," in other words, to the coolies in our employment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 97.

Imperial Edict.

(Translation.)

[THE following appears to have been issued the day before the action at Chang-kia-wan, or on the day of the action; at all events, before the result of that action and the capture of Mr. Parkes and the rest was known to the Emperor. It is procurable in Peking in the form of a broad sheet, though the copy from which this translation was made had all the appearance of having formed part of the ordinary Gazette *brochure*.]

Whether soothing or bridling (*i. e.*, whether paternally at peace or at war with) (the inhabitants of) the seas of the world, we have regarded them all with the same feeling of benevolence, nor was any interdict laid upon commerce with the nations of the outer waters. But the English and French, after many years of peace with China, no cause of feud having for a long time presented itself, did in the winter of the seventh year (of our reign) commence war in Kwang-tung, with violence made entry into its city, and entrapped (or laid an ambush) and made prisoners of its authorities. Still holding that the Governor-General Yeh Ming-shin had, by over inflexibility and independence, provoked this quarrel, we did not at once put troops in motion to inflict punishment upon them; and when, in the eighth year, the barbarian Chief Elgin and others came to (the coast of) Tien-tsin to complain, we commanded the Governor-General Tau Tsing-siang to proceed thither to make inquiry (into their case) and to dispose of it. The barbarians, however, took advantage of our want of preparation; they stormed the forts, and came straight up the passage to Tien-tsin. Apprehensive lest the spirit of life should be poisoned by the pernicious influence (of war), we spent no long time in argument with them, but at once dispatched the Chief Secretary Kweiliang and his colleague to confer with them, to still this trouble, and to bring hostilities to an end. The Treaty they requested us to sanction, containing

much that had been exacted, right or wrong (*lit.*, coercively insisted on), we again commissioned Kweiliang and his colleague to proceed to Shanghae, with orders to discuss and determine a tariff of duties, and so to reconsider the Treaty with them as to render it clear and satisfactory; that so faith might be reposed in it (1).

In the 8th year (9th year?), nevertheless, the barbarian Bruce (2) and others, ferocious and overbearing, of no docility, again sailed up with ships of war, and coming straight up to Takoo destroyed our defensive apparatus, nor did they retire until Sang-ko-lin-sin, the high officer in command, had inflicted a severe blow upon them with his artillery and other arms.

This these barbarians drew upon themselves; China, as all the Empire is aware, had committed no breach of faith towards them.

And this year, when once more the Chiefs Elgin and Gros appeared off the coast, China, not to be too hard upon them (3), authorized them to land at Peh-tang, and to proceed by that route to the capital to exchange (the ratifications of) their Treaties. These barbarians, however, concealing danger in their hearts, carried with them guns mounted on carriages, and with bodies of Horse and Foot, gained the rear of the Takoo forts, and when our forces had retired, they again came on to Tien-tsin.

As Kweiliang was the person who negotiated the Treaty at Tien-tsin the year before last, we again desired him to proceed thither to issue to them reasonable commands (or authoritatively to point out to them what was right). We still hoped that the barbarians had some sense of decency and justice, and we should certainly have had the liberality to accede to any of their requests, provided that the concession could with propriety be made. Not so: Elgin was extravagant in his demands; in his covetousness he would have extorted an indemnity for war expenses; he would have forced the opening of additional new ports; he would have crowded a large army into the territory surrounding our capital (4); he showed himself truculent, tricky to the last degree.

On this we sent forward Tsai-yuen the Prince of I, with Muh-yin, President of the Board of War, to set before them once and again the right path, and to consider with them and satisfactorily arrange the various concessions for which they were applying. Yet these rebellious barbarians still ventured to indulge their ferocity; pressed hard on Tung-chow with their troops, and stated that they would bring them even into our presence (or would come with them even to an audience of us).

How could we have stood before the Empire had we longer in silence forborne? We have given strict orders to the high officers in command of troops to bring up Horse and Foot from every side, and to fight them to the death, while the scholars and people of the districts surrounding the metropolis are either to assemble the militia who with united hearts will join in the war, or to train bands of volunteers, who shall beset and obstruct their communications. If any, be he officer, soldier, or other, shall cut off the head of a black barbarian, he shall receive 50 taels reward; if any shall cut off the head of a white barbarian, he shall receive 100 taels reward; if any shall make prisoner of a distinguished barbarian Chief, he shall receive 500 taels reward; if any shall burn a barbarian ship, he shall receive 5,000 taels reward. All the wealth we possess shall go to pay them.

The people of Tien-tsin have ever been reputed patriotic and valiant. They will surely feel the enmity we feel, and share in our hatred; fighting alike in fair field and secret ambush, until the pestilent spirit of rebellion be laid.

We are not a ruler given to war, or ever for fighting; and the officers and people of our Empire will no doubt understand our pain at a state of things so desperate.

As regards those natives of Fuh-kien and Kwang-tung of whom the barbarians have made captives, all these too are our babes; and if any be able to rescue himself and return to us, or to present us with the head of a barbarian Chief, he shall also be handsomely rewarded. These barbarians came 10,000 *li* from their homes for the circulation of their wares; it is by traitors perverse and wicked that they have been throughout egged on, until now things have reached this irremediable condition.

It is incumbent on us further to command that all the ports be closed, and their trade cut off. The other nations who are respectfully obedient, if they continue to attend to their business in peace, shall not be alarmed or molested.

And if these same barbarians, upon the issue of this our earnest exhortation and plain command, be enabled to awake to a sense of their transgression, to repent them of it, and make tender of their faith (*sc.*, return to their allegiance), we will continue our permission to them to trade at every port heretofore open to them, in evidence of the great extent of our benevolence. But if, still clinging to their belief, they will not perceive; if, ignoring their sense of right (5), they persist in deeds of violence (or in wrong doing), our Generals and warriors, and our volunteers from among the people, have nothing for it but to exert themselves to the utmost to exterminate them; an oath being taken that the hateful brood shall be utterly annihilated. Let them be wise in time (*lit.*, there will be no regret (possible) afterwards).

Respect this.

Notes.

(1.) *Lit.*, that it might be faith-proof.

(2.) Mr. Bruce's name is written as in the printed copy of the Decree issued to the United States' Minister, Mr. Ward, "Go-lo-sz," instead of "Pu-lu-sz." It is a simple misprint.

(3.) That is, not to repeat the very severe lesson they had received last year.

(4.) *Lit.*, the Imperial domain; the whole Province of Chih-li is meant.

(5.) *Lit.*, obliterating "li," reason, or the sense of right implanted in man by Heaven.

No. 98.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received December* 27.)

My Lord, *Peking, October* 22, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a despatch which I received from Prince Kung on the 15th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 98.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication.

The Prince has been informed of the strict discipline of the British Minister's retinue now in the city (1); it produces a feeling of security amongst the people, and prevents any doubts or fears on their part.

The Prince is greatly gratified at this evidence of the British Government's sincere desire for friendly relations, and he feels it his duty to conduct himself towards (the British Minister) with corresponding fairness. He has accordingly deputed Hang-ki, President of the Wu-pi-yuen (Military Department of the Household), to arrange definitely with any British officer who may be similarly deputed, all details essential to the sealing and signature of the Tien-tsin Convention, and to ascertain sufficiently beforehand the day on which the British Minister will exchange (the ratifications of) the Treaty of the 8th year (1858), to enable all necessary preparations to be made. These may otherwise, it is to be feared, be so hurried, if undertaken only after the Minister has entered the capital, and thus there might be some want of what is due to his Excellency, which would be quite at variance with the desire of the Prince to treat him properly.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 9th moon, 1st day (14th October, 1860).

(Received October 15, 1860.)

Note.

(1.) The text means, literally, the following men, retinue of the Honourable, *i. e.*, your nation. The Prince is anxious to persuade himself that the gate has not been surrendered to the Commanders-in-chief.

No. 99.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received December* 27.)

My Lord, *Peking, October* 23, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith translations of two despatches which I received from Prince Kung, one on the 20th, and the other on the 21st instant, with a copy of my reply, fixing the 24th instant for the signing of the Convention, and for the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 99.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication.

Upon the 6th instant (19th October), the Prince addressed a communication to the British Minister in reply to his Excellency's answer of the 4th instant, appointing the 10th of this moon (23rd October) as the day on which the Convention must positively be signed, and the (ratifications of the) Treaty of the 8th year (1858) exchanged. His Excellency's despatch, however, did not specify any hour on the 10th instant; and as the French are to sign and seal the Convention, and exchange ratifications on the same day, unless an hour be fixed beforehand, the preliminary arrangements may possibly not be completed in time.

The Prince trusts, therefore, that the British Minister will specify the hour at which the Convention is to be signed, and the exchange of the ratifications effected, that he may direct officers to make the necessary preparations.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 9th moon, 8th day (21st October, 1860).

(Received October 21, 1860.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 99.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication.

On receipt of the British Minister's despatch applying for the sum o 300,000 taels, to compensate (the sufferings and losses) of the British officers and soldiers (made prisoners), the Prince wrote to say that he assented entirely and he has this day sent officers to hand over that sum, in security of a good understanding between the two nations.

He trusts that the British Minister will have it duly taken over, and will write a reply acknowledging the receipt of this money, which reply can be handed to the officer sent with it, that he may bring it to the Prince in token of good faith.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl o Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 9th moon, 9th day (22nd October, 1860).

(Received October 22, 1860.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 99.

The Earl of Elgin to the Prince of Kung.

THE Undersigned, Earl of Elgin, &c., has the honour to acknowledge the Prince of Kung's two despatches, of the 21st and 22nd instant, and begs, in reply, to inform His Imperial Highness that as soon as the silver forwarded yesterday shall have been duly examined by the British and Chinese officers now about to commence inspection of it, the Undersigned will inclose His Highness the receipt he requests.

The Undersigned has further the honour to acquaint His Imperial Highness that he proposes signing the Convention, at the Court of the Board of Ceremonies, to-morrow, at 2 o'clock, and immediately after its signature exchanging the ratifications of the Treaty of 1858.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 100.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Peking, October* 25, 1860.

GENERAL IGNATIEFF, the Representative of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia in this country, has had the great kindness to allow us to bury in the Russian cemetery our countrymen who fell victims to the barbarity of the Chinese. Nothing could be more considerate than the manner in which this service was rendered to us.

I inclose, herewith, the copy of a letter which I addressed to his Excellency on the subject, and I beg to assure your Lordship that I have not stated in that letter, as strongly as I feel it, my sense of the obligation under which I lie to General Ignatieff, for the course which he has followed ever since we have been brought together in the discharge of our official duties.

I inclose the copy of his Excellency's reply.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 100.

The Earl of Elgin to General Ignatieff.

M. le Général, *Peking, October* 17, 1860.

PERMIT me to convey to your Excellency my very sincere thanks for the great favour which you have done to me, and to my countrymen, by permitting the British subjects who have been barbarously murdered by the Chinese authorities to find a last resting-place in the Russian cemetery.

Your Secretary gave, I doubt not, a just expression to the sentiment which dictated this most considerate act on your Excellency's part, when he said to me after the funeral, "To-day we look on this cemetery, not as Russian or Greek, but Christian."

I cannot address your Excellency on this subject without availing myself of the opportunity to acknowledge the gratification and advantage I have derived from my intercourse with your Excellency ever since our official relations have brought us together. Without departing from the attitude which the instructions of your Government prescribed, you have throughout shown a legitimate sympathy in the success of the endeavours which we have been making to cause a semi-barbarous Government to respect the obligations of good faith in its dealings with other nations. For my own part, I have always derived benefit from your Excellency's opinion and knowledge on the subjects on which I have had the good fortune to converse with you.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 100.

General Ignatieff to the Earl of Elgin.

Milord, *Peking, le $\frac{6}{18}$ Octobre*, 1860.

J'AI l'honneur de recevoir l'aimable lettre de votre Excellence du $\frac{5}{17}$ Octobre.

En donnant à vos malheureux compatriotes qui sont morts d'une manière si horrible entre les mains cruelles des Chinois, la triste hospitalité sur le cimetière de notre Mission, je n'ai fait que mon devoir de Chrétien et de Représentant d'une nation amie. Je n'ai suivi dans cette occasion, comme dans toutes les autres, que l'esprit des instructions de mon Gouvernement, qui dans un cas comme celui-là ne voudrait jamais suivre une autre ligne de conduite.

Il va sans dire, Milord, et je n'ai certainement pas besoin de vous certifier expressément que les tombes des quatre Anglais qui gisent bien loin de leur patrie dans notre cimetière de Péking seront religieusement gardées par notre mission ecclésiastique avec les mêmes soins que celle-ci attache à la conservation des siennes.

Quant à ce que votre lettre contient de personnel sur les rapports qui ont existés entre nous, je remercie votre Excellence pour tout ce qu'elle a bien voulu me dire d'obligeant et de flatteur.

Je me félicite d'avoir entretenu avec votre Excellence les relations les plus franches, et je ne puis à cette occasion que répéter ce que déjà j'ai eu l'honneur de vous dire : que toujours je serai enchanté d'être d'accord avec votre Excellence et d'avoir pu profiter de vos lumières et de votre expérience, dans les conversations intimes sur des sujets qui intéressent au plus haut point nos deux pays.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) N. IGNATIEFF.

(Translation.)

My Lord, *Peking, October $\frac{6}{18}$*, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's kind letter of the $\frac{5}{17}$th of October.

In giving to your unfortunate countrymen who have died in such a horrible manner in the cruel hands of the Chinese the sad hospitality of the cemetery of our Mission, I have only done my duty as a Christian and the Representative of a friendly nation. I have only followed on this occasion, as on all others, the spirit of the instructions of my Government, who, in a case like this, would never wish to pursue any other line of conduct.

It is needless to say, my Lord, and it certainly is not requisite for me expressly to assure you, that the tombs of the four English who lie so far from their country in our cemetery at Peking will be religiously watched over by our Ecclesiastical Mission with the same care that is attached by them to the preservation of their own.

With regard to that part of your letter which refers to the personal relations which have existed between us, I thank your Excellency for all you so obligingly and flatteringly say.

I congratulate myself on having shown no reserve in my relations with your Excellency, and I can only, on this occasion, repeat that which I have already had the honour to say to you, that I shall always be delighted to be in accord with your Excellency, and to have been able to profit by your enlightenment and experience in the course of the confidential conversations which we have held on subjects in the highest degree interesting to our two countries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. IGNATIEF.

No. 101.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Camp before Peking, October* 25, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a letter which I addressed to Vice-Admiral Hope, in forwarding to him a copy of my note to Prince Kung of the 17th instant.

I inclose, likewise, a copy of Admiral Hope's reply.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 101.

The Earl of Elgin to Vice-Admiral Hope.

Sir, *Before Peking, October* 19, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Excellency's information, the copy of a communication which I addressed to the Prince of Kung on the 17th instant, and in which, as you will observe, I have taken the liberty of referring to your Excellency.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 101.

Vice-Admiral Hope to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *"Coromandel," at Tien-tsin, October* 23, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, and beg to assure your Excellency that whatever measures you may find it necessary to adopt will meet my best support.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HOPE.

No. 102.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Camp before Peking, October* 25, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a letter to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant, in which I requested an escort to accompany me on the occasion of the signature of the Convention of Peking, and of the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, together with a copy of Sir Hope Grant's reply.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 102.

The Earl of Elgin to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Sir, *Camp before Peking, October* 22, 1860.

I HOPE that arrangements will be sufficiently advanced this evening to enable me to sign the Convention to-morrow.

The signature will take place at the Board of Ceremonies at about 2 P.M.

I think it advisable that I should be accompanied on this occasion by an escort of not less than 500 men, and I beg to know whether you will be prepared to furnish it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 102.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Head-Quarters, October* 23, 1860.

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of this day's date, I have the honour to state that an escort of 500 men, as requested by your Lordship, will be ready to attend you into Peking to-morrow. The escort will be composed of 100 Cavalry and 400 Infantry.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT.

No. 103.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Peking, October* 25, 1860.

PRINCE KUNG'S communication to me, of which the translation was forwarded in my despatch to your Lordship of the 13th instant, and of which I furnish a duplicate translation herewith, was by no means a satisfactory document. Although we were receiving, day by day, fresh evidence of the barbarous treatment which our fellow-countrymen who had been illegally arrested had experienced at the hands of the Chinese authorities, and although I had constantly stated in my letters to him that I could not entertain proposals for the establishment of peace until they should have been restored, he makes in it no allusion to them at all; on the contrary, he refers somewhat flippantly to peace as already existing, complains of the advance of the army to the Palace of Yuen-ming-yuen, and endeavours to make conditions respecting the cession of the gate of the city, with the manifest intention of giving to that act the appearance of an arrangement entered into for mutual convenience rather than of an absolute surrender. To have accepted such a communication as satisfactory, and as the basis on which an agreement for the final settlement of our differences with China might be built, would have been, in my judgment, to compromise the most important objects for which this costly expedition was undertaken. The people of China would have been ere long informed that we had been baffled by the defences of Peking. In the more secret councils of the Imperial Court it would have been argued that the arrest of the prisoners had been a successful measure, as it had in some degree at least paralyzed our movements, and gratified the resentment of the Emperor, without entailing any specific penalty. Low as is the standard of morals which now obtains in China on such points, we should in my opinion have still further lowered it if we had not treated the act in question as a high crime calling for severe retribution.

Such being the convictions at which I had arrived after a full and anxious consideration of all the circumstances of the case, and of the obligations which those circumstances imposed upon me, I had to determine how I could best give effect to them, but here I found myself beset with difficulties of no common magnitude.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant, as your Lordship will perceive from my correspondence with him, of which a copy is transmitted herewith, held the opinion that its army must commence its march towards Tien-tsin on or before the 1st of November; and further, that any attack on Peking, or on the public buildings contained therein, unless preceded by some fresh provocation on the part of the Chinese, would be inconsistent with the conditions on which he had accepted the surrender of the Anting Gate of the city. Baron Gros was, on the other hand, most desirous that we should take no step which might prevent us from obtaining the signature of the Convention, and the ratification of the Treaties of 1858. On this point I entirely agreed with his Excellency; but I confess that I attached more importance to the impression which we might leave behind us on our departure from this place, than to any formal stipulations by which the Chinese authorities might bind themselves. It was necessary, therefore, to discover some act of retribution and punishment sufficiently severe to produce the required effect, and yet capable of such rapid execution that it would be possible after it had been accomplished, to complete, before the 1st of

November, the Treaties of Peace, and such further measures as might be immediately necessary to put them into operation. This had to be done without attacking Peking, or anything within Peking, and in such a manner as to make the blow fall on the Emperor, who was clearly responsible for the crime committed; without, however, so terrifying his brother, whom he had left behind him to represent him, as to drive him from the field.

The destruction of the Yuen-ming-yuen Palace, coupled with the exaction, as a step preliminary to negotiations, and in name of compensation to the sufferers, of such a sum of money as could be raised on the spot by the Government, seemed to me to be the only combination which fulfilled all these conditions. I had also at one time resolved to require that a monument should be erected at the expense of the Chinese Government, stating the circumstances of the arrest and murder of the British subjects illegally captured, who had died from the effects of their ill-treatment in prison, and the penalty which had been inflicted for the deed; but this proposal I finally abandoned for reasons which I have explained elsewhere.

As the destruction of Yuen-ming-yuen is, however, an act to which exception may, with great apparent reason, be taken, it is my duty before closing this despatch to say a few words respecting the only modes of inflicting a specific punishment for the crime in question which, limited as were my means of action for the reasons above stated, I could have adopted as substitutes for that measure.

I might, perhaps, have demanded a large sum of money, not as compensation for the sufferers, but as a penalty inflicted on the Chinese Government. But, independently of the objection in principle to making a high crime of this nature a mere money question, I hold on this point the opinion which is, I believe, entertained by all persons, without exception, who have investigated the subject, that, in the present disorganized state of the Chinese Government, to obtain large pecuniary indemnities from it is simply impossible, and that all that can be done practically in the matter is, to appropriate such a portion of the Customs' revenue as will still leave to it a sufficient interest in that revenue to induce it to allow the natives to continue to trade with foreigners. It is calculated that it will be necessary to take 40 per cent. of the gross Customs' revenue of China for about four years in order to procure payment of the indemnities already claimed by Baron Gros and me, under instructions from your Lordship and the French Government.

Embarrassing questions respecting the occupation of Chinese territory are involved in this arrangement, and I do not think that it would be advisable to bind the Chinese Government by engagements which would cause the term of liquidation of these indemnities to be indefinitely extended.

Or, I might have required that the persons guilty of cruelty to our countrymen, or of the violation of a flag of truce, should be surrendered. But if I had made this demand in general terms, some miserable subordinates would, probably, have been given up, whom it would have been difficult to pardon, and impossible to punish. And if I had specified Sang-ko-lin-sin, of whose guilt in violating a flag of truce evidence sufficient to ensure his condemnation by a court-martial could be furnished, I should have made a demand which, it may be confidently affirmed, the Chinese Government would not have conceded, and mine could not have enforced. I must add that, throwing the responsibility for the acts of Government in this way on individuals resembles too closely the Chinese mode of conducting war to approve itself altogether to my judgment. Having, therefore, to the best of my judgment, examined the question in all its bearings, I came to the conclusion that the destruction of Yuen-ming-yuen was the least objectionable of the several courses open to me, unless I could have reconciled it to my sense of duty to suffer the crime which had been committed to pass practically unavenged. I had reason, moreover, to believe that it was an act which was calculated to produce a greater effect in China, and on the Emperor, than persons who look on from a distance may suppose.

It was the Emperor's favourite residence, and its destruction could not fail to be a blow to his pride as well as to his feelings. To this place, as appears from the depositions of the Sikh troopers, copies of which were inclosed in despatch to your Lordship of the 13th of October, he brought our hapless countrymen in order that they might undergo their severest tortures within its precincts. Here have been found the horses and accoutrements of the troopers seized, the decorations torn from the breast of a gallant French officer,

and other effects belonging to the prisoners. As almost all the valuables had already been taken from the palace, the army would go there, not to pillage, but to mark, by a solemn act of retribution, the horror and indignation with which we were inspired by the perpetration of a great crime. The punishment was one which would fall, not on the people, who may be comparatively innocent, but exclusively on the Emperor, whose direct personal responsibility for the crime committed is established, not only by the treatment of the prisoners at Yuen-ming-yuen, but also by the Edict inclosed in my despatch of the 22nd October, in which he offers a pecuniary reward for the heads of the foreigners, adding, that he is ready to expend all his treasure in these wages of assassination.

I have now submitted as full a statement as it is in my power to furnish, of the motives which determined the tenour of the despatch which I addressed to Prince Kung, in replying to his communication to me of the 12th instant. I conclude by inclosing a copy of it, and a translation of the rejoinder which it called forth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 103.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication.

The Prince having repeatedly written to say that he had deputed officers to treat the British Secretary, Mr. Parkes, with all honour, and that as soon as they and he had satisfactorily settled together all questions relating to the sealing and signature of the Convention (the rest of), the British subjects to be returned (as well), conduct towards the British Government which was not illiberal, how comes it that the British troops have carried their outrages into the garden palace of the Emperor, and have fired His Majesty's audience-halls and dwellings? Is it reasonable that, the nation of the British Minister being one acquainted with the obligations of man to man, with discipline long established in its army, while its troops have wantonly fired and plundered the garden-palace, the Commanders of the two armies and the British Minister should affect ignorance of this? The British Minister should by rights state plainly in his reply what steps are to be taken with regard to these proceedings (1). This day, however, to his surprise, the Prince has received a despatch from his Excellency General Grant, the British Commander-in-chief, to the effect that he is about to take possession of the Anting Gate, and to preface this by the erection of a battery, and that in the event of a refusal he will assault the city on the 29th instant (13th October).

That the soldiers the British Minister might bring with him when he came to the capital to exchange the Treaties should be distributed without the walls, and that his escort should accompany him into the city, were indeed considerations inserted in the Convention, and to which of course effect will be given, as (the Convention) has been *in toto* assented to both by the former Commissioners and the Prince. The British Minister having also stated, in a despatch which the Prince has received, that there should be no alteration whatever in the Treaty, this too can be at once exchanged; that a good understanding may be established to endure for ever. But the words of the Convention had reference to the British Minister's entrance into the capital for the purpose of exchanging the Treaties; the city gates have ever been under the surveillance of high officers specially charged to see them opened and closed; if they be thrown open at this moment, before (peace be concluded), and the duty of inspection and search recklessly neglected, the disorderly of the place will probably seize the opportunity to commit all sorts of irregularities. It is indispensable, therefore, that proper precautions should be taken. The letter received from the British Government (Sir Hope Grant's despatch) says that the Anting Gate will be occupied by a body of troops, and the two nations being now at peace this is an arrangement which of course can be made, but the reply to this despatch should specify certain regulations for the occupation of this gate, and when the British Minister's reply to this effect shall have been received, a day can be named for the signature of the Convention and the exchange of the Treaties, in

order that before that day all necessary arrangements may be duly considered, to the establishment of a good understanding.

The British officers (still detained) were seized by the late Commissioners; a certain number were missing after the fight, or (have died) of their wounds or of sickness. The Prince gave orders to the officers whose business it was to find out where they were, to make them comfortable, and to put them under medical treatment, and he now returns them as his former despatch promised that he would return them, keeping his word, without any abatement or modification.

The Prince's correspondence during the last few days has been all carried on with the British Minister, and he thinks it proper to continue to address himself to his Excellency, although he has received the despatch from his Excellency the British General, as the good understanding has been restored.

He therefore writes this despatch.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung. 10th year, 8th moon, 28th day (12th October, 1860).

(Received 12th October, 1860.)

Note.

(1.) What punishment inflicted on the troops, what reparation made for losses, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 103.

The Earl of Elgin to the Prince of Kung.

THE Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge receipt of a despatch from His Serene Highness the Prince Kung, under date the 12th instant.

As that despatch was in its principal part a reply to a communication which had been addressed to Prince Kung by the Commander-in-chief of Her Britannic Majesty's force, he transmitted a copy of it as soon as it reached him to his Excellency, in order that he might take such notice of it as might seem to him to be fitting.

It is unnecessary, therefore, for the Undersigned to refer to those parts of the despatch in question which refer to the attack on Yuen-ming-yuen, and other military acts consequent on the advance of the British and French troops to the neighbourhood of Peking. He will only observe on this head that this advance took place because the Chinese Government refused to accept the terms of peace offered to it by the Undersigned, firstly at Tien-tsin and again at Tung-chow, and because in the latter case that refusal was accompanied by an act of barbarous treachery for which it would be difficult in the annals of the world to find a parallel.

The Commander-in-chief has informed the Undersigned that he took no notice whatsoever of that portion of the despatch of the Prince in which His Highness requires that a letter should be written to him specifying the regulations under which the gate shall be held when surrendered to the allies.

The gate has, nevertheless, been surrendered unconditionally. This is well. Had the Prince adhered to the demand implied in that clause of his despatch, the city of Peking would have been assaulted and taken.

The Undersigned has further to inform His Serene Highness that the letter of the Commander-in-chief, stating the terms on which the city of Peking would be spared, was written before he knew the treatment to which the British and French subjects, seized, in violation of a flag of truce, on the 18th ultimo, had been subjected, and when all the evidence which he possessed on this point was contained in the despatch of the Prince to the Undersigned, in which despatches the Prince repeatedly averred that the prisoners in question had suffered no mortal injury, were comfortably lodged, and treated with all proper attention.

Information since received establishes the fact that at the time when these words were written several subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, not taken in fight, but seized and bound while relying on the security that should have been afforded them by a flag of truce, and offering no resistance, had already died from the effects of the barbarous cruelty to which they and their companions

had been subjected as prisoners. This flagrant misrepresentation of the facts of the case, for which the Prince is himself responsible, would fully justify the Commander-in-chief in setting at nought the conditions under which the gate of the city was surrendered into his hands; but he is still desirous to spare, if possible, the lives of the common people.

The Undersigned now proceeds to advert to those portions of the despatch of His Serene Highness which concern him more immediately, and especially to that clause which speaks of peace as already established between Great Britain and China.

The Undersigned begs to remind His Serene Highness that, in the first communication which he had the honour to address to him, he informed him that suspension of hostilities and negotiation of peace would be impossible until the officers and subjects of Her Britannic Majesty still missing had returned: to that declaration he has constantly adhered.

How has this condition, which the Undersigned has throughout declared to be indispensable to the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of peace, been fulfilled by Prince Kung and the Government which he represents?

Of the total number of twenty-six British subjects, seized in defiance of honour and of the law of nations, thirteen only have been restored alive, all of whom, carry on their persons evidence, more or less distinctly marked, of the indignities and ill-treatment from which they have suffered, and thirteen have been barbarously murdered, under circumstances on which the Undersigned will not dwell, lest his indignation should find vent in words which are not suitable to a communication of this nature.

Until this foul deed shall have been expiated, peace between Great Britain and the existing Dynasty of China is impossible.

The following, therefore, are the conditions the immediate acceptance of which will alone avert from it the doom impending on it.

What remains of the Palace of Yuen-ming-yuen, which appears to be the place at which several of the British captives were subjected to the grossest indignities, will be immediately levelled with the ground. This condition requires no assent on the part of His Highness, because it will be at once carried into effect by the Commander-in-chief.

A sum of 300,000 taels must be paid down at once to the officers appointed by the Undersigned to receive it, which sum will be appropriated at the discretion of Her Majesty's Government to those who have suffered, and to the families of the murdered men.

The immediate signature of the Convention drawn up at Tien-tsin, which will remain as it is, with the single change that it shall be competent for the armies of England and France to remain at Tien-tsin until the whole indemnities spoken of in the said Convention are paid, if the Governments of England and France see fit to adopt this course.

The demolition of Yuen-ming-yuen will take place immediately.

Unless, before 10 A.M. on the 20th, the Prince informs the Undersigned, in writing, that the sum demanded as compensation for the British subjects who have been maltreated or murdered will be ready for payment on the 22nd, and that he will be prepared to sign the Convention and to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin on the 23rd, the Undersigned will again call on the Commander-in-chief to seize the Imperial Palace in Peking, and to take such other measures to compel the Chinese Government to accede to the demands of that of Great Britain as may seem to him to be fitting. It is proper, however, that he should inform the Prince that, should the contumacy of the Chinese force him to adopt this course, he will address himself to the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval forces, as well as to the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's land forces. He begs to remind the Prince that the Customs revenue of Canton is being collected for the profit of the Supreme Government of China, although that city is in the military occupation of the Allies; that it is the military force of the Allies which has for some time past prevented Shanghae from falling into the hands of the rebels; and that the junks carrying rice and tribute to Peking have been allowed to pass and repass unmolested, although the fleets of the Allies command both the seas and rivers.

If peace be not at once concluded, this state of things will cease, and the Undersigned will concert measures with Her Majesty's Naval Commander-in-chief, with the view of obtaining, from these and other sources, indemnification

for the expense which Her Majesty's Government is compelled to incur by the bad faith of that of China.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 103.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication in reply.

Upon the 4th of the 9th moon (17th October) the Prince received the British Minister's reply of the 3rd, and he now, in evidence of his desire for friendly relations, makes answer plainly and clearly that we positively agree to everything (therein demanded).

The despatch under acknowledgment states that of twenty-six persons seized, but thirteen have been sent back, and that to compensate these and (the families) of the thirteen who are dead, for what they have suffered, the British Minister requires 300,000 taels.

Feeling that his Excellency's requisition for the sum to be so appropriated is prompted by the best intentions on his part, the Prince at once approves of its payment.

As regards the barbarous treatment of the officers and men of the (French and British) nations, the Prince has assented to the payment of the compensation money, that in the amends it makes (or the comfort it will afford) there might be proof (of the re-establishment) of friendly relations.

The day on which his Excellency the British Ambassador will exchange the ratifications can be satisfactorily arranged between whatever officers may be deputed (for this purpose) on either side.

A necessary reply addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 9th moon, 6th day (19th October, 1860).

(Received 20th October, 7 A.M.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 103.

The Earl of Elgin to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Sir, *Before Peking, October* 15, 1860.

AS it is important that I should not, at the present conjuncture, make any demands on the Chinese Government, in the enforcement of which I shall not be supported by your Excellency, I beg to know whether I have rightly interpreted your Excellency's views on the following points:—

1. That it is your determination to return to Tien-tsin before the winter sets in.

2. That, in order to effect this object, it is necessary that you should commence your movement towards that place not later than the first week in November.

3. That you consider that good faith requires you to abstain from any attack on Peking, or on the public buildings contained therein, unless the Chinese give fresh cause of provocation.

4. But that you are prepared to take measures at once for the complete demolition of the palaces of Hai-tien and Yuen-ming-yuen.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 103.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Head-Quarters, Peking, October* 15, 1860.

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of this date, I have the honour to state as follows:—

1. That, in consultation with General de Montauban, I have determined that it will not be advisable to keep the army here during the winter.

2. That, in order to make the necessary arrangements for wintering at Tien-tsin, the allied forces must march towards that place about the 1st of November.

3. That, after the engagements under which the Anting Gate has been surrendered, viz., that the city should not be injured, it would be not only contrary to good faith to attack the city or public buildings, excepting it should become a military necessity, from the Chinese giving fresh cause of provocation, but would also tend to destroy the reputation which we now possess, both in Europe and in the East, for adhering strictly to our word; and, in the present state of our relations with China, I consider it still more important that we should give rise to no possible misunderstanding on this point.

4. That I am prepared to ensure the destruction of the palaces of Hai-tien and Yuen-ming-yuen, should your Lordship consider this step to be advisable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT.

No. 104.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Peking, October 26, 1860.*

IN my despatch of the 23rd instant I inclosed the copy of a letter from myself to the Prince of Kung, fixing the 24th instant for the signature of the Convention of Peking, and for the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

I have now the honour to report that, on the day appointed, I went to the Hall of Ceremonies, which is near the southern wall of the Tartar city, accompanied by Sir Hope Grant and several officers of rank, and attended by an escort, furnished by order of the Commander-in-chief. I found the Prince of Kung already there, surrounded by a large number of mandarins of distinction.

After the exhibition of our respective full powers, we proceeded to the signature of the Convention, which does not materially differ from the draft transmitted to your Lordship from Tien-tsin in my despatch of the 8th of September. Two Articles have, however, been added to those contained in that draft; the one legalizing emigration, and the other ceding to Her Majesty that portion of the township of Cowloon which is included in the lease granted to Harry Smith Parkes, Esq., C.B., on behalf of the British Government, by the Governor-General of the Two Kwang.

The signature of the Convention was followed by the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin; and, as the Chinese form of ratification is different from ours, I thought it proper to require that the Prince of Kung should certify on the face of the document, under his signature and seal, that the form adopted was binding on the Emperor.

A Minute recording the proceedings which had taken place in connection with the exchange of the ratifications was then drawn up in duplicate, and signed and sealed by the Plenipotentiaries, of which duplicates one was delivered to the Prince of Kung, and the other to me.

I inclose herewith the Convention of Peking, duly signed and sealed by myself and the Prince of Kung, the Treaty of Tien-tsin ratified by the Emperor of China, and the Minute certifying the act of ratification, signed and sealed by the Plenipotentiaries, and I have committed these important documents to the care of Mr. Loch, my private secretary, in order that he may in person deliver them to your Lordship.

I commend Mr. Loch to your Lordship's favourable consideration. He was illegally seized and cast into prison by the Chinese authorities on the 18th ultimo, while engaged in the discharge of his official duties, and his conduct, under very trying circumstances, was in the highest degree creditable to him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosures in No. 104.

Treaty between Her Majesty and the Emperor of China, signed at Tien-tsin, June 26, 1858; and Convention between Her Majesty and the Emperor of of China, signed at Peking, October 24, 1860.

[Presented to Parliament, February 1861.]

No. 105.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Peking, October 26, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a translation of the Imperial Decree conferring full powers on Prince Kung, and of the certificate affixed to the ratified Treaty, and signed and sealed by him, declaring the apposition of the Emperor's Seal to the Treaty to be a full and valid act of Imperial ratification.

Before consenting to be satisfied with the ratification in this form, I inquired what Baron Gros' views on the subject were, and I ascertained that he would be glad to have the certificate which I proposed to demand, but that he was quite willing to accept the Seal as a valid act of ratification, even without any such certificate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 105.

Decree produced by the Prince of Kung at the Court of the Board of Ceremonies, before signing the Convention of the 24th October, 1860.

(Translation.)

ON the 7th day of the 8th moon of the 10th year of the reign of Hien-fung (21st September, 1860), the Chief Secretariat had the honour to receive the following Imperial Decree:—

"We command Yih-su, Imperial Prince of Kung, to be Imperial Commissioner Plenipotentiary, with power to do whatever may be necessary to the exchanging of Treaties and the making of peace between the two nations.

"Respect this!"

Note.

Note.—The term "tsinen-kinen" translated "Plenipotentiary," is of foreign manufacture, and employed here, as on former occasions, out of deference to our prejudices. The Plenipotentiary power, according to Chinese notions and usages, is really conferred by the words "pien-i-hing-sz,"—"to do the things which the occasion may demand as essential."—T. F. W.

Inclosure 2 in No. 105.

Certificate appended to the Treaty of Tien-tsin by the Prince of Kung, October 24, 1860.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Commissioner and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of the Ta Tsing Dynasty, hereby executes a Certificate:—

"Be it known, that the impression of the 'Hwang Ti-chi P'au' (the fifth of the twenty-five seals of the Empire), which has been reverentially affixed to the foregoing Treaty, the same being the Treaty of Peace concluded at Tien-tsin in the year wu-wu (1858), is an attestation of the full assent of His Majesty the Emperor of China to, and his promise to abide by, all the Articles therein, and renders unnecessary any separate authorization by the Imperial signature.

"This Certificate is accordingly appended to this Treaty, to serve as a record for evermore.

"Executed at Peking on the 11th day of the 9th moon, in the 10th year of the reign Hien-fung (24th October, 1860)."

No. 106.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Peking, October 26, 1860.*

WHEN I addressed to your Lordship my despatch of the 13th instant, of the total number of twenty-six British subjects seized by the Chinese authorities on the 18th ultimo while under the protection of a flag of truce, eleven only, namely, Mr. Parkes, Mr. Loch, and eight Sikh troopers, had been returned. Since that date, two Sikh troopers have been restored to us alive, though suffering severely from the effects of ill-treatment; and twelve corpses have been given up, among which have been recognized the remains of Lieutenant Anderson, Mr. de Norman, and Mr. Bowlby.

Of the regrets inspired by the sad fate of Lieutenant Anderson and Mr. de Norman, I have already written. Mr. Bowlby was the correspondent of the "Times." He made the passage from England in the same steamer as myself, and I became acquainted with him during the voyage. I deplore his loss not only because he was a highly-accomplished and well-informed gentleman, but also because, from the conscientious and liberal spirit in which he addressed himself to the investigation of the singularly complicated problems presented by the moral, social, political, and commercial condition of China, I had conceived the hope that he would be the means of diffusing sound information on many points on which it is most important for the national interests that the British public should be correctly informed. The other corpses sent in are those of eight Sikh troopers and of one English Dragoon.

Of the British subjects captured, therefore, Captain Brabazon, of the Royal Artillery, is alone unaccounted for. The silence of the Chinese authorities, who always plead ignorance of his fate when questioned on the subject, and rumours which reach us from various quarters, lead us to fear that he must have met a violent death. It is reported that, together with a French gentleman (a priest acting as interpreter to General de Montauban), he was beheaded after the action of the 21st ultimo, by direction of a Chinese General who was wounded on that occasion, and who in his exasperation is said to have ordered that these two prisoners, who chanced to be in his power, should be executed. I am inclined to credit this report, although I have no positive evidence of its accuracy. Captain Brabazon was an officer of much promise, and held the appointment of Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General of Artillery.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 107.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Peking, October 30, 1860.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from the French Ambassador, covering the copy of a Convention signed by his Excellency on behalf of France, and by His Imperial Highness Prince Kung on behalf of China, on the 25th instant; also the copy of a Minute similarly signed, and certifying that the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty between France and China, concluded at Tien-tsin in 1858, took place on the same day.

I inclose, moreover, the copy of a letter from myself to Baron Gros, in which I have transmitted to his Excellency copies of the corresponding documents signed by myself and the Chinese Plenipotentiary on the 24th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 107.

Baron Gros to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Dans Péking, le 26 Octobre*, 1860.

J'AI l'honneur d'envoyer ci-jointes à votre Excellence une copie certifiée de la Convention de Paix que j'ai signée le 25 de ce mois avec le Prince Kung, et une copie aussi du procès-verbal qui constate que l'échange des ratifications du Traité de Tien-tsin a eu lieu dans la même séance entre les Hauts Commissaires respectifs de France et de Chine.

J'ai envoyé une copie de ces deux documents à M. le Général-en-chef des forces Françaises en Chine, et je lui ai demandé au nom du Gouvernement de l'Empereur de vouloir bien faire cesser tout acte d'hostilité contre la Chine qui n'aurait pas, cela va sans dire, un caractère essentiellement défensif.

La paix étant heureusement rétablie entre la France et la Chine il ne reste plus qu'à exécuter loyalement les engagements qui tiennent depuis le 25 de ce mois les deux Parties Contractantes signataires du Traité de Tien-tsin et de la Convention de Péking.

Je compte retourner dans peu de jours à Tien-tsin avec les forces Françaises qui se trouvent devant Péking, et là, my Lord, je pense que nous aurons encore à nous concerter sur les mesures à prendre pour faciliter dans l'avenir les relations politiques et commerciales si heureusement rétablies par les actes de Péking.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire, my Lord, combien je suis heureux du concours si cordial et si éclairé que votre Excellence a bien voulu me donner pendant la seconde mission que j'ai eu à remplir avec elle, comme pendant la première; et votre Excellence aura remarqué, je l'espère, que j'ai toujours cherché à marcher avec elle, autant que possible, et à lui rendre autant qu'il a dépendu de moi le secours moral qu'elle a bien voulu me donner, et que j'ai été heureux en remplissant un devoir de faire connaître au Gouvernement de l'Empereur.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) Bon. GROS.

(Translation.)

My Lord, *Peking, October* 26, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a certified copy of the Convention of Peace which I signed on the 25th instant with Prince Kung, together with a copy of the *procès-verbal* recording that the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin took place on the same occasion between the respective High Commissioners of France and China.

I have forwarded a copy of these two papers to the General-in-chief of the French forces in China, and I have requested him, in the name of the Emperor's Government, to cease all acts of hostility against China which do not partake of an essentially defensive character.

Peace being happily re-established between France and China it only remains to execute loyally the engagements which, since the 25th instant, are binding on the two Contracting Parties who signed the Treaty at Tien-tsin and Convention of Peking.

I count upon returning in a few days to Tien-tsin with the French forces now before Peking, and it appears to me, my Lord, that when there we shall have to concert the measures which will require to be taken to facilitate for the future the political and commercial relations so happily re-established by the Conventions of Peking.

I need not say, my Lord, how fortunate I esteem myself in having met with your Excellency's cordial and enlightened co-operation during our second joint mission as during the first: and your Excellency will have remarked, I trust, that I have always sought to act in accord with you, as far as possible, and to afford to you, as far as it was in my power to do so, the moral support which you on you side have been so good as to give me, and which I have been happy, as it was my duty, to report to the Emperor's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) Bon. GROS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 107.

Convention between the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of China, signed at Peking, October 25, 1860.

SA Majesté l'Empereur des Français et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de la Chine voulant mettre un terme au différence qui s'est élevé entre les deux Empires, et rétablir et assurer à jamais les relations de paix et d'amitié qui existaient entre eux et que les regrettables événements ont interrompues, ont nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires respectifs, savoir :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, le Sieur Jean Baptiste Louis Baron Gros, Sénateur de l'Empire, Ambassadeur et Haut Commissaire de France en Chine, Grand Officier de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'Honneur, Chevalier Grand-Croix de plusieurs Ordres, &c., &c., &c.;

Et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de la Chine, le Prince de Kong, membre de la famille Impériale et Haut Commissaire;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des Articles suivants :—

ARTICLE I.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de la Chine a vu avec peine la conduite que les autorités militaires Chinoises ont tenue à l'embouchure de la rivière de Tien-tsin, dans le mois de Juin de l'année dernière, au moment où les Ministres Plénipotentiaires de France et d'Angleterre s'y présentaient pour se rendre à Péking, afin d'y procéder à l'échange des ratifications des Traités de Tien-tsin.

ARTICLE II.

Lorsque l'Ambassadeur, Haut Commissaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, se trouvera dans Péking pour y procéder à l'échange des ratifications du Traité de Tien-tsin, il sera traité pendant son séjour dans la capitale avec les honneurs dus a son rang, et toutes les facilités possibles lui seront donneés par les autorités Chinoises pour qu'il puisse remplir sans obstacle la haute mission qui lui est confiée.

ARTICLE III.

Le Traité signé à Tien-tsin, le vingt-sept Juin, mil huit cent cinquante-huit, sera fidèlement mis à l'exécution dans toutes les clauses, immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications dont il est parlé dans l'Article précédent, sauf, bien entendu, les modifications que peut y apporter la présente Convention.

ARTICLE IV.

L'Article IV du Traité Secret de Tien-tsin, par lequel Sa Majesté l'Empereur de la Chine s'engage à faire payer au Gouvernement Français une indemnité de deux millions de taëls est annulé et remplacé par le présent Article, qui élève à la somme de huit millions de taëls le montant de cette indemnité.

Il est convenu que les sommes déjà payées par la Douane de Canton à compte sur la somme de deux millions de taëls stipulée par le Traité de Tien-tsin seront considérées comme ayant été payées d'avance et à compte sur les huit millions de taëls dont il est question dans cet Article.

Les dispositions prises dans l'Article du Traité Secret de Tien-tsin sur le mode de paiement établi au sujet des deux millions de taëls sont annulés. Le montant de la somme qui reste à payer par le Gouvernement Chinois sur les huit millions de taëls stipulés par la présente Convention le sera en y affectant le cinquième des revenus bruts des douanes des ports ouverts au commerce étranger, et de trois mois en trois mois, le premier terme commençant au premier Octobre de cette année et finissant au trente-et-un Décembre suivant. Cette somme, spécialement réservé pour le paiement de l'indemnité due à la France, sera comptée en piastres Mexicaines ou en argent cissé, au cours du jour du paiement, entre les mains du Ministre de France ou de ses délégués.

Une somme de cinq cent mille taëls sera payée cependant à compte d'avance, en une seule fois, et à Tien-tsin, le trente Novembre prochain ou plus tôt si le Gouvernement Chinois le juge convenable.

Une Commission Mixte, nommé par le Ministre de France et par les

autorités Chinoises, déterminera les régles à suivre pour effectuer les paiements de toute l'indemnité, en vérifier le montant, en donner quittance, et remplir enfin toutes les formalités que la comptabilité exige en pareil cas.

ARTICLE V.

La somme de huit millions de taëls est allouée au Gouvernement Français pour l'indemniser des dépenses que ses armements contre la Chine l'ont obligé de faire, comme aussi pour dédommager les Français et les protégés de la France qui ont été spoliés lors de l'incendie des factories de Canton, et indemniser aussi les missionnaires Catholiques qui ont souffert dans leurs personnes ou leurs propriétés. Le Gouvernement Français repartira cette somme entre les parties intéressées dont les droits ont été légalement établis devant lui, et en raison de ces mêmes droits, et il est convenu entre les Parties Contractantes que un million de taëls sera destiné à indemniser les sujets Français ou protégés par la France, des pertes qu'ils ont éprouvées ou des traitements qu'ils ont subis, et que les sept millions de taëls restant seront affectés aux dépenses occasionnées par la guerre.

ARTICLE VI.

Conformément à l'Edit Impérial rendu le vingt Mars, mil huit cent quarante-six, par l'auguste Empereur Tao-Kouang, les établissements religieux et de bienfaisance qui ont été confisquées aux Chrétiens pendant les persécutions dont ils ont été les victimes, seront rendus à leurs propriétaires par l'entremise du Ministre de France en Chine, auquel le Gouvernement Impérial les fera délivrer, avec les cimetières et les autres édifices qui en dépendaient.

ARTICLE VII.

La ville et le port de Tien-tsin, dans le Province de Petcheli, seront ouvertes au commerce étranger aux mêmes conditions que le sont les autres villes et ports de l'Empire où ce commerce est permis, et cela à dater du jour de la signature de la présente Convention, qui sera obligatoire pour les deux nations sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'en échanger les ratifications, et qui aura même force et valeur que si elle était inserée, mot à mot, dans le Traité de Tien-tsin.

Les troupes Françaises qui occupent cette ville, après le paiement des cinq cent mille taëls dont il est question dans l'Article IV de la présente Convention, pourront l'évacuer pour aller s'établir à Ta-koo, et sur la côte nord de Shang-ton, d'où elles se retireront ensuite dans les mêmes conditions qui présideront à l'évacuation des autres points qu'elles occupent sur le littoral de l'Empire. Les Commandants-en-chef des forces Françaises auront cependant le droit de faire hiverner leurs troupes de toutes armes à Tien-tsin, s'ils le jugent convenable, et de ne les en retirer qu'au moment où les indemnités dues par le Gouvernement Chinois auraient été entièrement payée, à moins cependant qu'il ne convienne aux Commandants-en-chêf de les en faire partir avant cette époque.

ARTICLE VIII.

Il est également convenu que dès que la présente Convention aura été signée et que les ratifications du Traité de Tien-tsin auront été échangées, les forces Françaises qui occupent Chusan évacueront cette île et que celles qui se trouvent devant Péking se retireront à Tien-tsin à Takoo, sur le côte nord du Shang-ton ou dans la ville de Canton, et que dans tous les lieux ou dans chacun d'eux le Gouvernement Français pourra, s'il le juge convenable, y laisser des troupes jusqu'au moment où la somme totale de huit millions de taëls sera payée en entier.

ARTICLE IX.

Il est convenu entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes que dès que les ratifications du Traité de Tien-tsin auront été échangées, un Edit Impérial ordonnera aux autorités supérieures de toutes les provinces de permettre à tout Chinois qui voudrait aller dans les pays situées au delà des mers pour s'y établir ou y chercher fortune, de s'embarquer lui et sa famille, s'il le veut, sur les batiments Français qui se trouveront dans les ports de l'Empire ouverts au commerce étranger. Il est convenu aussi que dans l'intérêt de ces émigrés, pour assurer leur entière liberté d'action et sauvegarder leurs intérêts, les autorités Chinoises compétents l'entendront avec le Ministre de France en Chine pour faire les réglements qui devront assurer à ces engagements, toujours volontaires, les garanties de moralité et de sûreté qui doivent y présider.

ARTICLE X et dernier.

Il est bien entendu entre les Parties Contractantes que le droit de tonnage qui, par erreur, a été fixé dans le Traité Français de Tien-tsin à cinq maces par tonneau sur les batiments qui jaugent cent cinquante tonneaux et au-dessus, et qui dans les Traités signés avec l'Angleterre et les Etats Unis en mil huit cent cinquante-huit n'est porté qu'à la somme de quatre maces, ne s'élèvera qu'à cette même somme de quatre maces, sans avoir à invoquer le dernier paragraphe de l'Article XXVII du Traité de Tien-tsin, qui donne à la France le droit formel de réclamer le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

La présente Convention de Paix a été faite à Péking, en quatre expéditions, le vingt-cinq Octobre, mil huit cent soixante, et y a été signée par les Plénipotentiaires respectifs, qui y ont apposé le sceau de leurs armes.

(L.S.) Bon. GROS.
(L.S.) KONG.

Inclosure 3 in No. 107.

Procès-Verbal.

LE 25 Octobre, 1860, les Hauts Commissaires des Empires de France et de la Chine, munis de pleins pouvoirs, trouvés réciproquement en bonne et due forme, savoir : pour l'Empire de France, son Excellence le Baron Gros, Sénateur de l'Empire et Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français en Chine, Grand Officier de la Légion d'Honneur, Chevalier Grand-Croix de plusieurs Ordres, &c., &c., &c. ; et pour l'Empire Chinois Son Altesse Impériale le Prince de Kong, membre de la famille Impériale, et Haut Commissaire, &c., &c., &c. ;—se sont réunis au Palais du Lipou dans Péking, à l'effet de procéder à l'échange des ratifications du Traité de Paix, d'Amitié, et de Commerce, signé à Tien-tsin le 27 Juin, 1858, ayant avec eux les Secrétaires et les Interprètes des deux nations, et son Excellence M. le Haut Commissaire de France a remis entre les mains de Son Altesse Impériale le Prince de Kong l'instrument original du Traité de Tien-tsin, transcrit dans les deux langues et revêtu du grand sceau de l'Etat, de l'Empire de France, et de la signature de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, qui déclare dans cet acte que toutes les clauses du dit Traité sont ratifiées et seront fidèlement exécutées.

Son Altesse Impériale ayant reçu le Traité ratifié, a remis à son tour à son Excellence M. le Haut Commissaire Français l'un des exemplaires du même Traité approuvé et ratifié au pinceau vermillon par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de la Chine.

Et l'échange des ratifications du Traité signé à Tien-tsin en 1858 ayant eu lieu, les Hauts Commissaires Impériaux ont signé le présent procès-verbal, rédigé par leurs Secrétaires respectifs, et y ont fait apposer le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait, en double expédition, à Péking, dans l'une des salles du Palais de Lipou, le 25 Octobre, 1860.

(Signé) Bon. GROS.
KONG.

Inclosure 4 in No. 107.

The Earl of Elgin to Baron Gros.

M. le Baron, *Peking, October* 30, 1860.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 26th, inclosing copies of the Convention signed by your Excellency and the Chinese Plenipotentiary on the 25th instant, and of a Minute recording the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of 1858, and I have the honour herewith to inclose copies of corresponding documents executed by myself and the Chinese Plenipotentiary on the 24th instant.

I believe with your Excellency that on this, as on a former occasion, the perfect cordiality and confidence which has subsisted between your Excellency and myself has been very conducive to the furtherance of the objects which we were instructed by our respective Governments to attain, and for my own part I have a most grateful sense of the consideration and kindness which I have

experienced from your Excellency in the discharge of the duties imposed upon me.

It will give me great pleasure to confer with your Excellency either here or at Tien-tsin on the subjects referred to in your letter which still require consideration.

In the present disorganised state of the Empire it is difficult to speak confidently of the future of China; but I venture to think that whatever be the issue of the civil contest now raging here, the British and French Treaties of 1858, supplemented and confirmed by the Conventions of 1860, which open up this vast country to Christianity and commerce, will be henceforward the basis on which its relations with Christendom will rest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 108.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received December* 27.)

My Lord, *Peking, October* 30, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's perusal, a very interesting and detailed narrative by Mr. Parkes of the occurrences which took place while he was detained as a prisoner by the Chinese authorities.

Painful as is the process by which this experience is acquired, such an incident as the capture of Mr. Parkes affords us an insight into the working of the Chinese system which we should never otherwise probably have obtained.

Mr. Parkes' consistent refusal to purchase his own safety by making any pledges, or even by addressing to me any representations, which might have embarrassed me in the discharge of my duty, is a rare example of courage and devotion to the public interest; and the course which he followed in this respect, by leaving my hands free, enabled me to work out the policy which was best calculated to secure his own release, as well as the attainment of the national objects intrusted to my care.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 108.

Mr. Parkes to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *British Head-Quarters, Peking, October* 20, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to lay before your Excellency the following statement of the circumstances which attended my capture and subsequent imprisonment:—

I left Ho-sê-woo at 4 A.M. on the morning of Monday, the 17th September, accompanied by Mr. Loch, Private Secretary to your Excellency, Mr. de Norman, First Attaché to Her Britannic Majesty's Legation, Colonel Walker, Deputy Quartermaster-General, Mr. Thomson, Deputy Commissary-General, and Mr. T. W. Bowlby. The escort consisted of five men of the King's Dragoon Guards, and twenty sowars of Fane's Horse, under Lieutenant Anderson.

Shortly after passing Matow, we were met by a Colonel and three other Chinese officers, who had been sent out, as they stated, by the Imperial Commissioners to escort us into Tung-chow. On approaching Chang-kia-wan, I pointed out to Colonel Walker the point, five *li* south of that place, proposed by the Imperial Commissioners, and agreed to by your Excellency, as the advanced position of our army; and as we rode over a part of the ground, we could see no indications of there being any Chinese force in that vicinity. After passing Chang-kia-wan, however, we observed bodies of Tartar Horse between that place and Tung-chow, and were informed by their Commander, Tih-hingah (the Lieutenant-General commanding at Sin-ho when that place was taken on the 12th August), who rode forward to meet us in a most friendly and courteous manner, that these were some of the troops which had lately held the country between Tung-chow and Ho-se-woo, and had just been called in by order of the Imperial Commissioners. He congratulated us, with much apparent warmth, on "the conclusion of peace," and, in a soldierly way, made the voluntary

observation, "Let us forget that we have been enemies, and henceforward know each other as friends."

Writing after the event, I now see a serious significance in the removal of several small bridges placed across the small canal or streamlet that runs past Chang-kia-wan, at a point which I afterwards knew, by sad experience, to be the spot whence Sang-ko-lin-sin directed, in person, the movements of the following day. I had observed these bridges on the occasion of my previous visit to Tung-chow, but, in the absence of any other cause for suspicion, we naturally did not now attach an important meaning to the circumstance of their removal.

On reaching Tung-chow at about 10·30 A.M., we went at once to the Temple pointed out by the Chinese officers as the place selected both for our own accommodation and for the meeting with the Imperial Commissioners. All our personal wants were readily supplied, and about 1 o'clock I was admitted to an interview with the Commissioners, Tsai, Prince of I, and Muh-yin, who were assisted on this occasion by Hang-ki, late Assistant Commissioner at Tien-tsin, and well known to me when he formerly occupied the position of Superintendent of Customs at Canton.

Having delivered to the Commissioners, who received me courteously, your Excellency's despatch of the 16th of September, they raised discussion on three points, namely, the escort, the immediate withdrawal of the forces, and the presentation of Her Majesty's autograph letter to the Emperor.

They objected to the escort being taken by your Excellency beyond Tung-chow, urged that the forces should commence to retire the moment the Convention was signed, and called the delivery of the letter a new demand which they had then heard of for the first time.

To these objections I replied, that it had already been settled at Tien-tsin that your Excellency should take the escort to Peking; that it could not be expected that the forces would retire before your Excellency had concluded all matters connected with the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of 1858; and also, that this was not the first time that the delivery of the Queen's letter had been mentioned, your Excellency having already been in written communication on this subject with the Commissioners at Tien-tsin.

As the discussion proceeded, the Commissioners withdrew their objections to the first two points, but continued to oppose the presentation of the letter by your Excellency in person with great earnestness. It could be received, they said, in a manner which denoted, in their opinion, high respect, and an autograph reply could be returned; but the whole ceremonial should be conducted by a Prince, or Imperial Commissioner, appointed for the purpose, and there could be no occasion for your Excellency to have an audience with the Emperor on this account.

I explained the object of the letter—that it was a mark of the respect and friendship entertained by the Queen for the Emperor, but that the honour due to the former would not allow of the letter being presented in any other way than by her own Ambassador; and that, seeing that your Excellency had come from a great distance for the purpose of establishing friendly relations with the Chinese Government, it would be unfortunate if the latter were to prove themselves still opposed to closer intimacy, and unwilling to reciprocate the cordiality and good feeling shown by Her Majesty.

Finding, however, that these arguments had little weight with the Commissioners, I tried to avoid the question, which, I said, might be considered by themselves and your Excellency on another occasion, and endeavoured to draw their attention to the other business I had on hand; but as they insisted on recurring to it, I distinctly declined further discussion, on the ground that I was not authorized to speak on the subject, but that I would not fail to report all that they had urged to your Excellency.

The meeting was interrupted at 4 o'clock by the arrival of the French Secretary of Embassy, who was then received by the Commissioners according to appointment.

I was at one time invited both by the French officers and the Commissioners to assist at that interview; and at about 6 o'clock I was once more left alone with the Commissioners, who again brought up the question of audience, and unreasonably insisted that I should decide this without any previous reference to your Excellency.

Having at last satisfied them, as I thought, that this was impossible, I prevailed on them to proceed with the consideration of other matters. The

terms of the Proclamation in which your Excellency proposed that the Imperial Commissioners should make known to the people the circumstances under which the allies desisted from further hostilities, were discussed, and they accepted, apparently with complete approval, the Draft supplied me by Mr. Wade. I begged, therefore, that it should be put in the hands of the type-cutters that night, and while they gave, or affected to give, directions to that effect, their Secretaries arranged with me certain particulars as to the form of the document.

The Commissioners next named the officers who were to accompany Colonel Walker and myself at daylight the next morning to mark out the position of the British camp at the five-*li* point, south of Chang-kia-wan. Other officers were also appointed to act with me in forming a depôt of supplies at the latter town; and the same persons were directed to furnish the carts required by Mr. Loch for the transport of your Excellency's baggage to Tung-chow.

I parted from the Commissioners at about 8 P.M., and such was their tone during the latter part of the interview that I had no reason to suppose that the gratification they expressed, when I congratulated them on the conclusion of the Preliminaries of Peace, was wholly insincere; and I was subsequently engaged with Hang-ki until a late hour in the evening in arranging the details necessary to give effect to the measures they had agreed to.

At daybreak the next morning, Tuesday the 18th September, the Chinese officer appointed to act with Colonel Walker and myself in marking out the position of the camp was in attendance, and we rode out together to Chang-kia-wan. As we passed the latter place, and reached the five-*li* point, we were surprised to find that the ground on both sides of the road was occupied by considerable bodies of Infantry and Cavalry; that the long embankment which formed, as I had understood, the leading mark of the five-*li* point was lined with matchlockmen, while Cavalry were thrown out in skirmishing order far beyond it; that guns were being rapidly brought into position, we ourselves having unintentionally entered a masked battery of twelve guns, upon the construction of which men were still engaged, and, in short, that a very considerable force was in active movement all around us. It was in vain that I asked to be directed to some commanding officer who could give me an explanation of this movement: the officers to whom I spoke returned only vague answers, such as that their General might be ten or twenty *li* off, or that they did not know where he was.

Having my suspicions fully awakened by what I saw, I determined to hasten back to Tung-chow (distant about five miles) for the purpose, first, of learning if the Imperial Commissioners would avert a collision by directing the withdrawal of the force, and, then, of bringing away the remainder of my party (twenty of whom remained in the town) if they refused to do so.

I at the same time requested Mr. Loch to ride on and report to General Grant the state of affairs, together with my intention of returning with further information as soon as possible; while Colonel Walker, with the small portion of the escort we brought out, remained on our encamping ground, making such observations as he thought proper.

On my way to Tung-chow I met Hang-ki, who told me that he was going by direction of the Imperial Commissioners to see your Excellency, an instruction which, if given, he did not carry out, and he expressed surprise at the movement of force then going on, which he said he did not understand.

I also met the Secretary of the French Embassy and two other parties of French officers, and advised them to lose no time in returning to their own head-quarters.

On arriving at Tung-chow I sent after the gentlemen of my own party who were out in the town, and then proceeded in quest of the Commissioners. As no one in the Temple would tell me where they were staying, I went to the Chief Magistrate of the city who, after some hesitation, guided me to them in a temple nearly three miles distant from the one in which we had been put up. They did not appear until after some delay, and I at once observed a marked change both in their manner and in that of the crowd of officers around them. I informed them in a guardedly respectful tone of what I had that morning seen, and asked them whether they were aware that a large force of Chinese troops had occupied the very ground which they themselves had named as the situation of the allied camp. The following conversation then ensued:—

Commissioners.—We are not military authorities, and have no control over the troops.

Mr. Parkes.—But your Excellencies, as Imperial Commissioners, have certainly power to instruct your Generals to desist from hostilities, and a collision is now imminent between the force I speak of and the allied column which must shortly reach the same spot. Will you, therefore, direct the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops?

Commissioners.—We can only direct our troops to retire when peace shall have been determined on.

Mr. Parkes.—I thought that peace had been determined on both by yourselves as well as by the Allies. Have not all the preliminaries been discussed and concluded at our several interviews?

Commissioners.—We do not think so. You have left one very essential point unsettled—that of the audience.

Mr. Parkes.—I informed your Excellencies that I had no instructions on that point; but at the same time assured you that it could be settled at another time, and the very fact of my not being authorized to discuss it proved that it was not a question upon which peace or war depended.

Commissioners.—We take a different view, and hold that there can be no peace until this point is finally arranged. Until peace is settled our troops cannot retire.

Mr. Parkes.—I am sorry to hear your Excellencies speak in this tone. You should at least have stated as much to me yesterday. I can only return and report what you now say to Lord Elgin.

Commissioners.—You can do much more if you like. You can settle the point at once yourself: but you will not do this.

Mr. Parkes.—I can only repeat that I have no power to do anything of the kind, and all that I can now do is to return to Lord Elgin.

While this conversation was going on, I was repeatedly interrupted by the mandarins standing around the Commissioners, who thought it right to attempt to drown my voice by repeating in a loud tone, with various additions of their own, the remarks of their superiors, and the Commissioners made no attempt to check this rudeness. I made brief notes of the replies of the latter in my pocket-book, explaining to them that I did so to enable me to report accurately to your Lordship all that they had said; and then taking a respectful leave of them, I lost no time in returning to my party.

I found them all collected, and that they had been waiting for me about twenty minutes. Mr. Loch, accompanied by Major Brabazon, had come in from General Grant to say that we must lose no time in returning, and we gave our best heed to the injunction.

We had just passed Chang-kia-wan, and were hoping to be clear in ten minutes of the Chinese lines, when a fire of Chinese artillery opened along their front, and showed that the engagement had begun. As soon as we were observed, a number of Tartar Horse moved into the road to intercept us, and halting the party, I informed an officer whom we were, and asked him to allow us to pass on. He desired us not to proceed until orders arrived from a superior officer close at hand, upon which I suggested that time might be saved if I visited that officer myself. He assented, and I therefore rode towards the spot, accompanied by Mr. Loch and one sowar, carrying a white flag. The remainder of the party, namely, Major Brabazon, Lieutenant Anderson, Messrs. De Norman and Bowlby, one dragoon, and, I believe, eighteen sowars, remained in the road, and were also provided with a white flag.

On passing a field of tall cane, which hid us from our party, we suddenly came upon a body of Infantry, who were with difficulty prevented from firing upon us, and we were directed to a mounted mandarin, evidently one of rank, and wearing a red button, who was standing on the opposite side of the canal referred to in the early part of this report, and near to the spot where one of the bridges had been removed. The crowd of soldiers called on us to dismount and cross the canal in a boat. I tried to avoid this, but as the mandarin referred to would not speak to me unless I did so, and seeing that we were surrounded by rude and excited soldiers, who clearly looked upon us as their prisoners, I advised Mr. Loch and the sowar to comply. By this time another mandarin had ridden up to the former one, and hearing, as he approached, the cry raised of "The Prince! the Prince!" I enquired from an officer what Prince it was. He told me Prince Sang (Sang-ko-lin-sin), and I therefore hoped that the use which this personage had himself made in the late hostilities of flags of truce

would induce him to respect the one under which we were now acting. We, therefore, dismounted in order to cross to him, and directly we did so the soldiers fell upon us, tore off several of the things we had on, dragged us across the canal, and hurled us prostrate on the ground before the Prince.

The moment the Prince gave me an opportunity of speaking to him, which he did by asking me my name, I at once clearly informed him who I was, and of the whole character of my mission to Tung-chow, adding that I was returning to my Ambassador when I was stopped by his troops.

I was proceeding with a remonstrance against the treatment I was receiving, when the Prince interrupted me by saying, "Why did you not agree, yesterday, to settle the audience question?"

"Because I was not empowered to do so," I replied.

The Prince then continued in a very forbidding tone, "Listen! You can talk reason; you have gained two victories to our one. Twice you have dared to take the Peiho forts; why does not that content you? And now you presume to give out" (the Prince here alluded to the proclamation of the Commander-in-chief) "that you will attack any force that stops your march on Tung-chow. I am now doing that. You say that you do not direct these military movements, but I know your name, and that you instigate all the evils that your people commit. You have also used bold language in the presence of the Prince of I, and it is time that foreigners should be taught respect for Chinese nobles and Ministers."

I endeavoured to explain the mistakes of the Prince; told him distinctly what my functions were; that I had come to Tung-chow by express agreement with the Imperial Commissioners, and solely in the interests of peace, and I again begged him to show the same respect to an English flag of truce that we had always paid to those so repeatedly sent in by the Chinese.

The Prince, however, simply laughed at all this, and going towards a house that was close by, directed the soldiers to bring me after him.

On arriving at the house, I was again thrown on my knees before him, and the Prince asked me if I would write for him.

Having asked what it was that he wished me to write, he said, "Write to your people, and tell them to stop the attack."

"It would be useless for me to do so," I replied, "as I cannot control or influence military movements in any way. I will not deceive your Highness by leading you to suppose that anything I might write would have such an effect."

"I see you continue obstinate," he said, "and that you will be of no use to me."

I then heard him give directions to take Mr. Loch, the Sowar, and myself to the Prince of I, but to conduct the escort into Chang-kia-wan. While the necessary preparations were being made, two high officers in his suite, wearing red buttons, took me aside into a tent, and told me to sit down and talk with them. "Follow our advice," they said, "and don't think of denying that you can do this or that, or you will get into trouble."

I again explained to them who I was, and how far my powers extended, but they replied that they did not believe me.

Having expressed surprise at the engagement then going on, and inquired how it had commenced, they observed, "It does not matter how it commenced; perhaps you began it, perhaps we did; but you have at last gone too far, and will now get your deserts."

"But we have not gone too far," I replied. "It has been agreed between our Ambassadors and your Commissioners that we are to occupy ground up to five *li* south of Chang-kia-wan."

"Oh, we are not particular to a few *li*," said the officers. "It would have been quite the same if you had come within five, ten, or twenty *li* of our army. You have gone too far, we tell you."

The cannonading now became heavier, and the two officers had to follow Prince Sang, who rode away to the front. Mr. Loch, the Sowar, and myself, were ordered to get into an open cart of the roughest description, and two French soldiers, whom we had not before seen, were put in with us. A few moments before I had observed a French officer, whom I knew to be the Commissariat Intendant, being led up to the house; he had evidently been ill-used, but I could not see to what extent, nor had I any opportunity of speaking with him.

We were conveyed to Tung-chow, seeing nothing of our escort on the way,

and were taken through the city to the temple in the western suburb where I had seen the Commissioners in the morning. They had left, and our guard (consisting of fifty horsemen) followed the Peking-road, inquiring for the Commissioners as they went along, and enjoying the sufferings which the severe shocks occasioned us when the cart was driven along the dilapidated stone causeway at a rapid pace. After retracing their steps in more than one direction, they at last took us into an encampment, and threw us on our knees before a mandarin, who they told us was the General and Minister of State Juy-lin. To avoid another painful and useless examination I feigned faintness, and in reply to his inquiries called out for water. He then directed that we should be taken into the air, but we were so pressed upon by a disorderly mob of soldiers, that we had to be removed into a house, where we were searched by a military officer of the rank of Tajin, and everything that we had in our possession was taken from us. Again we were removed to a temple, and a mandarin on the suite of the Prince of I, named Tsing-Tajin, who had behaved with marke drudeness to me at the morning's interview, came in and directed that we should be brought before him for examination. He asked us our names and who we were, and then insisted upon my telling him where I had obtained a paper that had been found in my pocket, in which prominent mention happened to be made of several Princes and other important personages who were believed to be among the leading advocates of the war policy. Fearing to criminate the native writer of the memorandum (which was nothing but a list of names), I replied that I obtained it in a Canton yamun. He declared this to be false, demanded why I presumed to make inquiries about Chinese Princes, and said that force should be used to make me divulge from whom I received the information.

At this moment he was suddenly called away: we heard a stir outside the house, and a number of soldiers with drawn swords rushed in, dragged us all out, and bound our wrists tightly behind us. They were much excited, and called out that death was only our desert, as our soldiers had been killing their people. After a short delay, during which Mr. Loch and myself took, as we thought, a final leave of each other, we were seized by the soldiers and run out of the house at a swift pace, exactly in the way in which I have observed the Chinese conduct their prisoners to execution. Again we came together under some trees, and all five of us were put once more into a cart. All was confusion around us; the camp we had previously observed was being struck, and I could see that some advance on the part of the allied force was evidently causing a retreat on that of the Chinese. Soon we found ourselves again on the Peking-road, and suffering much more than before from the jolting of the cart, as we could not now use our hands or arms to ward off the shocks.

The cart being too heavily laden to proceed at the desired pace, another one was called, and the Sikh and one of the Frenchmen were transferred to it. We passed numerous bodies of Infantry in position along the road, and were met by a considerable force of Cavalry going in the direction of Tung-chow. The road was so much blocked up by men and vehicles, retreating while others were advancing, that we were often obliged to halt. The Prince of I, Muh-yin, his fellow Commissioner, and Hang-ki, passed us in large sedan-chairs, but would not deign to notice us. We could see that we were in the charge of Tsing-Tajin, the officer already described as being on the suite of the Prince of I, and our first solicitations for relief from pain and thirst afforded him so much cruel gratification that we made no second appeal to his humanity. Fortunately, one of the four soldiers in the cart with us was less relentless, and gave us a little water.

It was about half-past 2 o'clock when we were put into the cart, and the sun was setting as we reached the Chaou-yang, or eastern gate of the city. The streets were crowded with people, and our captors made the best use they could of us, to give their return the character of a triumph. We continued to be driven through street after street, passing through the eastern and southern, and into the western quarter of the city, until we entered, at about 8 P.M., a large court, and I saw with a shudder that we were in the hands of the Board of Punishments.

After we had been kept waiting in a dense crowd for half-an-hour longer, I was taken from the cart, and carried before a tribunal composed of examiners of small rank, who made me kneel, and after treating me in a very tyrannical manner, and questioning me on a few unimportant points, they loaded me with

chains, and gave me over to a number of ruffianly-looking jailors. These men conducted me through several long courts, and, happening to halt for some purpose, I knew by the clank of chains that another prisoner was approaching. It proved to be Mr. Loch, but they would not allow us to converse, and hastily sent us away in different directions. At last we stood before a building, which I could see was a common prison, and as the massive door opened and closed on me, I found myself in a throng of seventy or eighty wild-looking prisoners, most of them offensive in the extreme, as is usual in Chinese jails, from disease and dirt, and who were naturally anxious to gaze on the new-comer.

I was again carefully examined and searched by the jailors, who also saw that my chains were properly secured, and bound my arms with fresh cords, not so tightly, however, as to prevent circulation, or to occasion serious inconvenience. At the same time, however, they removed, to my intense relief, the cords from my wrists, which being very tightly tied, had caused my hands to swell to twice their proper size, and were now giving me great pain. They then laid me on the raised boarding on which the prisoners sleep, and made me fast by another large chain to a beam overhead. The chains consisted of one long and heavy one, stretching from the neck to the feet, to which the hands were fastened by two cross chains and hand-cuffs, and the feet in a similar manner.

Being exhausted with fatigue and want of food, which I had not tasted for upwards of twenty-four hours, I fell asleep, but was soon made sensible of my position by being called up, and again carried before the same Board of Inquisitors. It was then about midnight, but the hour did not prevent the collection of a large crowd, composed, however, in this instance of police-runners, jailors, lictors, and the other numerous myrmidons of Chinese law. The mandarins, as I was placed kneeling in my chains before them, warned me that they would force the truth from me if I did not give it willingly, and, in proof of their earnestness, they ordered four torturers to seize me, even before they began to put their questions, by the ears, and the hair of the head and face. They first asked me if I were a Chinese. I told them they had only to look at my face and hair to see that I was not. Their next questions related to my age, length of residence in China, how and where I had been employed, &c. They then proceeded as follows:—

Inquisitors.—State the name of your headman.

Answer.—Which one do you mean—the Ambassador, General, or Admiral?

Inquisitors (angrily).—You have no such functionaries. Don't presume to use such titles.

Here the torturers suited their action to the tone of the mandarins, by pulling simultaneously at my hair, ears, &c.

Inquisitors.—Now give the name of your headman.

Answer.—Which one?

Inquisitors.—The head of your soldiers.

Answer (in English).—Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Inquisitors.—What?

Answer (in English).—Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Inquisitors.—Say something that we can understand.

Answer.—I am obliged to use the English terms as you will not let me give you these in Chinese.

They attempted to write down, in Chinese sounds, "Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant," but not succeeding, they asked the name of another headman.

Answer (in English).—Ambassador Extraordinary the Earl of Elgin.

Finding it equally impossible to write this down in Chinese, or to get on with the examination, they told me I might revert to Chinese names and titles, and I then gave them those of the Ambassador and the Commanders-in-chief.

Inquisitors.—How many soldiers have you?

Answer.—Not less than 20,000 fighting men.

Inquisitors.—That is false. [Torturers clutched me as before.] Repeat how many.

Answer.—Not less than 20,000 fighting men, in which I do not include followers, &c. I have stated that once to you, and have no other answer to give.

Here I was again threatened, both by mandarins and torturers, but deeming it dangerous to swerve from any statement I had once made, I adhered to that which I had already given them, and it was taken down.

Inquisitors.—How many soldiers have the French?

Answer.—I am less acquainted with their force, but they cannot have less than 10,000 fighting men.

Inquisitors.—You are lying again.

The same question was repeated and enforced by the torturers; I returned the same answer, and it was noted down. I then explained that being myself a civilian I could not be expected to be familiar with military matters, or to know all the particulars of so large an army as the present combined force.

Inquisitors.—So large an army do you call it? What are 30,000 men? They are a mere nothing.

They then proceeded to examine me in the same strain as to the number of our cavalry and artillery, ships, steamers, horses, Chinese coolies, &c., and, in particular, of the range of our field and siege-guns, which I gave them at three miles and upwards, together with other particulars of their destructive properties. Hearing that the horses of the force came from India, they questioned me as to the resources of that country, and were much displeased with my statement that it was within twenty days' sail of China, and had an army of upwards of 300,000 men, and a population of more than 100,000,000. They also equally disapproved of my estimate of the population of Great Britain, which I stated at about 30,000,000. But the remark which probably gave them most displeasure, and caused me some pain at the hands of the torturers, was the use, on my part, of a term for Her Majesty denoting equality of rank with the Emperor. They had inquired after our "Prince," to which I had replied, by stating that we had many Princes, both in England and India, but that they were all under one Sovereign, as in the case of the Empire of China.

"What do you mean by using such language?" they said; "you have yourself shown that you have been long in China, that you can speak our language and read our books, and you must know, therefore, that there is but one Emperor, who rules over all lands. It is your duty to communicate your superior knowledge on this subject to your countrymen, instead of encouraging them in their extravagant ideas."

They then insisted that I had often been in Peking; that I had confederates here, and that they would force me to reveal their names. I firmly denied all this, and told them that I knew but three persons in Peking.

Inquisitors.—Name them.

Answer.—The two Imperial Commissioners, Prince of I and Muh-yin, and the Assistant Commissioner Hang-ki.

I made this reply in the hope of disarming their suspicions, which I could see were very strong on this point; and the idea that through our Chinese coolies, or in some other way, we had set treason at work within the walls of the capital, was one which evidently gave them considerable apprehension. They were also particular in demanding information as to the number and names of our Interpreters. I complied by giving them the Christian names and surnames of several of these gentlemen in full, knowing, as the event proved, that they would be unable to take down intelligibly the long English words, and they soon relinquished the inquiry. They made pointed inquiries, however, after Mr. Lay, and when I told them that he was now engaged by the invitation of the Chinese authorities in managing their foreign revenue, which had nearly doubled since the collection of it had been placed in his hands, they reproved me for using such language, and called out that Lay was nothing else than a native (Chinese) traitor.

Towards the close of the examination, throughout which I was compelled to remain kneeling on the stone floor, I obtained their permission to make a statement on my own account. I then told them why I and the other gentlemen of my party had come to Tung-chow; that we were all employed in the cause of peace and not of war; but, although acting under a flag of truce, and admitted to interviews with the Imperial Commissioners, we had been seized and were now being treated not even as prisoners of war but as common felons, and as offenders against Chinese law. I was urging that this great, and to me unaccountable, mistake, should not be persisted in, when they interrupted me by saying, "That is your account, but we have another story. Besides, if, as you state, you are a civilian and have nothing to do with soldiers or their movements, why are you always seen with the advance?" To this I answered that we always kept an Interpreter in the front to be ready to receive overtures

or communications from the Chinese authorities, and to look after the interests of the people. The examination ended I was ordered back to prison.

I have thus given a full recital, my Lord, of the occurrences of the 18th September, the day on which we were seized; but I shall endeavour to avoid similar detail in the account I have now to add of our subsequent twenty days of imprisonment. On the 19th and 20th a great number of mandarins visited the prison, and those whose official position entitled them to make the demand, ordered me to be brought out, that they might have the satisfaction of seeing me kneeling before them. Among these were the highest authorities of the Board of Punishments, including, as I now know, the President himself, who abused me in a very bitter tone, laughed at my statement, and appeared as ignorant of foreigners, and as much prejudiced against them, as his subordinates who had conducted the examination above described. Several Censors and Vice-Presidents of the other five Boards of Government were also pointed out to me by the jailors as being among the visitors. Whenever brought out before mandarins of rank, I lost no opportunity of protesting against my treatment, and of pointing out that in wronging me they were injuring themselves, as it was impossible that peace could be made if they seized and imprisoned the instruments of negotiation.

But it was only from the prisoners that I obtained sympathy or a hearing. Many of these unfortunate men were glad, when so permitted, to come round me to listen to my story, or any description that I would give them of foreign countries and usages. Instead of following the example set them by their authorities, and treating me with abuse or ridicule, they were seldom disrespectful, addressed me by my title, and often avoided putting me to inconvenience when it was in their power to do so. Most of them were men of the lowest class and the gravest order of offenders, as murderers, burglars, &c. Those who had no means of their own were reduced by prison filth and prison diet to a shocking state of emaciation and disease, but those who could afford to fee the jailors, and purchase such things as they wanted, lived in comparative fulness and comfort.

They explained to me that their prison system cost the Government nothing more than the pay of the jailors, and the supply of two bowls of boiled millet per day to each prisoner. All other expenses, such as water, lighting, fuel, tea, salt vegetables for the prisoners, and good meals for the jailors, &c., are defrayed by some one among the prisoners who voluntarily undertakes the charge in redemption of a certain portion of his term of imprisonment.

The mandarins of the Board having ordered that I should be supplied with food that I could eat, my maintenance, which cost, as I was told, 1s. a-day, was carried to the charge of the man who held this position, but instead of taking a dislike to me on account of the increased expense which I occasioned him, he was one of the foremost in showing me kindness or consideration. My meals consisted of two meals a-day of boiled rice, or a kind of maccaroni seasoned with a very sparing allowance of meat or vegetables; also cakes or the bread of the country, and a little tea and tobacco.

In the prison roll which was hung up on the wall, I found myself returned as "a rebel," and that I was one of five, out of a total of seventy-three, who were ordered to wear the heaviest chains.

As I grew more intimate with the inmates of the prison, I cautiously endeavoured to obtain information from or through them of the movements of the allies, or the intentions of the Chinese authorities; but the jailors were always on the watch to prevent communication between me and the prisoners on these subjects, nor would they allow themselves to be drawn into conversation respecting them. Two of these men remained always beside me, both by day and night; and although they occasionally answered my inquiries respecting Mr. Loch and my fellow-prisoners, they defeated every endeavour I made to get a message or note conveyed to them.

On the 22nd September I was removed from the common prison to a separate ward about eight feet square, on the opposite side of the court, the four jailors apppointed to watch me crossing at the same time, and putting up in the same little room. This was scarcely done when I received a visit from the Inspector of the prison, who, instead of making me kneel before him, as he had done on previous visits, desired me to be seated, and introduced another mandarin of small rank as his relief. The latter said he had come merely to pay me a friendly and a private visit, and to suggest in an equally private way whether I

could not do something by writing a note of some kind, or in any way that I might suggest, to bring about a settlement of the present differences between our respective nations. I said that when two nations at war wanted to come to friendly understanding, the first thing to be done was for one or the other to make overtures for peace; negotiations, either by writing or conference, would follow, and if these were carried out to the satisfaction of both parties, peace would ensue. The difficulty in the present case was, that the Chinese had made prisoners of the very persons—although essentially non-combatants—who were required to conduct these conferences. Here I gave them a recital of my own story, but after hearing this they simply came back to their first proposal that I should suggest some mode of arrangement, and said they would shortly repeat their visit to hear what had occurred to me. They would give me no information as to the occurrences of the last five days.

Shortly after they had gone, the head jailor asked me if I knew a mandarin named Hang-ki. He would like to see you, he said, but cannot come into the prison on account of the stench, and I do not see how you can be allowed to go out to him. I told the jailor to act as he pleased, and a few minutes afterwards Hang-ki entered. I have by me the following note of our conversation, which I succeeded in making shortly after he had left me:—

"*Note.*—Hang-ki assumes a look of pity for my condition, though apparently without thinking that is undeserved. He asks how matters are to be arranged, and I inquire for news. Skirmishes, he says, occasionally occur between Sang-ko-lin-sin and our troops, who have not yet passed Chang-kia-wan. The Prince of I and Muh-yin have been recalled to Peking, and the Prince of Kung, a younger brother of the Emperor—a very able and amiable man—appointed in their place. Perhaps Kweiliang will be his colleague. How can negotiations be set on foot?

"I say that they have increased their difficulties by their wrongful treatment of me and my party, by their violation of a flag of truce, and the rights of an Envoy, and I also complain of the deceit practised in my case.

"Hang-ki at first professes surprise at hostilities of the 18th. Had he known that these were going to occur, he would not have gone to see Lord Elgin. Came back because he thought Lord Elgin would not see him, and because he found Lord Elgin a long way off—— (Correcting himself)—Came back because the Baron de Meritens had told him that it was useless trying to see Lord Elgin before I had returned. The Prince of I had told him that I had been taken prisoner because it was war and not peace, and because I had admitted to him, Hang-ki, on the evening of the 17th of September, that we knew of the arrest several days previously, by our military, of the Prefect of Tien-tsin.

"I reminded Hang-ki of all the business we had transacted together the same evening, as showing that the Prince of I had quite given me to believe that he considered hostilities at an end. Certain officers had been appointed to settle with me the position to be taken up by our forces; other officers had been appointed to furnish supplies; a proclamation making known the cessation of hostilities had been agreed to, and was being printed under his (Hang-ki's) superintendence; and yet the Chinese attack our troops the next morning when proceeding to take up the ground agreed on, and seize me when engaged in the transaction of the above business. Either the Prince of I had grossly deceived me, or Sang-ko-lin-sin had acted independently of the Prince. In a word, the Prince had either played false, or he had no power over his own people. How could business be transacted with such Commissioners?

"Hang-ki evades explanations, and suggests that I should write a letter, but to whom, or to what purpose, he does not seem to know. They want a letter, he says, that will bring about a settlement of affairs. I tell him that such a letter should come from them. He still presses me to write, but I decline to do so, as, apart from the vagueness of the requisition, I can see that he has some concealed object in view. He leaves me, and says he will shortly pay me another visit."

The 23rd and 24th passed without my seeing Hang-ki, and as an interview with any officer was a relief to the monotony of my imprisonment, and afforded me a chance of gaining some information, I requested the jailor, on the 25th, to inform Hang-ki that I should be glad of another visit from him. The jailor returned and told me that the message could not be forwarded unless I wrote the usual red card in my own handwriting. I complied on being furnished with

writing materials, and I find that the card I then sent is the one forwarded to your Lordship in Prince Kung's despatch of the 27th September in proof of my being well in health and comfortably put up! On the 26th Hang-ki came to the prison, and I quote from a note made at the time the following summary of our conversation:—

"At about 2 P.M., 26th September, received a visit from Hang-ki, attended by two Prison Inspectors, Gan and Choo Laou-yays. I first spoke about being put in the same prison with Loch; a small request, and easily granted if they wished to show us any humanity.

"Hang-ki followed with a long speech. Grand Councils had been held, he said, on the subject of foreign relations. It was considered that the hostilities of the Allies are very different on this to all previous occasions, as by advancing on Peking they are attacking the Emperor himself, and not, as heretofore, the Emperor's Viceroys. The Emperor is therefore on his defence, and must fight for his Throne and Dynasty. He has therefore determined to retire to the Hunting Palace at Jehol, in Tartary, and to call in the aid of the forty-eight Mongol Princes, each of whom can furnish, probably, 20,000 men. But supposing that all is lost—that is, Peking taken—and the Imperial forces retreat, fighting, beyond the frontier, the dismemberment of the Empire will follow, and all trade will be at an end. Is this the course that must be adopted or not? The majority of the Princes and Ministers are for it. The Prince of Ching, Prince of I, Sang-ko-lin-sin, and others, say that peace cannot be made with the Allies, because they always make negotiations an opportunity for putting in fresh demands; also that commercial relations are far more costly than profitable to China, for, although some 4,000,000 taels are received from foreigners annually as duties, the claims for indemnities—first 21,000,000 dollars in 1842, then 6,000,000 taels in 1858, and now 10,000,000 taels more—almost equal the amount that has reached the Imperial Treasury from the same source during the above period. The personages just named, together with a large majority of their advisers, urge war. The Prince of Kung—the brother of the Emperor—who has now the direction of the foreign question, would be glad to see some other course, but, unless I point one out, no alternative presents itself. If I will not do this, and affairs continue to go wrong, I shall make myself a mark for the public fury, which cannot be restrained at a moment of extremity.

"I reply, that the conclusion of peace is a very simple matter, and might be managed at any moment. All that is necessary is, that both parties should sincerely wish for it. There can be no doubt as to the desire of Great Britain to be at peace with China. What has Lord Elgin come all this great distance for, but to make peace? But any peace that we conclude must secure to us our rights and national honour. The refusal of China to admit the principle of equality in her relations with foreign countries is the source of all the foreign troubles that have come upon her. Had it not been for those unreasonable pretensions, to which foreign Powers will no longer submit, she would not have seen foreign armies within her borders, and would have saved the large sums paid as indemnities. I cannot understand the singular distinction which he draws between former wars and the present one, or why the Emperor should still persist in fighting. But if Peking be taken, and His Majesty should fly, I do not see how he is to take the population of the eighteen provinces of China with him, and it is population that makes trade. But to the question of peace, why do they not make peace—or why do they break it as fast as they make it? Can it be that they really have no sincere wish for peace? At Tung-chow the other day they made peace on one day, and then fought us the next. They certainly cannot say that the English had any share in causing war to break out again on the 18th of September, or I should not have been in their hands. Is this double dealing the result of bad faith, or of divisions in their Councils and Government? I again go into the story of the 18th, but Hang-ki, whose manner on this occasion is abrupt and unfriendly, stops me by saying that it is useless to refer again to that affair. The question is, what can now be done? Have I, or have I not, anything to suggest?

"I point out that, being in ignorance of all that has occurred since the 18th, I am not the best person to apply to for suggestions.

"Hang-ki is careful not to supply information, but admits that a correspondence is going on between the Prince of Kung and Lord Elgin. He seems to say that nothing conclusive is yet arrived at or immediately expected.

"I again observe, that differences can only be settled by negotiation, and negotiation, to be effectual, should not be confined to correspondence, but should be conducted by Conferences, either between the Plenipotentiaries themselves or their Deputies.

"But after what has occurred to you, Hang-ki said, your Deputy, Mr. Wade, will not come to see us.

"You certainly cannot expect, I said, that any one of our officers should again place himself in your power, and it is for you who have violated a flag of truce, to come forward now and send Deputies to our side.

"But will you guarantee their safety? he asked.

"Yes, I replied, if you send Mr. Loch and myself with them.

"Hang-ki answered this remark with a smile of derision. That will not do, he said; we want you to guarantee that your people will make peace without any more fighting.

"You have a better guarantee for peace, I said, in your own sincerity than any that I can give. If you really wish for peace, you have only to send out your Deputies to open negotiations, and convince the Ambassadors by your proceedings that you regret all past acts of bad faith.

"It is of no use, said Hang-ki, for me to return to the Prince of Kung with a set speech of this kind. Business presses, and I doubt whether I shall be able to see you again. Have you nothing else to say? Do you still refuse to suggest a plan? Here the Prison Inspector, Gan Laou-yay, interposed the remark that I ought to write a letter. Yes, said Hang-ki, write to your Ambassador or to Mr. Wade, engaging that the mandarin who takes the letter shall be well treated, and that there shall be a cessation of hostilities.

"I replied that it was quite out of my power to say anything about the discontinuance of hostilities, and that were I to make such a proposal it would be wholly useless, as it would have no effect upon the proceedings of the English Ambassador. I have suggested a plan, I added, namely, that you should send out your Deputies, and return Mr. Loch and myself with them, in which case we would be answerable for their safety, and they could make any representations or overtures that you might desire. I cannot undertake to do more. As to your menace, I know that I am in danger as long as I am in your hands, because it is no uncommon thing for the Chinese to deal cruelly with their prisoners, or even to take their lives. But while I should prepare for the worst, I know also that my fate will be determined, not by your will, but by that of God. On the other hand, it is for you to bear in mind that, although you would do the allied force but little injury by killing the few prisoners who have fallen into your hands, you would, by such an act, bring down upon yourselves a terrible vengeance. I also reminded Hang-ki of the different treatment which he received when detained as a prisoner by the allies at Canton in 1858; and I again begged that, in view of whatever might happen to us, Mr. Loch and myself might at least have the satisfaction of being put into the same prison.

"Hang-ki replied that his imprisonment and mine were not parallel cases, that he could not say whether Mr. Loch and myself could be allowed to be together, and that he felt he was returning to the Prince of Kung without having anything to tell him. You will be in no danger, however, he added, during the next two or three days."

Two days afterwards, the 28th of September, Hang-ki again appeared, being accompanied, on this occasion, by a mandarin named Sung, whom he introduced as an officer attached to the Prince of Kung. The Prince, Hang-ki said, had heard of the private visits which he had paid me on the 22nd and 26th, and had sent for him in order that he might hear Hang-ki's own account of all that had passed between us. The Prince wholly disapproved of the manner in which I was treated, and attributing this injustice to Sang-ko-lin-sin and the Prince of I, declared his intention of following a very different policy to that of the latter. Having now the direction of foreign affairs, said the Prince, I shall take my own course, however open it may be to attack, and however people may say that I am encouraging the extravagant pretensions of foreigners by treating them well. I shall adhere strictly to courtesy and justice in my treatment of foreigners, and if they do not meet me in the same way they place themselves in the wrong, while whatever may happen I shall, at least, have the consciousness of having acted rightly. Therefore go to Mr. Parkes and tell him that he shall be removed to good quarters, and that he shall not have to

complain of his treatment now that he is in my hands. Let there be no delay, no not even to write orders, but take the officer Sung with you in proof that you are acting by my direction.

Hang-ki followed up this speech with a longer one of his own, the tenour of which was that I should mark my appreciation of the Prince's goodness by persuading the allies to observe the same high principles as those which actuated the Prince.

I replied, that I had no difficulty in assuring the Prince that justice and courtesy would continue to mark, as hitherto, the action of my own nation. It was the absence of those principles on the part of Chinese officials, as shown in their discourteous and unjust treatment of foreign Governments, by refusing to hold intercourse with them on terms of equality, that had been the cause of the present troubles. With justice and courtesy on the side of the Chinese, I had no doubt that an accommodation could be arrived at.

"Listen!" said Hang-ki to the three mandarins who were with him, "he declares that his nation will act according to justice. Take off his chains!"

This having been done, Hang-ki again resumed the conversation. He told me that affairs remained in a doubtful state; that correspondence between the Prince of Kung and Lord Elgin continued; but that it was still impossible to say whether the result would be war or peace. He thought, however, that in the course of the negotiations an opportunity would be afforded me of rendering the Prince some assistance in return for his kindness to me.

I thanked the Prince for his good intentions, but pointed out that, so long as I remained a prisoner, I could be of very little use in promoting the settlement of differences; and I begged, therefore, that he would form no high expectations of my assistance, as, in the event of matters going contrary to their wishes, they might visit their dissatisfaction upon me.

Hang-ki assured me that I need not apprehend danger in my own case, except in the event of a great emergency—say the assault of the city, when the foreigners would be killing Chinese, and it was only natural that the latter should take revenge.

This led me to remark upon the more humane practices of Western nations in regard to their treatment of non-combatants, and those protected by a flag of truce, &c.; but Hang-ki met my observations by stating, that the customs of all nations could not be expected to be the same on these points.

Hang-ki having told me that I should probably be taken out of prison to-morrow, I stated that I hoped Mr. Loch would have the benefit of this arrangement, as, if not, I could not avail myself of it. We had been sent away together, under the same flag of truce; had been seized and imprisoned together; and it would not now do to take one of us out of prison and leave the other in.

Hang-ki replied, that I was raising a difficulty which he could not meet without further instructions from the Prince of Kung.

He then took leave of me, but returned in a quarter of an hour, to say that he did not see how he could bring up the subject of the removal of Mr. Loch to the Prince, unless I gave him a note stating that the latter had been exceedingly kind to me, and was also very able and intelligent.

I said that it was quite impossible for me to express any opinion as to the Prince's character and attainments, as I had never seen the Prince, nor had I ever heard anything of his Highness besides what Hang-ki himself had told me. Neither could I conscientiously declare that he had treated me with extraordinary kindness, seing that I was still detained in the common prison into which I had been at first thrown, and that I had only that moment been released from my chains, although this privilege was enjoyed by nine-tenths of the felons who were my companions. It was not favour, but justice, that I sought at the hands of the Prince. To be detained as a prisoner at all was in itself an injustice, but if so detained, I ought not to be treated as a criminal and an offender against Chinese law, but as an officer and a prisoner of war. I was certain, I added, that the justice and courtesy of the Prince, of which Hang-ki had said so much, would induce him to relieve Mr. Loch and myself from our present ignominious position, if the matter were properly represented to him.

Hang-ki urged that if I furnished him with a paper to the effect requested, he could do more than if he went to the Prince empty-handed. Not willing to lose the advantage which this demand gave me, I again replied that I could

write nothing of the kind as long as I remained in prison, and that I would not leave the prison unless I was accompanied by Mr. Loch; but that, as soon as we were taken out of prison, and were treated properly, I should be ready to note the fact in writing, and also to state, if he wished it, that I had been told that the Prince was an able and intelligent man.

Hang-ki then left me, and returned in the afternoon of the following day (September 29), with an order for the removal of Mr. Loch and myself from the prison of the Board of Punishments to a temple where quarters had been prepared for us. I need not here dwell upon the satisfaction we both felt as we met each other again in one of the outer courts of the Board. Having been put into separate vehicles we were conveyed, in the charge of Hang-ki and a strong escort, to the temple spoken of. Here we were placed in a room about twenty feet by ten, which was entered by another room of the same dimensions, in which eight of the jailors of the Board were stationed, These rooms looked into an open court about forty feet square, in which we were allowed to take exercise; but a strong party of soldiers guarded the outer entrance into this court, and we soon became aware that military were put up, in and about all parts of the building. Hang-ki explained the presence of the jailors, by saying that they had been brought here to act as our servants. With a degree of consideration for our comfort, not usually shown by mandarins, he had supplied us not only with such essentials as good food, beds, &c., but also with the luxuries of writing materials, soap and towels, &c. He left it to ourselves to order our meals whenever we chose, and these, I may mention, were abundant and good during the time of our stay in the Kaou-meaou temple. As soon as he had seen us located in our new quarters, I gave him, according to my promise, the following note:—

"The Chinese authorities are now treating Mr. Loch and myself well, and we are informed that this is done by direction of the Prince of Kung. We are also told by them that his Highness is a man of decision and great intelligence, and I trust that, under these circumstances, hostilities may be temporarily suspended to give opportunity for negotiation."

September 30.—One of Hang-ki's head servants delivered, in the name of the Prince of Kung, a large present of fruit and confectionary. Hang-ki followed himself at 2 P.M., and talked at considerable length without having any apparent object. He maintained that the invasion of a country and a march upon the capital was altogether contrary to justice and reason, and that was what we were now doing.

I held that the justice or injustice of invasion depended upon circumstances; if one Power were wronged by another Power and could not obtain redress by fair means, force was the only resource left. We knew from history that China had been invaded about two hundred years ago by the Manchoo Tartars, who, when once they had taken possession of the country, never quitted it, but founded the present dynasty, and yet I presumed that he, as a Manchoo, was quite prepared to defend that course.

He then argued that if we captured Peking, we should have to contend against the Viceroys of all the provinces, who would, of course, march upon us

I said I thought not, as many of these Viceroys were already unable to hold their own against rebels and banditti. Instead, however of wasting time in arguing upon the degree of mischief that would ensue upon the capture of Peking, I advised Hang-ki to avoid that contingency altogether, by effecting a timely settlement of affairs, instead of continuing to indulge in delays which, under present circumstances, must prove particularly dangerous.

Hang-ki went over a good deal of old ground, and defended hesitation on their part, on the ground that we put difficulties in their way which they could not get over. Among these he enumerated bringing up a large escort to Peking, the demand for indemnities, the presentation of the Queen's letter, &c.

As Hang-ki insisted in keeping me in the dark as to the movements both of the Ambassadors and the allied forces, I could not give a more practical form to my suggestions. I had gathered from a conversation with one of Hang-ki's servants, previous to the arrival of his master, that our army had advanced to, and continued to halt at, Pa-li-chiau, and when I assumed this as the fact, Hang-ki's equivocations convinced me of its truth. I advised him, therefore, not to lose what appeared to me their last chance of negotiation, as one more march would bring our army under the walls of Peking. Hang-ki having again

put forward the old plea that their fears for the safety of their deputies prevented the despatch of these officers to our camp, Mr. Loch volunteered to escort them out and to return with them again. Hang-ki said he would submit this proposal to the Prince of Kung.

October 1.—Hang-ki called at 11 A.M., and was accompanied by Lau, formerly Taoutae at Shanghae, and a high literary mandarin. Lau had been sent by the Prince of I to Ho-se-woo with despatches for the Ambassadors at the same time that Mr. Wade and myself had visited the Prince at Tung-chow. In a half-serious tone, I compared the different treatment in the two cases. On the 16th September I had carefully escorted Lau past our lines, and on the 18th I had been seized and brutally treated by the Chinese in theirs. Hang-ki came forward in defence. The seizure of myself and party was almost a necessity, he said, arising out of the exigency of the moment; hostilities had been resumed, I was in their hands at the time, and it is contrary to all reason, he added, to put a sword into the hand of your enemy at the very time when you are going to give him combat. True, I had at one time to complain of ill-treatment, but that had been corrected, and I was now well taken care of. They all blamed Sang-ko-lin-sin and the Prince of I for fighting at Chang-kia-wan instead of concluding peace; but, although they admitted that my detention was an act of treachery, they would not see in my present detention a continuation of the injustice. The Prince of Kung does not approve, Hang-ki said, of Mr. Loch going out with the deputies; but we wish you to write a note to Lord Elgin, proposing that your army should retire for ten or twenty *li*, and that deputies from both sides should then meet upon some neutral ground. I pointed out that such proposals should be made by them to your Lordship direct, and not through me, and that I could not lower myself in the eyes of my own people by proposing that our troops should fall back previous to negotiation. I consented, however, to note the proposal they made as to a meeting on neutral ground, and accordingly wrote your Lordship the annexed letter. Mr. Loch and myself also prepared private notes, to be used in the event of Prince Kung allowing these to be forwarded with the former.

The 2nd of October passed without a visit, but on the 3rd Hang-ki and Lau called in the afternoon. The Prince of Kung, they said, had kept back all the letters we had written on the 1st. Again they seemed disposed to limit their conversation to general subjects, and to deplore the existence of present differences, without making any real effort to settle them. They stated that Lord Elgin had started a different proposition to theirs, namely, that deputies should meet "before the armies," instead of "at a neutral spot." I pointed out that this was a distinction without a difference. They then showed me a paper purporting to be an extract from one of your Lordship's despatches, on the subject of the presentation of the Queen's letter, and wanted me to declare to them whether this meant that your Lordship had no intention of insisting upon an audience with the Emperor. They also produced another extract, and desired me to inform them whether that meant that your Lordship demanded nothing more than the execution of the Treaty of Tien-tsin. I declined to give an opinion as to the meaning of any isolated passages in your Lordship's communications unless they showed me the original letters. These they always declined to produce. They then delivered the following note, which had been sent by Mr. Wade in reply to the paper I had written on the day we were removed from prison, and which, I now learned, had been forwarded by them to the English camp:—

"My dear Parkes,

"We were glad to hear from you at last. I have written you a note in Chinese, and take my chance with this in English. Ever since the Prince Kung has begun to write, Lord Elgin has been writing to say, that if they send an officer to get the Treaty ready for signature, and send out the prisoners at the same time, peace will be made. He adds no conditions to those he insisted on before, and if the Chinese had had any sense they would have made peace a week ago. As it is, they have delayed so long that we have been obliged to move on the force; and if they do not make peace now, we shall be obliged to attack Peking. Our shell will easily destroy the city; and if any harm befall you all, it will be burned from one end to the other. Every one here wishes you well; if the other fellows want anything, try to get the mandarins to inform us."

The Chinese version of the above note, which had been forwarded open

had, of course, informed them of its contents. It gave us the information we had so long been wishing for, and enabled me to point out to Hang-ki and Lau that it was useless for them to ask me any longer for suggestions, as it was quite clear they had only one course to pursue. Again I urged on them the great risk to which they exposed their Government and city by indulging in further delay; but they did not appear much concerned, and said that they had heard, through the French, that there was to be no more fighting. I then wrote the following acknowledgment of Mr. Wade's note, in English and Chinese, and begged them to deliver it:—

"My dear Wade,

"We have received the clothes and your note of the 2nd, acknowledging mine of the 29th September. I see that subsequent notes (one public and two private) of 1st October have not been delivered to you. I find that such arguments as I have been able to use to the Chinese authorities are in complete accord with your own, and my only hope is that Prince Kung is a man of sufficient intelligence and weight in the Councils of his Government to induce the latter to follow without further hesitation, the course marked out by Lord Elgin."

In one respect Mr. Wade's note gave us considerable concern, as it seemed to infer that several other persons were in the hands of the Chinese besides the Sikh and the two Frenchmen who were sent to Peking with us; but though we often tried to learn from Hang-ki and the other mandarins the fate of the other gentlemen and men from whom we were separated on the day of our seizure, they always insisted that they knew nothing about any other prisoners, and had only accidentally heard three or four foreigners were detained in Sang-ko-lin-sin's camp. Having imagined, from casual remarks let fall from time to time by Chinese about us, that Mr. Loch and myself, with the Sikh and the two Frenchmen, were the only prisoners in Peking, we had hitherto hoped that the larger portion of our original party, numbering no less than twenty-three persons, had escaped capture.

October 4.—Lau called to say that all our notes had been sent to the English camp, with another despatch from the Prince of Kung to your Lordship, upon the answer to which, peace or war depended. He would not, however, tell us the tenour of the Prince's despatch.

October 5.—Hang-ki and Lau called in the afternoon. As usual, their conversation was at first desultory, and they pretended to want to discuss with me certain provisions of the Treaty of 1858 and the Convention of Tien-tsin. To our inquiries as to whether they had any letters for us, they at first produced only one newspaper and a packet of medicine, but on my insisting that they must have received something more, they delivered us Mr. Wade's note of October 4, informing us, in very decided language, that your Lordship had determined not to open negotiations with the Chinese authorities until the prisoners seized under the flag of truce had been given up: further, that, as the Chinese had not complied with this demand, although often repeated, hostilities would at once be resumed. As reference to this letter may be convenient in this place, I beg to annex a copy. I read it over to Hang-ki twice, and the uneasiness which he and Lau had, till then, been trying to conceal, became now more apparent. They again endeavoured to lead me into a long discussion as to the rightfulness of our proceedings, but I had only the one reply to give them: "You have to choose between the destruction of your capital or the unconditional surrender of your prisoners." They could not agree, they said, to that mode of proceeding, and things must, therefore, take their course. Twice they went away, and twice they returned to ask if I could not point out some other mode of meeting the difficulty. In reply I simply quoted from Mr. Wade's letter. "But if you are released," they said, "before the Convention is signed and peace concluded, you will want to retaliate upon us in some way for what you have undergone." Mr. Loch and myself very distinctly assured them that we had no wish or intention of the kind, and that they had it yet in their power to atone for the wrong committed, by immediately releasing all their prisoners. They then urged that the Prince of Kung wanted to see me before we were returned. They could not say when, perhaps in two or three days' time. I warned them against incurring any delay on this account, adding that, although it would be gratifying to me to see His Highness, such an interview could not have any influence upon your

Lordship's actions. I then wrote and gave them, in English and Chinese, the following reply to Mr. Wade:—

"My dear Wade,

"We have received your letters of the 4th, and I read the contents of yours to Hang-ki (who brought it to me), in order that he might see that the only way of adjusting difficulties is the one which you point out.

"The Chinese, if they are sincere in their wish for peace, have the means in their own hands of bringing about a settlement at any moment, and if the destruction of Peking or any great calamity ensue, it is the consequence of their own conduct."

October 6.—Hang-ki called at noon. He had been up the whole night, he said, with the Prince of Kung, discussing the provisions of the Treaty of 1858, and the proposed Convention. The Prince of Kung had determined to accept both, and to give up the prisoners in three days' time, on the condition that both the Allied and the Chinese forces should fall back a few miles, and thus place some distance between each other. The Prince now wanted me to write to your Lordship to this effect; and he also wished explanations from me on several points in both Treaty and Convention, particularly in respect to the Resident Minister, the payment of indemnities, and the evacuation of the places held by the allied troops.

I again pointed out how useless it was for me to continue to write notes to your Lordship, and repeated my objections to being made the medium of proposing that our troops should fall back from any position they now held before or near Peking. It was equally useless for me, I also said, to discuss the Treaty or Convention; but, in order to gratify the Prince, I gave such explanations on some points as I felt at liberty to make, while on others I merely referred him to your Lordship.

I then wrote a note in Chinese to Mr. Wade, stating that I had been informed by the Chinese authorities that they intended to send back the whole of their prisoners on the 8th instant; that their troops had already been directed to fall back; and that I trusted there would no longer be occasion for ours to advance.

I also gave Hang-ki, at his particular request, a note, stating—

"If Mr. Loch, myself, and all the other prisoners, are sent back in a proper manner, the English Government will take no revenge.

"As far as I can understand the present position of affairs, the British Government do not intend to make fresh demands upon the Chinese, if the latter agree, without any exception, to the provisions of the Treaty of 1858 and the proposed Convention."

October 7.—At daybreak this morning we heard the sound of a cannonade, which lasted for a few minutes, and then ceased. It seemed to come from no considerable distance, and, as the information conveyed to us, both publicly and secretly, from our friends in camp, had warned us that an attack might take place at any time, we thought that this critical moment had now arrived.

At a quarter to 8 Hang-ki came in to learn from us the meaning of the firing. He could no longer conceal from us that our army was before Peking, and admitted that Yuen-ming-yuen—the Emperor's Summer Palace—had been taken by the allied troops yesterday afternoon. The Prince of Kung, who had been staying there all along, had managed to escape; but he, Hang-ki, had been nearly taken as he was going out to the Palace yesterday afternoon. Returning to the city in the evening, he found all the gates closed, and the walls manned; and his only means of getting into the city was by being hauled up in a basket. He feared that my note, stating that we should be sent out on the 8th, and the official letter from Prince Kung covering it, could not have reached the English camp.

I told him that, during the whole time of our confinement, both in the prison and in the temple, we had never ceased to warn them against the danger of delay, and all that we had foretold seemed now to be coming to pass. Their only chance of escape lay in the immediate surrender of their prisoners.

How is that to be done, said Hang-ki, in the face of firing? and how can I now get the authority of Prince Kung for your surrender? Your immediate

departure would also interfere with the interview he intended to give you to-day.

The interview, we replied, was of little importance, and danger to the city, in case of delay, was imminent. We advised him, therefore, to arrange for our being sent away at once, regardless of whether we had to go out in the face of fire or not, as we were very willing to risk that danger.

He left us, promising to return shortly, and we counted the minutes, until these became hours, and the day began to wear away. We did not again hear the sound of attack, but detected, now and then, some stir, as of the movement of troops, in our vicinity, and could observe looks of concern on the faces of our guards and jailors. We sent to Hang-ki's house, to inquire about his movements, but all we could learn from his servants was, that after leaving us he had been lowered over the city wall, and had gone, as they supposed, in quest of Prince Kung. It was impossible to tell when he would return.

We anxiously looked for the next morning, and felt some relief when no cannonade was heard as daylight broke. By sending to Hang-ki's house, we learned that he had returned home at 3 A.M., and would be with us shortly. He came at 9, and the glimpse obtained of his countenance, before he had put on the look he wished to assume, showed considerable dejection and anxiety. He explained to us why he had not returned yesterday. I left you full of concern, he said, as I knew that the city and your lives were both in danger. Had the city been assaulted, the first cry raised by the soldiers would have been, "Away with the foreign prisoners!" When I inquired for Prince Kung, I found that he was too far off for me to hope to reach him. I therefore dispatched a note, proposing that you should be given up at once, on condition that the foreign troops should retire from Yuen-ming-yuen, which they had begun to plunder. At the same time I received an invitation from Mr. Wade, to meet him outside the Tih-shing Gate at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. I went, and we had a long discussion. He demanded not only the immediate surrender of the prisoners, but also one of the city gates, and he handed me this letter, in which you see he states the same in writing. It is quite impossible to comply with such a demand, and what, therefore, can be done under such circumstances?

I read the note, which ran in the names of the Allied Commanders-in-chief, demanding the liberation of all the prisoners who had been seized, and the delivery into their hands of one of the gates of the city, as a precaution against further acts of perfidy on the part of the Chinese. I could only tell Hang-ki that this step was rendered necessary by their previous acts of bad faith, and that the allies could no longer put any trust in them. It was useless to hope that the Allied Generals would alter their determination when they had once taken it, nor did I see any course open to the Chinese except compliance.

At this moment the prospect before us seemed darker than ever, but Hang-ki, after some hesitation relieved us from our suspense by remarking that he had agreed with Mr. Wade that we should be given up to-day, as already promised, and that we should be sent out at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Unable to rely upon the assurance of any mandarin, we anxiously awaited the hour named, and could see that considerable uneasiness was evinced by Hang-ki, who visited us several times in the course of the morning. At one time he whispered to me, "I am particularly anxious to get you away for reasons that I will tell you of at a future time, and I will not wait for the hour named to send you off." He was now willing to give us some information respecting the other prisoners. Upwards of twenty had been taken, he said, but, with a view to their safe custody, they had been divided into small parties, and sent away to different district cities in the interior. It would take some days to get them all back, and he had heard that four or five of them had sickened and died. Those in Peking numbered eight in all, inclusive of Mr. Loch and myself; and we were all to be sent out together.

At last, at 2 o'clock, he told us that all the prisoners had been assembled, and that we could take our departure. We were placed in covered carts, without being allowed to see each other, and were escorted by a large party of soldiers and mandarins through streets which wore a deserted appearance to the Se-che, or north-western gate of the city. We soon saw, with thankful hearts, as those great portals opened, and then immediately closed behind us, that we were already free men, for our guard, not daring to follow us out of the city, had left to ourselves the pleasant task of finding our own way to the allied camp.

I must not close this report without endeavouring to express my gratitude to your Lordship for the firm and uncompromising manner in which you insisted, from the first, upon our surrender, and which, under the blessing of Divine Providence, has mainly contributed to our liberation. Nor should I omit to acknowledge the great debt I also owe to my fellow-prisoner, Mr. Loch, for the warm support I invariably received from him whenever a moment of trial or of danger presented itself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 108.

Mr. Parkes to the Earl of Elgin.

Peking, October 1, 1860.

THE Chinese authorities have requested the Undersigned to state to your Lordship that it is the wish of their Government to open negotiations with the allies; and that looking to what has passed, and the distrust which it is feared exists now on both sides, they desire that some neutral spot between the positions at present held by the respective armies may be selected for this purpose, where deputies on the part of the Chinese and the allies may meet, and arrange, it is hoped, the preliminaries of a permanent peace. They consider that while these negotiations between the deputies are being carried on, and in order to afford the necessary facilities for these negotiations, hostilities should be entirely suspended on both sides.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY S. PARKES.

Inclosure 3 in No. 108.

Mr. Wade to Mr. Parkes.

My dear Parkes, *October* 4, 1860.

WE received this morning letters from Loch and yourself. Lord Elgin has read your note stating that the Chinese authorities are willing to send a deputy to meet one from us at some neutral spot, to arrange the preliminaries of peace. Lord Elgin has proposed this over and over again, but he has also insisted upon your being given up at the same time as the deputy comes forward. He fully commends your efforts to bring about an arrangement, and he is greatly struck by your magnanimity in making no allusion to your own release. He is, however, quite clear on this point, you and others have been seized under a flag of truce. This was not only a violence done to you, but an offence to our national honour, and it is impossible for him to commence negotiations with any Chinese officer so long as you are detained by the Chinese Government. No Chinese deputy, therefore, will do any good unless, when he comes, he brings you all with him. On the other hand, if the Chinese Government continues to detain you, hostilities will certainly continue; and if, in the course of hostilities, any damage befall any of you, Peking will be destroyed. Our heavy guns are up, and we can burn Peking from one end to the other without the loss of a man. If Peking falls, of course there is an end of this Dynasty. The news from the South is bad. The rebels have occupied all the country from Soo-chow to Hang-chow, and if they attack Hang-chow, they are certain to take it.

Ever yours, &c.
(Signed) THOMAS WADE.

No. 109.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received December* 27.)

(Extract.) *Peking, October* 31, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a correspondence which has passed between Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant and me, with reference to the period of the departure of the army from this place.

Her Majesty's forces are under no obligation to retire from Peking until an Imperial Decree shall have been issued authorising the publication, in all the provinces of the Empire, of the Treaty between Great Britain and China of the year 1858, and of the Convention of 1860. I attach great importance to the fulfilment of this condition, and I have therefore thought it to be my duty to request the Commander-in-chief to suspend for a few days the march of his troops to Tien-tsin, in order that, if possible before their departure, the required decree may have been received from the Emperor, who is said to be now at Je-hol.

Inclosure 1 in No. 109.

The Earl of Elgin to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

(Extract.) *Peking, October* 27, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Excellency's information, copies of Articles VI, VIII, and IX of the Convention between Great Britain and China executed at Peking on the 24th instant.

By the first of these Articles that portion of the township of Kowloon which is now held by the British Government under lease is ceded to Her Majesty.

By the last it is provided that when the Convention in question shall have been signed, the ratifications of the Tien-tsin Treaty of 1858 exchanged, and a certain Imperial Decree specified in Article VIII issued, Chusan will be evacuated, and Her Majesty's forces will retire to Tien-tsin and Takoo, the north part of Shan-tung and Canton.

The two first of the conditions above-mentioned have been already fulfilled, but I fear that eight or ten days will elapse before a Decree can be obtained from the Emperor in fulfilment of the third condition.

I therefore earnestly hope that your Excellency will find it to be consistent with your duty to postpone, for a few days after the 1st of November, the departure of the army from this place for Tien-tsin. The publication of the Treaty, as provided for by Article VIII of the Convention, is, in my opinion, quite as essential to its future working as the Emperor's ratification of the instrument. And if the army retires before the Decree necessary for that purp se be obtained, it is very probable that the publication may never take place.

Inclosure 2 in No. 109.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Head-Quarters, Peking, October* 27, 1860.

REFERRING to your Excellency's letter of this date, I shall be much obliged by your informing me of the latest day on which I may calculate to be able to start, if I wait here for the arrival of the Emperor's Decree.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT.

Inclosure 3 in No. 109.

The Earl of Elgin to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Sir, *Peking, October* 29, 1860.

I AM very desirous to give your Excellency the precise information called for in your despatch of yesterday's date, and I have made inquiries accordingly; but as I know nothing of the route to Jehol, it is very difficult for me to state absolutely what is the latest day on which you may calculate to be able to start if you wait here for the arrival of the Emperor's Decree.

I have reason, however, to believe that the Chinese authorities earnestly desire that the British army should be withdrawn from Peking at the earliest moment, and that if they know that it will not retire until the Decree in question

shall have been obtained, they will lose no time in getting it. My belief therefore is, that if your Excellency were to defer your departure until the 8th proximo, or, perhaps, even until the 6th proximo, the required object would be effected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 109.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Head-Quarters Camp, Peking, October* 29, 1860.

IN accordance with the request contained in your Excellency's letters of the 27th and 28th instant, I have the honour to state that I will cause the departure of the troops to be delayed until the 7th and 8th of November, on which days the 1st and 2nd Divisions will respectively march *en route* for Tien-tsin, being the latest possible date to which I can remain, according to the best information I can obtain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT.

Inclosure 5 in No. 109.

The Earl of Elgin to Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant.

Sir, *Peking, October* 30, 1860.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of yesterday's date, and beg to thank you for delaying the departure of the troops from this place until the 7th and 8th of November, in compliance with my request.

With reference to our conversation of this morning, and in further explanation of the last paragraph of my despatch to your Excellency of the 27th instant, I beg to state that peace being now re-established between Great Britain and China, I know of nothing to prevent you from removing to Great Britain or to India all the army under your command, with the exception of such portions as may be required to garrison the points specified in that despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 110.

Colonel Foley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

French Head-Quarters, near North Gate, Peking,
(Extract.) *October* 26, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 10th instan a letter was sent to the authorities in Peking by the two Commanders-in-chief, in which they demanded that the North Gate, opposite to where the French army is encamped, should be given up, to be occupied by a force of 200 French and English soldiers. In the event of refusal the walls to be breached and the city entered by force. Whereas, if the authorities agreed to the demand the troops would be prevented from entering the city, and no pillaging would be allowed.

Up to 12 o'clock P.M., on Saturday, the 13th instant, was given for a reply.

The Commanders-in-chief immediately ordered batteries to be erected and armed within a short distance of the city walls in case of refusal.

On Friday evening an answer was received from the city authorities, in which they agreed to give up the gate in question; but it does not appear that the Chinese Government had anything to say in the matter. Arrangements having been made early on Saturday the 13th instant, a force of 200 French and English took peaceable possession of the gate at 12 P.M. on that day.

In the meantime intelligence of the death of several of the prisoners arrived, some of them having died, I grieve to say, under the savage ill-treatment they had experienced.

The bodies of Mr. de Norman, Lieutenant Anderson, Mr. Bowlby (correspondent of the "Times"), one English soldier, and twelve Sikhs, have been sent in, also those of Colonel Grandchamp, M. Ader, Intendent Dubut, and three French soldiers. All are now accounted for (thirteen Sikhs having returned alive), excepting Captain Brabazon, Royal Artillery, Abbé Deluc, and a French soldier, but there is every reason to suppose they were murdered after the failure of the treacherous affair of the 18th of September.

The interment of the English bodies received took place in the Russian cemetery, outside of the north wall, on the morning of the 17th of October, nearly all the officers of the French army off duty attending.

It is General de Montauban's intention to have the bodies of the French officers and soldiers interred within the precincts of the French Catholic chapel, inside the city walls.

On the 15th instant the Commanders-in-chief met, and agreed that they could not stop in the neighbourhood of Peking after the 1st of November.

On the 16th instant Sir Hope Grant sent an English force to Yuen-ming-yuen and burnt all the numerous buildings in the place.

On the 17th instant letters were sent by the English and French Plenipotentiaries respectively to Prince Kung, the Imperial Commissioner, in which they demanded that the Treaty should be immediately agreed to, and further that 300,000 taels should be paid to the English, and 200,000 taels to the French; these sums to be devoted as a sort of indemnity to the families of the deceased prisoners for the loss occasioned by their deaths, and to the survivors for the sufferings they had endured; also that an acceptance of these demands should be sent by 10 o'clock on the morning of the 20th instant, otherwise the city should be entered by the two forces, and the Imperial palace of Peking be burnt to the ground.

Prince Kung sent a letter respectively to the Plenipotentiaries early on the morning of the 20th instant to say that he accepted unconditionally all the terms, and that the money for the indemnity for the indignities offered to and murder of the prisoners was ready to be paid. This money was delivered over to the English and French on the 22nd instant.

On the morning of the 24th instant his Excellency Baron Gros proceeded, with an escort of 500 men to take up his residence in the city of Peking.

At 2 o'clock P.M. on the same day his Excellency the Earl of Elgin entered the city in state, and having met Prince Kung in a yamun fitted up for the occasion, the English Treaty was signed.

At 11 o'clock A.M. on the 25th instant his Excellency Baron Gros entered Peking in state, and after the same formalities had been observed as on the 24th the French Treaty was signed.

Nothing which needs remark took place at the latter ceremony. Prince Kung, I am informed by persons present on both occasions, appeared rather more at ease, or perhaps less alarmed, than he did on the previous day.

The weather has changed very much during the lost fortnight, the mornings and evenings being excessively cold, the thermometer showing occasionally as low as freezing point. The health of the troops still continues wonderfully good.

It is General de Montauban's present intention, should nothing occur to prevent him, to leave Peking about the end of the month and proceed to Tien-tsin, where he will remain sufficient time to arrange the location of 2,000 men under General Collinot, then take his departure for Shanghae, which place he intends to make his head-quarters with the rest of his force, excepting the detachments of Chusan and Che-foo, until he receives further instructions from the Minister of War.

No. 111.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received December* 27.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, October* 25, 1860.

A POOR woman brought up in one of the missionary schools here, has just returned from a visit to Soo-chow, whither she had proceeded to inquire after her family, who were in the town when it fell into the hands of the insurgents. She found her mother, who had been badly beaten about the head to extort money, but eight or nine of her immediate kindred were missing. The men had been forced to join as soldiers, and two young girls, part of the family, had been taken away, and given as wives or concubines to the insurgent soldiery. She said military service or death is the option given to the men who cannot purchase exemption by money.

Mr. Roberts, an American missionary, from whom the Tae-ping leader, Heng-tze-tseuen, received some religious instruction, has joined the insurgents at Soo-chow. He has described, in a letter which will no doubt be published, one of their religious meetings at which he attended, having previously dined with their leader Le (styled the "Chang-wang.") It consisted of the offering up of large heaps of provisions before an altar erected in honour of Shang-te. The assemblage knelt in silence for a couple of minutes, then a short prayer was read from a paper, which was burnt, and a hymn was sung.

Mr. Roberts may be presumed to take a favourable view of their religious observances, but I understand that he expresses doubts as to the ceremony having any other meaning in the eyes of the mass of the worshippers than is attached to the rites performed by the Emperor. He seems to think that they consider Shang-te merely as the material heaven and earth; and it is significant that he recommends the missionaries not to employ that word any longer to designate the Divine Being.

At his own request he was permitted to preach, and he states that his discourse was directed against sacrifice, and contained a strong remonstrance against the cruelties committed by the insurgents, as alienating from them the sympathies of foreigners. I entertain little hope of his exhortations producing any effect on the conduct of his friends.

Mr. Roberts announced his intention of going to Nanking, and obtaining access, if possible, to the Chief. His position will be a very difficult one, as Heng-tze-tseuen claims to derive his knowledge from immediate inspiration, and advances pretensions which a courageous missionary can hardly admit, while it would be hazardous to deny them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 112.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received December* 27.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, October* 26, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose two copies of a pamphlet lately published, containing translations of various letters and memorials emanating from the Chinese authorities, on the subject of engaging the services of foreigners to assist in the management of the Custom-house.

I beg to call attention particularly to No. 8, being a memorial to the Emperor from Laou, the Governor-General of Canton, and to No. 11, in which the Governor-General of Fuh-kien requests the Emperor's sanction to the introduction of the same system at Foo-chow, Amoy, and Formosa.

I gather from some observations in Parliament, that the constitution of this establishment, and its objects, are very imperfectly understood, and as I entertain a profound conviction that the interests of China, of Her Majesty's Government, and of commerce in general, are intimately involved in the successful operation of this great experiment, I take the liberty of submitting a few reflections on the subject.

The records of the Foreign Office will prove that for several years after the

opening of Shanghae to trade, a system of smuggling and of compromising duties prevailed to an extent that destroyed practically the value of a fixed Tariff, and defeated the calculations of the honest merchant, who found himself, owing to the corruption of the Chinese Custom-house officials, exposed to a ruinous and unfair competition with his less scrupulous rivals in commerce. Her Majesty's Consuls, in fulfilment of the obligation imposed on them by the Treaty of Nanking (an obligation not assumed by the other Treaty Powers), omitted no effort to insure the payment of the just duties to the Chinese Government. They imposed fines for breaches of regulation on British merchants, they gave notice of lax proceedings to the Chinese, but they succeeded in effecting no improvement in the system, while they incurred much odium among their countrymen, by inflicting penalties on them for acts which it was notorious the citizens of other countries were committing every day with complete impunity.

The abuses at last attained such a height that the Chinese authorities were unable to check them, and as they were pressed for funds to meet the expenses entailed on the Government by the insurrection, they requested the Consuls of the Treaty Powers to assist in organising the Custom-house establishment, and readily agreed to accept the services of three foreign Inspectors, one being named or recommended by each Consul, to aid in the collection of the revenue. The good effects of the energy and honesty thus imported into the administration soon made themselves felt; in one year the revenue doubled itself, and has since shown a steady progression in proportion to the increase of trade. The returns in the year 1859 amounted to 2,902,377 taels, not far short of 1,000,000*l.* sterling; and this sum does not include the revenue derived from opium, which hitherto has not come under the cognizance of the Foreign Custom-house. The increase of the revenue is by no means, however, the most beneficial result of the arrangement. The partial levy of duties, and the capricious enforcement of regulations which fell so heavily on the British merchant, no longer exist, and the Custom-house now weighs equally upon all. To show your Lordship that this change has been effected without having recourse to any great severity, I may mention that in the six years during which the Inspectorship lasted, there were only eighteen cases of fine and confiscation, amounting in all to the value of 20,000 taels, between 6,000*l.* and 7,000*l.*, a fact which speaks in favour of the manner in which business is conducted by the community, and testifies to the conciliatory spirit which has animated the Custom-house authorities.

A reference to the letter of the Shanghae Chamber of Commerce to the Earl of Elgin (p. 63, Blue Book, "Special Mission"), will show that the merchants, as a body, have been well satisfied with the working of the system, and favourable to its extension to the other trading ports in China. But as the appointment of three Inspectors at each port would have been cumbersome, and have entailed unnecessary expense on the Chinese Government, the High Commissioners of England, France, and the United States, contented themselves with insisting that a uniform system of collection should be adopted at all the ports, recognising at the same time, in express terms, the right of the Chinese Government to adopt such measures as it might judge expedient to protect its revenue from smuggling, and to select such foreigners, being subjects of their respective Governments, as they might consider well suited to assist them in the management of the Custom-house.

Mr. Lay, who, by his services as British Inspector, has acquired the confidence of the Chinese authorities, was placed at the head of the establishment as deputy of the Chinese Imperial Commissioner and Superintendent of Trade. He is charged with the general supervision of the trading arrangements at the different ports, and with the responsible office of choosing the foreigners who are to carry out the details of Custom-house administration.

The system is already at work at Shanghae, Canton, and Swatow, and will be introduced at the other ports as soon as the pending difficulties are at an end.

Your Lordship will see that the new system differs from that which previously existed at Shanghae, inasmuch as the foreigners employed are no longer recommended by the foreign Consuls. It has now become a purely Chinese service, and the position of the foreigners employed in it differs in nothing from that of foreigners employed, for instance, in Egypt, and in other parts of the Levant. The Chinese Government is responsible for any abusive act they may

commit in the discharge of their duties, and it is at liberty to discharge them, as long as there is no violation of the terms of the contract under which they are engaged.

It surprised me considerably to see in a late discussion in Parliament, that gentlemen having mercantile relations with China should have been so misinformed as to talk of the duties being received by British Agents at the Chinese ports. In two out of the three ports which are open, the Commissioners of Customs happen to be American citizens.

I may add that it is to this system that we must mainly look for the recovery of indemnities, and for the successful carrying out of the important experiment of Chinese free emigration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No, 113.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord, *Shanghae, October* 28, 1860.

BEFORE going to the North, I thought it advisable to come to some arrangement with reference to the expenses entailed on us by the defence of Shanghae, and having ascertained that M. de Bourboulon's sentiments were in accordance with mine on the point, I addressed the inclosed letter to Brigadier Jephson, who commands Her Majesty's forces at this place.

The expenses of fortifying the posts necessary for the defence of the town, of making proper communications between them, and of providing accommodation for the men quartered in the city, I had already directed to be defrayed by the Chinese authorities. But I think well to assert formally the principle that they shall pay for the assistance we give them, as it will make it more difficult to conceal the real position of Shanghae from the Peking Government, and will divert from other, and perhaps objectionable, purposes, part of the resources they derive from duties on foreign trade. It is, moreover, pending a final arrangement, of advantage to commence realizing from a Government which has hitherto paid its indemnities out of its receipts, and not by loan.

The Chinese authorities have lately brought some 3,000 men from the Yang-tze to aid in recovering the province. They were much dissatisfied at not being allowed to enter Shanghae; and as their object in doing so would have been to "squeeze" the inhabitants, the latter are proportionably glad. They have been dispatched up the river to occupy a large town called Sung-keang, from which the insurgents have retired.

I have suggested to the Brigadier that the Taoutae should be informed that no Chinese troops will be allowed to enter Shanghae without his consent to the measure being previously obtained; and I have pointed out to him, privately, that we cannot prudently surrender the town to a Chinese military force until our differences with the Imperial Government are definitively settled.

The insurgents have withdrawn from the posts they occupied in this neighbourhood, with the intention, it is said, of attacking Hang-chow-foo. Had the Imperialists any resolution, it is not improbable that they might recover Soo-chow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 113.

Mr. Bruce to Brigadier-General Jephson.

Sir, *Shanghae, October* 22, 1860.

I CONSIDER it very desirable, under existing circumstances, that the local authorities at Shanghae should be called on, as long as they are allowed to collect the duties, to pay the expense of the troops stationed here to protect the city and Settlement of Shanghae, that necessity having been entailed upon the

allies by the inability of the Chinese to afford the protection they are bound to give to life and property at this place.

I would suggest, therefore, that the Taoutae should be called on to defray the expenses of the accommodation required for the troops, and of the food-rations supplied here to them. An account should be kept, and it will remain for the Ambassadors or the Governments of the allies to determine whether the sum so paid is to be included as part of the indemnity or not.

I think it would be desirable that the Interpreter attached to you should notify this decision to the Taoutae, and that an estimate should be given of the sum which will be probably required.

Unless considerations connected with the accounts or the financial arrangements render it desirable to fix on another period, I would suggest that the expenses incurred under these heads since the 1st of the present month should be demanded.

I am very anxious that nothing should be included in the account which would not be charged against the British Government according to the Army Regulations; and I therefore take the liberty of suggesting that officers should not be allowed to send for articles on their own responsibility, but that every requisition should be submitted for the proper counter-signature. But the expenses connected with making roads and communications, and for the strengthening of the posts held by the troops, ought to be carried to the account.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 114.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 2, 1861.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 25th October, inclosing a copy of a letter which you had written to General Ignatieff, expressing your thanks for the friendly sympathy he had shown in the success of your negotiations, and for his generous conduct in allowing the bodies of Her Majesty's subjects who had been murdered by the Chinese to be interred in the Russian cemetery at Peking.

I have to instruct your Excellency to convey to General Ignatieff the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the course which he has taken in these matters; and your Excellency will be enabled by the inclosed copy of a despatch which I have addressed by the Queen's commands to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh, to show to General Ignatieff that Her Majesty has conveyed to the Emperor of Russia her warmest acknowledgments for the friendly and considerate acts of His Imperial Majesty's Ambassador at Peking.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 114.

Lord J. Russell to Sir J. Crampton.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1860.

YOU will have observed in the Earl of Elgin's correspondence, which was published in the "London Gazette Extraordinary" of the 28th ultimo, a letter addressed by his Excellency to General Ignatieff, expressing his Excellency's thanks for the friendly sympathy which that distinguished officer had shown in the success of the negotiations with which Her Majesty's Ambassador was charged, and for the consideration which had prompted him to offer a place of sepulture in the Russian cemetery at Peking, for the bodies of those subjects of Her Majesty who had fallen victims to the treachery and cruelty of the Chinese authorities.

I am commanded by the Queen to instruct you to convey to Prince Gortchakoff, and, if you should have an opportunity of doing so, to His Imperial

Majesty himself, the deep sense which Her Majesty entertains of these friendly proceedings on the part of General Ignatieff, which are the more gratifying to the Queen inasmuch as they afford an additional assurance of goodwill on the part of His Imperial Majesty towards Her Majesty and the British nation.

But the thanks of Her Majesty, and of all classes of her subjects, are more especially due to General Ignatieff in permitting the interment in the Russian cemetery of those bodies of British subjects which were recovered from their murderers.

The fate of those gallant and devoted servants of Her Majesty has excited the deepest interest in this country, and has called forth the sympathy of all classes of the community towards their sorrowing relatives. It is a matter of general satisfaction that the remains of those victims of barbarous cruelty have been preserved from further insult and indignity, by the friendly care of the Ambassador of His Imperial Majesty.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 115.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 9, 1861.

YOUR Excellency's despatches from the 21st to the 31st of October, inclusive, were received at this office on the 28th of December, and have been laid before the Queen, and I am commanded by Her Majesty to convey to you her full approbation of your conduct in the various particulars reported in those despatches.

The Convention which you concluded with the Prince of Kung on the 24th of October is entirely satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government. It records the reparation made by the Emperor of China for his disregard in the previous year of his Treaty engagement; it sets Her Majesty's Government free from an implied engagement not to insist in all particulars on the fulfilment of those engagements; it imposes upon China a fine in the shape of an augmented rate of indemnity; it affords an additional opening for British trade; it places on a recognized footing the emigration of Chinese coolies, whose services are so important to Her Majesty's Colonial possessions; it relieves Her Majesty's Colony of Hong Kong from a source of previous annoyance; and it provides for bringing generally to the knowledge of the Chinese the engagements into which the Emperor has entered towards Great Britain.

These are all solid and real advantages, and coupled with the provisions of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, they will, it may be hoped, place the relations between the two countries on a sound footing, and insure the continuance of peace for a long period to come. For these advantages the country is mainly indebted to your Excellency's judgment and prudence both at Tien-tsin and at Peking, supported as they have been, more particularly on the last occasion, by the valour of Her Majesty's forces, and by the vigour and determination shown by Her Majesty's military and naval Commanders acting in co-operation with the forces of the Emperor of the French.

These gratifying results have, indeed, been in no small degree overclouded by the loss of several subjects of Her Majesty, both military and civil, captured by treachery, and sinking under the cruelties practised on them by the Chinese into whose hands they fell; yet while deeply lamenting the loss of so many valuable lives, Her Majesty, in common with all classes of her subjects, rejoices at the safe release of Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch from the hardships which they endured in the prison of Peking.

I have had the opportunity of expressing to Mr. Loch in person my gratification at his escape, but I must request your Excellency to convey to Mr. Parkes the fullest expression of approval on the part of Her Majesty's Government for the constancy and devotion which he exhibited in difficulties and trials of no ordinary description.

It now only remains for me to congratulate your Excellency on the successful termination of your mission, and to express a hope that you may

have a prosperous return to this country, where your services are highly appreciated, and your devotion to its interests gratefully acknowledged.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 116.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 9, 1861.

THE Convention of Peking puts an end to all questions as to the right of Her Majesty, if she should be so pleased, to fix the residence of her Ambassador to the Emperor of China permanently at Peking. Whether Her Majesty should be advised to act upon that right must be determined after the receipt of further reports from the Earl of Elgin or yourself. But in the meanwhile I think it right to relieve you from doubt and embarrassment, which you might otherwise have felt, by directing you not to insist on an audience of the Emperor, but only to require to be acknowledged as Ambassador.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 117.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1861.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Mr. Bruce,* instructing him, in case of his being called upon to take up his residence at Peking, not to insist upon an audience of the Emperor, but only to require to be acknowledged as Ambassador.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 118.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received January* 12, 1861.)

My Lord, *Peking, November* 4, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Prince Kung paid me a visit on the 2nd instant, at the palace where I am residing. He came with a considerable following of mandarins, and I received him with the honours due to his rank. On the day succeeding I returned his visit. On both occasions we had a good deal of conversation, and he repeatedly admitted the advantages which would accrue from the more direct intercourse between foreign Ministers and the Government of Peking which will take place under the new Treaties.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

No. 119.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received January* 12, 1861.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, November* 13, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the translation of a despatch which I received from the Prince of Kung, on the 2nd of this month, embodying an edict from the Emperor, which directs that the Treaty of Tien-tsin of the year 1858, and the Convention of Peking of the year 1860, shall be published

throughout the Empire. Your Lordship may remember that by the terms of the last Article of the Convention in question, the withdrawal of Her Majesty's forces from Peking is made contingent, *inter alia*, on the issue of an Imperial Edict to the above effect, and that this stipulation was the subject of a correspondence between Lieutenant-General Sir Hope Grant and me, the copy of which was transmitted to your Lordship in my despatch of the 31st ultimo. The language of the Edict forwarded to me by the Prince of Kung is very full and satisfactory. It amounts to a ratification and adoption by the Emperor of the Treaty and Convention in the most public form. I must add that the Prince has shown every disposition to give effect to it. The documents referred to have not only been published *in extenso* in the "Peking Gazette," but have also been printed on placards and posted about the city in all conspicuous parts. These proceedings will, it may be hoped, go far to ensure the faithful execution of their provisions.

The despatch in which the Prince communicated to me this Edict was preceded by another in which he inclosed, and requested me to forward, letters respecting the cession of the Kowloon Peninsula, the payments due at Canton on the 1st of December next, and the legalization of emigration, which had been addressed by him to the local functionaries, whose duty it will be to see these measures carried out. A translation of that despatch is also transmitted herewith.

On the 7th instant Mr. Bruce reached Peking, having hastened up from Shanghae in compliance with my request. His arrival was most opportune, as it was very important that before my departure from the capital I should be able to confer with him on various matters, and more especially on the subject of the place of residence for the future of Her Majesty's Representative in China. Mr. Bruce informed me that he was perfectly willing to take up his abode in Peking at once. On consultation with Baron Gros and General Ignatieff, however, I found that the latter was about to leave Peking for the winter, and that the former was of opinion that it would not be advisable that M. de Bourboulon should establish himself in the capital until the spring. I considered it, therefore, to be my duty to advise Mr. Bruce to return with me for the present to Tien-tsin, and to remain there until a suitable residence should be provided for him in the capital. In order, however, that there might be no misapprehension on the part of the Chinese Government in reference to this point, we selected a house which we thought might be adapted to the purpose, and which was procurable on easy terms, and we accepted the services of Mr. Adkins, one of the Student Interpreters, a very promising young man, who volunteered to remain at Peking, and to superintend the arrangements necessary for putting it in order. I think it right to mention that Mr. Wade, Mr. Parkes, and Mr. Morrison, severally intimated to me their readiness to stay at Peking if I thought that the public interest would be promoted by their doing so.

Having taken these measures I wrote to Prince Kung to express to him my sense of the good faith which he had evinced in the matter of the publication of the Treaty, and to inform him that Her Majesty's forces would at once retire to Tien-tsin. I added that I proposed to pay him a visit with the view of taking leave of him, and that I should bring with me Mr. Bruce, who had just arrived at Peking. I inclose a copy of the letter which I addressed to the Prince on these subjects, and of his reply.

In introducing Mr. Bruce to the Prince of Kung on this occasion I was especially desirous to convey to the latter the impression that the rank and authority of the former was in no degree inferior to mine. Accordingly, when the visit which I had offered in my letter took place, after conversing for some time very amicably with the Prince, I requested the interpreters to inform him that with us the person representing the Sovereign always holds the highest rank; that peace being happily concluded between the countries my task was at an end; that Mr. Bruce, therefore, resumed his functions as the Queen's Representative in China, and that I proposed, with the Prince's permission, to cede to him the seat of honour which I was then occupying. On the following morning the Prince returned our visit, and I purposely absented myself in order that Mr. Bruce might receive him alone. They had a long and somewhat interesting conversation, in which, as in several interviews which he had previously had with me, the Prince showed much less reserve than the provincial

functionaries, with whom we have formerly dealt, ever dared to do, in discussing delicate questions, such as the advisability of the mission of a Chinese Ambassador to England. Mr. Bruce took occasion to state that his correspondence would be henceforth with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs at the capital, and that though he was returning to Tien-tsin until his residence at Peking was prepared for his reception, he would be at hand and ready to come up at any time if public business required his presence.

Before the Prince left I entered the room to thank him for having paid me a visit of adieu, and we parted on good terms. It is, I fear, probable that when the Emperor returns from Jehol, with the bad advisers who surround him, there may be a moment of reaction; but if foreign affairs continue under the charge of the Prince of Kung, it may be hoped that the new Treaty will be faithfully carried out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 119.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication.

In proof of (his desire for) friendly relations between their respective Governments, the Prince feels it his duty to inclose to his Excellency the British Minister the copies hereto appended of the despatches he has addressed to the higher authorities of Kwang-tung and other provinces, as also to the Superintendent of Customs at Canton, upon the steps it will be necessary to take in accordance with the provisions of Articles III, V, and VI of the Convention.

A necessary communication, with an inclosure, addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 9th moon, 10th day (October 29, 1860).

[Appended are five inclosures.]

(1.)—Despatch of instructions to the Superintendent of Customs, Canton.

The Superintendent is hereby informed that, on the 11th day of the 9th moon (October 24), the Prince signed and sealed a Convention with the English (or with the British Government) continuing and extending (the Treaty of 1858). Article III of this lays down that (here follows the text of the Article *in extenso*). The French, however, it appears, have, during the past year, been paid 333,333 taels odd, out of the Canton Customs revenue. The same rules being in all cases applicable to the English as to the French, the proper course no doubt will be to a like sum out of the same revenues, to the former. It is at the same time expedient to apprise the Commissioner that, as by the Convention this sum will become due on the 20th of the 10th moon ( ), he will be expected to provide the whole of it out of the current revenues of the Customs, deducting from it the amount of whatever sums shall have been advanced by the British Government towards the construction of the British factory site at Shameen (1).

A despatch to the above effect is being written to Laou, Governor-General of the Two Kwang. It is further the duty (of the Prince) to address these instructions to the Superintendent. In regard to the remaining (moneys due), the Superintendent will proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

(2.)—Communication addressed to Laou, Governor-General of the Two Kwang.

This despatch is word for word the same as the preceding, until it reaches the Shameen site question, in respect of which the Governor-General is desired to deduct (from the sum of 333,333 taels) whatever proportion the British Government will have to bear of the moneys advanced by him, the Governor-General, towards the construction of the factory site at Shameen.

The rest of the letter is the same as No. 1.

(3.)—Communication addressed to Laou, Governor-General of the Two Kwang.

The Governor-General is hereby informed that, on the 11th of the 9th moon, the Prince signed and sealed a Convention with the English, continuing and extending the Treaty. Article V provides (here follows the whole Article). It becomes the duty of the Prince accordingly to call upon the Governor-General to put himself in communication with the British Minister, and make with him such arrangements as time and the circumstances of the different ports (in his jurisdiction) may require, on the basis of the regulations already in force at Canton.

(4.) Communication addressed to the Governor-General of the Two Kwang, and of Fuh-kien, and Cheh-kiang; also to the Prefect of Fung-tien Fu, the senior civil authority in Manchuria Proper.

This is identical with Inclosure 3 in form and language.

(5.) Communication addressed to Laou, Governor-General of the Two Kwang.

[The preamble of this despatch, which relates to the cession of Kowloon, is the same as that of the foregoing. Then follows a quotation of Article VI at length. Then]

It becomes the duty of the Prince to acquaint the Governor-General of this, that he may depute officers to make the necessary inspection or partition of the ground, in company with the British officers deputed for the same purpose; and to consider with them and dispatch everything to be done in a satisfactory manner.

The lease in perpetuity will of course be cancelled, and the Governor-General will not fail to perform everything as the Treaty requires it should be done.

Note.

(1.) These words have since been cancelled in the original despatch, which now runs as Inclosure 2 on the same subject.

Inclosure 2 in No. 119.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung makes a communication.

The Prince has had the honour to receive this day, about the hour of 6 A.M., a Decree issued by His Majesty the Emperor.

This the Prince is publishing for the information of all within (the capital) and without it. He is also communicating it to the Governments of the different provinces (or circulating it throughout the different provinces).

It is further his duty to forward a copy of it, reverently made, to his Excellency the British Minister, for his information and guidance in all respects (or that he may inform himself, and respectfully conform in all particulars thereto).

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency the Earl of Elgin.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 9th moon, 19th day (November 1, 1860).

(Received November 2, 1860.)

[Inclosed in the same cover with the foregoing despatch was the following Imperial Decree:—]

On the 15th of the 9th moon (October 28), the Nin-koh (Grand Secretariat) had the honour to receive the following Imperial Decree:—

"In the matter of the exchange of Treaties reported to us by Yih Sin (1), Prince of Kung: Yih Sin, Prince of Kung, having on the 11th and 12th of this moon (24th and 25th October), exchanged with the English and French the Treaties concluded in the 8th year (of our reign, *sc.* 1858), together with the

Treaties in continuance thereof (the Conventions) of the present year, we command (that it be known) that we promise and authorize the operation for evermore of each and every Article in the Treaties and Conventions, that there may be henceforward no more war between us (*lit.*, that the shield and spear may evermore rest), but that both may contribute to the consolidation of (or unite to consolidate) a good understanding, peaceful relations reposing on good faith, without doubt or suspicion on either side.

"And let the high provincial authorities be directed by circular one and all to carry out everything that by the Treaty it is essential should be done in accordance therewith.

"Respect this."

Note.

(1.) Yih Sin, properly Yih Su, but the last syllable, according to usage, has had its sound changed in consideration of its present honourable employment.

Inclosure 3 in No. 119.

The Earl of Elgin to the Prince of Kung.

THE Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the despatch of the Prince of Kung, under date the 25th ultimo; inclosing copies of the letters His Serene Highness has addressed to the high authorities of the coast provinces, apprising them of such provisions of the Convention signed on the 24th ultimo as require their immediate attention.

The Undersigned has also received His Serene Highness' later despatch of the 1st instant, inclosing copy of an Imperial Decree of the 28th ultimo, by which His Majesty the Emperor of China has been pleased to acquaint his servants and subjects throughout his dominions of his entire acceptance of the Treaties and Conventions concluded with England and France, and directs that full operation be given to their provisions in every particular.

The Undersigned has learned with pleasure that in the capital every publicity has been given to His Majesty's Decree, as well as to the important instruments to which it refers; also that copies of both have been printed in the form of a "Peking Gazette," for general distribution.

The Imperial Government having so far satisfied its obligations, the Undersigned begs to inform the Prince of Kung that, in accordance with the terms of the Convention, Her Britannic Majesty's forces will at once be withdrawn from the vicinity of the capital.

It is the sincere hope of the Undersigned that there may be no more occasion for their employment; that, in the words of His Serene Highness, the shield and the spear may indeed be laid aside for evermore.

It was with much regret that the Undersigned, ever the advocate of peace, found, upon his return to this country, that the policy recommended by evil counsellors to His Imperial Majesty rendered a resort to hostilities inevitable; that they have proceeded no further he is willing to attribute to the counsels of His Serene Highness, in whose hands it will be gratifying to him to be able to report that the administration of foreign affairs is to continue.

The objects of his special mission accomplished, the Undersigned has no further part to play in China. He will be replaced in his Ministerial functions by the Honourable Mr. Bruce, who arrived in Peking only yesterday.

Mr. Bruce proposes leaving an officer in the residence which it has been agreed he should occupy, and until this be in proper order for his reception he will himself reside at Tien-tsin.

It but remains for the Undersigned to request that the Prince of Kung will do him the honour to name an hour at which he may take leave of His Serene Highness. The Undersigned will avail himself of the opportunity to present Mr. Bruce to His Serene Highness.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 119.

The Prince of Kung to the Earl of Elgin.

(Translation.)

THE Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication in reply.

The Prince has read with pleasure the despatch he has just received from his Excellency the British Minister. Time does not permit of his replying to it more detailedly.

In answer to his Excellency's question regarding the hour at which he and his Excellency Mr. Bruce could have an interview this day with the Prince, the has to state that he will await (their Excellencies) at the Kwang-hwa-sz at 4 o'clock.

A necessary communication, &c.

Hien-fung, 10th year, 9th moon, 26th day (8th October, 1860).

(Received November 8, 1860, 3 P.M.)

No. 120.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received January* 12, 1861.)

(Extract.) *Tien-tsin, November* 14, 1860.

I INCLOSE a translation of an Edict degrading Sang-ko-lin-sin and Jui-lin, with some explanatory notes upon it by Mr. Wade.

Inclosure in No. 120.

Memorandum by Mr. Wade on the Decree degrading Sang-ko-lin-sin and Jui-lin.

THE Decree is one of a batch, published in the ordinary *brochure*, and dated from the 1st of the 9th moon to the 10th (13th October to 23rd October). It runs:—

"Let Sang-ko-lin-sin be deprived of his nobility; let Jui-lin be immediatley deprived of his office; as a warning.

"Respect this."

It has been stated that this Decree was published by the Prince of Kung of his own authority; in other words that it did not emanate from the Emperor. This I am convinced is simply impossible.

I may add that the above Decree stands third in the collection, which includes in all sixteen. I assume it, therefore, to have been issued nearer the 13th than the 23rd October; allowing, at least, three days for its transmission from Jehol, I do not think its date was later, in all probability, than the 10th October.

Sang-ko-lin-sin is commonly reported to have been chief in command at Chang-kia-wan on the 18th September. He had already lost his three-eyed peacock's feather, his chief command of a banner corps, and his Commission as High Officer of the Imperial Guard, for his defeat at Takoo. Still he was retained in his command in the field. We may suppose a General of Lord Clyde's degree, stripped of his G.C.B., the command of his regiment of Her Majesty's Guards, and an honorary position about Her Majesty's person, and yet not dismissed from the chief command in India; then, after a second defeat, deprived of the latter, and turned out of the Peerage.

Jui-lin is a Manchu, and a protégé of Twan-wha, the Prince of Ching. His rise has been very rapid, and he is a young man to be found in so high a place as a Chief Secretaryship. Like most Manchus of mark, he had high military rank, and was Captain-General of a Corps of Banners. He held also several high civil offices, amongst the rest that of Superintendent, above the two Presidents, of the Board of Revenue.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE.

No. 121.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received January 12, 1861.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, November* 15, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a letter from Mr. Adkins to Mr. Bruce, written three days after our departure from Peking, and showing that the state of affairs in the capital up to that period was satisfactory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 121.

Mr. Adkins to Mr. Bruce.

Sir, *Peking, November* 12, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to report that, immediately after your Excellency's departure on the 9th instant, I took possession of the building which has been chosen for the residence of Her Majesty's Representative in this city. I was assisted in every way by the local authorities, and one of the Magistrates of the city accompanied me to the spot.

The disposition of the people seems to be friendly enough, and in my rides and walks about the city I am as free from molestation now as I should have been while the allied forces were before the city.

Report says that Sang-ko-lin-sin has within the last few days been summoned to Jehol to wait upon the Emperor.

Several days must elapse before His Majesty can return to the capital, as the Memorial advising him of a final settlement of the foreign business was only dispatched yesterday.

The city gates are most of them open now, and the inhabitants, who fled on the approach of the Allies, are returning in large numbers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) T. ADKINS.

No. 122.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(Received January 12, 1861.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, November* 15, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, herewith, translations of some very interesting papers found by Mr. Morrison at Yuen-ming-yuen, and translated by him.

The first of these papers is a memorial by Sang-ko-lin-sin written after the capture of the Takoo Forts by the allies. He advises the Emperor to leave the capital. The remainder are by Censors and other high officers, who generally deprecate the abandonment of Peking by the Sovereign. The freedom with which they comment on His Majesty's supposed intentions is very remarkable.

Together with these papers, I forward the translation of a document in the vermilion pencil found by Mr. Wade, and which seems to be the draft of a Decree by the Emperor, to which reference is frequently made in the Memorials.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 122.

Translations of Documents found at the Palace of Yuen-ming-yuen, on the 8th of October, 1860.

[Some complimentary and merely formal phrases used in the originals are omitted.]

(1.) Memorial by Sang-ko-lin-sin.

YOUR slave Sang-ko-lin-sin kneeling presents a memorial. Judging that the changeable disposition of the barbarians will make it impossible to carry into effect the pacific policy, he, in the name of the Princes and Dukes of the Six Leagues, prays Your Majesty to proceed on a hunting tour, in order that measures for attacking and destroying the barbarians may be facilitated.

Your slave lately lost the position of Takoo, where he commanded, in consequence of the unforeseen explosion of the powder magazines at two of the North Forts simultaneously, and not from any slackness in the defence or insufficiency of means therefor. He apprehends that now it will be difficult to make the barbarians submit, and yet that their demands can hardly be granted. Your slave has made the necessary dispositions along the road between Tien-tsin and Tung-chow. If fighting should take place near Tung-chow it is to be feared that the minds of the inhabitants of Peking would be greatly agitated. Victory or defeat may depend on the circumstances of a moment. Should a reverse possibly occur the trading people who congregate in the capital would desert in multitudes, and if perhance the heart of the soldiers should fail the consequences might be momentous. (This means that the Emperor might be made a prisoner.) Your slave has received the greatest favours from your Majesty and has shown no return for them. After the most anxious reflection on the present critical state of affairs the best course which has suggested itself to him, and which he has adopted, appeared to be to write to the Princes and others of the Six Leagues desiring them to repair to the capital with the *élite* of their troops, so that they might receive your Majesty on your route with the proper honours, and then join the rest of the forces. He humbly begs your Majesty to follow the precedent of making a hunting tour in the autumn, and accordingly to leave the capital for a time; and, further, that the Princes and State officers left at the head of affairs may be commanded to see that the army keep the city in the most perfect state of defence, until they be joined by the troops of the Six Leagues, when all together may attack and exterminate the enemy. If at that time your Majesty should be in the capital, not only might the execution of needful plans be impeded, but also alarm might unfortunately be excited in your own mind.

Your slave does not shrink from thus, in the name of the Princes and others of the Leagues, expressing his and their obscure views; and which he yet urgently solicits your Majesty to permit to be carried into effect. He would then be at liberty to choose his own time and mode of attack, and might advance or retire as events should make necessary. Without any doubt he would sweep the vile brood from off the earth, and redeem his previous shortcomings. He addresses this secret memorial to your Majesty for your decision thereupon, &c.

He does not venture to forward this by the regular express, but reverently sealing it, he intrusts it Kwo-shuy-to deliver in person, &c.

7th month, 10th day (August 26).

(2.) Memorial by Kia Ching, a Principal Secretary of State, and signed by twenty-five others.

YOUR Minister Kia Ching, and others kneeling, present a memorial, plainly expressing, in obedience to the Imperial command, their opinions on the present critical conjuncture.

On this 24th day of the month (9th September) they have received a Vermilion Decree, together with a secret memorial by Sang-ko-lin-sin, which they were directed to peruse. In the Decree they reverently read that their Emperor proposed to command in person the battalions of the Empire, and to proceed to Tung-chow to exterminate the vile brood of barbarians, and in this they observed the firm resolution of the Sacred Son of Heaven, who tranquillizes and governs the universe. But they remember that the place in question is not Tan-yuen, and that at this time a Kow-chun has not come forward (an allusion to a circumstance in Chinese history, A.D. 1000, when the then reigning Sovereign

took the field against the Mongol Tartars and defeated them). The mist of the sea would be dissipated by the celestial wrath; but still, they consider that the course proposed is not that which would best conduce to the interests of the State, and they deem that it ought not on any account to be lightly adopted. And Sang-ko-lin-sin's proposition regarding a hunting tour your Ministers hold to be even more objectionable. If the capital, which is encompassed with a strong and uninterrupted line of fortifications, is not secure, what shelter is to be looked for in open and unfenced hunting-grounds? But further, your Majesty's departure would excite the wildest agitation in the people's minds. (Here a reference to Chinese history is inserted, which implies that the Emperor after passing the Great Wall might be unable to return.) Since the barbarians have been able to reach Tien-tsin, what is there to prevent them from likewise penetrating to the Loan river (at Jehol)? Your Ministers cannot endure to dwell on the ideas which these reflections awaken in their minds. To their dull perception it seems, however, that men must act in reference to calculable contingencies, while they await in submission the inscrutable decrees of Heaven. They cannot but think that Providence has guarded their humane and beneficent Government during the 200 years of its tenure of the Empire, and they would take courage to exert themselves strenuously in the emergency which has occurred. They propose that your Majesty should issue an edict to reassure the people and incite them to courageous action, that high rewards should be promised to all who distinguished themselves, and that special attention should be given to placing the army in a state of perfect efficiency. They request that your Majesty will command the Princes and others charged therewith speedily to mature and carry out the arrangements for the war of defence and extermination. They humbly beg for your Majesty's decision as to whether their proposals are right or wrong, &c.

7th month, 24th day (9th September).

(3.) Memorial by Tsinen King and forty others.

Your Ministers consider that the project of a hunting-tour is likely to endanger the stability of the government, and they therefore pray that your Majesty will remain in the capital.

Your Ministers have heard with the greatest surprise and alarm that in consequence of the failure of the attempt to bring the barbarians to terms, your Majesty had resolved on making a tour to Jehol, and that orders had been sent to the various Corps of the Banners to make the necessary preparations. As the safety of the Empire might be compromised by such a proceeding, your Ministers, under a deep sense of responsibility, desire to submit in detail the reasons which they conceive to weigh against its adoption.

More than 200 years have elapsed since the establishment of the Empire by Shun-che, and the foundation of the ancestral temples. A time of general distress and difficulty having now arrived, it is of the utmost consequence that the minds of the people should be kept tranquil. But for your Majesty to undertake so unusual a journey at the very moment when the approach of the outside barbarians is imminent, is a thing which must cause extreme alarm and confusion. The daily accounts of the impressment of carts and carriages along the route have already produced much agitation amongst the people; but after your Majesty shall have started, a succession of disorders will arise. So great a disturbance of the ancestral and tutelary spirits, this voluntary provocation of dangers, must surely hereafter produce bitter but unavailing regret in your Majesty's mind. And these considerations constitute the first ground which your Ministers have to adduce against the project of the hunting excursion.

The autumnal hunting-tour has hitherto been undertaken, when the occasion seemed expedient, only at periods of tranquillity, and in this manner it has been an institution of our august dynasty. But now when the barbarians are raising commotions, when the rebels are spreading over the country, all people, both at the capital and in the provinces, look to your Majesty, present at the seat of Government, as the centre from which the plans of Government must emanate and the support of authority and order. This sudden departure without any apparent reason, although called a hunting-tour, will bear the aspect of a flight. Not only will it tend to shake the resolution of the troops and their officers near the capital, but the commanders of the various armies at a distance also will be

filled with doubts and alarms. Nor can it be asserted that the intelligence will not greatly raise the courage of the rebels. Thus all the great interests of the Empire will be endangered, and perhaps beyond chance of remedy. Herein is the second ground of our objections to the tour.

The Imperial residence is securely guarded, and it is the honourable seat of Majesty. Such a moment as this, when it especially behoves the Sovereign to stay within it, is the least fit for suddenly proposing a hunting-tour. Moreover, when turmoil everywhere prevails, the police of the roads cannot be expected to be perfect. A journey to Jehol has not been made since that of the late Emperor Tao Kwang forty years ago, and the crowd of carriages and horses will greatly surprise and frighten the inhabitants of the places through which they pass. It is said, too, that the people about Jehol are far from being so orderly as they formerly were. Robberies on the highway have become very numerous. The people who are distressed, through the falling off in the yield of the mines, band together in tens and hundreds, and go about creating disturbance.

Should some unlooked-for mischief befall (your Majesty), or should spies carry the information of your absence, the barbarians might be emboldened to attempt some fresh enterprizes.

If the discussions respecting the exchange of the Treaties should be brought to a successful conclusion, it would cause great inconvenience to be long delayed in waiting for your Majesty's commands thereupon.

The above are a third reason against the tour.

Since the commencement of the war (the rebellion) the treasury has daily become more and more embarrassed, and it is very difficult to meet the regular expenditure of the capital.

Jehol is a great resort of the Mongols, upon whom, it is said, that whenever an Imperial tour was made in the times of Kien Lung and Kia King, presents amounting to no less than several tens of millions (of taels) were bestowed. The state of the finances would not admit of this rule being now followed, and it would be difficult to soothe the discontent of the tributaries at losing your Majesty's bounty.

Again, the requisite escort of officers, troops, and followers would have to be over 10,000 persons, numbers of whom, should there be any deficiency in the supplies, could not be prevented from deserting.

Lastly, much of the route is along the frontier, where banditti roam about at will, by whom some unexpected mischief might be committed.

These considerations make a fourth ground of objection to the proposed tour.

Let it not be supposed that your Ministers desire to parade grand arguments, regardless of your Majesty's danger in a critical emergency, nor that they would have anything to allege against an ordinary peaceful tour, such as has been the practice of former times.

Taking the most practical view of the subject, they cannot see that there is now any necessity to enter precipitately upon the undertaking in question. Granting that the whole force of the barbarians hardly exceeds 10,000 men, and that Sang-ko-lin-sin commands more than 30,000, they make no question that the many might not defeat the few. But they desire to notice the fact that the barbarians who have come far from across the ocean have hitherto shown that their object was only to trade. Their creeping into Kwang-tung, Fo-kien, Shanghae, and other places, was only to seize the ports, and not to take possession of the country; nor have they attempted any conquest of China. Even the point of entry into Peking is one which might be satisfactorily disposed of. In all which is going on, then, there is nothing to make one apprehend great misfortune. But if before the appearance of the barbarians a flight should take place, it is impossible to say what revolution in affairs might not be the immediate consequence. The mind recoils from speculation upon the subject. Far better would be due deliberation before the event than unavailing regrets after.

Another consideration is that, in your Majesty's present happy state of convalescence, it would be undesirable to expose yourself to the fatigues of travelling during the yet hot weather of autumn.

Such are your Ministers' obscure views, &c.

7th month, 27th day (September 12).

(4.) Memorial by Tsinen King, a President of the Board of Civil Office. Signed by twenty-three others.

YOUR Ministers Tsinen King and others, kneeling, present a Memorial. They again state in detail their opinions to show that the departure of your Majesty to a place to the northward of Peking must create great agitation in the metropolis; and that the best means of restoring tranquillity, and confirming the spirit of the army, would be, for your Majesty to remain at Peking.

At a period of public distress, the man of heroic character is prepared to die at his post, and at such a time the most perfect sincerity and truthfulness only befit the conduct of either high or low. Your Ministers have to-day respectfully read the Vermilion Decree, stating that the arrangements for your Majesty's hunting expedition are to serve as preparations for taking the field in person, and that if the enemy is met in the vicinity of Ma-tow or Tung-chow, your Majesty will proceed with a strong force, as originally intended, to a place to the northward of Peking, and there take up a position. They admire the awe-inspiring demeanour and the well-devised strategy thus displayed. But the common people are extremely slow of apprehension; they easily suspect and with difficulty appreciate; and they will say that, as the barbarians are to the south-eastward of the capital, the change of plan from a hunting-tour to taking the field in person should induce your Majesty to remain at Tung-chow, for the support of Sang-ko-lin-sin; that the taking up a post to the northward of the capital would be a deviation from the seat of war; and, accordingly, that what in name was campaigning was in reality a hunting-tour. The peoples' minds would be perturbed, and the spirit of the troops would fail.

If defence and holding out in words are to mean flight and dispersion in fact, your Ministers will not urge on your Majesty that thus the temples of your ancestors, and the altars of the tutelary gods would be abandoned (*i.e.*, the Empire would be lost); but they ask where else could your Majesty's personal safety be better assured than at the capital? Beyond the Hoo-pe-kow Pass (in the Great Wall), is the haunt of numbers of Russian barbarians, and these have been constantly pretending to deliver communications to the Government at Peking for the furtherance of some treacherous designs. That region is also frequented by bands of mounted robbers, who suddenly collect in hundreds and thousands, and attack traders and officials, respecting whom, however, all reports have been suppressed by the local mandarins.

Although the barbarians may be near the capital, yet, its fortifications being strong and its garrison large, in it no danger need be feared. Wherefore, then, should your Majesty go into the dens of tigers and wolves? If it be said that your Majesty's departure would balk the barbarians' designs, and contribute to facilitate either peace or warfare, as might be expedient, it should not be forgotten, on the other hand, that if commotions were to arise within the capital, the authors of our calamities would be, not the barbarians, but ourselves.

There may be some about your Majesty's person who will say that the repeated attempts of so many of your Ministers to dissuade your Majesty from travelling proceed from personal motives, and a desire to lessen their own danger. To this they would reply, that a hunting-tour has never been known to occasion inconvenience to the whole body of officials, but, on the contrary, that did they desire their own advantage they would favour the project; for it would give themselves the means of escaping danger.

These three questions present themselves:—What if your Majesty should find yourself in a place without any retreat? What if your Majesty's departure should lead to commotions within the capital? What if elsewhere your Majesty should be in the midst of more serious dangers than when at Peking?

Your Majesty is well familiar with the maxim that the Prince is bound to sacrifice himself for his country. But far be it from your Ministers, at such a time as this, to desire to wound your Majesty's feelings by adverting to such thoughts, and, indeed, the crisis is in no degree so serious as to make it necessary to dwell on them. The great danger now to be avoided is that of disturbances arising from within. At all risks, your Ministers make the above renewed exposition of their sentiments, and they await your Majesty's commands, &c.

7th month, 28th day (13th September).

(5.)—Memorial by Ai Jin, a Censor, and seventy-four others.

Your Minister Ai Jin and others respectfully submit their opinion that the capital and Court ought not to be forsaken on light grounds.

On the 24th day of the present month, the Princes and Ministers of the Inner Council received a vermilion Decree, stating that your Majesty intended proceeding for a time on a hunting-tour. Your Ministers heard of this with extreme astonishment and alarm. They would humbly remark that although the barbarians' vessels may have reached Tien-tsin, the circumstance has not excited much fear in the capital. The Throne is that in which all things centre, and to which the eyes of all men turn. One step of the Emperor's foot shakes the earth.

The project in question, then, must have arisen without due thought of the dangers which would ensue therefrom. It is impossible that your Majesty's household, and the Princes and Grandees who will form your escort, and whose families live in Peking, can be well disposed to leave a place of security, even in attendance on the Imperial person. Commencing their journey in haste and confusion, the crowd of followers would be alive to everything which might excite their fears, and if they should disperse in mid-journey, no means might be found of going back or forward.

Since 1820, the year in which His late Majesty discontinued the hunting tour (the 25th year of Kia King, and the year in which Taou Kwang succeeded), we have heard that the country has become very desolate, and that the travelling palaces have fallen into disrepair, and are unfit to live in. We are not certain, also, as to what the character of the inhabitants may now be, but may safely say that it cannot be as loyal as that of the inhabitants of the capital city, which has been established for 200 years. Again, Jehol is at no great distance from the Shan-hai-kwan (pass near the terminus of the Great Wall), and New-chwang and other places, which are quite accessible to the barbarians. It is also near the Russian barbarians; and such being the case, who can deem it secure?

Our troops now are several times more numerous than those of the barbarians, but if your Majesty were to leave the Court, every one would be disheartened, a panic might break out, the barbarians would use the opportunity to take the city, and we should become victims to their wiles in a worse degree than when the men of Kin, in ancient times, installed Lew Yü and Chang Pang-chang in the Government (about A.D. 1127). Thenceforward the capital would not belong to us, and the Empire would share its fate.

As to a Council of Regency, composed of Princes and Ministers, being appointed to act during your Majesty's temporary absence, we would remark that the present time may not be compared with that of the Kia King reign. By no possibility could the proper management of domestic as well as foreign affairs be safely confided to it. From of old we have seen that it could never be certified that the conclusion of such a Regency would match with its beginning. Although Tai Tsing, of the Ming Dynasty (A.D. 1455), was not a disloyal Prince, yet when Ying Tsing returned from his northern journey to the Sha-mo, it was by a slight chance that he escaped passing the remainder of his days (in retirement) in the south of the country. The experience of all former Regencies is calculated to inspire the utmost caution with reference to such a mode of administration.

From the first establishment of our Dynasty there has been a great intermingling of natives and foreigners, and they have flourished in mutual prosperity; of this we had had no previous example. The barbarians of the present day are nothing comparable in ferocity to those of the time of Yung Kia, in the Tsin Dynasty (A.D. 309), or Tsing Kang, in the Sung Dynasty (A.D. 1127). If then giving ear to loose gossip and on the impulse of a moment, the Empire of the World is to be thrown away like a weed, the duty to the spirits of the saints in the other world will have been left undone, and no response will have been made to the aspirations of governing or governed throughout the universe. Let the Emperor's clear intelligence decide how he could bear such a thought.

We know how in the 18th Kia King year (1813), while His Majesty the then reigning Emperor (Kia King) was on a hunting-tour, the revolt of Sin-tsing broke out, the alarm it occasioned causing all traffic to be suspended and the shops to be shut, and how the Emperor's return diffused general delight, and restored the tranquillity of the city. The danger then was most threatening, as

need not be proved. A puff of breath is now sufficient to decide the balance in which hangs the loss or preservation of the succession of your ancestors and the repose of the tutelary gods (*i. e.*, the fate of the Empire). We humbly entreat your Majesty, of your sole motion, to determine that the project lately contemplated shall be reversed, and so make your Empire to rejoice.

Your Ministers ask one more act of grace. As your Majesty's intention to travel was publicly announced, and men's mind's have been so much disturbed that it would be difficult to reassure them, they beg that you will promulgate your determination to return to your palace, that false rumours may be at once extinguished and tranquillity be restored, the national decline may be arrested, and the Government may recommence a course of success.

Your Ministers and the others being by their office obliged to call attention to national evils, have accordingly thus expressed their imperfect views with all humility, and they await your Majesty's commands, &c.

7th month, 27th day (September 12).

(6.)—Memorial by Ai Jin, a Censor, and seventy-six others.

Your Ministers having yesterday presented a Memorial in their joint names to your Majesty, then received with reverence a vermilion Decree. On perusal of it, they were deeply and gratefully impressed by the solicitude which it showed to have been excited in your Majesty's mind. But the proposition it contained was one in which they cannot concur, and therefore they do not dare to refrain from again rashly urging their views.

For the Emperor to command the army in person is a thing which may not lightly be undertaken. In 1853, when the Cantonese rebels overran the country, advancing impetuously towards the North, the alarm excited in the capital was many times more serious than that now manifested. Happily your Majesty appointed Generals able to cope with the enemy, and the rampant outbreak was quelled. Why should not now the barbarians, hardly 10,000 in number, be easily vanquished and expelled from the country by the many times larger army under our Generals? Would not the assumption of command be a derogation from the Imperial dignity, and likely to astonish all who should hear of it? Moreover, your Majesty's intention to go hunting having been first published, would the announcement of your change of purpose be certain to meet with universal belief? Again, the tranquillity of people's minds depends upon your Majesty's presence at the seat of Government, and it would be subverted by your departure therefrom. Again, your Majesty's proceeding to the Northward while the enemy was at the South would be another circumstance producing much doubt and disturbance.

In former journeys of the Emperor, it has been the practice to appoint sundry Princes and State officials to carry on affairs while he was absent, matters of great moment being still referred to His Majesty. But this troublous season is not at all to be compared with peaceful times. It would be most difficult to find men to whom the administration of government could be safely entrusted. The gravest evils might arise if a little excess of authority were given to them. While the mischiefs resulting from negligence might be easily remedied, those springing from abuse of power would be impossible to control, and it is fearful to think of them. On all these points your Ministers have most maturely deliberated, and they now state their views, &c.

7th month, 28th day (September 13).

(7.)—Memorial by Tsao Tang-yung, ex-Censor of the Hoo-kwang Provinces.

Your Minister Tsao Tang-yung, kneeling, presents a Memorial.

The barbarians being on the advance, and the plans with respect to peace having been found difficult of accomplishment, he urgently entreats your Majesty to return to your capital, and so to yield assent to men's wishes, to maintain the dignity of the Throne, and to pacify the spirits of your ancestors and the tutelary divinities.

Since the stealthy entry of the rebellious barbarians into the Tien-tsin district, although the Imperial counsels have been shrouded in secresy, and not known to the public, yet all kinds of confused rumours have been everywhere

prevalent, producing great disturbance. Lately, in the "Gazette," it appeared that Sang-ko-lin-sin had retired to Yang-tsun, and then to Tsai-tsun; and again, that he was deprived of his commission. After that, that His Majesty had appointed Kweiliang and Hang-fuh Imperial Commissioners to settle affairs. Subsequently, expresses at the rate of 600 *li* incessantly arrived. One report was, that peace at any price was determined on; another, that 20,000,000 taels were promised, of which the payment, in ready money, of 2,000,000 taels was a matter undecided on; another, that several tens of thousands of Mongol soldiers had been ordered down, and that war was determined on; another, that your Majesty's design of carrying on the war was opposed by some persons. The confusion and alarm are indescribable. But there has been nothing so strange as the report now heard, that your Majesty intended making a tour to Jehol. This has caused the utmost consternation, but your Minister does not believe in it. Still, as many officials have repeatedly prayed your Majesty to return to your Palace without obtaining a favourable reply, an undefinable fear cannot be resisted. If, indeed, the report is true, the effect produced will be like a convulsion of nature, and the mischief must be irreparable. In what light does your Majesty regard your people? In what light the shrines of your ancestors, or the altars of the tutelary gods? Will you cast away the inheritance of your ancestors like a damaged shoe? What would history say of your Majesty for a thousand generations to come? It has never been known that a Sovereign should choose a time of danger and distress to make a hunting-tour, supposing that thereby he would prevent trouble. If the capital should be disturbed, what would there be to prevent Jehol alone from being disturbed? Your Majesty is besought to return without delay to your Palace, in order that the people's minds may be reassured. The capital is most strictly guarded; the spirit of all the inhabitants is raised to the highest pitch, and even women and children are determined to fight to the last. Above all, Sang-ko-lin-sin is now at the head of several tens of thousands of Mongol troops, who have brought their supplies with them, and who take nothing from the Imperial Treasury. Their fidelity and valour are completely proved. If, on the first approach of the rebellious barbarians, Takoo and Peh-tang had been equally defended, and the barbarian vessels had been attacked as they advanced, they would have been unable to ascend the shallow and narrow creeks.

It was those, be they who they might, who directed the pacific policy who embarrassed our plans and caused their failure, leading to the occupation of Tien-tsin. And who are the persons responsible for this? In the time of the Southern Sung Dynasty, when the people of Kin raised disturbances, Yo-fei recommended war, and Tsin-hwey opposed him, and was the cause of national calamities. If, now, there are some like Tsin-hwey near your Majesty's person, it would be fitting that the law should overtake their crime. Your Majesty might make a public confession of your own error, and thus fortify the national resolution. Moreover, the supreme control of the war might be placed in the hands of Sang-ko-lin-sin. When Te Tsung, of the Tang Dynasty, made a public confession of error, the mutinous soldiery of Shan-tung were moved to reform.

The enrolment of volunteers in the Tien-tsin district is a step to be recommended. They were found serviceable in the incursions of the Cantonese banditti in 1853, and also when the rebellious barbarians invaded Tien-tsin last year. Your Majesty is prayed to command that they may be employed as auxiliaries to Sang-ko-lin-sin's regular force. The barbarians do not exceed a few thousands in number, and a considerable portion of their force consists of hired traitorous Chinese, gain being the motive which chiefly actuates this heterogeneous mob. If money were judiciously employed, and an appeal made to the patriotism of the mercenaries, the whole of this body might be dispersed without recourse to arms.

Your Minister cannot imagine why this has not been attempted. Should any object to such an expenditure, one need not refer to the 20,000,000 proposed to be spent in carrying out the pacific measures, but only ask that the 2,000,000 of ready money should be so used. When once the pacific policy should be accomplished, fresh demands would be made every year, for which the barbarian rebels would always find a pretext.

When Soo-chow and Hang-chow fell this year, several millions of Government money went to swell the rebels' booty; and of private property the amount sacrificed was incalculable.

Your Majesty is prayed to command that the money required be issued from the privy purse, to be refunded as may be found expedient after the restoration of peace. If the outside barbarians are to be duly controlled, it is certain that peace must not be accorded before they have been defeated in battle. His late Imperial Majesty in his last testament speaks with shame and contrition of the peace with the English barbarians. May your Majesty take this to heart!

[The memorialist here digresses into a personal narrative to excuse his addressing the Emperor without proper authority.]

Postscript.—While your Minister's memorial was being written he reverently read the vermilion Edict of this day, as follows:—

"Considering that the approach of the barbarians, and the various circumstances of the present crisis demand from us a course of action calculated to fortify the resolution of our people, we have directed that the arrangements for our proposed hunting-tour shall serve as preparation for our taking the field in person against the enemy. Let the Hwey-tsin-wang (the Emperor's uncle) give orders for the proper distribution of the garrison of Peking. If the enemy is met between Tung-chow and Matow, we shall proceed as originally intended to the northward of the capital, and take up a position with a strong force. The spirit of our army leaves us no reason to fear that the handful of barbarians, not amounting to 10,000, shall not be completely destroyed. Let this Decree be read by the Princes and other officers of State."

From the above, it appears that your Majesty's northern tour is positively decided on. Does our Emperor then think nothing of his people, of the temples of his ancestors, and of the altars of the tutelary gods? If he really means to command in person, why does he speak of proceeding to the northwards to take up a post with a strong force? Such language will not meet with any faith on the part of the people.

But the grand army under Sang-ko-lin-sin is quite sufficient to conclude the war with success; and why, therefore, should your Majesty expose yourself to the fatigues and danger of a campaign. The gravity of the crisis does not allow of much speech. Your Minister only entreats that you will consent to the advice and desires of all, and return to your Court to superintend the affairs of Government, and rejecting doubtful counsels, &c.

7th month, 28th day (13th September).

Inclosure 2 in No. 122.

Decree.

(Translation.)

[THE following is either the actual draft, or the memorandum from which the draft was to be prepared, of a Decree alluded to in more than one of the Memorials found and translated by Mr. M. C. Morrison. It is in the vermilion pencil, and bears no date.]

We have perused the Memorial of Kweiliang and his colleagues, detailing the breaking down of the barbarian question (1), and our indignation is greater than we can bear. To save the people of this the territory of our capital from the pernicious effects of the poison (of war), we had, in our extremity, obliged ourself to assent to a scheme of conciliation. These barbarians have, notwithstanding, again and again, with wanton violence, insisted on various concessions, right or wrong, until there is nothing for it but to fight them to the death.

Besides (2), it is impossible but that our Ministers and servants, Manchoo and Chinese, who have for generations received of the bounty (of our family), should feel the enmity we feel and share our hatred, should unite to do justice to their long-accumulating wrath.

We shall now move straight to Tung-chow at the head of our army (3), there to take the vengeance Heaven requires; to do an act of punishment and subjugation, the effect of which shall be widely felt (4).

We command the Princes who have the *entrée*, the High Officers of the Guard, the Members of the Great Council, and High Officers of the Household, to enter upon the consideration (of this question) with all speed.

We have also perused the confidential Memorial of Sang-ko-lin-sin, for the discussion of which as well, let the Ministers not having the *entrée*, who have this day memorialized us on the same question, meet in conference.

A special command.

Notes.

(1.) The breaking down, or grand smash: the same expression used in the Emperor's draft of the 7th September.

(2.) This is the course consistent with reason; besides which we know we may count on the fidelity of our servants, &c.

(3.) *Lit.*, the six armies; a phrase used when the Emperor takes the field.

(4.) *Lit.*, far extend chastisement and subjugation.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE.

No. 123.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received January* 12, 1861.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, November* 16, 1860.

A FEW days after the signature of the Convention of Peking, I received a letter from Vice-Admiral Hope, in which he informed me that, if Her Majesty's troops were to winter at the Takoo forts and at Tien-tsin, he would wish to have it in his power to station some ships and stores at one of the Miatau Islands, where there is a convenient harbour, and he repeated this statement to me when I saw him at this place on my return from Peking.

I told the Admiral, in reply, that I thought there would be no objection to this arrangement on the part of the Chinese Government; but that, for obvious reasons, I considered it to be important that the principle of joint English and French occupation should be adhered to, in respect of any portion of Chinese territory which we might see fit to hold as a pledge for the payment of the indemnities claimed by us. I suggested, therefore, that the Commanders-in-chief of the Allied Powers should come to an understanding, to the effect that the joint occupation of Shan-tung, as provided for in the Convention of Peking, should be carried out by the establishment of an English force at the Miatau Islands, and a French force at Che-foo.

I inclose, herewith, a copy of the correspondence which I have had on the subject with Vice-Admiral Hope and Baron Gros.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 123.

The Earl of Elgin to Vice-Admiral Hope.

Sir, *Tien-tsin, November* 13, 1860.

WITH reference to our conversation of yesterday, in which your Excellency informed me you would rather station such vessels of war and stores as you may deem it proper to retain in the North at the Miatau Islands than at any point on the Shan-tung Promontory, I would beg to observe that I do not apprehend that, in so far as the Chinese Government is concerned, there will be any difficulty in adopting this course. It will no doubt be more agreeable to them that we should occupy the islands in question than that we should place troops on the mainland.

It must, however, be distinctly understood, that whatever portion of Chinese territory we now occupy is held by us conjointly with our French allies, in terms of the Convention of Peking of this year, that is to say, that such occupation will cease when the indemnities due by the Chinese Government are paid off, or sooner if the English and French Governments shall so determine.

If, on the score of convenience, the Allied Commanders-in-chief agree that the English flag alone should fly at the Miatau Islands, and the French flag alone at Che-foo, I see no objection to this arrangement, provided always, that it be adopted subject to the understanding which I have stated above.

Your Excellency will probably see fit to confer with Admiral Charner, Sir

H. Grant, and General de Montauban on this subject; and I will communicate to Baron Gros what has passed between us in reference thereto.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 123.

Vice-Admiral Hope to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *"Coromandel," Tien-tsin, November* 14, 1860.

WITH reference to your letter of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency a copy of a Minute relative to the occupation of the Shan-tung Promontory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HOPE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 123.

Minute.

AGREED that the Shan-tung Promontory shall be held in terms of the Convention of Peking of this year, as follows, viz.:—

1. That the port of Che-foo shall be held by a French force, naval or military, as convenient.
2. That the Miatau Islands shall be held by an English force, naval or military, as convenient.
3. That such occupation shall cease when the indemnities due by the Chinese Government are paid, or sooner if the French and English Governments shall determine.

Given at Tien-tsin, the 14th November, 1860.

(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT,
Lieutenant-General commanding British Forces.
(Signed) J. HOPE,
Vice-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief.

IL a été arrêté, d'accord avec la Convention de Péking de cette année, que l'occupation de la presqu'île du Shan-tung aura lieu dans les conditions suivantes:—

1. Le port de Ché-fou sera occupé par une force Française de terre ou de mer.
2. Les Iles Miatau seront occupées de même par une force Anglaise de terre ou de mer.
3. Cette occupation cessera aussitôt le paiement fait par le Gouvernement Chinois des indemnités dues, ou plus tôt selon les ordres du Gouvernement Anglais ou Français.

Fait à Tien-tsin, le 14 Novembre, 1860.

Le Général Commandant-en-chef l'expédition Française,
(Signé) CH. DE MONTAUBAN.
Le Vice-Amiral Commandant-en-chef les forces navales Françaises.
(Signé) S. CHARNER.

Inclosure 4 in No. 123.

The Earl of Elgin to Baron Gros.

M. le Baron, *Tien-tsin, November* 15, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a correspondence which has passed between Vice-Admiral Hope and me, with reference to the occupation of the Shan-tung Promontory, as provided for in the Conventions signed by your Excellency and myself at Peking.

I trust that your Excellency will approve of the arrangement for carrying out this object, which has been agreed to by the Commanders-in-chief, and which is embodied in the Minute of which Admiral Hope has transmitted to me the copy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 123.

Baron Gros to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, le* 16 *Novembre*, 1860.

J'AI reçu hier la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire, au sujet de la Convention signée par les Amiraux et les Commandants-en-chef alliés, pour régler le mode d'occupation de la presqu'île du Shan-tung, occupation prévue par la Convention de Péking.

Ainsi que votre Excellence le suppose, je ne puis qu'adhérer complètement aux dispositions prises par les chefs alliés, dispositions qui se trouvent détaillées dans la Convention dont votre Excellence a bien voulu m'envoyer une copie, et que je connaissais déjà par M. le Général de Montauban.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) BON. GROS.

(Translation.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, November* 16, 1860.

I RECEIVED yesterday the letter which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me on the subject of the Convention signed by the Allied Admirals and Commanders-in-chief, to regulate the manner of occupying the Peninsula of Shan-tung, the occupation of which is provided for by the Convention of Peking.

As your Excellency supposes, I have only to give my entire assent to the arrangements made by the Allied Commanders, as detailed in the Convention, of which your Excellency has been so good as to send me a copy, and with which I had already been made acquainted by General de Montauban.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BON. GROS.

No. 124.

The Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received Januray* 12, 1861.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, November* 16, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the translation of a fragment of a draft Decree in vermilion, dated 7th of September, 10 P.M., and found in one of the Emperor's private apartments at the Palace of Yuen-ming-yuen.

It is a comment on some report by Kweiliang, respecting the negotiations which he was carrying on with us at Tien-tsin at that moment.

This paper was therefore written after the fall of the Takoo forts. It is not, however, very easy to gather from its terms the precise extent of the concessions which the Emperor was then prepared to make to our demands.

Some expressions seem to imply that he was willing to have accepted, at least in form, the Treaty of 1858. On the other hand, there are indications of a belief that a further conflict with us is inevitable, and that we may yet be worsted in the open field when away from our ships. It is remarkable that our demand for a payment of 2,000,000 of taels (about 600,000*l.*) at Tien-tsin, within two months' time, is treated as an insuperable difficulty in the way of the re-establishment of peace.

There must be, no doubt, a great deal of wealth in China, but weakness and maladministration have made its Government one of the poorest in the world.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Inclosure in No. 124.

Fragment of a Draft of Decree in Vermilion, dated 10 *o'clock* P.M., *7th September, found in the Palace of Yuen-ming-yuen, on the* 8*th of October,* 1860.

(Translation.)

[THE Decree appears to be in reply to a Minute upon Kweiliang's report of his proceedings. The first fold, if no more, of the Chinese sheet has been torn off.

On coming to the opening of Tien-tsin to trade, the Emperor proceeds]—

(As to the observation that it) is already in the hands of the barbarians, and that it therefore makes no difference whether trade (there) be promised them or not; also, that as the barbarians have seized the forts and the confluence of the river with the canal (the San-fun-ho), there will be nothing for it, if they by-and-bye bring up a large force, but to fight them in the open country; that to oppose bodies of flesh to ships and cannon is an utter impossibility.

Our first intention was, and is, the correct one. Kweiliang and his colleagues were not, when they went to Tien-tsin in this instance, to have promised (the barbarians) Tien-tsin; if they would have war, they were to be led far into (the country), and then, after a hard fight (*lit.*, a fight to the death), they would have been plainly told that the new conditions were not to be taken into account, and that the old Treaty (*sc.*, of 1858) might take effect. If this could not be, then trade at Tien-tsin was to be exchanged against residence in the capital (1). This was (or we thought would be) a feasible arrangement. As these Ministers have conceded trade (at the port), the only course will be to assent to the proposition as it stands (2), and so to keep (the barbarians) in hand (tether them) for the time being; and when (negotiation) breaks down altogether (3), to recall Kweiliang and his colleagues, or degrade them, and, according to the point things may have reached, to make such further arrangements as the occasion may require.

As to their exaction of (war) expenses, they have been at many shifts to force us into a dilemma (4) regarding these, and they would leave us no alternative but to acquiesce in their demands; but setting aside the fact that it is impossible to pay them the two millions by the time (named), were this sum forthcoming, such a thing is utterly out of the question (5). From of old it has been held a disgrace to make a Treaty under your city wall (6), and if one is again (7) to tender gifts while one's face is ashamed, will China be still thought to have a man (8)?

As to their being accompanied by a force when the Treaties are exchanged, on the ground that with the misgiving felt on either side precautions will be necessary, with conciliation of (the barbarians) once negotiated, what necessity will there be for him to bring up a crowd of soldiers? If he did bring up a crowd of soldiers, it would be clear that he had some purpose undisclosed (inscrutable). If the proposition were assented to, he would be sure, when he entered the capital, to have other conditions to which it would be scarcely possible to agree, and it would then be as impossible to fight as it would be improper to promise him what he asked, were one so disposed. Besides, bodies of barbarian troops would be introduced (9) in a continuous succession, so that, even with a force, they could not well be stopped, nor would it be in our power, be notifications ever so stringent, to prevent the vagabonds who will hang on to them from occasioning alarm and disquiet. (In short) a dangerous malady would be pressing on the body, and once (the skin) were broken, the heart within would burst (10). (Were we to assent) would there be any word more of that important of all places, the capital?

[The following paragraph is distinguished by having each column lower than those in the text preceding or following.]

If Kweiliang and his colleagues have so madly lost themselves as to presume on their own authority to concede these last two points, they have not only disobeyed our written commands (11), and shown fear of the barbarians, but they have simply taken up the Empire and put it into his hands; and we will at once vindicate the law by the execution of these Ministers, and then fight it out with the barbarians.

As to the admission of the Chief Pa (Mr. Parkes) into the capital: peace

once negotiated between the two countries, orders will, of course, have to be given to the proper department to make satisfactory arrangements for the supply of all requisites. What need, then, will there be for (Pa's) personal inspection? Besides, this rebellious Chief, idly yelping, frantically barking, is certain to bring forward other restrictive conditions, and, once he is come, will not go away. (His admission, therefore) would be as bad as that troops should accompany (the barbarians when they come) to exchange their Treaties. It cannot in any way be accorded: certainly not.

As to the refusal (of the barbarians) to withdraw their troops immediately from the city of Tien-tsin and from Takoo, their conciliation once negotiated, hostilities ought to cease. Is it reasonable to exact compensation by holding a knife to the throat? Besides, this stipulation is only mixed up with that for the indemnities, for the purpose of obtaining ground (on which to base demands) for further compensation. The way to cancel it will be to make a demand for war expenses on the barbarians, when (negotiation) shall have broken down.

(Lastly.) As to war to the knife, it is essential that this should begin soon—that it should not be postponed. We should avail ourselves of the autumn and winter, using therein our advantage, and pressing them on their weak side; if we wait until the spring and summer of next year, these barbarians will, of course, raise large additional levies of black barbarians, and will bring the force of all the world (*lit.*, the four nations) to try conclusions with us; and they will league with the long-haired rebels, and thus, between war with those from afar and those close at hand, we shall have trouble enough to hold our own.

The remarks (*lit.*, articles) above, which exhaust our opinions (on the subjects to which they refer), we have written with our own hand, to give the Prince of Hwin, Tsai Yuen, Twan Hwa, Shu Shun, and other Members of the Great Council (12), to understand that whatever settlement they may make must be in accordance herewith. If they have any feasible plans distinct from these, let them state them explicitly to us in person; let there be no reservations whatever.

A special decree.

7th moon, 22nd day (September 7), the "hai" period (9 to 11 P.M.).

Notes.

(1.) Tien-tsin was to be opened, and the right of the British Minister to reside at Peking relinquished.

(2.) *Lit.*, to assent to the proposed Article or Articles under consideration. The Emperor apparently expected each Article to come before him for assent or rejection in its turn.

(3.) *Lit.*, At the time of the demolition or grand smash. The expression is a very strong one, compounded of two words, of which the first signifies the spread and waste of water spilt; the second, the smash of a cup or like utensil. It occurs very frequently in the papers seized on this occasion.

(4.) "Many shifts." The Emperor may be supposed to allude to the ultimatum, the correspondence at Peh-tang, the assault of Takoo, the advance on Tien-tsin, &c.

(5.) *Lit.*, this could never be right, or reasonable.

(6.) *Lit.*, a league below your wall. The words are from the spring and autumn classic, Confucius' Annals. The Sovereign of a small State invaded by a powerful neighbour, who appeared before his capital, although ready to acknowledge his inferiority, still refused to treat till the hostile force retired thirty *li*, which it did.

(7.) "Again," viz., as in 1842 and 1858.

(8.) This is also a historical common-place, frequently applied by poets to questions arising out of the foreign relations of China.

(9.) "Move," *lit.*, furtively arriving.

(10.) *Lit.*, would spread as a flood, or burst its gates. The theory is, that if the flesh wound is large, the earth-influence, fatal to life, rushes in.

(11.) *Lit.*, our will; the commands issued in answer to representations to the throne.

(12.) The Prince Hwin is Mien-yu, the Emperor's uncle; Twan Hwa is Prince of Aing: Tsai Yuen, Prince of I, one of the Imperial blood; Suh Shun

brother of Twan-hwa. The last three, according to common report, the real Government of the country for some time past.

(Signed) T. F. WADE.

No. 125.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received January* 12, 1861.)

My Lord, *Tien-tsin, November* 16, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in consequence of the despatch addressed to me by the Earl of Elgin, I left Shanghae in Her Majesty's ship "Furious," and reached the mouth of the Peiho on Sunday, the 4th of November.

Finding that the unfavourable reports of the state of affairs which had arrived at Shanghae before my departure were without foundation, I proceeded next day to Tien-tsin, where I was informed by Admiral Hope that the army was to leave Peking on the 7th or 8th; and by starting immediately on horseback, I was able to reach Peking on the morning of the 7th.

Lord Elgin will have informed your Lordship of the grounds on which it was decided that the Ministers should not take up their residence immediately at the capital. I was, however, presented to the Imperial Prince Kung as Her Britannic Majesty's Minister in China. He returned the visit next morning before our departure, and I took that opportunity to press strongly on his consideration the situation of the Province of Kiang-su; the fact that the presence of the allied troops alone preserved Shanghae from falling into the hands of the rebels; and the impossibility of our occupation being prolonged indefinitely. I urged upon him the necessity of immediate steps being taken to restore the authority of the Imperial Government in the province, and represented to him that he was misled in supposing that our interest would lead us to hold Shanghae for the Imperialists if the province and the principal marts in it remained in the hands of the rebels. I pointed out to him the anomalous position in which I was placed in upholding the authority of a Government which pursued a hostile and defiant course of policy towards us, against the insurgents, whose professions and declarations at all events were couched in a friendly spirit. I hinted that the best means of counteracting these impressions, which could not fail to act unfavourably on opinion in England, would be to send an Ambassador as a pledge of the intention of the Chinese to conduct their foreign relations in a different spirit.

The Prince listened with great attention and interest. He expressed himself as greatly obliged for information, much of which was new to him, in terms which certainly seemed to recognize the benefit his Government would thus derive from direct personal intercourse with foreign Ministers.

After the interview, we left for Tung-chow, and arrived at Tien-tsin on Monday the 12th instant, where I propose staying for the present.

Before quitting Peking, it was arranged that a house in the immediate vicinity of the Russian establishment should be taken for Her Britannic Majesty's Legation, and Mr. Adkins, one of the student interpreters, who has considerable acquaintance with the language, and is steady and discreet, was left in possession of it, with the full assent of the Prince Kung. He is to put the house in order, so as to enable me at an early date to take up my residence there.

I informed Prince Kung of my resolution not to accept any provincial authority as Imperial Commissioner, to correspond with him or the Foreign Minister at the capital, and of my readiness to proceed there, at any amount of inconvenience, should business of importance require my presence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 126

Colonel Foley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received January 12, 1861.)

My Lord, *French Head-Quarters, Tien-tsin, November* 17, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that their Excellencies the Earl of Elgin and Baron Gros, finding it necessary to delay their departure from Peking for some days, Sir Hope Grant requested General de Montauban to remain with his force until the Ambassadors should be ready to proceed to Tien-tsin. General de Montauban declined stopping after the 1st of November, on the score of the uncertainty of the weather, but signified his intention of leaving a battalion of 500 men of the 101st Regiment, with two guns, as an escort for Baron Gros.

On Sunday, the 28th ultimo, the bodies of the unfortunate French prisoners were interred in the Portuguese burying-ground, outside the north-west gate of the city. Almost all the English officers off duty attended. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Peking, and the Bishop's coadjutor, were present.

On the 29th ultimo, at 9 A.M. the ceremony of re-opening the French Roman Catholic church in the Tartar city was performed. Baron Gros, the two Bishops, General de Montauban, with their Staffs, and most of the French officers, attended.

The Bishop of Peking, in his discourse, expressed in grateful terms his acknowledgments to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and the English army in China, for the assistance the latter had rendered to the cause of Christianity. The ceremony was much marred by the rain which fell, the roof of the church being in a very dilapidated condition.

On Thursday the 1st of November, General de Montauban started with his force, leaving a battalion of the 101st Regiment, with two guns, as an escort for Baron Gros, and after a prosperous but very cold march, reached Tien-tsin on the 6th instant.

His Excellency Mr. Bruce passed us during the night of the 5th instant, *en route* for Peking,

On the 12th instant his Excellency the Earl of Elgin and Sir Hope Grant arrived from Peking, and M. de Bourboulon from Shanghae. Mr. Bruce returned on the 13th.

On the 15th instant the Allied Naval and Military Commanders-in-chief, with the sanction of their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries, agreed that the Shan-tung Promontory shall be held in terms of the Convention of Peking, as follows, viz:

"1. That the ports of Che-foo shall be held by a French force, naval or military, as convenient.

"2. That the Miatau Islands shall be held by an English force, naval or military, as convenient.

"3. That such occupation shall cease when the indemnities due by the Chinese Government are paid, or sooner if the French and English Governments shall so determine."

It was also agreed that the French flag alone shall fly at Che-foo, and the English flag alone at the Miatau Islands.

It is General de Montauban's present intention to proceed about the 20th instant to Shanghae, leaving about 2,000 men and two batteries of Artillery here. The rest of his force is embarking as fast as possible for Shanghae, where he intends it shall winter, and await further orders from the Minister of War.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ST. GEORGE FOLEY.

No. 127.

Lord J. Russell to the Earl of Elgin.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1861.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches to that of the 17th of November inclusive, reporting your proceedings at Peking subsequently to the restoration of peace; and I am to acquaint you

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that Her Majesty entirely approves of your conduct as explained in those despatches.

Her Majesty's Government trust that the personal intercourse which you have had with the Prince Kung will have a salutary effect on the future relations between this country and China; and they greatly commend the measures which you took on introducing Mr. Bruce to the Prince, to impress the Prince with a due sense of the important functions which that gentleman will henceforth have to discharge in China.

The publication of the Treaty and Convention, in the formal manner described by your Excellency, was a well-devised measure to insure the real state of the case being generally known by the population of Peking, so that no question may hereafter arise as to the circumstances under which those engagements were concluded, or as to the nature of the obligations contracted by the Emperor of China.

Her Majesty's Government further consider that you rightly advised Mr. Bruce to defer fixing his residence at Peking until the spring; but there is no reason why a British Ambassador should not reside in the Chinese capital as free from molestation, and in the enjoyment of the same honour, privileges, and facilities, as an Ambassador of the Emperor of Russia; and while Her Majesty's Government do not anticipate that any inconvenience will result from the temporary delay in the establishment of the British Mission within the walls of Peking, neither do they apprehend that when the season arrives for Mr. Bruce's residence in the capital he will be subject to any hindrance on the part of the Chinese authorities.

I am glad to take this opportunity to instruct your Excellency to convey to Mr. Wade, to Mr. Parkes, and to all the gentlemen, whether belonging to your own immediate establishment or to those under the supervision of Mr. Bruce, whose talents and exertions have been called into action during the late events in China, Her Majesty's Government's entire approval of their conduct in the several capacities in which your Excellency has seen occasion to employ them, and their hearty acknowledgment of the zealous and able manner in which they appear uniformly to have executed your Excellency's instructions, regardless of any danger or inconvenience to which, in doing so, they might be exposed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 128.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1861.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 16th of November, reporting your proceedings at Peking and your return to Tien-tsin, leaving Mr. Adkins there to make arrangements for your future residence in the capital.

Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the course you have taken as described in your despatch, and specifically of the language which you held to Prince Kung in the interviews which you had with him previously to your departure from Peking.

I inclose a copy of a despatch which I address to the Earl of Elgin by this mail in answer to his last despatches, in case he should have left China previously to the arrival of the mail.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* No. 127.